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PETITIONER: RANI INDER KUMARI ETC.  ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/02/1975

BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. BENCH: GOSWAMI, P.K. MATHEW, KUTTYIL KURIEN UNTWALIA, N.L.

CITATION:  1975 AIR 1058            1975 SCR  (3) 878  1976 SCC  (1) 377

ACT: Rajasthan   Cash   Jagirs   Abolition   Act,   1958--S.    3 Constitutional   validity  of--Delay  in   approaching   the Court--Effect of.

HEADNOTE: By s. 3 of the Rajasthan Cash Jagirs Abolition Act, 1958 all cash   jagirs  .sanctioned  to  the  former   princes   were abolished.   Sub-s.  (2)  of s. 3 provided  for  payment  of compensation.   The petitioners received  compensation  from 1958  to  1970.   In  1970,  however,  they  questioned  the validity  of  s.  3 on the ground that it  is  violative  of articles 31 and 19(1)(f) of the Constitution. Dismissing the petitions. HELD  :  The  petitioners have approached  the  court  after inordinate  delay  and  even then after  enjoying  the  full benefit under the Act.  The petitioners cannot be allowed to blow  hot  and  cold  in the  same  breath.   Right  to  the compensation, of whatever nature or content. flowed from the abolition of the cash jagirs under the Act and acceptance of compensation  gave a quietus to  the claim to have  the  Act adjudged as ultra vires.  The foundation of the compensation was the abolition of cash jagirs. [707G; F] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ranojirao Shinde & Anr. [1968]  3 S.C.R. 489, distinguished.

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION : Writ Petitions Nos. 610 to  614  of 1970. Petition% under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India. Mohan Behari Lal, for the petitioners. L. M. Singhvi and S. M. Jain, for the  respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI,  J.-By the above Writ Petitions the  constitutional validity  of the Rajasthan Cash Jagirs Abolition  Act,  1958 (Act  No.  29  of 1958) is challenged as  violative  of  the petitioners, fundamental rights under articles 14, 19(1) (f) and 31 of the Constitution. The  facts  of Writ Petition No. 610 of 1970  may  alone  be

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sufficient.  The petitioner states that in view of the  near relationship  as well as in lieu of her husband’s  share  in the   parental  Jagir  of  Riri  the  Maharaja  of   Bikaner sanctioned  a  separate cash grant to her  husband,  Maharaj Chander  Singh ji, of Rs. 1200/- per annum on May 23,  1942. This  amount  was continuously paid to her  husband  by  the State  of  Bikaner and was later raised to  Rs.  2400/-  per annum with effect from February 2, 1943.  This grant of  Rs. 2400/-  with an addition of Rs. 600/- as dearness  allowance was  shared between her and her husband under the  order  of the  Prime  Minister of Bikaner State  dated  September  18, 1942.  This payment of Rs. 1500/- per annum was continued to be received by the petitioner through Bikaner Treasury  upto the, formation of the State of Rajasthan, on April 7,  1949. After the death of her husband on May 6, 1951, the payment 706 of  her grant was continued.  The State of  Rajasthan  being the  successor to the former Bikaner State  recognised  this grant  and continued to make payment to the petitioner.   It appears  that after the death of her husband it was  decided in  December  1953  that no payment should be  made  to  her thereafter  and the regular payments received by. her  after the  death  of her husband would not be recovered.   On  the petitioner’s representation, however, the grant was restored and  was allowed to continue till its discontinuance by  the act  of the legislature.  Annexure ’C to the petition  shows the  order  of the Accountant General of  Rajasthan  to  the Treasury  Officer,  Bikaner, conveying the sanction  of  the Governor  for  the continuance of the grant of  Rs.  125/per month to the petitioner from the date the same had been dis- continued "till the cash jagirs are resumed".  ’Ms order  is dated June 5, 1958. The  Rajasthan Cash Jagirs Abolition Act, 1958 (briefly  the Act) received the assent of the President on July 13, 1958. Section  2  (a) of the Act defines cash jagir to  mean  "any grant  of  money  by  way of jagir  or  otherwise,  made  or recognised  to have been made by the Government in any  part of the State or by the Ruler of a convenanting State without any  consideration or in lieu of jagir resumed or  abolished otherwise   than  under  the  Rajasthan  Land  Reforms   and Resumption of Jagirs Act, 1952....... "               Section 3 which provides for abolition of cash               jagirs reads thus               3(2) "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary               contained in any law, sanad, order, custom  or               usage  in force in any part of the State,  all               payments of money on account of cash jagirs to               which  this Act applies, that were being  made               or  enforced at the commencement of this  Act,               shall be discontinued on and from the 1st  day               of April, 1958 and all such cash jagirs  shall               stand abolished as from that day.               (2)Notwithstanding such discontinuance  and               abolition the State Government shall  continue               to  make  payments by way of  compensation  in               accordance with scale laid down in the  Second               Schedule, and the provisions of the  Rajasthan               Pensions  Act,  1958,  shall  apply  to   such               payments". The  Second Schedule shows, inter alia, that if the  monthly rate of the grant exceeds Rs.  50/- but does not exceed  Rs. 250/- the grantee will be paid the compensation for a period of twelve years from the 1st day of April, 1958.  Section  6(2),  which is also under attack,  provides  that "nothing  in this Act or in the rules made thereunder  shall

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affect  such other grants of money as the  State  Government may,  from  time to time, by notification  in  the  Official Gazette,  declare to be exempt from the provisions  of  this Act, and the provisions of the Rajasthan Pensions Act, 1958, shall apply to such exempted grants of money". 707 It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that section  3 of ’he Act is violative of articles 31 and 19(1) (f) of  the Constitution and section 6(2) is violative of article 14  of the  Constitution.   According. to,  the  petitioners  their cases  are covered by a decision of this Court in  State  of Madhya  Pradesh  v. Ranojirao Shinde & Anr.,(1)  where  this Court  held  the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of  Cash.   Grants Act,  1963,  to  be violative of article 31 (2)  or  in  the alternative of article 19 (I) (f) of the Constitution. Before  we  proceed  further  we  have  to  state  that  the petitioners. have an insurmountable obstacle to got over  in these  petitions.   In  Nadhya  Pradesh  case  (supra)   the petitioners therein approached the High Court soon after the promulgation  of  the particular Act in 1963. and  the  High Court  accepted  their  contention that the  Act  was  ultra vires.  of article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution and was  not saved  by  sub-article  (5) thereof.  The  State  of  Madhya Pradesh  appeared  to this Court by a  certificate  obtained from  the High Court under article 133(1)(c) and this  Court in  the  above  mentioned  decision  dismissed  the  State’s appeals.  In the present case the petitioners took advantage of  the provisions of the Act, particularly sub-section  (2) of  section 3 by which payments by way of compensation  were allowed  notwithstanading the abolition of the  grant  under sub-section (1) of section 3. So far as the abolition of the cash  jagirs was concerned it was. complete on and from  the 1st day of April, 1958 under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the  Act.   The  petitioners had been in  enjoyment  of  the compensation  in accordance with the scale laid down in  the Second  Schedule  from  the  inception  of  the  Act   which abolished the cash jagirs on and from 1st April, 1958,  till 31st March, 1970, and approached this Court under article 32 of  the  Constitution on October 12, 1970, when  under  sub- section (2) of section 3 the compensation was discontinued. The  petitioners cannot be allowed to blow hot and  cold  in the  same  breath.  Right to the compensation,  of  whatever nature  or  content, flowed from the abolition of  the  cash jagirs under the Act.  Acceptance of the compensation  under the  Act for the full length of the period of  twelve  years completely negatives the scope of attack upon the  abolition of  the grant.  The foundation of the compensation  .is  the abolition of the cash jagirs.  Section 3(2) under which  the compensation  is  available  is  integrally  connected  with section  3(1)  which has abolished the cash  jagirs  from  a specified  date  and  it  is only  on  such  abolition  that compensation   is   rendered   possible.    Acceptance    of compensation,  therefore,  gives a quietus to the  claim  to have  the  Act  adjudged as ultra  vires.   The  petitioners cannot  eat a cake and have it. At any rate the  petitioners have  approached the court after inordinate delay  and  even then  after  enjoying the full benefit under the  Act.   The petitions, therefore, can not be entertained. The petitioners also contend that section 6(2) of the Act is discriminatory and is violative of the equality clause under article  14  of  the Constitution.  Section 6  is  a  saving provision.  The case of the, (1) [1968] 3 S.C. R. 489. 708 petitioners  is  that  a good number of  persons  have  been

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exempted  from the operation of the abolition of the  grant. It  is  submitted  that while under section  6(1)  there  is guidance,  with  regard  to the exemption,  there,  is  none whatsoever under section 6(2).  Whatever the merit ,of  this submission, the petitioners are not going to be benefited by striking down section 6(2) of the Act.  Assuming it is ultra vires,  section 6(2) is clearly severable from the  rest  of the  provisions.   On the other hand,  depending  upon  this provision,   the   petitioners  may  be  able   to   receive appropriate,   consideration  from  the  Government  to   be included  in the list of exemptees.  Indeed,,  Dr.  Singhvi, the learned Advocate General, gave us to understand that  he would himself recommend the case of three of the petitioners as  deserving consideration under section 6(2).  We  do  not know  whether the other two petitioners may also be able  to convince  the Government about the merit of their  case  for equal consideration.  We assume that under these  provisions the  Government has certain principles on which it  acts  to give  relief to the needy.  It is, therefore, idle  for  the petitioners  to  have a decision from this Court  to  strike down  a provision which may ultimately be to their aid.   We are  not,  therefor,  inclined to pass  on  this  submission advanced  by the petitioners.  In the result  the  petitions fail  and are dismissed, but in the entire circumstances  of the case the parties will bear their own costs. P.B.R.                        Petition dismissed. 709