06 May 1999
Supreme Court
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RANJEET SINGH Vs HARMOHINDER S. PRADHAN

Bench: M. JAGANNADHA RAO.
Case number: C.A. No.-002008-002008 / 1998
Diary number: 3969 / 1998
Advocates: Vs NARESH BAKSHI


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PETITIONER: RANJEET, SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HARMOHINDER S-INGH PRADHAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       06/05/1999

BENCH: M.  JAGANNADHA RAO.

JUDGMENT:

     Dr.  Anand.CJI :

     This  appeal calls in question the judgment and  order of  the High Court of Punjab & Haryana in Flection  Petition No.   7 of 1997 decided on 29th September, 1997, The  appeal arises in the following circurmstances.

     The  appellant  contested  the election to  54  Raikot Assembly  Constituency  in  the .general  elections  to  the Punjab  Legislative Assembly held on 7th February, 1997, The respondent;   a  candidate of the Indian National  Congress, was  declared elected.  After the declaration of the  result of  the  elections  on 10th February- 1997.   the  appellant filed  an election petition in the High Court alleging  that the respondent was disqualified from contesting the election to  the Punjab Legislative Assembly under Section 9-A of the Representation of People Act;  1951 (hereinafter referred to as

     "the  Act")  as  on  the date of  the  filing  of  the nomination  paper  aswell as on the date of the scrutiny  of the  nomination  paper,  the  respondent  had  a  subsisting contract,   for  the  sale  of   liquor,  with  the   Punjab Government, which he had obtained in partnership with others at  the auction held for the year 1996-97.  The petition was resisted  by  the respondent, who in the  written  statement denied  the allegations concerning his disqualification.   A preliminary  objection was raised that the election petition was  not  maintainable  as  the same did  not  disclose  any factual  basis to establish violation of Section 9-A of  the Act.   It  was asserted that the election petition  did  not contain any allegation to the effect that the respondent had entered  into a contract with the Government either for ’the supply of goods or for the execution of the works undertaken by  the Government’ and as such the respondent could not  be said to have incurred any disqualification under Section 9-A of  the  Act.   The  respondent  Further  pleaded  that  the contract for sale of liquor was not such a contract to which the  provisions  of  Section  9-A.   of  the  Act  could  be attracted.   Replication was filed and from the pleadings of the parties, the fol lowing issues were raised :

     "1,  whether  the respondent had subsistinci  contract for  the  sale  of  the liquor from  the  Punjab  Government obtained in partnership for the year 1996-97 at the time of

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     the  filling of the nomination papers and on the  date of  the scrutiny of the nomination papers as alleged in Para No.  3 of the election petition, and if so, to what effect ? OPP

     2.  Whether the election petition "is not maintainable in  view  of the objections raised in Para Nos.  1 and 2  of the preliminary objections?  OPR.

     3.   Whether  the  election of the respondent  to  the Punjab) Assembly from 54 - Raikot Assembly Constituency - is valid for the reasons stated in the petition ?  OPP.

     4.  Relief."

     The  parties  led  evidence and  after  hearing  their arguments, the High Court dismissed the election petition.

     Since,  the challenge in the election petition to  the election  of  the respondent, as canvassed before  the  High Court  and before us, is based on Section 9-A of the Act, it would  be  desirable to first notice the provisions of  that Section.  Section, 9-A reads :

     "9-A.   Disqualification  for  Goverrnment  contracts, etc.

     A person shall be disqualified if, and for so long as, there subsists a contract entered into ’by him in the cnurse of his trade or business with the appropriate Government for the  supply  of goods to, or for the execution of any  works undertaken by.  that Government.

     Explanation :- For the purposes of this section, where a contract has been fully performed by the person by whom it has  been entered into with the appropriate Government,  the contract shall be

     deemed  not to subsist by reason only of the fact that the Governrnent ha.s not performed its parts of the contract either wholly or in part."

     On its plain reading, Sect-ion 9-A of the Act requires (i) that there must be a subsisting contract which has been entered into by the person whose candidature is sought to be disqualified with the Government;  (ii) that contract is for the  supply  of goods to the Government, or (iii)  that  the contract is for the execution of any works undertaken by the Government.

     The  High Court held that Section 9-A.  of the Act was not  attracted in the fact situation of the case.  In taking this  view,  the High Court relied upon a judgment given  by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in B.  LakshmikanthaRao vs.  P Chinna Mallaiah, AIR 1979 AP 132, which has been approved by this  Court  in Dewan Joynal Abed in vs.  Abdul Wazed  alias ,Abdul   Wazad  Miah  and   Others,  1988  (Suppl.)SCC  580. According  to  both  these   judgments,  merely  becoming  a licensee  with the State Government, cannot amount to either supplying  the  goods  to  the  Government  or  engaging  in execution of any work undertaken by the Government.  Learned counsel  for the appellant fairly conceded that it was not a case  of ’supply of goods to the Government’ but  maintained that  the subsisting contract between the respondent and the

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Government  amounted to ’execution of any work undertaken by the Government’.

     In  Dewar) Joynal (supra), this Court interpret.ed the word ’works’ as used in Section 9-A of the Act and opined :

     "........,  The  word ’worms’ In the express i  on  in ’execution of any works’ appearing in Section 9-A of the Act is  used  Jn the sense of ’projects’, ’.schemes’,  ’plants’, such  as bilding works, irrigation works, defence works etc. Respondent 1 in this case had not undertaken to carry on any such  work.  According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary  the ’expression  ’work’  means a structure or anparatus of  some kind:    an  architectural  or   engineering  structure,   a bulldi’ng  edifice.   When  it is used in plural,  i.e.,  as ’works’  it means ’architectural or engineering  operations: a fortified building;  a defensive structure, fortification; any  of  the  several parts of such  structure".   The  word ’works’  used in entry 35 of List II of the Seventh Schedule of  the  Constitution of India which reads as "works,  lands and buildings vested in or in the possession of the .Statft" is  used in the same sense.  The runn"ng of boats across  in land waterways is a topic which falls under entry 32 of List III  of  the Seventh Schedule which reads thus :   "Shipping and  navigation on inland waterways as regards  mechanically propelled  vessels,  and  the  ru^e  of  the  road  on  such waterways,  and  the  carriage of passengers  and  goods  on inland  waterways  subject to the provisions of List I  with respect to national waterways".  It is, therefore, difficult to  hold  that when a person acquires the right  to  collect toll at a public ferrv under Section 8 of the Ferries Act he is performing a contract of execution of works undertaken by the  government.  It may have been perhaps different if  the words ’in performance of any services’ which were present in Section 7Cd) of the Act.  as it stood prior to its amendment in 1958 had been there in Section 9-A of the Act."

     We  find  ourselves unable to agree with  the  learned counsel  for the appellant that keeping in view the  purpose for  which  Section 9-A of the Act was enacted,  namely,  to avoid any conflict between private interest and public duty, a broad interpretation should be placed on Section 9-A.

     Section  9-A i?  a statutory orovision which imposes a disqualification  on  a  citizen.  It would,  therefore,  be unreasonable  to take a general or broad view, ignoring  the essentials  of  the  Section  and   the  intention  of   the legislature.   Purposive  interpretation is  necessary.   In Dewan  JoynaVs  case ( supra).  Section 9-A of the  Act  has been correctly interpreted in the following words :

     "An  analysis of Section9-A of the Act shows that only in  two  cases  a  person would be disqualified  if  he  has entered  into a contract with the approoriate government  in the  course of his trade or business which is subsisting  on the  date of scrutiny of nomination.  They are (1) when  the contract  is  one  for supply off goods to  the  appropriate government  and (ii) where the contract is for the execution of any works undertaken by that doverment.  ........

     .......  The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that since the  contracts entered into by the successful candidate with the  State Government to sell arrack and toddy did not  come within  the mischief of Section 9-A of the Act as thev  were

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neither  for  supply of goods to the government nor for  the execution of any works undertaken he did not suffer from any disqulification  for  being  chosen  as   a  member  of  the Ledislative Assembly,

     We have gone through the above decision carefully.  We are  of the view that.  the High Court was right in the said case in holding that the returned candidate had not suffered from  any disqualification by reason of the fact that he was an excise contractor"

     We  agree with the aforesaid view.  No other point has been urged.

     For what we have said a.bove, we find that there is no merit  in  this appeal.  Tt is, accordingly) dismissed,  but without any order as to costs.