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PETITIONER: RAMESH CHANDER KAUSHAL

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: VEENA KAUSHAL & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT27/04/1978

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A.

CITATION:  1978 AIR 1807            1978 SCR  (3) 782  1978 SCC  (4)  70

ACT: Criminal Procedure Code, (Act II of 1974), 1973 Section 125- Scope of-Construction of the words "in the whole"  occurring in s. 125.

HEADNOTE: The  petitioner sought divorce through the civil court  from the  respondent and the respondent claimed maintenance  from the  criminal  court.  As an interim measure,  the  district court awarded maintenance and the High Court fixed the  rate at  Rs.  400/- per mensem for the spouse  as  a  provisional figure.   Meanwhile the Magistrate, on the  evidence  before him, ordered ex parte, monthly maintenance at Rs. 1000/- for the respondent-mother and two children together. In  this  Court,  the petitioner contended  :  (i)  a  civil court’s determination of the quantum is entitled to  serious weight and the criminal court, in its summary decision  fell into an error in ignoring the former; and (ii) the awardable maximum  for mother and children, as a whole  under  section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was Rs. 500/-,  having regard to the text of the section. Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court HELD (1) Though a final determination of a civil right by  a civil  court  must  prevail against a  like  decision  in  a criminal  court, in the instant case, two factors  make  the principle inapplicable.  Firstly, the direction by the Civil Court is not a final determination under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act but an order pendente lite under section 24  of  the Hindu Marriage Act to pay the  expenses  of  the proceeding  and monthly during the proceeding, such sum  as, having regard to the petitioner’s own income and the  income of  the  respondent,  it  may  seem  to  the  Court  to   be reasonable.   Secondly,  this amount does  not  include  the claim  for  maintenance of the children although  the  order does  advert  to  the fact that  the  respondent  has  their custody.   This  incidental direction  is  no  comprehensive adjudication.  Therefore, barring marginal relevance for the Magistrate,  it  does not bar his jurisdiction  to  award  a higher maintenance and the Magistrate cannot be faulted  for giving Rs. 1000/- on this score. [784 D-F]  (2) Sections of Statutes calling for construction by Courts are  not  petrified  print, but vibrant  words  with  social

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functions   to   fulfil  The  brooding   presence   of   the constitutional  empathy for the weaker sections  like  women and  children, must inform interpretation if it has to  have social relevance. [785B-C] (3)  The  provision in Section 125 of the Code  of  Criminal Procedure  is  a  measure of social  justice  and  specially enacted  to protect women and children and falls within  the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by Art. 39. [785 B] (4)  ’In  the  whole’ in the context means working  all  the items  of  maintenance together not all the members  of  the family  put  together.   This  interpretation  accords  with social justice and semantics and, is obvious. [787 B] (5)  Each  claimant  for maintenance, be he  or  she,  wife, child,  father,  or  mother  is  independently  entitled  to maintenance upto a maximum of Rs 500/-.  Indeed an  opposite conclusion may lead to absurdity.  Therefore, courts  cannot agree  to the obvious jurisdictional inequity by  reading  a limitation  of  Rs. 500/although what  the  section  plainly means is that the court cannot grant more than Rs. 500/- for each  one of the claimants.  The Magistrate did  not  exceed his powers while awarding Rs. 1000/- for mother and children all together.                                     [786G, 787A] Prabhavati v. Sumatilal, AIR 1954 Bom. 546 (FB); Md.  Bashir v. Noor Jahan Begum, [1971] Crl.  LJ. 553 (Cal.); approved. 783 (6)  Mere  divorce  does not end the right  to  maintenance. Whether  the appeal ends in divorce or no, the wife’s  claim for  maintenance qua wife under the definition contained  in Explanation  (b)  to s. 125 of the  Code  continues,  unless parties  make  adjustments and come to terms  regarding  the quantum or the right to maintenance. [788 C-D]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Special  Leave  Petition (Criminal) No. 1268 of 1977. From the Judgment and Order dated 5-9-1977 of the Delhi High Court in Criminal Revision No. 224 of 1977. S.   T. Desai and R. Bana for the Petitioner. Y.   M.  Isser, S. Balakrishnan and M. K. D.  Namboodri  for the Respondent. The Order of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA  IYER,  J.-Social  justice  is  not   constitutional claptrap but fighting faith which enlivens legislative texts with  militant meaning.  The points pressed in  the  Special Leave Petition, which we negative, illustrate the functional relevance   of  social  justice  as  an  aid  to   statutory interpretation. The conjugal tribulations of Mrs. Veena, the respondent, who hopefully  married Capt.  Kaushal, the petitioner, and  bore two young children by him, form the tragic backdrop to  this case.   The  wife  claimed that  although  her  husband  was affluent  and  once affectionate,  his  romantic  tenderness turned  into flagellant tantrums after he took to the  skies as  pilot  in the Indian Airlines  Corporation.   Desertion, cruelty  and  break-up  of  family  followed,  that   sombre scenario which, in its traumatic frequency, flaring up  even into macabre episodes consternates our urban societies.  The offspring  of  the young wedlock were not  only  two  vernal innocents but two dismal litigations one for divorce, by the husband,  hurling  charges of adultery, and  the  other  for maintenance,  by  the  wife, flinging  charges  of  affluent

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cruelty  and  diversion  of  affection  after  the  Airlines assignment.  These are versions, not findings. We do not enter the distressing vicissitudes of this marital imbroglio  since  proceedings  are  pending  and  incidental moralizing, unwittingly injuring one or the other party, are far  from  our intent and outside the orbit of  the  present petition.   Even  so, we cannot help but  observe  that  the current  Indian  ethos rightly regards the  family  and  its stability as basic to the strength of the social fabric  and the  erotic doctrine of ’sip every flower and  change  every hour’  and the philosophy of  philandering  self-fulfilment, unless combated on the militant basis of gender justice  and conditions   of  service,  are  fraught  with   catastrophic possibilities.   AR public sector (why, private sector  too) institutions,  including  the Airlines,  must  manifest,  in their  codes  of discipline, this  consciousness  of  social justice  and inner morality as essential to its life  style. Lascivious looseness of man or wife is an infectious disease and marks the beginning of the 784 end  of  the material and spiritual  meaning  of  collective life.   The  roots  of  the rule of  law  lie  deep  in  the collective   consciousness   of   a   community   and   this sociological  factor  has a role to  play  in  understanding provisions  like Section 125 Criminal Procedure  Code  which seek  to inhibit neglect of women and children, the old  and the infirm.  A facet of this benignancy of Section 125 falls for study in the present proceeding. The  husband sought divorce through the civil court and  the wife claimed maintenance through the criminal Court.  As  an interim measure, the District Court awarded maintenance  and the  High Court fixed the rate at 400/- per mensem  for  the spouse as a provisional figure.  Meanwhile, the  magistrate, on  the  evidence  before  him,  ordered  ex-parte,  monthly maintenance  at Rs. 1000/- for the mother and  two  children together. Sri S. T. Desai urged two points which merit reflection  but meet  with rejection.  They are that : (i) a  civil  court’s determination  of the quantum is entitled to serious  weight and  the criminal court, in its summary decision, fell  into an error in ignoring the former; (ii) the awardable  maximum for mother and children, as a whole under Section 125 of the Code was Rs. 500/- having regard to the text of the section. Broadly  stated and as an abstract proposition, it is  valid to assert, as Sri Desai did, that a final determination of a civil  right  by a civil court must prevail against  a  like decision by a criminal court.  But here two factors make the principle inapplicable.  Firstly, the direction by the civil court is not a final determination under the Hindu Adoptions and  Maintenance  Act  but an  order  pendente  lite,  under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act to pay the expenses  of the  proceeding, and monthly during the proceeding such  sum as,  having  regard to the petitioner’s own income  and  the income  of  the respondent, it may seem to the court  to  be reasonable.   Secondly,  this amount does  not  include  the claim  for  maintenance of the children although  the  order does  advert  to  the fact that  the  respondent  has  their custody.   This  incidental direction  is  no  comprehensive adjudication. Therefore, barring marginal relevance for the Magistrate  it does not bar his jurisdiction to award a higher maintenance. We  cannot, therefore, fault the Magistrate for  giving  Rs. 1000/- on this score. The  more  important  point turns  on  the  construction  of section  125, Crl.  Procedure Code which is a  reincarnation

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of  section  488 of the old Code except for  the  fact  that parents  also  are  brought into  the  category  of  persons eligible for maintenance and legislative cognizance is taken of the devaluation of the rupee and the escalation of living costs by raising the maximum allowance for maintenance  from Rs. 100/- to Rs. 500/-.  The relevant portion of the section reads               "125.  (i)  if any  person  having  sufficient               means neglects or refuses to maintain-               (a)   his wife, unable to maintain herself, or               785               (b)   his  legitimate  or  illegitimate  minor               child,  whether  married  or  not,  unable  to               maintain itself, or               a  Magistrate  of the first  class  may,  upon               proof  of such neglect or refusal, order  such               person  to  make a monthly allowance  for  the               maintenance of his wife or such child,  father               or mother, at such monthly rate not  exceeding               five  hundred  rupees in the  whole,  as  such               Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same  to               such person as the Magistrate may from time to               time direct." This provision is a measure of social justice and  specially enacted  to protect women and children and falls within  the constitutional sweep of Article 15(3) reinforced by  Article 39.  We have no doubt that sections of statutes calling  for construction  by Courts are not petrified print but  vibrant words  with  social  functions  to  fulfil.   The   brooding presence  of the constitutional empathy for the weaker  sec- tions like women and children must inform interpretation  if it has to have social relevance.  So viewed, it is  possible to  be selective in picking out that interpretation out  of two  alternatives  which advance the cause he cause  of  the derelicts. Sri Desai contends that section 125 of the Code has  clearly fixed  the  ceiling  of  the  monthly  allowance  "for   the maintenance of.... wife or such child, father or mother,  at such  monthly rate not exceeding five hundred rupees in  the whole".   Assuming  the  Parliament  not  to  be  guilty  of redundancy  it is argued that the words "in the whole"  mean that  the  total award- for wife, child,  father  or  mother together  cannot exceed Rs. 500/-.  We do not  agree.   Both precedentially   and   interpretatively  the   argument   is specious. The words which connote that the total, all together, cannot exceed  Rs. 500/- namely "in the whole’ have been  inherited from the previous Code although some ambiguity in the  sense of  the  clause  is  injected  by  these  words.    Clarity, unfortunately,   has  not  been  a  strong  point   of   our draftsmanship,  at  least on occasions, and  litigation  has been  engendered by such deficiency.  Luckily,  these  words have  been  subject to decisions which we  are  inclined  to adopt as correct.  A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court  in Prabhavati  v. Sumatilal(1) has held that the sum  specified is not compendious but separate.  Chagla C.J. explained  the position correctly, if we may say so with respect :               "The  suggestion that the jurisdiction of  the               Magistrate is limited to allowing one  hundred               rupees  in respect of maintenance of the  wife               and  the children jointly is, in our  opinion,               an impossible construction once it is accepted               that  the right of the wife and of each  child               is an independent right.  Such a construction               would  lead  to extremely  anomalous  results.

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             If,   for   instance,  a  wife   applies   for               maintenance  for herself and for her  children               and the Magistrate allows a maintenance of one               hundred rupees, and if thereafter an (1)  A.I.R. 1954 Bom. 546 786               illegitimate child were to come forward and to               make  an  application  for  maintenance,   the               Magistrate having allowed an allowance to  her               up to the maximum of his jurisdiction would be               prevented  from making any order in favour  of               the  illegitimate child.  Or, a man  may  have               more than one wife and he may have children by               each  one of the wives. If the  suggestion  is               that   maintenance  can  be,  allowed   in   a               compendious  application to be made  and  such               maintenance  cannot exceed one hundred  rupees               for all the persons applying for  maintenance,               then  in a conceivable case a wife or a  child               may  be  deprived  of  maintenance  altogether               under the section.               The  intention of the Legislature  was  clear,               and  the intention was to cast  an  obligation               upon  a  person  who neglects  or  refuses  to               maintain his wife or children to carry out his               obligation towards his wife or children.   The               obligation  is  separate  and  independent  in               relation to each one of the persons whom he is               bound  in  law to maintain. it  is  futile  to               suggest  that in using the expression "in  the               whole"   the  Legislature  was  limiting   the               jurisdiction  of the Magistrate to passing  an               order  in respect--Of all the persons whom  he               is bound to maintain allowing them maintenance               not exceeding a sum of one hundred rupees."               Meeting the rival point of view Chief  Justice               Chagla held :               ".  .  . . we are unable to  accept  the  view               taken   by   the  Division  Bench   that   the               jurisdiction of the Magistrate is confined  to               making   a  compendious  order  allowing   one               hundred  rupees in respect of all the  persons               liable to be maintained." A recent ruling of the Calcutta High Court in Md.  Bashir v. Noon  Jahan Begum(1) has taken a similar view reviewing  the case  law in India on the subject.  We agree with  Talukdar, J. who quotes Mr. Justice Macardie: "All  law must progress or it must perish in the  esteem  of man." In short the decided cases have made a sociological approach to,  conclude that each claimant for maintenance, be  he  or she wife, child, father or mother, is independently entitled to maintenance up to a maximum of Rs. 500/-. Indeed, an opposite conclusion may lead to absurdity.  If  a woman has a dozen children and if the man neglects the whole lot and, in his addiction to a fresh mistress, neglects even his  parents  and  all  these members  of  the  family  seek maintenance   in   one  petition  against   the   delinquent respondent, can it be, that the Court cannot- (1)  1971 Crl.L.J. 547@553. 787 award more than Rs. 500/- for all of them together ? On  the other hand if each filed a separate petition there would  be a  maximum  of  Rs. 500/- each awarded  by  the  Court.   We cannot,  therefore,  agree to  this  obvious  jurisdictional

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inequity by reading a limitation of Rs. 500/- although  what the  section  plainly means is that the Court  cannot  grant more than Rs. 500/- for each one of the claimants.  "In  the whole"  in  the  context  means  taking  all  the  items  of maintenance together, not all the members of the family  put together.   To  our mind, this interpretation  accords  with social justice and semantics and, more than all, is  obvious : "It  is  sometimes more important to emphasize  the  obvious than to elucidate the obscure." -Attributed to Oliver Wendell Holmes. We  admit  the  marginal obscurity in the  diction,  of  the section  but mind creativity in interpreting  the  provision dispels  all doubts.  We own that Judges perform a  creative function even in interpretation. "All  the  cases  in  this book  are  examples,  greater  or smaller, of this function". writes Prof.  Griffith in the Politics of the Judiciary.(1) The  conclusion is inevitable, although the argument to  the contrary  is ingenious, that the Magistrate did  not  exceed his powers while awarding Rs. 1000/- for mother and children all together. We have been told by Shri S. T. Desai that the divorce  pro- ceeding terminated adversely to his client but an appeal  is pending.   If the appeal ends in divorce being decreed,  the wife’s  claim for maintenance qua wife comes to an  end  and under  section 127 of the Code the Magistrate has the  power to make alterations in the allowance order and cipherise it. We make the position clear lest confusion should breed fresh litigation. The special leave petition is dismissed.                       ORDER (22-8-78) Noticing a patent error which has unfortunately crept in the above  judgment  in the last paragraph thereof,  counsel  on both sides were given notice to appear and they were heard. Section 125(1), Explanation (b) of the Cr.  P.C. reads "Wife"  includes  a woman who has been divorced by,  or  has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried." The  last  paragraph  in the  judgment  concludes  with  the statement "If the appeal ends in divorce being decreed,  the wife’s claim for (1)  J.A.G. Griffith ’The Politics of the Judiciary’ p. 175. 788 maintenance  qua wife comes to an end and under section  127 of   the  Code,  the  Magistrate  has  the  power  to   make alterations in the allowance order and cipherise it." The  judgment  would seem to indicate that once  divorce  is decreed  the  wife  ceases  to  have  any  right  to,  claim maintenance and that such an impact can be brought about  by an application u/S. 127 of the Code.  It is clear that  this conclusion contradicts the express statutory provision.  The advocates  on both sides agree that this is a  patent  error and  further agree that the law may be correctly stated  and the  contradiction with the statute eliminated.   Therefore, we  direct that in substitution of the last  paragraph,  the following paragraph will be introduced. "We  have  been told by Shri S. T. Desai  that  the  divorce proceeding  has terminated adversely to his client but  that an appeal is pending: Whether the appeal ends in divorce  or no,  the  wife’s claim for maintenance qua  wife  under  the definition  contained in the Explanation (b) to sec. 125  of the Code continues unless parties make adjustments and  come to terms regarding the quantum or the right to  maintenance. We  make the position clear that mere divorce does  not  end the right to maintenance."

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We  regret the error and pass this order under Art.  137  of the Constitution with the consent of both sides so that  the ends of justice and the law that this Court lays down may be vindicated. S. R.                  Petition dismissed. 78 9