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PETITIONER: RAMRATAN AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF RAJASTHAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/09/1961

BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. BENCH: WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1962 AIR  424            1962 SCR  Supl. (3) 590

ACT: Evidence-Single  witness-Corroboration-Indian Evidence  Act, 1872(1 of 1872), s.157.

HEADNOTE: The  appellants were convicted on a charge of murder on  the sole testimony of one witness.  Another prosecution  witness deposed  that the former witness told him immediately  after the  incident that the appellants were responsible  for  the murder.   The  question  which  arose  was  whether  it  was necessary  for  the former witness also to depose  in  Court that  he  had told the names of the murderers to  the  other witness  immediately  after the occurrence  or  whether  his former  statement  be  proved  under  s.157  of  the  Indian Evidence  Act  to  corroborate his.  testimony  without  his deposing about it in Court. Held, that it was not necessary under s. 137 of the Evidence Act that the witness to be corroborated must also say in his testimony in court that he had made the former statement  to the witness who was corroborating him.  What s.157  required was  that the witness to be corroborated must give  evidence in court of some fact and if that was done his testimony  in court  relating  to that fact could be corroborated  by  any former statement made by him relating to the same fact. Mt.  Misri v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1934 Sind 100 and Nazar  Singh v. The State, A.I.R. 1951 Pepsu 66, held as wrongly decided. As  a  general rule a court may act on the  testimony  of  a single  witness,  though  uncorroborated  and  the  question whether  corroboration of the testimony of a single  witness was or was not necessary must depend on the circumstances of each case. Vemireddy  Satyanarayan  Reddy v. The  State  of  Hyderabad, (1956) S.C.R. 247, distinguished. Vedivelu  Thevar v. The State of Madras, (1957) S.C.R.  981, followed.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 248  of 1960.

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Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated October  31,  1960,  of the Rajasthan High Court  in  D.  B. Criminal Appeal No. 290 of 1960 and D.  B,  Criminal  Murder Reference No 7 of 1960.                             591 R.  L.-  Anand,  C.  L. Sareen and  B.  L.  Kohli,  for  the appellants. S.K. Kapur  and T. M. Sen, for the respondent 1961.   September.  13.   The  Judgment  of  the  Court  was delivered by WANCHOO,  J.-This  is an appeal   by  special  leave    from the  judgment   of the Rajasthan High Court.  It arises  out of an incident in which Bhimsen was murdered on May 8,  1959 at  Mandi Pili Bangan shortly before 3 P.m. The  prosecution story briefly was, that there was bad blood between Ramratan appellant  and  the  members of the  family  of  Bhimsen  on account  of panchayat elections in which they had  supported rival  candidates.  Another cause for. enmity was that  some time   before   the  occurrences  Ramratan   appellant   was prosecuted  under  s.  307 of the Indian  Penal  Code  and Bhimsen was cited as a prosecution witness in that case  and Ramratan did not like that. Bhimsen  and  his father brought some gram for sale  on  the night  between  May  7/8, 1959,  to  Pili  Bangan.   Bhimsen returned to the village to bring more grain and came back at about10/11 A.M. on the 8th on his tractor-trolly along  with his  brother Ram Partap.  The gram was to be  sold  ’through Roopram  and was stacked in front of his shop in the  mandi. Ram  Partap was apparently not interested in the  sale;  and had  wandered  away  leaving his father  Jawanaram  and  his brother  Bhimsen at the shop.  Shortly before 3  p.m.  while the  gram  was being weighed by Lekhram weighman, the  three appellants and two others (namely, Moman and Ramsingh)  came up there armed with ,guns.  Ramratan shouted that the  enemy should  not  be allowed to escape as Bhimsen was  trying  to enter  the shop of Roopram to save himself on  seeing  these persons.  Before, however, Bhimsen could enter the shop  of- Roopram,  Ramratan came in between and fired at him  from  a distance 592 about  5 feet.  Bhimsen got injured and fell down and  died soon  after.   Jawanaram  raised his  hands  and  asked  the assailants not to kill Bhimsen but Hansraj appellant  fired at him causing a wound on his left hand,. which resulted  in a compound fracture.  Maniram also fired at.  Jawanaram  but he  dropped on the ground and pellets hit  Lekhram  weighman who  was  standing  behind Jawanaram.   Thereafter  all  the assailants ran away.  Roopram had shut up his shop when  the incident took place and he only came out When everything was over.   Jawanaram  asked  him to  send  telegram  to  police station  Suratgarh  and  told  him the  names  of  the  five assailants.   Thereafter  jawanaram started for  the  police outpost  in  Pili  Bangan to make  a  report;  but  Ramsingh constable  met him on the way at a short distance from  the shop of Roopram.  Thereupon Jawanaram made a report (Ex.  P- 1) to Ramsingh then and there.  While this report was  being recorded,  Ram Partap also turned up.  After the report  had been recorded, Jawanaram was sent to the hospital where  his injuries were examined at 3-30 P.m. Ramsingh constable  went to  the spot after recording the report and found  the  dead body  of  Bhimsen  lying in front   of   Roopram’s  shop  It appears  that head-constable gone outside and returned at  5 P.M.   and  started  investigation  thereafter.   The   Sub- inspector arrived on the scene at about 6 p.m. and took over the  investigation and. completed it.  Thereafter the  three

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appellants  and  two others who have been acquitted  by  the Sessions Judge were prosecuted for this murder.  The case of the appellants was that they had not committed this  offence and that they had been implicated on account of enmity  They examined no evidence in defence. The main prosecution evidence consisted of the statements of Jawanaram,  his  son Ram Partap, Roopram and Lekhram  as  to what  happened  at the spot.  Jawanaram  related  the  whole story  as  given above, Ram Partap  said  that he  had  come near                             593 the  spot  on seeing the assailants going that way  and  hid himself  at some distance and saw the incident  from  there. Roopram’s statement was that he shut up his shop as soon  as he heard some noise outside and did not see the  assailants. When  he  came out, however, he was told  by  Jawanaram  the names  of the five assailants and saw Bhimsen lying  dead. He had also heard three reports of gunshots from inside  his shop.  He saw Jawanaram and Lekhram were also there  injured and Jawanaram went away shortly after for making the report. Sometime thereafter the police came to the spot and  started investigation.   Lekhram stated that he was  there  weighing the  gram.  Four or five persons armed with guns came  there and  shouted  and fired two or three times with  the  result that Bhimsen, Jawanaram and he were injured and Bhimsen died immediately.   But  he was unable to say  whether  the  five persons in the dock were the assailants.  Because of certain answers  that he gave in cross-examination this witness  was treated as hostile by the prosecution. The Sessions Judge relied on the statement of Jawanaram  and convicted  the  three  appellants.   He  however,  gave  the benefit  of doubt to the other two assailants and  acquitted them.  He did not rely on the statement of-Ram Partap as  he was of the view that Ram Partap did not arrive in the  Mandi till  about 6 P.m. He also did not rely on the statement  of Lekhram,  which  in any case was useless in so  far  as  the connection  of the appellants with the crime was  concerned. As to Roopram he held that his statement that Jawanaram  had told  him the names of the assailants immediately after  the incident was over when he came out of his shop could not  be used  as corroborate on of the statement of Jawanaram  under s. 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, as Jawanaram had not said in his statement in Court that he had told Roopram the names of  the  five assailants He was also  doubtful  whether  the report (Ex.  P-1) was 594 recorded  at  3  P.m. and thought that it  might  have  been recorded  any time up to 6 P.m. But even so he  placed  full reliance on the evidence of Jawanaram only and convicted the three appellants, sentencing Ramratan to death and the other two to imprisonment for life. This  was  followed by an appeal to the High  Court  by  the convicted persons.  The Sessions Judge also made a reference for  the  confirmation of the sentence of  death  passed  on Pamratan.   The  High Court dismissed the appeal.   It  also accepted  the evidence of Jawanaram in the main.   The  High Court  was  further of opinion that Ram Partap was  in  Pili Bagan  when the incident took place having come  there  with his  brother Bhimsen at about10/11 A.M.; but the High  Court did  not  think  it fit to rely on his evidence  as  to  the actual incident, for it thought that he had not been able to see  it properly from where he said he was hiding.   Further the  High Court did not consider the evidence of Lekhram  of much  value as if, did not connect the appellants  with  the crime.  But the High Court was of the opinion that Roopram’s

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statement that Jawanaram had told him immediately after  the occurrence  the names of the five assailants was  admissible in  evidence and could be used to corroborate the  statement of Jawanaram.  The High Court thought that this statement of Roopram was admissible under s. 6 as well as under a. 157 of the  Evidence  Act.   The High Court  therefore  upheld  the conviction  on the evidence of Jawanaram corroborated as  it was  by  the  evidence of Roopram.  The  High  Court  having refused  to grant a certificate, the appellants  applied  to this Court for special leave which was granted; and that  is how the matter has come up before us. Two main contentions have been urged before, us on behalf of the  appellants.  In the first place, it is urged  that  the High  Court was not right in the view that the statement  of Roopram was                             595 admissible under s. 6 and s. 157 of the Indian Evidence  Act and   went  to  corroborate  the  statement  of   Jawanaram. Secondly, it is urged that once the statement of Roopram  is ruled  out  as inadmissible there is only the  statement  of Jawanaram left to connect the appellants with the crime  and in  the  circumstances of this case that  solitary  evidence should ’De held insufficient to bring home the guilt to  the appellants. The  first question therefore that arises in the  appeal  is whether  the  statement  of  Roopram  to  the  effect   that Jawanaram  told him immediately after the incident, when  he came out of his shop that the appellants and two others were responsible  for the murder of Bhimsen and the  injuries  to Lekhram  and  himself, is admissible, either under s.  6  or under s. 157 of the Indian Evidence Act.  We (lo riot  think it  necessary to consider whether this statement of  Roopram is  admissible  under  s. 6 of the Evidence  Act  and  shall confine  ourselves  to  the  question.  whether  it  can  be admitted under s. 157 as corroboration of Jawanaram’s state- ment.  Learned counsclfor the appellants in this connection relies on Mt.  Misri v. Emperor (1), and Nazar Singh v.  The State  (2)  which support him and lay down that  unless  the witness  to be corroborated says in his statement  in  court that  be,  had  told certain things  immediately  after  the incident  to another person, that other person  cannot  give evidence  and  say  that the witness bad  told  him  certain things immediately after the incident.  The argument is that the  corroboration  that is envisaged by s. 157  is  of  the statement  of the witness in court that he had told  certain things to the person corroborating the witness’s  statement, and  if  the witness did not say in court that he  had  told certain things to that person, that person cannot state that the  witness had told him certain things  immediately  after the incident and (1) A.I.R. 1934 Sind 100, (2) A.I.R. 1931 Pepsu 66. 596 thus   corroborate  him.   We  are  of  opinion  that   this contention is incorrect.               Section 157 is in these terms:-               ",In  order to corroborate the testimony of  a               witness,  any  former statement made  by  such               witness relating to the same fact, or at about               the  time when the fact took place, or  before               any authority legally competent to investigate               the fact, may be proved." It  is  clear  that there are only  two  things  which  are essential  for this section to apply.  The first is  that  a witness  should  have Riven testimony with respect  to  some

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fact.   The second is that he should have made  a  statement earlier  with respect to the same fact at or about the  time when  the  fact took place or before any  authority  legally competent to investigate the fact.  If these two things  are present,  the former statement can be proved to  corroborate the testimony of the witness in court.  The former statement may be in writing or may be made orally to some person at or about  the  time  when the fact took place, if  it  is  made orally  to  some person at or about the time when  the  fact took place, that person would be competent to depose to  the former  statement  and  corroborate  the  testimony  of  the witness in court.  There is nothing in s. 157 which requires that before the corroborating witness deposes to the  former statement  the witness to be corroborated must also  say  in his  testimony  in  court  that  he  had  made  that  former statement  to the witness who is corroborating him.   It  is true  that  often  it does happen that  the  witness  to  be corroborated says that he had made a former statement  about the fact to some person and then that person steps into  the witness-box and says that the witness to be corroborated had made a statement to him about the fact at or about the  time ",hen  the fa ct took place.  But in our opinion it  is  not necessary  in view of the words of s. 157 that in  order  to make  corroborating evidence admissible, the witness  to  be corroborated must also say in his evidence that he had  made such 597 and such statement to the witness who is to corroborate him, at  or about the time when the fact took place.  As we  have said already what s. 157 requires is that the witness to  be corroborated  must give evidence in court of some fact.   If that  is done, his testimony in court relating to that  fact can  be  corroborated under s. 157 by any  former  statement made  by  him  relating  to the same fact,  and  it  is  not necessary  that the witness to be corroborated  should  also say in his statement in court that he made some statement at or about the time when the fact took place to such and  such person.   The words of s. 157 are in our opinion  clear  and require  only two things indicated by us above in  order  to make  the former statement admissible as corroboration.   We are therefore of opinion that the Sind and Pepsu cases  were wrongly decided. Now  let  us see what happend in this case.   Jawanaram  was examined  in court and stated about a certain fact  (namely, that  the  assailants of Bhimsen, Lekhram and  himself  were five persons whom he named).  The testimony of Jawanaram  to be  corroborated is his statement in court with  respect  to the  fact  that five persons attacked Bhimsen,  Lekhram  and himself.   Section  157  makes  his  former  statement  with respect  to  the  same fact  admissible  provided  that  the statement  was made at or about the time when the fact  took place or before any legal authority competent to investigate the  fact.  In this case we are concerned with the first  of the  two conditions necessary, namely, whether he  had  made that former statement relating to the same fact. at or about the  time  when the fact took place.  The  former  statement which  can be used as corroboration must be about  the  fact namely  that  Jawanaram  had  seen  five  persons  attacking Bhimsen,  Lekhram and himself and must have been made at  or about  the  time when the fact took place i.  e.,  when  the attack was made.  Now Roopram says that Jawanaram 598 had  made the statement immediately after the incident  was over  that five persons including the three  appellants  had attacked Bhimsen, Lekhram and himself.  This was therefore a

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former statement of Jawanaram at or about the time when  the fact took place, namely, the attack by five persons on Bhim- sen and others.  This former statement can be proved by  the person to whom it was made and can be used as  corroboration of  the evidence of Jawanaram.  It was not necessary  before the statement of Roopram as to what he heard from  Jawanaram can be admissible for Jawanaram also to say in his testimony in  court  that he bad told Roopram  immediately  after  the incident  the  names of the five assailants of  Bhimsen  and others.  The former statement which can be used as  corrobo- ration is the, statement at or about the time the fact  took place  about which evidence has been given in court  by  the witness   to   be  corroborated.   Section  157   does   not contemplate that before the; former statement can be  proved in  corroboration, the witness to be corroborated must  also say in his testimony that he had made the, former statement. Of course if the witness to be corroborated also says in his testimony  that he had made the former statement to  someone that  would add to the weight of the evidence of the  person who gives evidence in corroboration, just as if the  witness to be corroborated says in his evidence that he had made  no former  statement to anybody that may make the statement  of any  witness  appearing as corroborating witness as  to  the former statement of little value.  But in order to make  the former statement admissible under s. 157 it is not necessary that  the  witness  to be corroborated  must  also,  besides making  the former statement at or about the time  the  fact took  place, say in court in his testimony that he had  made the former statement.  We are therefore of opinion that even though Jawanaram did not say in his statement in court  that he  had  told  Roopram the names  of  the  five  assailants, Roopram’s  599 evidence  that Jawanaram had made such a statement would  be admissible  under  s. 157 in  corroboration  of  Jawanaram’s testimony  as  to the fact that five  persons  had  attacked Bhimsen and others.  As to the value to be attached to  this corroboration in the present case, it is enough to say  that Roopram is an independent witness and even though  Jawanaram may not have said in evidence that he had told the names  of the  assailants to Roopram (perhaps by inadvertence  as  the High Court seems to think), we agree with the High Court  in accepting  the  statement  of  Roopram  that  Jawanaram  had immediately named the five persons who had attacked Bhimsen, Lekhram   and  himself.   Thus  the  statement  of   Roopram corroborates  the  statement  of Jawanaram  in  two  ways  : firstly, that there was an incident in front of his shop  in which  Bhimsen was murdered and Jawanaram and  Lekhram  were injured,  arid  secondly,  proves the  former  statement  of Jawanaram  as to the persons who took part in the  incident, thus corroborating his statement in court under s.157.  This is  not therefore a case where there is no corroboration  of the  testimony  of Jawanaram, even if he were  the  solitary witness of the incident itself. As  to the second point, namely, that we should  not  accept the solitary testimony of Jawanaram in the circumstances  of this case, learned counsclrelies on Vemireddy  Satyanarayan Reddy v. The State of Hyderabad (1).  In that case there was the solitary testimony of one witness and it was urged  that he  was an accomplice.  This Court hold that he was  not  an accomplice   but   remarked  that  "we  would   still   want corroboration  on  material particulars in  this  particular case, as he is the only witness to the crime and as it would be unsafe to hang four- people on his sole testimony  unless we feclconvinced that he is speaking the truth." The reason

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why this Court said so in that (1)  [1956] S. C. R. 247. 600 case  was that though the witness was not an accomplice  his position  was  considered somewhat analogous to that  of  an accomplice  though  not exactly the same.  It was  in  those circumstances  that  this Court said that  corroboration  in material particulars would be required in the  circumstances of  that  case.  We are of opinion that  those  observations cannot  be divorced from the context of that case.   In  the present case Jawanaram is neither an accomplice nor anything analogous  to an accomplice; he is an ordinary  witness  who was undoubtedly present at the time the incident took place. ’.rho case of such a solitary witness was considered by this Court  in  Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of  Madras  (1)  and after  referring to the earlier case it was held that  as  a general  rule a court may act on the testimony of  a  single witness,  though uncorroborated.  It was further  held  that unless  corroboration  is insisted upon by  statute,  courts should not insist on corroboration except in cages where the nature  of  the  testimony  of  the  single  witness  itself requires as a rule of prudence, that corroboration should be insisted  upon, and that the question whether  corroboration of  the  testimony  of  a single  witness  was  or  was  not necessary, must depend upon facts and circumstances of  each case.   These  are the general principles which we  have  to apply in the case of the testimony of a single witness, like Jawanaram.   But  as we have held that in the  present  case there  is  corroboration  of Jawanaram’s  statement  by  his former statement deposed to by Roopram, it is not a case  of altogether uncorroborated testimony of a single witness. In any case the evidence of Jawanaram has been considered by both the Sessions Judge and the High Court, and the Sessions Judge  was  prepared to convict the appellants on  the  sole testimony  of  Jawanaram  while  the  High  Court  has  also accepted  that  testimony, though it has added  that  it  is corroborated by the statement of Roopram.  In (1)  [1957] S. C. R. 981. 601 the  circumstances when the evidence of Jawanaram  has  been accepted by both the courts, with or without  corroboration, we see no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the  two courts  as  to  the  value  of  Jawanaram’s  evidence.   The criticism  made  against the acceptance of the  evidence  of Jawanaram has been considered by the two courts and in spite of that criticism the two courts have come to the conclusion that  the evidence of Jawanaram is reliable.  We agree  with the  estimate  of that evidence by the two courts  and  hold that   Jawanaram’s  evidence  can  be  relied  on   in   the circumstances  of this case.  Two main points are  urged  in this connection to shake the testimony of Jawanaram.  It  is said  that Jawanaram has introduced Ram Partap in the  first information  report and that the Sessions Judge at any  rate did not believe that Ram Partap was in Pill Bangan before  6 P.m.-though the High Court held otherwise.  Secondly, it  is said that Jawanaram did not make the first report at about 3 P.  M.  and  the Sessions Judge at any rate  held  that  the report  could have been made at any time upto 6  P.m.-though the High Court held otherwise. We  have been taken through the evidence in this  connection and we agree with the High Court that even though Ram Partap might not have actually seen the incident he had  definitely come  to  Pili  Bangan at about II  A.M.  with  his  brother Bhimsen.   There is the evidence of Ram Singh constable  who says  that Ram Partap came there when the report (Ex.   P-1)

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was being written at about 3 P.m., which is supported by the fact that Ram Partap’s presence is mentioned in the  report. The  defence  relied on a statement in  the  inquest  report (Ex.P-4) in which it is mentioned at the end that Ram Partap son  of  Jawanaram  also arrived during the  course  of  the completion of the inquest report and was sent along with the corpse.  This means that Ram Partap was not present when the inquest proceedings began and arrived there when they 602 were coming to an end.  From this it cannot be inferred that Ram  Partap  was  not in Pili Bangan at all  before  6  P.m. There.  is ample evidence, which the High Court has  rightly believed, to show that Ram Partap had come to Pili Bangan at about 10 or 11 A. M. The other criticism with respect to the time when the report (Ex.   P.1) was made is also in our opinion unjustified  and the  High  Court  was  right in the view  it  took  in  that connection.   There is no doubt that Jawanaram  reached  the hospital  at 3-30 P.m. as deposed to by Dr. Sudershan  Singh and that he was sent by the police.  It is obvious therefore that Jawanaram had contacted the police before 3-30 P.m.  It stands to reason that if he had contacted the police  before 3-30  P.m. be must have made a report of the  incident  also and  that is what exactly Ram Singh constable  deposes.   We agree with the High Court that in the circumstances there is no   reason  to  disbelieve  the  statement  of  Ram   Singh constable.  The Sessions Judge was doubtful of the  evidence of  Ram  Singh because he was of the view  that  documentary evidence from the police outpost at Pili Bangan had not been produced in support of Ram Singh’s statement.  Ram Singh was asked about it and stated that though Ex.  P-1 did not  bear the  despatch  number as it was not sent to the  outpost  at all,  he must have made entries in the diary of the  outpost about his starting from there and his return and also  about the  occurrence, though he did not remember about it.  After this  statement  of Ram Singh, the Sessions  Judge  was  not right  in disbelieving him because of the non-production  of the entries from the outpost.  It would have been better  if the prosecution had produced those entries ; but even if the prosecution rested upon the oral testimony of Ram Singh, the Sessions Judge could and should himself have sent for  those entries, if he was inclined to disbelieve the oral testimony of Ram Singh constable who appears 603 to  be a reliable witness.  In the circumstances we  are  of opinion that the view of the High Court that the report  was written  at  3  P. m. as stated by Ram  Singh  constable  is correct.   The  evidence of Jawanaram  therefore  cannot  be rejected on these two grounds. Lastly it was urged that Jawanaram bad named five assailants and  at least two have been acquitted, and that  shows  that Jawanaram is not wholly reliable.  It is enough to point out that the Sessions Judge gave the benefit of doubt so far  as two  accused persons were concerned.  He did not  hold  that Jawanaram’s  evidence  was false with respect to  those  two persons.   Apparently  those two persons did  not  take  any active  part  in  the incident and that  may  have  led  the Sessions  Judge to give them the benefit of doubt; that  is, however, no reason for disbelieving the testimony of Jawana- ram.  We are therefore of opinion that the two courts  below were  right  in  relying  on  Jawanaram.   His  evidence  is corroborated  undoubtedly by other witnesses to  the  extent that the incident did take place at the shop of Roopram; his statement that the three appellants and two others were  the assailants  is  corroborated by his  former  statement  made

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immediately  after the incident was over and deposed  to  by Roopram.   In the circumstances we are of opinion  that  the appellants have been rightly convicted. Two  of  the appellants (namely, Maniram and  Hansraj)  have been  sentenced to imprisonment for life while Ramratan  has been  sentenced to death.  The reason why Ramratan has  been sentenced to death is that he was the man who shot  Bhimsen. He  was  also the leader of this group and  the  enmity  was directly  between  him  and the members  of  the  family  of Jawanaram.   We agree with the High Court that there are  no extenuating 604 circumstances which would justify the reduction of  sentence of death passed on Ramratan. The appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed.                      Appeal dismissed.