27 January 1977
Supreme Court
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RANGASWAMI, THE TEXTILE COMMISSIONER & ORS Vs SUGAR TEXTILE MILLS (P) LTD. & ANOTHER

Bench: CHANDRACHUD,Y.V.
Case number: Appeal Civil 1182 of 1972


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PETITIONER: RANGASWAMI, THE TEXTILE COMMISSIONER & ORS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SUGAR TEXTILE MILLS (P) LTD. & ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/01/1977

BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. BENCH: CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. GOSWAMI, P.K. SHINGAL, P.N.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1516            1977 SCR  (2) 825  1977 SCC  (2) 578

ACT:             Cotton    Textiles   (Control)   Order   1948,    clause         20(1)--Whether  the provisions make it obligatory  upon  the         Textile Commissioner to  specify- the  period  of  operation         of his direction’s  Meaning of the word "may".

HEADNOTE:             Clause  20 of the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order,  1948         empowers    the Textile Commissioner, having regard  to  the         capacity  of the producer to produce cloth and yarn of  dif-         ferent description or specification and to the needs of  the         general  public, to issue from time to time such  directions         in  writing to any manufacturer or  manufacturers  generally         regarding  the class or specifications of cloth or yarn  and         the  maximum  or the minimum quantities thereof  which  they         shall  or  shall not produce during such periods as  may  be         specified m the directions.             The respondents’ challenge to the vires of the   notifi-         cation   issued   by   the appellant  which  prohibited  the         printing  of  any border or heading on sarees  etc.  for  an         indefinite period was accepted by the Gujarat High Court.         Dismissing the appeals by special leave, the Court,             HELD:  (1  ) The impugned notification in so far  as  it         prohibits  the printing of any border and heading on  sarees         etc.,  for an indefinite period is ultra vires clause 20  of         the Cotton Textiles (Control) Order 1948 since the aforesaid         clause  casts an obligation or a duty upon the Textile  Com-         missioner to specify the period during which the prohibition         shall remain in force.  [827 B-C]             (2) It is well settled that the word "may" is capable of         meaning  "must" or "shall" in the light of the  context  and         that where a discretion is conferred upon a public authority         coupled  with  an obligation the word  "may"  which  denotes         discretion should be construed to mean a command.    Consid-         ering the purpose of the relevant empowerment and its impact         on  those who are likely to be affected by the  exercise  of         the  power,  it  is clear that the power  conferred  on  the         Textile  Commissioner in the Cotton Textile (Control)  Order         1948  to issue directions is coupled with a duty to  specify         the  particular  period for which the  directions  shall  be         operative.  [826 F-G]

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           State  of Uttar Pradesh v. Jogendra Singh [1964]  2  SCR         197 (a) 202, principles reiterated.

JUDGMENT:         CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos.  1545-         1546 of 1972.             Appeals  by  Special Leave from the Judgment  and  Order         dated the 4-8-1971 of the Gujarat High Court in S.C.A.  Nos.         972  and 1527 of 1970 respectively.         826             V.P.  Raman,  Addl. Sol. Gen., S.N. Prasad  .and  Girish         Chandra, for the Appellant in CA 1182/72 and CAS.1545-46/72.             V.M. Tarkunde, V. N. Ganpule, (Miss) M Tarkunde and P.C.         Kapoor for Respondents in C.A. 1182/72.             V.N. Ganpule, A.K. Srivastava and Vineet Kumar  for  RR.         No. 1 in C.As. 1545-46/72.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             CHANDRACHUD, J.  Under the power conferred by Section  3         of the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946,  the         Central  Government issued an Order called "The Cotton  Tex-         tiles  (Control) Order, 1948".  Clause 20 of that Order,  as         amended, reads thus :--                             "20(1) The Textile Commissioner may from                       time   to time issue directions in writing  to                       any   manufacturer  or class of  manufacturers                       or  the manufacturers generally regarding  the                       classes  or specifications of cloth  or  yarn,                       and  the  maximum or  the  minimum  quantities                       thereof,   which they shall or shall not  pro-                       duce  during such periods as may be  specified                       in the directions, and they shall comply  with                       such directions.                             20(2)  In  the exercise  of  the  powers                       conferred  upon  him  by  sub-clause  (1)  the                       Textile Commissioner  shah  have regard to the                       capacity of the producer to produce cloth  and                       yarn  of different descriptions or  specifica-                       tions  and  to  the needs of the general  pub-                       lic."         The  question  for  our determination in  these  appeals  is         whether, if the Textile Commissioner decides to issue appro-         priate  directions to any manufacturer or class of  manufac-         turers,  it is obligatory  upon him to specify  therein  the         period for which the directions will remain in operation.             As   hold   by  this  Court in State  of  Uttar  Pradesh         v. Jogendra Singh,(1) it is well settled that the word "may"         is capable of meaning "must" or "shall" in the light of  the         context  and  that where a discretion is  conferred  upon  a         public authority coupled with an obligation, the word  "may"         which  denotes  discretion  should be construed  to  mean  a         command.  Considering the purpose of the relevant   empower-         ment  and its impact on those who are likely to be  affected         by  the exercise of the power, we are clear that  the  power         conferred on the Textile Commissioner to issue directions is         coupled  with  the duty to specify the particular period for         which the directions shall be operative.  Directions of  the         kind envisaged by clause 20 are influenced and justified  by         exigencies which render it imperative that the directions be         reviewed  from time to time.  That becomes feasible only  if         the directions as limited expressly to a determinate  period         of"         (1) [1964] 2 S.C.R. 197 at 202.         827

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                          (Chandrachud, J.)         time at the end of which a fresh review of facts and circum-         stances  becomes obligatory.  There is a fear that a  direc-         tion  not limited in point of time may continue  to  operate         even after it has outlived its utility for the reason merely         that  the need to review it is not clearly  perceived.   Be-         sides,  the manufacturers must know,  in  order   that  they         may organize their business in their own interest as well as         in  the interest of the community at large, as to  how  long         any particular embargo is going to be operative.             Accordingly,  we affirm the judgment of the  High  Court         though on the ground only that the impugned Notification  in         so far as it prohibits the printing of any border or heading         on  sarees  etc.  for  an indefinite period is  ultra  vires         clause 20  of  the  Cotton  Textiles (Control) Order,  1948,         since  the  aforesaid clause casts an obligation or  a  duty         upon  the  Textile  Commissioner to   specify   the   period         during  which  the prohibition shall remain  in  force.   We         express no opinion on the other points, including Point  No.         6 urged before the High Court for its consideration.             The  appeals are accordingly dismissed.  The  appellants         will  pay one set of costs of these appeals to the  respond-         ents.         S.R.                                          Appeals   dis-         missed.         5--206SCI/77         828