23 February 1996
Supreme Court
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RAMESH SINGH Vs CINTA DEVI .

Bench: AHMADI A.M. (CJ)
Case number: C.A. No.-004255-004255 / 1996
Diary number: 3999 / 1994


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PETITIONER: RAMESH SINGH & ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: CINTA DEVI & OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       23/02/1996

BENCH: AHMADI A.M. (CJ) BENCH: AHMADI A.M. (CJ) MANOHAR SUJATA V. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR 1560            1996 SCC  (3) 142  JT 1996 (5)   543        1996 SCALE  (2)782

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Special leave granted.      The short  question is  : does a right of appeal accrue to  a   claimant  under   the  Motor   Vehicles  Act,  1939, hereinafter called  the ’Old  Act’, on  the institution of a claim application  in the  Motor Accident  Claims  Tribunal, notwithstanding its  repeal by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, hereinafter called  the ’New  Act? In  other words, does the right of  appeal under  the Old  Act survive  even after its repeal by the New Act? The brief facts are that an  accident took place  on 27.5.1988  which gave  rise to  a claim for a compensation under  the Old  Act. The  claim application was filed on  23.12.1988. Thereafter the New Act came into force with effect  from 1.7.1989.  The claim application which was instituted under  the Old  Act was  disposed of on 29.6.1992 after the New Act came into force. That gave rise to a right to file  an appeal.  The appeal  was preferred under the Old Act on  25.9.1992. However,  the Division  Bench of the High court by  the impugned  order dismissed  the appeal  on  the ground that  the appellant  had not  deposited the amount as required by  the proviso  to section  173 of  the  New  Act. Section 173  of the  New Act, insofar as is relevant for our purposes, reads as under:      "Section 173. Appeals - (1) Subject      to the  provisions  of  sub-section      (2), any  person  aggrieved  by  an      award of  a  Claims  Tribunal  may,      within ninety days from the date of      the award,  prefer an appeal to the      High Court: Provided that no appeal      by the  person who  is required  to      pay any  amount in  terms  of  such      award shall  be entertained  by the      High Court  unless he has deposited      with  it   twenty  five   thousands

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    rupees or  fifty per  cent  of  the      amount  so  awarded,  whichever  is      less, in the manner directed by the      High Court." Admittedly, the  appellant had  not deposited  the amount as required by  the said  proviso. The  High Court,  therefore, came to  the conclusion that the appeal was not maintainable and dismissed  the same. It is against the said order of the High Court that the present appeal is preferred.      We have  heard learned  counsel for  the appellant  and have perused  the relevant provisions of the Old Act as well as the  New Act  bearing on  the question whether or not the appellant was  required to make the deposit and we may state that the repealing clause, namely sub section (4) of Section 217, preserves  Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. We may at this  stage reproduce  section 217 (4) of the New Act and Section 6 of the General Clauses Act.      "Section 217  (4). The  mention  of      particular matters  in this section      shall not  be held  to prejudice or      affect the  general application  of      section 6  of the  General  Clauses      Act, 1897  810 of 1897) with regard      to the effect of repeals."      "Section 6.  Effect  of  repeal.  -      Where this  Act,  or  any  [Central      Act] or  Regulation made  after the      commencement of  this Act,  repeals      any  enactment   hitherto  made  or      hereafter to  be made, then" unless      a different  intention appears, the      repeal shall not      (a) revive anything not in force or      existing at  the time  at which the      repeal takes effect; or;      (b) affect  the previous  operation      of any  enactment  so  repealed  or      anything  duly   done  or  suffered      thereunder; or      (c) affect  any  right,  privilege,      obligation or  liability  acquired,      accrued  or   incurred  under   any      enactment so repealed; or      (d) affeet  any penalty" forfeiture      or punishment  incurred in  respect      of any  offence  committed  against      any enactment so repealed; or      (e) affect any investigation, legal      proceeding or  remedy in respect of      any    such    right,    privilege,      obligation,   liability,   penalty,      forfeiture   or    punishment    as      aforesaid,      and any  such investigation,  legal      proceeding   or   remedy   may   be      instituted, continued  or enforced,      and any such penalty, forfeiture or      punishment may be imposed as if the      repealing Act or Regulation had not      been passed." Suffice it  to say that the New Act does not expressly or by necessary   implication   make   the   relevant   provisions retrospective in character.      The High  Courts of  Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh have, vide AIR  1990 Allahabad  104 and AIR 1990 MP 354, held that

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in  such  circumstances  the  appellant’s  right  to  appeal without being  required to  make the deposit under the first proviso to  Section 173  of the  New Act remains unaffected. However, the  judgment impugned  herein  takes  a  different view. Hence  there  is  a  controversy  which  needs  to  be resolved.      In our  view the point at issue stands squarely covered by three  decisions of  this Court reported in Hussain Kasim Da a  V. State  of Madhya  Pradesh & Others (1953 SCR 987 at 991), State  of Bombay  v. Supreme  General  Films  Exchange Limited (1960 (3) SCR 640) and Vithal Bhai Narang Bhai Patel V. Commissioner  of Sales  Tax, M.P.  & Nagpur  (AIR 1967 SC 344). In  all these  decisions the view taken is that unless the New  Act expressly or by necessary implication makes the provision applicable  retrospectively, the  right to  appeal will crystalize  in the  appellant on the institution of the application in  the Tribunal  of  first  instance  and  that vested right  of  appeal  would  not  be  dislodged  by  the enactment of  the new  Act. In  other words,  the  appellant would be  entitled to file the appeal without being required to make  the deposit under the proviso to Section 173 of the New Act. The law, therefore, seems to be fairly well settled by the said three decisions of this Court.      In  the  result,  the  appeal  succeeds.  The  impugned judgment of the High Court dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the  award made  by the  Tribunal is  set aside. The matter will  go back  to the  High Court for disposal of the appeal in  accordance with  law without insisting on deposit of the amount. There will, however, be no order as to costs.