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PETITIONER: RAMA VERMA BHARATHAN THAMPURAN

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF KERALA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/07/1979

BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. DESAI, D.A. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1979 AIR 1918            1980 SCR  (2) 136  1979 SCC  (4) 782

ACT:      Valiamma Thampuram  Kovilakam  Estate  and  the  Palace (Partition)  and   the  Kerala  Joint  Hindu  Family  System (Abolition)  Amendment   Act,  1978   (Act  15   of   1978), constitutional validity of.

HEADNOTE:      The Maharaja of Cochin, reigned and ruled over a pretty State, Cochin,  which is  now an integral part of the Kerala State. The  Travancore-Cochin State  came into being on July 1, 1949.  Two days  before this  constitutional merger,  the Maharaja of  Cochin issued a Proclamation to provide for the impartibility, administration  and preservation of the Royal Estate and  the Palace  Fund through  a  Five-man  Board  of Trustees. A  small Process  of  family  legislation  on  the Cochin Palace  followed the  political transformation of the State. The first was the Valiamma Thampuram Kovilakam Estate and the  Palace Fund (Partition) Act, 1961 (Act 16 of 1961), the primary  purpose of  which was to undo the impartibility of the  Royal Estate,  as declared  by the  Proclamation  of 1949. Sections  4 and  5 of the Act prescribed the shares of the members,  the mode  of division  and the  machinery  for partition under these provisions, on a majority of the major members of  the royal  family expressing  their wish  to  be divided, the  Maharaja would  consider whether it was in the interest of  the family  to partition  the estate  among the members and,  if he  did, direct  the Board  of Trustees  to proceed  with   the  partition  under  his  supervision  and control. Each  member including   en  ventra  sa  mere,  was eligible for  a single  share on  an equal  basis. The Board nominated under  the earlier  Proclamation was continued but its responsibilities  were broadened.  The privileges of the Maharaja were preserved as his personal rights but vis-a-vis family assets feudal "primogeniture" fell to modern egalite, within  limits.   As  a  result  of  the  26th  Constitution Amendment  Act   of  1971   which  extinguished   all  royal privileges,  privy   purses  and   other  dignities  of  the erstwhile rulers  of the  Indian States, the Cochin Maharaja stepped down  to the  level of  the Karta  of a  Joint Hindu Family.   The    Marummakkattayam   system   which   ensured impartibility and  management by  the senior most member had

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lost its  functional value  and virtually  vanished from the Kerala coast  with the  passing of  the Kerala  Joint  Hindu Family System  (Abolition)  Act,  1975  (Act  30  of  1976). Despite this  revolutionary change,  the Cochin royal family maintained its  former status  as Marummakkattayam undivided coparcenary since  it was  governed by  special  legislation which remained unrepealed. Therefore, the Kerala Legislation enacted the  Valiamma Thampuram  Kovilakam  Estate  and  the Palace Fund  (Partition) and  the Kerala  Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition)  Amendment Act,  1978 (Act  15 of  1978). Before the High Court and in the special leave petition, the vires of the Amending Act omitting sections 4 and 5 from the Principal Act  16/1961 was  challenged as offending Articles 14 and 19 of the Constitution.      Dismissing the special leave petition, the Court, 137 ^      HELD:  The  public  policy  behind  Section  7  of  the Valiamma Thampuram  Kovilakam Estate  and  the  Palace  Fund (Partition) Act, 1961, excluding civil court jurisdiction is not merely  the special situation of the former royal family but the virtual impossibility within a life-time of division by metes  and bounds  and allotment of shares to the 800 odd members, most  of whom  are real royalties in rags, homeless and hungry,  seeking to survive by the small pieces from the large cake if ever it will be sliced and distributed. [141A- B]      Civil litigation for partition is the surest punishment to the  tattered ’princelings’  by pauperizing  them through the justice  process and giving them stones instead of bread in the  end, if  the end would arrive at all. The compulsive pragmatics  of  distributive  justice  elicited  legislative compassion for  this uniquely  numerous crowd  of pauperised patricians by  exclusion of  civil courts  jurisdiction. The pathology of  protracted, exotic processual legalistic needs comprehensive renovation if the Justice System is to survive but the  legislature salvaged  the largest royal family with the littlest  individual resources  without waiting  for the remote undertaking  to overhaul  Processual Justice  to  the People. Sociology  is the  mother of  law, lest  law in  the books should be bastardized by the law of life. [141D-F]      2. Our constitutional order is sensibly and sensitively allergic to  arbitrary power  and  the  Supreme  Court  will unhesitatingly  strike  down  any  provision  which  can  be anathematised as  creating uncanalised  and Neronised power. Section 4 of the Principal Act of 1961 provided for an equal opportunity for  every member  including those  en ventre sa mere. This  provision was  deleted because  its purpose  was otherwise served  by the  substituted Section 3 of Act 16 of 1961 by  including a  direction  to  the  Board  "to  effect partition of  the Estate  and the  Palace Fund among all the members entitled  to a share"..................under Section 4 of  the Kerala  Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act  30 of  1976)." The  effect of  the importation of Section 4  of the  Abolition Act  is to ensure partition per capita among all the members as in the case of a Joint Hindu Family other than an undivided mitakshara Hindu family. What was otiose,  namely, Section  4 of  Act 16  of 1961, was cut out. This  was merely  a drafting  operation not  making any change in the substantive law bearing upon the shares of the members. The contention that by this deletion the members of the Kovilagam  had been made over as hostages to the caprice of  the   Board  of   Trustees  is   a  frightful  error  or disingenuous scare. [142-F-G, 143H, 144A-B]      3. Section  5 of the 1961 Act arrogated to the Maharaja

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of Cochin  the power  to exclude  any  properties  from  the category of  partible estate.  If most  members were  to  be indigent, the infliction upon such members by the Maharaja’s act of  exclusion of as many properties as he thought should not be  divided would  be unjust.  Since  every  member  was entitled to an equal share with the Maharaja himself all the properties  should  be  available  for  partition  and  this result, which is eminently just, is achieved by the omission of Section  5 from  Act 16 of 1961. Therefore, the provision in Act  15 of 1978 omitting Section 5 from the principal Act is a  virtue to be commended, not a vice to be condemned. It is  eminently  reasonable  and  to  contend  against  it  is obviously unreasonable. [143D-F]      4. To  blaspheme the Board as an imperium in imperio, a law unto  itself and  therefore, arbitrary  is an  egregious error. The Board was not a new creation 138 but an old concoction brought into being by the Ruler thirty years ago,  continued by the Kerala Legislature in Act 16 of 1961 and  recognised by  the latest amendment Act. The Board is a  time honoured  entity wherein  the heads  of the  four branches are  members and  is entrusted  with  the  work  of division of  assets. The  Board, being an old institution in plenary management since 1949 and wisely composed of senior- most members  of the  four branches,  is  sentimentally  and functionally the  best instrument  to divide and distribute. Indeed Act  16 of  1961  had  also  entrusted  the  task  of partition to  the same Board and no member had during nearly two decades challenged the wisdom of the provision. [144B-D]      Section 3  of the Act 15 of 1978 does not dispense with canons of fair play of natural justice and of quasi-judicial values.  A  non-curial  instrumentality  and  procedure  for partitioning cannot  be  condemned  as  discriminatory.  The alternative created  by the  statute is quite reasonable and is a  better instrument  having regard  to the  totality  of factors. Law  is not  a cocoon and keeps its eyes wide awake to the  realities of  life. The  legislation in question has taken note of all facts namely; (a) absence of any complaint against their  management ever  since the  Board’s creation; (b) sanctification  of the  Board by the principal Act 16 of 1961 by  conferring powers  of partitioning  the "Kovilagam" properties on  this very  Board; and  does nothing more What was good  and valid  in 1961  could not  become vicious  and invalid in 1978. [145 B-D, E]      Quasi-judicial  responsibilities  are  implied  by  the statute in  the Board’s  function and  if the Board breaches these norms  and canons,  the  constitutional  remedy  under Article 226  comes into  play. After  all, the  Board  is  a statutory body  and not  an executive  creature. It has been saddled with effecting the rights of parties and is bound to act quasi-judicially.  Its deviances are not unreviewable in writ  jurisdiction.   Sufficient  guidelines  are  built  in Section 3  and therefore  Section 3 (2) is not unbridled and unconstitutional. [145F-G. 146E]      Maneka Gandhi  v. Union  of India, [1976] Suppl. S.C.R. 489; M.  S. Gill and Anr. v. Union of India, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 621, Organo Chemical Industries and Anr. v. Union of India & Anr., [1980] 1 S.C.R. p. 61 referred to.      5. Absence of appeals does not jettison justice, though often times,  appeals are  the bane  of the  justice system, especially because the rich can defeat the poor and the weak can be  baulked of  their rights  indefinitely that way. The Board  is   a  statutory  body  and  when  it  violates  the prescriptions of  the law  or otherwise  acts arbitrarily or malafide, Art. 226 of the Constitution is a corrective. [146

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F-G]      6. Act  15 of  1978 has  none of the characteristics of class legislation  and is  on the  other hand, an equalising measure with  a pragmatic touch. The Cochin Kovilagam vis-a- vis  the   Kerala  State   is  sui   generis.  It  has  been legislatively dealt  with as  a special class throughout the history of  Kerala and  before. Partitioning  of  the  royal family estates on principles similar those applicable to all other Kerala  Hindu Families with the only difference that a Board instead  of a  Civil Court  allots shares by metes and bounds, is  fully justifiable  by the special circumstances. [147 A-B]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Special  Leave  Petition (Civil) No. 5863 of 1979. 139      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  15-12-1978 of  the Kerala High Court in Original Petition No. 679/78-II.      N. Sudhakaran for the Petitioner.      A. S. Nambiar for the Respondents.      The Order of the Court was delivered by      KRISHNA IYER,  J. All  the parties  are represented  by counsel and  we have  heard them  in extenso.  We  therefore proceed to pass a speaking order.      The  princely  family  of  Cochin  with  a  proletarian plurality of  members  has  been  the  cynosure  of  special legislations, the  last of  which is  Act 15  of  1978,  the target of attack in this special leave petition. Articles 14 and 19  of the Constitution have been the ammunation used by the petitioner  in the High Court and here to shoot down the legislation as ultra vires.      A brief  sketch of the family law of the Cochin royalty may serve to appreciate the scheme of the latest legislation under challenge.  The Maharaja  of Cochin, reigned and ruled over a  pretty princely  State,  Cochin,  which  is  now  an integral part  of the  Kerala State.  When  the  curtain  of history rose  to  find  India  free,  the  constellation  of princedoms  fused   into  Independent   India’s   democratic geography. Cochin  and Travancore  finally fell in with this trend. As  a  first  step  they  were  integrated  into  the Travancore-Cochin State  which came  into being  on July  1, 1949.  Two  days  before  this  constitutional  merger,  the Maharaja of  Cochin issued a Proclamation to provide for the impartibility, administration  and preservation of the Royal Estate and  the Palace  Fund through  a Board of Trustees. A small process  of family  legislation on  the Cochin  Palace followed the  political transformation  of  the  State.  The Valiamma Thampuram  Kovilakam Estate  and  the  palace  Fund (Partition) Act,  1961 (Actt  16 of 1961) was the first, the primary purpose  of which  was to  undo the impartibility of the royal  estate as  declared by  the Proclamation of 1949. The shares  of the  members, the  mode of  division and  the machinery  for  partition  were  statutorily  prescribed  by Sections 4  and 5  of the  said Act. The basics of those two sections were that on a majority of the major members of the royal family  expressing  their  wish  to  be  divided,  the Maharaja would  consider whether  it was  in the interest of the family to partition the estate among the members and, if he did,  direct the  Board of  Trustees to  proceed with the partition under  his supervision  and control.  Each member, including a  child in  the womb,  was eligible  for a single share on an equal basis. The privi-

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140 leges of  the Maharaja  were preserved as his personal right but vis-a-vis  family assets  feudal ’Primogeniture’ fell to modern egalite, within limits.      The next  epochal legislation was the 26th Constitution Amendment Act  of December 1971 which extinguished all royal privileges, privy purses and cher dignities of the erstwhile rulers of  the Indian  States. With  the denudation  of  his royal privileges  the Cochin  Maharaja stepped  down to  the level of  the karta  of a  joint Hindu  family. The  royalty which was  once a  reality became a mere memory and with the statutory injection  of democratic  rights into  this  blue- blooded family, plebeian claims for equal shares began to be voiced, especially  because the multifid of little royalties of the Maharaja’s matriarchal family lived in lurid poverty, as   counsel    distressingly   described.    Indeed,    the marummakkattayam  system   which   at   one   time   ensured impartibility and  management by  the senior-most member had lost its  functional value  and virtually  vanished from the Kerala coast,  thanks to  the erosive process of legislative individualism. The  final blow  to this system was delivered by the  Kerala Joint  Hindu Family  System (Abolition)  Act, 1975 (Act  30 of 1976) which fully wiped out the matriarchal pattern of  holding and the Hindu undivided family system in the State  of Kerala. Despite this revolutionary change, the Cochin royal  family  maintained  its  former  status  as  a marummakkattayam undivided coparcenary since it was governed by special legislation which remained unrepealed. This regal matriarchal  survival   levelled  into  the  main-stream  of proprietary life  with equal,  partible shares for young and old,  like  the  rest  of  the  community  when  the  Kerala legislature enacted  the Valiamma Thampuram Kovilakam Estate and the  Palace Fund  (Partition) and the Kerala Joint Hindu Family System  (Abolition) Amendment  Act, 1978  (Act 15  of 1978) (preceded by Ordinance No. 1 of 1978).      A close-up  of this statutory scheme is necessary since it is  this legislation  which is  furiously  fusilladed  as unconstitutional  by   counsel  for   the  petitioner.   The legislative   Proclamation    of   1949,   if   we   briefly recapitulate, commended the Constitution by His Highness the Maharaja of  a five-man  Board of  Trustees charged with the plenary   task    of   ’administration,    management    and conservation’ of  the ’Estate’  and ’Palace Fund’. Act 16 of 1961 brought  about a  degree  of  economic  democratisation while preserving  some of  the special  legal habiliments of the royal  estate. The  Board nominated  under  the  earlier Proclamation was  continued but  its  responsibilities  were broadened to include partitioning of the Kovilakam assets if a majority  of major  members-the voice of Palace democracy- asked for divi- 141 sion and  the Maharaja  deemed it desirable in the interests of the  family. This  was  a  half  way  house  between  the impartible old  and partible-at-will  new. A short provision of great  relevance to  the issue of constitutionality is to be found in Section 7. The public policy behind this Section excluding civil court jurisdiction is not merely the special situation  of  the  former  royal  family  but  the  virtual impossibility within  a life-time  of division  by metes and bounds and  allotment of shares to the 800 odd members, most of whom  are little  royalties in rags, homeless and hungry, seeking to  survive by  the small pieces from the large cake if ever  it will be sliced and distributed. The exasperating longevity of  partition litigation,  what with  the  present cantankerous  orientation  and  procedural  interminability,

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preliminary   decree,    appeals    thereon,    commissions, objections, revisions, final decrees, and a ruinous crown of other  interlocutory   proceedings  punctuating   the  suit, followed by  inevitable appeals  and special leave petitions and the  like, baffles  the humble  and baulks their hope of getting a  morsel  in  their  short  life  span.  When  this phenomenon-an Indo-Anglican processual bequest-is compounded by the calamitous fact that there are around 800 sharers and a variety  of  considerable  assets  to  be  divided,  civil litigation for  partition is  the surest  punishment to  the tattered  ’princelings’  by  pauperising  them  through  the justice process  and giving  them stones instead of bread in the end,  if the  end would  arrive at  all ! The compulsive pragmatics  of  distributive  justice  elicited  legislative compassion for  this uniquely  numerous crowd  of pauperised patricians by  exclusion of  civil court’s jurisdiction. The pathology of protracted, exotic processual legalistics needs comprehensive renovation if the Justice System is to survive but the  legislature salvaged  the largest royal family with the littlest  individual resources  without waiting  for the remote undertaking  to overhaul  Processual Justice  to  the People. Sociology  is the  mother of  law, lest  law in  the books should be bastardised by the law of life.      A radical  measure  which  swept  off  the  matriarchal system and the Joint family form of estate for Hindus is the next statutory  even which  needs mention.  Kerala Act 30 of 1976 (The  Kerala Joint Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975), abolished  at one  stroke the  Hindu undivided family and converted them into tenancies-in-common with the rule of one  member  one  share.  The  Cochin  ’Kovilagam’  was  not affected because  neither Act 16 of 1961 nor the prior royal proclamation  expressly   repealed.  But  the  individualist spirit  of   Act  30   of  1976  invaded  the  royal  family legislatively  as   there  is   no  basis   for  proprietary privilege, even  as vestiges  of past  glory, in a democracy charged with  social  justice.  So,  Act  15  of  1978  (The Valiamma 142 Thampuram Kovilakam  Estate and  the Palace Fund (Partition) and  the   Kerala  Joint  Hindu  Family  System  (Abolition) Amendment Act,  1978) came  to be passed whereby division of the  Kovilakam   assets  was   freed  from   the  Maharaja’s subjectivism and made a mandate of the statute, in tune with the common  trend. The  modus operandi to work out partition was the  Board and  no specific  prescription regarding  the shares of  members is  given. No  appeal from  the partition effected by  the Board  is specified and Sections 4 and 5 of Act 16 of 1961 are deleted retrospectively.      A quick  glance at  the provisions gives the impression that the  legislature merely  equated the right in partition of the  junior members  of the  Kovilakam with  that of  the commonalty of  marumakkattayam families save that instead of the Civil  Court the  division by metes and bounds was to be carried out by the Board which was already in management and was familiar with the features of the family and the assets. A closer  look, in the light of the constitutional challenge which was  repelled by  the High  Court, leaves us cold, hot submissions  to   burn  down  the  allegedly  arbitrary  and irresesonable legislation notwithstanding.      Let us dissect the anatomy of the Amending Act of 1978. Be it  remembered that Act 16 of 1961 (the principal Act) is not and  has never  been attacked  as ultra  vires.  If  the principal Act  was good the search for the invalidatory vice must be confined to the cluster of new clauses.      The principal  violation  pressed  before  us  by  Shri

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Govindan Nair  for the petitioner, who is a senior member of the family, is of Art. 14 and the customary contention, more easily waged  than established, is that arbitrary, unguided, naked and  tyrannical power  is conferred  on the  Board and therefore the  whole Act is bad because the central piece of the  statutory   scheme  is   this  machinery.   True,   our constitutional order is sensibly and sensitively allergic to arbitrary power  and we  have no hesitation in striking down any  provision   which  can  be  anathematised  as  creating uncanalised and  Neronised Power.  The very  creation of the Board was  challenged as  violative of  Art.  14  since  the jurisdiction of  the Civil  Court is  the common  forum with other judicial remedies, appellate and revisional, available for the  aggrieved party.  While the  Board is given plenary power to divide and distribute with validity being conferred on such partition the grievance is that there are no appeals and revisions and the arbitrament of the Board even if it is arbitrary becomes  final. This is castigated as a caprice of the legislature. More than all, the very singling 143 out of  the  ruler’s  family,  populous  though  it  be,  is anathematised as discriminatory. Incidentally, the powers of the Board  are charged  as unreasonable  since there  is  no provision to  give a  hearing to the affected parties in the process of  adjudication and  the whole  process may well be the deliberations  of a secret campaign. These violent vices imputed to  the statute will certainly invalidate the Act 15 of 1978,  if there  were some  substance  therein.  Even  an imaginative exercise,  if informed  by realism, discovers no such infirmity.      Let us  clear the  confusion caused  by the omission of Sections 4  and 5  of the  principal Act. Shri Govindan Nair for the  petitioners relied on this omission to contend that the  wholesome  provisions  of  sections  4  and  5  of  the Principal Act  of 1961 have been waywardly withdrawn leaving it to  the Board to award such shares as they fancied to the various  members.  This  submission  proceeds  on  a  simple misconception. Section  4 provides  for an  equal share  for every member  including a  child in  the womb  and Section 5 arrogates to the Maharaja of Cochin the power to exclude any properties from the category of partible estate. No democrat will shed  a tear if Section 5 were deleted. The members, as Shri Govindan  Nair himself  urged, were mostly indigent. If that were  so, the  infliction  upon  such  members  by  the Maharaja’s act  of exclusion  of as  many properties  as  he thought should  not be  divided would be unjust. Since every member was  entitled to  an equal  share with  the  Maharaja himself all the properties should be available for partition and this result, which is eminently just, is achieved by the omission of  Section 5  from Act  16 of 1961. Therefore, the provision in  Act 15  of 1978  omitting Section  5 from  the principal Act  is a virtue to be commended, not a vice to be condemned. It is eminently reasonable and to contend against it is obviously unreasonable.      A different  criticism  has  been  made  regarding  the deletion of  Section 4  by Shri  Govindan Nair;  but  it  is equally mis-conceived, if we may say so. Section 4 of Act 16 of 1961 provided for the share of members including those en ventre sa  mere. This  provision  was  deleted  because  its purpose was otherwise served by the substituted Section 3 of Act 16  of 1961  by including  a direction  to the Board "to effect partition of the Estate and the Palace Fund among all the members  entitled to a share. . . under Section 4 of the Kerala Joint  Hindu Family System (Abolition) Act, 1975 (Act 30 of  1976)." The effect of the importation of Section 4 of

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the Abolition  Act is  to ensure  partition per capita among all the members as in the case of a Joint Hindu Family other than an undivided Mitakshara Hindu family. 144 What was  otiose, namely,  Section 4  of Act 16 of 1961, was cut out. This was merely a drafting operation not making any change in the substantive law bearing upon the shares of the members. The contention that by this deletion the members of the Kovilagam  had been made over as hostages to the caprice of  the   Board  of   Trustees  is   a  frightful  error  or disingenuous scare.      In the  course of his submissions, counsel had a dig at the Board,  which, according  to him,  was  an  imperium  in imperio, a  law unto  itself and, therefore, arbitrary. This again is  an egregious  error.  The  Board  was  not  a  new creation but  an old  concoction. Thirty years ago the Ruler brought it  into being.  Since then, the Kerala legislature, in Act  16 of  1961, continued it and the latest legislation now denounced before us recognised this time-honoured entity wherein the  heads of  the four  branches were  members  and entrusted it with the work of division of assets. The Board, being an  old institution  in plenary  management since 1949 and wisely  composed of  the seniormost  members of the four branches,  is   sentimentally  and   functionally  the  best instrument to  divide and  distribute. Indeed Act 16 of 1961 had also  entrusted the  task of partition to the same Board and no  member had  during nearly two decades challenged the wisdom of the provision. We see no legal ground to blaspheme this Board.      The greater  grievance of  counsel about  the Board was something else.  He contended that the Board under Section 3 (2) was  empowered to effect the partition of the Estate and the Palace  Fund "and  the partition  so effected  shall  be valid...." From  this the  criticism was  spun out  that the Board was  likely to  act in any manner it pleased, sell the properties at  any price, distribute the assets at its sweet will or  whim and  thus reduce  the partition  of  Kovilagam properties to a mock exercise by an unchallengable Board. He contrasted  this   grim  picture   with   the   advantageous alternative of  a civil  suit where  the shares  were  fixed according  to   law,  the   properties  were   valued  by  a Commissioner, objections  to the  report of the Commissioner were considered  by the  Court and  a decree, preliminary or final,  was  subject  to  appeal  and  further  appeal.  The judicial process  was a  great guarantee  of the  rights  of parties  which   was  unavailable   before  the  statutorily immunised and  potentially eccentric  Board of  Trustees. We remained unmoved  by this  sombre picturisation  made up  of illusory apprehensions. We have earlier pointed out that the strength of  the Cochin  Royal family  is  around  800.  The properties consist  of urban  lands, rural  lands, buildings and  other  assets  considerable  in  volume  and  value.  A litigative resolution  of the  conflicts among  members with the plethora of interlocutory proceedings plus revisions 145 and appeals  may be  an endless adventure which would surely bankrupt the  poorer members and deny to everyone a share in the properties by metes and bounds for a generation to come. Of  course,   those  who   are  already   in  possession  of properties-and counsel  for the  respondent hinted  that the petitioners  belong   to  this   category-would  benefit  by striking down  this legislation  and  delay  in  legislative rectification of  the situation  and the  further litigation that might  be launched  and so  on. Those  who have, have a vested interest  in procratination; those who have not, have

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an urgent  interest in instant justice. In this view, a non- curial instrumentality  and procedure  for partitioning  the properties  cannot   be  condemned  as  discriminatory.  The alternative created by the statute is quite a reasonable and in our  view  a  better  instrument  having  regard  to  the totality of  factors. Law is not a cocoon and keeps its eyes wide awake  to the  realities of  life. The  legislation  in question has  taken note of the fact that the Board has been for decades  entrusted by  the Maharaja  by his Proclamation with  the   administration  of  the  family  estate  and  no complaints have  ever been  voiced against their management. The latter  legislation of  1961 has  sanctified this Board. That legislation has gone to the extent of conferring powers of partitioning  the Kovilagam  properties on this Board and the present  Act of 1978 does nothing more. We are unable to understand how  what was  good and  valid in  1961 Act could become vicious  and invalid  in 1978. The composition of the Board and its history and experience convince us that it was a fit instrument for the task entrusted.      The fear  expressed before us that the Board may ignore the norms of judicial procedure while settling the rights of parties is  misplaced. We  do not regard Section 3 of Act 15 of 1978  as dispensing  with canons  of fairplay  of natural justice and of quasi-judicial values.      We realise  that the  enormous  work  of  dividing  the properties has  to be  carefully carried out. Quasi-judicial responsibilities are  implied by  the statute in the Board’s functions and  if the  Board breaches these norms and canons the constitutional remedy under Article 226 comes into play. After all,  the  Board  is  a  statutory  body  and  not  an executive creature.  It has  been saddled with effecting the rights of  parties and is bound to act quasi-judicially. Its deviances  are   not  unreviewable   in  writ  jurisdiction. Therefore,  we   direct  the   Board  to   comply  with  the requirements prescribed  in several  decisions of this Court in  quasi-judicial   jurisdictions.   Natural   justice   is obviously the  first as  this Court has ruled in a shower of cases especially highlighting in Maneka Gandhi’s case(1) and M. S. Gill’s case(2). This Court has 146 gone to  the extent  of holding that natural justice require reasons to  be written  for  conclusions  made.  The  Organo Chemical Industries  & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr.(1) this Court has  held that  the absence  of a right of appeal does not spell  arbitrariness. It  is further  held in  the  same ruling that  giving of reasons for conclusions is ordinarily an important  component of natural justice in quasi-judicial tribunals. In  short,  every  facility  that  a  party  will reasonably receive  before a quasi-judicial body when rights are adjudicated  upon, will  be available  before this Board and  we   mandate  it   to  extend   such   facilities   and opportunities. We  need hardly  mention that when properties are sold  parties  must  be  intimated  and  the  principles embedded in  the Partition  Act must  be taken  note of when properties are  valued and allotted. The services of valuers of  properties  or  of  Commissioners  must  also  be  used. Moreover, parties  must be  given opportunity  to object  to reports of  Commissioners, if  any, appointed. In short, the general  law,   processual  and   substantive,  bearing   on allotment of properties cannot be thrown to the winds by the Board merely  because Section 3 does not write these details into it.  We must  hasten to  caution that no party can hold the Board  in ransom  by  raising  vexatious  and  frivolous objections and putting in proceeding after proceeding merely to delay or defeat. The Board is geared to completion of the

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partition with  a reasonable  speed and  that  purpose  must inform its  activities. While  every party  is entitled to a reasonable voice  in the  proceedings no party can enjoy the privilege of  thwarting  the  processes  of  justice.  These observations and directions which are built-in in Section 3, in  our   view,  are  sufficient  guidelines  to  repel  the submission that  the power  under Section  3(2) is unbridled and unconstitutional.  Partitions are  best done  by a broad consensus  and   the  Board   will  remember  that  constant consultation with  the members  may facilitate  its work and reduce tension and friction.      Nor are  we impressed  with the  argument that  because appeals  are   absent  justice  is  jettisoned.  Oftentimes, appeals are  the bane  of  the  justice  system,  especially because the  rich can  defeat the  poor and  the weak can be baulked of  their rights  indefinitely that  way. We  do not mean to  decry the  right of appeal, but may not go with the petitioner in  glorifying it  in  all  situations.  We  have emphasised that  the Board  is a  statutory body and when it violates the  prescriptions of  the law  or  otherwise  acts arbitrarily or  mala fide, Art. 226 of the Constitution is a corrective. Nothing more is needed because everything needed is implied in that power. 147      The last  and perhaps  the least valid submission, with meretricious attraction,  is the  challenge based on unequal legislation picking  out one  from among  equals for hostile treatment. We  have held  that the  royal family  estate  is being partitioned  on principles similar to those applicable to all  other Kerala  Hindu families and the only difference is a  Board instead  of a court to allot shares by metes and bounds. This,  we have  shown, is  fully  justified  by  the special circumstances.  The Cochin  Kovilakam vis-a-vis  the Kerala State is sui generis. It has been legislatively dealt with as a special class throughout the history of Kerala and before. The  Act impugned has none of the characteristics of class legislation  and, is  on the other hand, an equalising measure with a pragmatic touch.      We negative the specious submission.      We find  no merit  in this  Special Leave  Petition and dismiss it without costs. V.D.K.                                   Petition dismissed. 148