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PETITIONER: RANA SHEO AMBAR SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ALLAHABAD BANK LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT18/02/1977

BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) BENCH: BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH (CJ) GUPTA, A.C. KAILASAM, P.S.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1552            1977 SCR  (3)  33  1977 SCC  (2) 604

ACT:             Execution  of a mortgage decree--Proprietary  rights  in         Sir, Khudkhast land and grove land which were mortgaged were         extinguished and the Bhumidari right an altogether new right         created  by U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land  Reforms  Act,         1950  (U.P. Act 1 of 1951)--Whether trees being a part of  a         grove  are included in the "grove-land" which vests  in  the         U.P.  State Government free from all encumbrances--Scope  of         section 6(a)(i). 6(h) and 18 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition         & Land Reforms Act, 1950.

HEADNOTE:             In Rana Sheo Ambar Singh v. Allahabad Bank Ltd., Allaha-         bad  (1962)  2 SCR p.441, this Court held that the  respond-         ent  could not enforce his rights under the mortgage by  the         sale  of the new Bhumidari rights created in favour  of  the         mortgagor by s. 18 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and  Land         Reforms Act, 1950 and that the respondent could only enforce         his  rights  against the appellant in  the  manner  provided         under s. 6(h) of the Act read with s. 73 of the Transfer  of         Property  Act, and follow the compensation awarded  to   the         intermediary.  Despite this decision having been brought  to         the  notice  in the execution proceedings initiated  by  the         respondent attachment of  the  trees  in groves belonging to         the appellant was ordered by the executing Court taking  the         view  that  there is a distinction between the trees  and  a         grove  and grove land. The Division Bench of  the  Allahabad         High Court (Lucknow Bench) upheld the views of the Executing         Court and dismissed the appeal         Allowing the appeal by certificate, the Court,             HELD:  (1) The view that there is a distinction  between         trees  and a grove and grove land and,  therefore  execution         against trees in groves could be proceeded against cannot be         accepted in the light of the definition of the  intermediary         grove  under  s. 3(13) of the U.P. Zamindari  Abolition  and         Land  Reforms Act, 1950, viz., "intermediary’s grove"  means         groveland held or occupied by intermediary as such.  [34  D-         E, H]             (2) Groves are only collection of trees in plots of land         so as to preclude cultivation in them.  The uncut trees  are         deemed  to  be parts of the land.  The proposition  is  well

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       settled  under the general law, that trees, before they  are         cut.  form  parts of ’land’.  And are  inseparable  part  is         always included in the whole. [34E-F]             (3) Section 18(1)(a) of the Act provide that an  "inter-         mediary  grove" bhumidary property.  Rights in it are  parts         of bhumidari rights. [34F]

JUDGMENT:             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2041   of         1968.             (From  the  Judgment and Decree dated  2.2.1966  of  the         Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) Lucknow in First Execu-         tion Appeal No 5/62).         S.N. Prasad, for the appellant.         G.C. Mathur and O.P. Rana for the respondent.         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by             BEG, C.J.--This appeal by certificate raises the  simple         question whether certain trees, said to be part of a  grove,         are included   in         34          grove-land,  which,  under  section 6(a) (i)  of  the  U.P.         Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950  (hereinafter         referred to as the Act)  vests in the State of Uttar Pradesh         free from all encumbrances. This  very question was   raised         by the  respondent-decree  holder in the  execution proceed-         ings in this very case, between the same parties  which came         to  this Court on an earlier occasion.We have  perused   the         judgment  of this Court reported in 1962 (2) S.C.R. 441,  in         the  case.   We find that the position taken by the respond-         ent-decree-holder then also was that, after the coming  into         force of the Act, what could  still be sold in execution  of         the decree was the right in trees of groves as these contin-         ued to vest in the intermediary.  This Court rejected’  that         submission  and  held that after vesting of all  the  rights         mentioned  in.  section 6 of the Act in the State  of  Uttar         Pradesh,  new  bhumidhari rights came into  existence  under         section 18 of the Act.   It also held’ that the only way  in         which  a  mortgagee  could enforce  his  right  against  the         mortgage  or  after the Act came into force is  provided  in         section  6(h)  of  the  Act, read with  section  73  of  the         Transfer of   Property Act, 1882, so that nothing more  than         the  compensation  awarded to  the,  intermediary  could  be         proceeded  against by the mortgagee.Proceed against  by  the         mortgagee.             We  are surprised that, even after that decision  which,         according  to the aPPellant-judgment-debtor,  constitutes  a         complete  answer  to any further execution   proceedings  in         respect  of any part of bhumidhari rights, execution  should         have proceeded against trees in groves and the view taken by         the  execution court, that there is a  distinction  between,         trees and a grove and grove land, should have been upheld by         a  Division  Bench  of the Allahabad  ’High  Court  (Lucknow         Bench).We  find that it is impossible for us to accept  this         opinion  in   view of the definition of  the  intermediary’s         grove-under   section   3(13)   of  the   Act   which   says         "intermediary grove means grove-land held or occupied by  an         intermediary  as such". This means that "grove-land" and  an         "intermediary’s  groves  are equated  and   groves   are        on ly         collections  of  trees in plots of land so  as  to  preclude         cultivation in them.  The uncut trees are deemed to be parts         of the "land".                 Section  18(1)(a)  of  the  Act  provides  that   an

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       "intermediary’s grove" is bhumidhari property.  Rights in it         are part of  bhumidhari rights.  After these clear words  of         the enactment. we think it is not necessary even to consider         previous definitions or to make out specious or  unrealistic         distinctions  between standing uncut trees, which are  parts         of  groves, and groves and grove-land.  The  proposition  is         well settled, under the general law, that trees, before they         are cut, form parts of ’land’.  And, an inseparable part  is         always  included in the whole.  In view of this  very  clear         legal  position,  we  allow this appeal and  set  aside  the         judgments  and decrees of the High Court and  the  Execution         Court with costs.         S.R.                                            Appeal   al-         lowed.         35