http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 9  

PETITIONER: RANCHHODDAS ATMARAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE UNION OF INDIA.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/02/1961

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) DAS, S.K. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA MUDHOLKAR, J.R.

CITATION:  1961 AIR  935            1961 SCR  (3) 718  CITATOR INFO :  F          1962 SC1559  (4)  RF         1966 SC 197  (43)

ACT: Sea  Customs--Import of prohibited goods--Maximum  Penalty-- Whether  can be levied in excess of Rs 1,000/-  Sea  Customs Act,  1878 (VIII of 1878), ss. 167, item No. 8.

HEADNOTE: Item  8  of the schedule to s. 167, Sea Customs  Act,  1878, provides  that  any person concerned in the  importation  or exportation of prohibited goods shall be liable to a penalty "not  exceeding three times the value of the goods,  or  not exceeding one thousand rupees." The petitioner was found  to have  imported  gold of the value of Rs’  25,000/-  and  the Customs  authorities imposed a penalty of Rs. 5,000/-.   The petitioner challenged the validity of the order imposing the penalty  on the ground that the. maximum penalty that  could be imposed under item 8 of s. 167 was Rs. 1,000/-. Held, that the orders imposing the penalty was valid.  It is open  to  the  Customs  authorities to  impose  any  of  the alternative  penalties  provided  though the  amount  of  it exceeds the amount of the maximum in the other  alternative. None  of  the previous decisions of the Supreme  Court  were authority for the proposition that the maximum penalty which can be imposed under item 8 of s. 167 is Rs. 1,000/- as this question  did  not  arise  in those  cases.   On  the  plain language of the provision which was in the affirmative  form it gave ail option to the Customs authorities to impose  any one of the two penalties provided.  The relevant words could not  be read as "shall not be liable to a penalty  exceeding three  times  the  value  of the  goods,  or  exceeding  one thousand rupees.  " Maqbool  Hussain  v.  State of  Bombay  [1953]  S.C.R.  730, Babulal  Amthalal Mehta v. The Collector of  Customs  [1957] S.C.R.  1110  and  F.N ’ Roy v. The  Collector  of  Customs. Calcutta [1957] S.C.R. 1151, explained and distinguished. The  Metropolitan  Board  of Works v. Steed  (1881)  L.R.  8 Q.B.D. 445, referred to.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 9  

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION 1. Petition No. 300 of 1960. Petition  under  Art. 32 of the Constitution  of  India  for enforcement of Fundamental Rights and Criminal Appeal No. 107 of 1958, 716 Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated April 5, 1957, of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Revision Application No. 1100 of 1956. Porus  A.  Mehta,  S.  J. Sorabjee,  S.  N.  Andley,  J.  B. Dadachanji,  Rameshwar  Nath  and  P.  L.  Vohra,  for   the petitioners. C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, H. B.  Khanna, Y.  S. Parmar and G. Gupta, for respondents (In  Petn.   No. 300 of 1960). N.   C. Chatterjee and B. L. Aggarwal, for the appellant. H.   R. Khanna and R. H. Dhebar, for respondents (In Cr.  A. No. 107 of 1958.) 1961.   February 3. The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by SARKAR,  J.-These  two matters have been heard  together  as they  raise  a common question.  One of these matters  is  a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution and the other, an appeal from a judgment of the High Court at Bombay. The  petitioner and the appellant were found by the  Customs authorities in proceedings under the Sea Customs Act,  1878, to have imported goods in breach of s. 19 of that Act.   The petitioner had without authority imported gold of the  value of  Rs. 25,000/and the appellant, steel pipes ’of the  value of  Rs. 1,28,182/-.  The Customs authorities by  independent orders,  imposed a penalty of Rs. 5,000/- on the  petitioner and  of  Rs. 25,630/- on the appellant for  these  offences, under  item  8 of the schedule to s. 167 of  the  Act.   The Customs  authorities  further confiscated  the  petitioner’s gold  under  the  same provision.  There  was  no  order  of confiscation  of the steel pipes for reasons to which it  is unnecessary to refer. The  appeal is against an order the result of which  was  to direct realisation of the penalty imposed on the  appellant, by execution of a distress warrant.  The petition challenges the  validity of the order imposing the  pecuniary  penalty. Neither the petitioner nor the appellant, however, questions the decisions of the Customs authorities that they had  been guilty of 720 breach  of a. 19 or that penalties could be imposed on  them under  item 8 in a. 167.  The petitioner does not,  further, challenge the order confiscating the gold. The  only contention of the petitioner and the appellant  is that  the orders of the Customs authorities are  invalid  as they  impose  penalties  in excess  of  Rs.  1,000/-.   They contend  that the maximum penalty that can be imposed  under item  8 in s. 167 is Rs. 1,000/-.  This contention is  based on two grounds.  First it is said that, it has been so  held by  this  Court.  Then it is said that, in any  case,  on  a proper  construction, item 8 in s. 167 does not  premit  the imposition of a penalty in excess of Rs. 1,000/- First,  as to the decisions of this Court, we were  referred to  three.  The earliest is Maqbool Hussain v. The State  of Bombay  (1).   That  was a case in which  the  question  was whether a person on whom a penalty of confiscation of  goods

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 9  

had  been  imposed under item 8 in s. 167,  could  later  be prosecuted  on the same facts for an offence under s. 23  of the  Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947, in view  of  the provisions  of Art. 20(2) of the Constitution against,  what has  been  called, double jeopardy.  It was held  that  Art. 20(2)  was  no  bar to the  prosecution  under  the  Foreign Exchange  Regulation  Act for, the authority under  the  Sea Customs Act imposing the penalty under item 8 in s., 167 was not a judicial tribunal and the proceeding resulting in  the imposition  of the penalty of confiscation  was,  therefore, not a prosecution.  No question arose in that case as to the maximum  penalty  that could be imposed under item 8  in  s, 167.    While   discussing  whether  a   Customs   authority exercising  the  power  to order  confiscation  and  levy  a penalty under s. 167 formed a judicial tribunal, this  Court observed at p. 742:               " Even     though  the  customs  officers  are               invested   with   the   power   of   adjudging               confiscation,  increased  rates  of  duty   or               penalty  the  highest  penalty  which  can  be               inflicted is Rs. 1,000/-." It  is  quite obvious that this observation was  made  in  a different context and was not intended to decide (1)  [1953] S.C.R. 730, 721 that the provision did not permit the imposition of a higher penalty,  as  to which no question had then arisen.   It  is clear that if the highest penalty which the Customs officers had  the  power to impose was in excess of Rs.  1,000/-  but subject  to another limit, it would not have  followed  that they  were judicial tribunals.  The judgment of  this  Court was  not based on ,the amount of the maximum  penalty  which the  Customs authorities could impose.  It seems  rather  to have been assumed that the maximum penalty was Rs.  1,000/-, for  the question about maximum penalty was neither  argued, nor discussed in the judgment at all. The  second case is Babulal Amthalal Mehta v. The  Collector of  Customs  (1).  The only question that  arose  there  was whether s. 178A of the Sea Customs Act, which placed on  the person  from  whose possession any goods  mentioned  in  the section  and reasonably believed to have been smuggled  were seized,  the  burden of proving that they were not  so,  was void   as  offending  Art.  14  of  the  Constitution.    In discussing  the  scheme  of  the Act,  it  was  observed  in connection  with item 8 in s. 167 that "This Court has  held that the minimum is the alternative: see Maqbool Hussain  v. The State of Bombay "(2) . Here again, it is clear that  the Court  was  not deciding the question that  has  now  arisen before  us.   It  only  made  a  passing  reference  to  the observation  in  Maqbool  Hussein’s  case(2).   It  was  not necessary  for  the decision of Babulal’s case (1)  to  have pronounced on the correctness of the observation in  Maqbool Hussain’s  case  (2) and no such pronouncement  was  clearly intended.   Nor  was it necessary in Babulal’s case  (1)  to express  any  view as to the maximum penalty that  could  be imposed under item 8 in s. 167. The  last case referred to is F. N. Roy v. The Collector  of Customs,Calcutta  (1).  That was a case where an  order  had been made under item 8 in s. 167 confiscating certain  goods imported  without  authority and imposing a penalty  of  Rs. 1,000/-  in  respect of that import.  The importer  filed  a petition in this Court under Art. 32 (1) [1937] S.C.R. 1110, 1116. (2) [1953] S.C.R. 730. (3) [1957] S.C.R. 1151.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 9  

722 of   the  Constitution  challenging  the  validity  of   the penalties  levied.   The main part of the  argument  of  the learned counsel for the petitioner was based on the  Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947, and raised questions  which do not concern us in the present cases.. It appears  however that  it was also contended that item 8 in s.  167  offended Art.  14 of the Constitution, a point which again  does  not arise in the cases in hand.  That contention was dealt  with in the following words at p. 1158:               "Another  similar  argument was that  s.  167,               item 8 of the Sea Customs Act itself  offended               Art.  14 in that it left to  the  uncontrolled               discretion  of  the  Customs  authorities   to               decide  the  amount  of  the  penalty’  to  be               imposed.  The section’ makes it clear that the               maximum penalty that might be imposed under it               is  Rs.  1,000/-.   The  discretion  that  the               section  gives  must be exercised  within  the               limit  so fixed.  This is not an  uncontrolled               or unreasonable discretion.  Furthermore,  the               discretion is vested in high Customs  officers               and there are appeals from their orders.   The               imposition  of  the fine is  really  a  quasi-               judicial act and the test of the quantum of it               is in the gravity of the offence.  The  object               of   the  Act  is  to   prevent   unauthorised               importation of goods and the discretion has to               be exercised with that object in view.  " It  will be observed that the fine imposed was Rs.  1,000/-. It  was  not therefore a case in which  any  question  could arise  as  to whether a penalty in excess  of  Rs.  1,000/-, could  be imposed and in fact no such question  arose.   The question  that arose was, whether the section offended  Art. 14,  so that, no penalty could be imposed under it  at  all. It  was in this connection that it was observed that item  8 in s. 167 did not leave it to the uncontrolled discretion of the Customs authorities to decide the amount of the  penalty because  it had imposed a limit on that amount.  It is  true that  the limit was there mentioned as Rs. 1,000/-.  But  it is  clear  that  the reasoning would have  held  equally  if it  .had been said that the limit imposed was  either  three times the value of the goods or: Rs. 1,000/-. The point 723 that  was sought to be made in the judgment was  that  there was  a limit and that that was a reason for saying that  the discretion given was not uncontrolled and, therefore,  there was  no violation of Art. 14.  For this purpose, it made  no difference what the limit was. Some  of  the High Courts have thought that this  Court  had decided in these cases that the maximum penalty  permissible under  the provision is Rs. 1,000/-.  The fact is  that  the question  was never required to be decided in any of  these- cases and could not, therefore, have been, or be treated as, decided   by   this  Court.   In  Leo  Boy   Frey   v.   The Superintendent,  ’District  JailAmritsar  (1),  this   Court observed  that  " No question I has been raised  as  to  the maximum  amount  of  penalty that can be  imposed  under  s. 167(8)  and we are notcalled upon to express any opinion  on that  point.   " This would show that this Court  had  taken notice  of the fact that the High Courts  were  interpreting the judgment in F. N. Roy’s case(") and the other case,%  in a manner which was not intended and desired to strike a note of  warning against the misconception.  None of these  cases is  authority for the proposition that the  maximum  penalty

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 9  

which can be imposed under item 8in s. 167, is RE;. 1,000/-. The  argument  that  this Court has already  held  that  the maximum penalty that can be awarded under it is Rs.  1,000/- must therefore fail. We  now  come  to the construction  of  the  provision,  the relevant portion of which is in these terms: S.   167.  The offences mentioned in the first column of the following  schedule  shall  be  punishable  to  the   extent mentioned in the third column of the same with reference  to such offences respectively: ----------------------------------------------------------                             Sections of Offences                    this Act to       Penalties                            which offence                            has reference ----------------------------------------------------------  ....................................... . . . . . . . . . 8.If  any goods, the importation or exportation of which  is for  the  time being prohibited or restricted  by  or  under Chapter  IV of this Act. be imported into or  exported  from India contrary to such prohibition or restriction.  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .               18 &  19 such  goods shall be liable to confiscation; and any  person concerned  in any such offence shall be liable to a  penalty not  exceeding  three times the value of the goods,  or  not exceeding one thousand rupees.  .......................................................... ---------------------------------------------------------- (1) [1958] S.C.R. 822, 827.   (2) [1957]S.C.R. 1151. 724 The  words which are material to this case are, "Any  person concerned  in any such offence shall be liable to a  penalty not  exceeding  three times the value of the  goods  or  not exceeding  one thousand rupees.  " The question is  whether, in imposing a penalty, the conditions laid down in both  the alternative  clauses  joined by the word " or " have  to  be fulfilled or the condition in any one of them only ? It is clear that if the words form an affirmative  sentence, then  the  condition  of one of the  clauses  only  need  be fulfilled.  In such a case ,for " really means It either " " or  ". In the Shorter Oxford Dictionary one of the  meanings of  the word " or " is given as " A participle  coordinating two (or more)-words, phrases or clauses between which  there is  an  alternative.   "  It is also  there  stated,  "  The alternative  expressed by " or " is emphasised by  prefixing to the first member or adding after the last, the associated adv.   EITHER."  So, even without " either ", " or  "  alone creates an alternative.  If, therefore, the sentence  before us is an affirmative one, then we get two alternatives,  any one  of  which may be chosen without the  other  being  con- sidered  at  all.   In such a case it must be  held  that  a penalty exceeding Rs. 1,000/- can be imposed. If,  however,  the  sentence is a  negative  one,  then  the position becomes different.  The word " or " between the two clauses  would then spread the negative influence  over  the clause  following  it.   This  rule of  grammar  is  not  in dispute.  In such a case the conditions of both the  clauses must  be fulfilled and the result would be that the  penalty that can be imposed can never exceed Rs. 1,000/-. The  question  then really comes to this:  Is  the  sentence before us a negative or an affirmative one ?  It seems to us that the sentence is an affirmative sentence.  The substance of the sentence is that a certain, person shall be liable to a  penalty.   That is a positive concept.  The  sentence  is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 9  

therefore not negative in its import. The  learned  counsel for the petitioner and  the  appellant said  that  the sentence began with a  negative,  namely,the words not exceeding " and therefore it 725 is  a negative sentence and the word " or " occurring  later in the sentence must spread the negative influence over that part  of the sentence which follows it. This  contention  is clearly  fallacious.   The word " not " refers only  to  the word  "  exceeding  "  following it  and  the  two  together constitute  a qualifying clause limiting the amount  of  the penalty that can be imposed.  There is no negative sense  to spread over and influence the rest of the sentence.  If  the learned  counsel  were right, the words "  not  exceeding  " would  not have been repeated after the word " or " for  the word  "  or  " would have  carried  the  negative  influence forward and another negative would not,have been  necessary. The  acceptance  of  learned counsel’s  argument  that  "or" carried any negative influence forward, would make  nonsense of the sentence. It  seems to us that the learned counsel really wants us  to read the section as if the words were, " shall not be liable to  a penalty exceeding three times the value of the  goods, or  exceeding one thousand rupees.  " So read  the  sentence would be a negative one and the word "I or " would carry the negative  influence  forward.  To do  that  would,  however, bere-enacting  and not interpreting.  It is clear that  each time the expression " not exceeding " is used, it  qualifies the extent of the punishment that is stated after it.   That expression  is really equivalent to the words " up to "  and can  be  easily substituted by them  without  affecting  the sentence  in  any way.  There is really no negative  in  the sentence  and  what  we have, is  a  purely  affirm.  active provision  laying down two alternative penalties  to  choose from, with a maximum for each. The  distinction between affirmative and negative  sentences may  be illustrated by the case of The, .Metropolitan  Board of Works v. Steed (1).  The provision there considered  was, "  No  existing road, being of less width than  forty  feet, shall be ... formed as a street for the purposes of carriage traffic,  unless such road be widened to the full  width  of forty  feet  ...or for the purposes of  foot  traffic  only, unless  such  road  be widened to the full width  of  twenty feet or unless such (1)  (1881) L.R. S Q.B.D. 415. 726 streets  respectively shall be open at both ends.  " It  was held  that both the conditions had to be fulfilled  and  the street  had to be of the prescribed width and also  open  at both ends.  One of the reasons given for this view was  that the  sentence was a negative one and the word " or "  (being the  one  underlined  by  us*) in  it  carried  forward  the negative influence and made it necessary to fulfil both  the conditions.  ’It was said at pp. 447-48 :               "  We  might have referred to  authorities  by               good writers, shewing that where the word ’or’               is  preceded  by  a  negative  or  prohibitory               provision, it frequently has a different sense               from that which it has when it is preceded  by               an   affirmative  provision.,  For   instance,               suppose  an  order that ’you  must  have  your               house either drained or ventilated.  The  word               I   or’   would  be  clearly   used   in   the               alternative.   Suppose  again, the  order  was               that  I  you must have your house  drained  or

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 9  

             ventilated,  that conveys the idea to my  mind               that  you must have your house either  drained               or  ventilated.  But supposing the order  were               that  ’you must not have your house  undrained               or  unventilated.’ The second  negative  words               are  coupled by the word I or’, and the  nega-               tive  in the preceding sentence governs  both.               In  a.  98  there is a  negative  preceding  a               sentence no existing road’ shall be formed." It  is  obvious  that the sentence before  us  contains,  no negative  or  prohibitory  provision.  It  only  contains  a positive  provision  empowering one of the  two  alternative penalties  laid  down  to be imposed.   The  fact  that  the penalties  are directed not to exceed a certain  limit  does not  change the sentence from affirmative to  negative;  the sentence remains permissive and does not become prohibitory. It  follows that any of the. alternative penalties  provided may be imposed though the amount of it exceeds the amount of the  maximum in the ’Other alternative.  A consideration  of the  object of the Act also supports that view.  The Act  is vital for the country’s economic stability.  It is: intended to prevent smuggling in goods and such goods may be of large value.  A small fine of Rs. 1,000/- would Here printed in italics. 727 often be quite inadequate to serve these objects.  It  would be in consonance with such objects if power is given to  the authorities  concerned to impose a higher penalty  when  the occasion requires it. The  learned  counsel for the petitioner and  the  appellant then  referred us to Webster’s New International  Dictionary (2nd ed.) where one of the meanings of the word " nor "  has been  given as " or not ". The learned counsel say that  the word  "  or " and the word " not " following it have  to  be read  together  and on the authority of Webster, ask  us  to substitute for them the word " nor " in order to get at  the intention  of the Legislature.  But we do not have here  the word  "nor ". Nor are we able to find anything in  Webster’s Dictionary  authorising the substitution of " nor "  in  all places for the words " or not ". We are clear that here no " or not " occurs which can be substituted by " nor    without doing violence to the sentence.  The wordnot, following  the word " or ", is really joined to and    qualifies the word " exceeding " which comes after it and cannot be joined to the preceding word "or" at all.  To read the words " or not " as joined  to  each other, and to substitute them by  "  nor  " would be to change the structure of the whole sentence  and, therefore,   its  meaning.   An  interpretation   which   so radically  alters  the  meaning of  the  clause,  cannot  be accepted. These  were  the  main arguments  advanced  by  the  learned counsel for the petitioner and the appellant.  There remain, however,  certain other points raised by them to deal  with. It was said that the fact that two alternative penalties had been  provided  would  indicate that one  of  them  was  the maximum.   It  is  somewhat  difficult  to  comprehend  this argument.   By  itself  it does not show  that  the  maximum penalty  would be Rs. 1,000/- and that is what  the  learned counsel  want us to hold.  We have earlier held that  either of  the  two  penalties  provided  may  be  chosen  by   the authorities  concerned as they consider fit.  Suppose  three times  the  value  of the goods with which  the  offence  is concerned,  exceeds Rs. 1,000/-.  Then that would be  larger of  the two penalties that can be awarded in that  case  and the present argument does

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 9  

93 728 not  establish that this larger penalty cannot  be  imposed. Which  is the maximum in a particular case, would depend  on the  value of the goods.  Further, there seems to us  to  be good  reason  why two alternative penalties  were  provided. Where the value of the goods is very large, it may be that a penalty   of  Rs.  1,000  /-  would  be  too  inadequate   a punishment.  Again, it may be that three times the value  of the  goods  may be ’Much smaller than Rs. 1,000/-.   It  may conceivably  be  necessary  in such a case  by  reason,  for example, of the person concerned having on earlier occasions committed  the  same offence or having  shown  a  determined state  of mind to commit the offence, to inflict  a  penalty higher than three times that value.  Then it may also happen that  the value of the thing concerned may,  in  conceivable circumstances,  not  be properly ascertainable.  In  such  a case  the  alternative penalty up to Rs. 1,000/- has  to  be adopted if any penalty at all is to be awarded. The learned counsel then said that if both the  alternatives were available to the authorities concerned to choose  from, then  the  provision  would  give  them  a  very   arbitrary discretion which, whether it offended Art. 14 or not,  there is  no reason to think was intended by the Legislature.   We do  not think that this argument is of force.  Each  of  the alternative penalties provided, has a limit attached to  it. Therefore the discretion is neither unlimited nor arbitrary. It  may  be  that three times the value  may  amount  to  an enormous sum but that will be so only when the value of  the goods  with  which the offence is concerned,  is  high.   If goods  of high value are the subject matter of the  offence, then  there is no reason for saying that the  provision  for imposing  a  penalty  of  three times  that  value,  is  not intended by the Legislature. Another  argument advanced on behalf of the  petitioner  and the appellant was that no other item in s. 167 provided  for a  penalty in money, as distinguished from confiscation,  in excess  of Rs. 1,000/- and this indicated the  intention  of the  Legislature  not to impose a higher  penalty.   It  was therefore said that item 8 should be construed in accordance with this 729 intention  as  not enabling the imposition  of  a  pecuniary penalty  higher than Rs. 1,000/-.  The first answer to  this contention  is  that  the  intention in item  8  has  to  be gathered from the language used in it.  If that language  is clear,  that must be given effect to whatever may have  been the  intention  in  other  provisions.   In  our  view,  the language in item 8 is clear and it permits the imposition of a  penalty  in  excess  of  Rs.  1,000/-.   No  question  of gathering  the intention of the Legislature from  the  other items arises.  The second answer is that the learned counsel are  not  right when they say that the other  items  do  not provide  for a pecuniary penalty in excess of  Rs.  1,000/-. Thus under item 29 when goods are found in a boat without  a boat-note  as  required by s. 76 of the Act, the  person  in charge  of  the  boat  shall be  liable  to  a  penalty  not exceeding  twice  the  amount of the duty  leviable  on  the goods.   Now  it  is conceivable that such duty  may  be  in excess of Rs. 1,000/-.  Provisions for similar penalty  will be found in items 17, 29, 31, 38, 48 and others.  There  are also several items which permit the imposition of a  penalty calculated at large sums like Rs. 500/- and Rs. 1,000/-  per package.   In these the amount of the penalty  might  easily exceed  Rs.  1,000/-: see items 17, 36, 49,  56.   There  is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 9  

another  group  of  items which permits  the  imposition  of penalty  calculated  on  the value of the  goods,  and  such penalty  may, of course, be far in excess of Rs.  1,000/-  : see  items 58, 59 and 73.  It would indeed be strange  if  a statute  like the Sea Customs Act, on the proper working  of which  the  finances  and commerce of  the  country  largely depend, considered a pecuniary penalty of Rs. 1,000/- enough for  a  breach of any of its provisions.  We feel  no  doubt that the Act did not intend this. It was also argued that a penal statute like the one  before us,  must be construed in favour of a citizen and  therefore item 8 should be construed as permitting the imposition of a penalty  up  to  Rs.  1,000/- and no  more.   This  rule  of construction of a penal statute is applicable only where the meaning  of the statute is not clear.  This is not the  case with the present statute.  The appellant and the  petitioner can therefore derive no assistance from this rule. 730 The  learned  counsel for the petitioner and  the  appellant also said that the Sea Customs Act was modelled on 39 and 40 Vict., Ch. 36, an English statute to consolidate the Customs laws,  s.  186 of which corresponds to s. 167  of  our  Act. They  said that the English section expressly provided  that the authority concerned would have the option to choose  any of  the punishments specified, but our statute  deliberately departed  from  this  and did not use the  words  "  at  the election  of " which occur in the English statute.   In  our view, even without these words the meaning in our  provision is plain.  It also seems to us that the English statute used the words " at the election of " by way of abundant caution. The  effect  of that statute would have been the  same  even without those words.  It may be that in our statute  similar words  were  not  used because it  is  somewhat  differently framed;   the   use  of  them  may  have   been   considered inappropriate.   The English statute gives a choice  between two fixed penalties of " treble the value of the goods"  and "one  hundred  pounds."  In our statute,  each  of  the  two alternative  penalties is flexible ; each penalty is not  to exceed a certain limit. The  last argument was based on the word " extent  appearing in the main part of s. 167 which, it is said, indicated that the third column laid down the extent of the punishment that could  be awarded.  This argument does not carry the  matter further   at  all  for,  whichever  of  the  two   competing interpretations is accepted, in each case there would be the extent of the punishment specified and that word cannot help in deciding what the correct interpretation is. For these reasons it seems to us that under item 8 in s. 167 a penalty in excess of Rs. 1,000/- can be imposed and so the orders that the Customs authorities had made in these  cases are  not open to any challenge.  It is not in  dispute  that the  penalties imposed did not exceed three times the  value of the goods concerned. The  petition  and  the appeal  are  accordingly  dismissed. There will be no order for costs.                          Petition and appeal dismissed. 731