http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  7474-7477 of 2003

PETITIONER: RAMA RAO & ORS

RESPONDENT: M.G. MAHESHWARA RAO & ORS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/08/2007

BENCH: H.K. SEMA & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T  [with C.A. No. 7478-7481 of 2003]

P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J.

1.      By the judgment under appeals the High Court partly  allowed the writ petition filed before it by the employees in  the ministerial cadre of the Karnataka Administrative  Tribunal.  Writ Petition Nos.16143-1646 of 1997 challenged  the decision of the Administrative Tribunal dismissing an  application filed by them before the Tribunal.  Feeling  aggrieved by the decision rendered by the High Court in the  writ petitions both sides are before us with these appeals.   Civil Appeal Nos.7474-7477 of 2003 is filed by those  belonging to the Stenographer Cadre and Civil Appeal  Nos.7478-7481 of 2003 filed by the ministerial cadre.   

2.              For convenience, hereafter, the parties are referred  to as Stenographers and Assistants.

3.              The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal was  constituted on 6.10.1986.  The Government of Karnataka  sanctioned the cadre strength and framed the Cadre and  Recruitment Rules, 1986.  The appointments of  stenographers were made in the year 1988.  The Government  published on 23.9.1992 a new set of draft rules.  The  stenographers filed objections to the draft rules.  On  31.5.1993 the Government published the Recruitment Rules.   Though the stenographers made representations to the  Government, their representations were rejected.  Thereupon  they filed application Nos.2250-2252 of 1993 and 2253-2258  of 1998 before the Administrative Tribunal challenging the  prescription of degree and test as qualifications for  promotion to the post of Junior Judgment Writer in the  Rules.  It is seen that the assistants or any one that would  be affected from that branch by an adjudication, were not  impleaded in the proceeding.  The Administrative Tribunal  allowed the applications and quashed the Rules in part.   Essentially, what the Administrative Tribunal did was to  alter the qualifications provided for promotions in the cadre  of stenographers by doing away with the higher  qualifications prescribed.  The striking down of the Rules  was done by a Bench presided over by the Vice-Chairman of  the Administrative Tribunal.   Thereafter the vice-chairman  proceeded to promote the stenographers on the basis of the  qualification prescribed by him on the judicial side.  The  assistants felt aggrieved by the promotions thus given.  They,

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

therefore, moved application Nos.3585-3592 of 1995 and  other connected applications before the Administrative  Tribunal challenging the decision of the Administrative  Tribunal dated 6.7.1994 as also the promotions given to the  respondents in those applications, the promoted  stenographers.  The applications were opposed on various  grounds.  By order dated 21.4.1997, the Administrative  Tribunal dismissed the applications.  It was challenged by  the Assistants before the High Court in the writ petitions  already referred to.  The High Court, by the judgment under  appeal, allowed the writ petitions in part holding that the  Administrative Tribunal had no jurisdiction to alter the  qualifications for promotions as it had done and since  promotions were made on the basis of this unauthorized  interference with the Rules prescribing qualifications for  promotions, the promotions were bad.    As a logical follow  up, instead of setting aside all the promotions, the High  Court set aside only the promotions of non-graduate  stenographers and declined to interfere with the promotions  of the graduate stenographers.  The non-graduate  stenographers are aggrieved by the setting aside of the  judgment of the Administrative Tribunal and the quashing of  the promotions of non-graduates.  The Assistants are  aggrieved by what they call the failure of the High Court to  give effect to its own judgment and in not setting aside the  illegal promotions given to all stenographers including the  graduate stenographers.  That is how these sets of appeals  are before us.   

4.              Logically it would be proper to deal first with the  appeal filed by the stenographers against the judgment of the  High Court.  For, if we were to agree with the contentions of  the appellants therein, the judgment of the High Court  setting aside the order of the Administrative Tribunal will  have to be set aside and in that case no further orders would  be required except to restore the order of the Tribunal.  Only  if we were to dismiss the appeals filed by the Assistants and  were to uphold the decision of the High Court on the main  aspect, we need consider the grievance of the assistants that  the High Court should have, as a consequence of its own  decision, set aside the promotions of graduate stenographers  as well, since those were illegal promotions.    We will, therefore, first deal with the appeals by the  stenographers.

5.              It is argued on behalf of the stenographers that  the High Court was in error in setting aside the order of the  Administrative Tribunal dated 6.7.1994 when the assistants  had not taken any step to get that order reviewed or  modified.  It is submitted that only after the decision in the  case of  L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and others  1997 (3)  SCC 261) that the High Court got jurisdiction to  entertain a proceeding against the decision of the  Administrative Tribunal and when the order was passed on  6.7.1994 by the Administrative Tribunal, only an appeal  could have been filed to the Supreme Court and in that  situation, in the subsequent writ petition, the High Court  was not competent to quash the order of the Administrative  Tribunal dated 6.7.1994.  It is also contended that in any  subsequent application filed by the assistants under Section  19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act (for short \023the Act\024),  the Administrative Tribunal could not have considered the  correctness or otherwise of the decision it had rendered  earlier and which had become final and consequently the  High Court while entertaining the writ petition challenging

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

the dismissal of the subsequent application by the  Administrative Tribunal, could not have set aside the order  earlier made on 6.7.1994 on the application filed by the  stenographers.  This contention raised, was met by the High  Court by pointing out that even though the assistants belong  to a different cadre, since there was a confluence of the two  streams leading to the promotional posts, the assistants had  locus standi to file an application under Section 19 of the Act  in which, to ventilate their grievances they could canvass the  correctness of the decision earlier rendered on 6.7.1994 by  the Administrative Tribunal.  The High Court referred to the  decision in  K. Ajit Babu and others vs. Union of India and  others [(1997) Supp 3 S.C.R. 56] to find that the proper  procedure to adopt by persons situated like the Assistants in  this case and who were not made parties to a prior decision  which had effect on their career, was to move an application  under Section 19 of the Act.  In that decision, this Court  noticed that even though the judgment of an Administrative  Tribunal may only be a judgment in personam, occasionally,  it could also operate as a judgment in rem and those affected  by it had the right to approach the Tribunal again with an  application under Section 19 of the Act when they are  affected as a consequence of the earlier decision and are  entitled to seek reconsideration of the view taken in the  earlier decision.  The High Court, following it, held that the  assistants had the locus standi to move the application  under Section 19 of the Act before the Tribunal and seek  reconsideration of the earlier decision passed by it without  notice to them and to show that the said order required  reconsidered or that it was not a legal or a proper one.  We  see no reason not to accept the reasoning adopted by the  High Court.  After all, the assistants who were not impleaded  in the earlier proceeding, must have an avenue to ventilate  their grievances.  This Court has indicated that that avenue  is an approach to the Tribunal and that was in a case in  which the very same Act was involved.  This Court had also  pointed out, what the Administrative Tribunal could do in  such a situation.  If this were not the position, the assistants  would be able to say that since they were not parties to the  earlier proceedings, they were not bound by it and they are  entitled to ignore the decision therein and that the said  decision cannot affect them since it would be a decision that  is void in law for non-compliance with the rules of natural  justice.  There is, therefore, no grace in the submissions that  the assistants could not have approached the Administrative  Tribunal with their grievance and the Tribunal could not  have consider their grievance or gone back on its earlier  decision.   We are in agreement with the approach made by  the High Court and the conclusion arrived at by it and hence  have no hesitation in overruling this contention.  The  argument that the jurisdiction of the High Court came to be  recognized only later, cannot change the situation, since  when the High Court entertained the writ petition it had the  jurisdiction to do so and it had jurisdiction also to consider  what was the effect of the earlier order or the proceeding  before it and whether the earlier order was legal and justified  in the context of the decision of this Court in Ajit Babu\022s  case (supra).    

6.              It is then contended that the Administrative  Tribunal was justified in passing the order dated 6.7.1994  since the qualifications prescribed for promotion were  unreasonable.  According to the stenographers, the Rules  clearly provided for double promotion and since the  assistants had not challenged the validity of the rules either

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

before the Administrative Tribunal or the High Court or in  this Court, the actions taken as a consequence, were also  not open to challenge in the light of the decisions of this  Court in Karam Pal and others vs. Union of India and  others (1985 (2) SCC 457) and Mohan Sing and others vs.  State of Punjab and others (1995 (4) SCC 151).   

7.              We agree with the High Court that when it passed  the order on 6.7.1994, the Administrative Tribunal had acted  beyond jurisdiction in prescribing qualifications of its own  while striking down what according to it was unreasonable  provisions.  First of all, there is nothing unreasonable  prescribing qualifications of promotion as was done in this  case and as rightly found by the High Court.  Secondly, even  if the relevant rules were liable to be struck down, it was not  for the Administrative Tribunal to re-enact that Rule as it  thought considered proper.  Once that conclusion is reached  and as has been found by the High Court no invalidity could  be found in the relevant rules for promotion, the obvious  consequence would be that all the promotions of the  stenographers became illegal.  In fact, the High Court in its  judgment has considered the relevant aspects and has come  to the conclusion that the decision dated 6.7.1994 was  unsustainable.  We do not think it necessary to reiterate the  reasons given by the High Court which has also noticed the  decision of this Court in J. Ranga Swami vs. Government  of Andhra Pradesh and others (AIR 1990 SC 535).  We  approve of the findings of the High Court.

8.              We also find it somewhat unpalatable that the  same vice-chairman, in the absence of the Chairman, sat on  the judicial side, quashed the rule and prescribed his own  qualifications for promotion of stenographers and on the  administrative side implemented that decision and promoted  the stenographers.  It would have been better if he had  awaited the appointment of a Chairman and left it to the  Chairman to implement the direction issued by the  Administrative Tribunal earlier.  A thing that is to be done  has not only to be done properly but also appear to be done  properly.  But this is only incidental and has no relevance to  the question falling for decision except for the contention  that the Vice-Chairman has no power to appoint, with which  we will deal later, if it becomes necessary.   

9.              Suffice it to say that we agree with the conclusion  of the High Court that the decision dated 6.4.1997 rendered  by the Administrative Tribunal was totally unsustainable and  the question of promotion has to be on the basis of the Rules  as they stood prior to the interference with it by the Tribunal.

10.             Thus, we find no merit in the appeals filed by the  stenographers and the cancellation of their promotions on  the basis they did not possess the requisite qualifications for  promotion as per the Rules.   

11.             We then come to the appeals filed by the  assistants.  Their grievance is that the High Court having  found that the order of the Administrative Tribunal dated  6.4.1997 was unsustainable and having found that the  amendments brought to the rules by it were also illegal and  unsustainable, should have followed up that finding by  setting aside the promotions of all the stenographers and   ought to have ordered a fresh consideration of the question  of promotions taking into account both the feeder channels.   We see considerable force in this submission.   What the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

High Court has done is to try and avert the cancellation of  certain stenographers who had graduate qualification, a  qualification prescribed by the Rules.  But having found that  the very order granting promotion, based as it was on a  wrong footing and that required interference in the light of its  decision, the High Court ought not to have shied away from  giving effect to its own conclusion.  After all, graduate  stenographers, if they are entitled to promotions as per the  Rules, would secure the promotion by the fresh exercise  undertaken. We have also indicated that the whole method  adopted by the vice-chairman was not proper and the  promotions were made improperly, was an irresistible  conclusion.  In the light of all this, we think that the  interests of justice would be sub-served only if the entire  promotions of stenographers made on the basis of the Rules  framed by itself by the Administrative Tribunal on its judicial  side are set aside.  To that extent we find substance in the  appeal filed by the assistants.

12.             We think that the proper course to adopt is to  undertake a fresh exercise of promoting the officers from  both streams in accordance with the Rules framed in that  regard.  But as the High Court held, the stenographers who  had been promoted and whose promotions have now been  cancelled, need not be visited with the penalty of having to  refund the higher salaries and allowances they have received  in the promotional posts.  Therefore, even while cancelling all  the promotions and directing a fresh exercise to be  undertaken, we direct that no recovery shall be made from  the salaries paid to the stenographers in regard to the period  they have worked in their promoted posts on the ground that  their promotions have now been quashed.   

13.             In the result, we dismiss Civil Appeal Nos.7474- 7477 of 2003 and allow the Civil Appeal Nos.7478-7481 of  2003.  We substantially affirm the decision of the High Court  but set aside in that part of it by which it declined to set  aside the promotions of graduate stenographers.  We direct  the undertaking of a fresh exercise regarding promotions of  those who are qualified in accordance with the Rules by the  concerned as expeditiously as possible.  We direct that there  shall be no recovery from the salaries and allowances paid to  the stenographers whose promotions are cancelled by the  High Court and by us while they worked in their promoted  posts.  The parties are directed to suffer their respective  costs in this Court.