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PETITIONER: RAM PRAKASH SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       24/10/1997

BENCH: M.M. PUNCHHI, S.P. KURDUKAR

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                THE 24TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1997 Present:                Hon’ble Mr.Justice M.M.Punchhi                Hon’ble Mr. Justice S.P.Kurdukar U.R.Lalit, Sr.Advs.  A.Sharan, A.P.Singh, Advs. with him for the appellant. H.L.Aggarwal, Sr.Adv.  (Kunwar Rajesh  Singh) Adv.  for B.B. Singh, Adv. with him for the Respondent.                       J U D G M E N T The following Judgment of the Court was delivered: S.P.KURDUKAR, J.      This Criminal  Appeal by  Special Leave is filed by the appellant (accused)  challenging the  judgment and  order of his conviction  and sentence  passed by  the Special  Judge, C.B.I., Patna,  and on appeal confirmed by the High Court of Patna for offences punishable under Sections 120-B read with 420 IPC  read with  5(1)(d) of  the Prevention of Corruption Act: 420/511  IPC, 468,  477-A  IPC;  4(3A)/5(1)(d)  of  the Prevention of  Corruption act  punishable under Section 5(2) of the  said Act and under Section 104 of the Insurance Act. The appellant  was sentenced  for various terms of RI on all these counts  and the  maximum sentence was being two years. All offences in question were alleged to have been committed by the appellant in 1974. 2.   The appellant  at the  relevant  time  was  working  as Development Officer  in the  Life Insurance  Corporation  of India (for  short ’LIC’) Dil Narain Singh who was co-accused was also  working with  LIC  as  Assistant  Branch  Manager, Patna. It  was alleged  by the  prosecution that  both these accused hatched  a  criminal  conspiracy  and  in  pursuance thereof introduced  some false  and take insurance proposals to the  Corporation in  the name  of non-existing  person as also without  the knowledge  and consent  of the  insurer in order to  ear undue  credit and promotions in the LIC on the basis of their inflated business. 3.   The three  proposals introduced  by the  appellant were the subject  matter of criminal trial.  (1) The proposal No. 10/913/518 (Ex.6) on the life of Sanjay Prasad son of Ganesh Prasad for  a sum  of Rs.  2.5 lacs,  (2) the  proposal  No. 107705/518 (Ex.6/1)  on the  life of Suresh Chandra Bajaj, a

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non-existent and  fictitious person  for a sum of Rs. 2 lacs and (3)  proposal No. 109417/518 (marked x/3) on the life of Sanjay Kumar  son of Gulzarbagh for a sum of Rs. one lac. In the appeal, we re however concerned with the proposal Nos. 1 and 2.  It was  alleged by the prosecution that proposal No. 107913/518  (Ex.6)  on  the  life  of  Sanjay  Prasad  under guardianship of  father Ganesh  Prasad (PW 10) was for a sum of Rs.  2.5 lacs.  The said  proposal was introduced without the knowledge  and consent  of Ganesh Prasad and a signature on the  proposal form  was forged  one.   This proposal  was faked one.   The  proposal form  (Ex. 8/1), the Moral Hazard Report (Ex.7),  the personal  statement regarding the health were forged by the appellant, Ganesh Prasad (PW 10) disowned the proposal  and signatures  thereon.   The  first  premium cheque of  Rs. 4575/- drawn on account No. 20/3 on Allahabad Bank was  dishonoured for  want of  sufficient funds.    The second cheque of Rs. 4100/- on Punjab National bank was also dishonoured.   Since both  the  cheques  towards  the  First premium were  dishonoured,  the  insurance  policy  was  not issued. 4.   The second proposal No. 107705/518 (Ex. 6/1) was in the name of  a fictitious  person Suresh Chandra Bajaj For Rs. 2 lacs. This  proposal was  written by  the appellant  and the signature  of   a  fictitious  person  purported  to  be  of Bhagwandin Bajaj  was also  forged. Chinta  Kumari  was  the agent of  this proposal.   The  cheques  towards  the  first premium  were  dishonoured  and  accordingly  the  insurance policy was  not issued.   It  was averred by the prosecution that the  dishonoured cheques  were issued by the appellant. The introduction  of the  proposals and Moral Hazard Reports were prepared by the appellant and Dip Narain Sing knowingly that both  these proposals were fake.  This was done by them with  a   view  to  show  the  inflated  business  and  earn promotions.  The  LIC  after  coming  to  know  about  these proposals, lodged  the FIR  against the  appellant  and  Dip Narain Singh.    After  Completing  the  investigation,  the appellant and Dip Narain Singh were put up for trial for the aforesaid offences. 5.   The appellant  denied the  allegations levelled against him and  pleaded that  he did  not  commit  any  offence  of cheating, forgery  or prepared the fraudulent documents.  he was falsely implicated in the present crime at the behest of Mr. J.P.  Shah, the superior officer in the LIC at Patna who was not  having good  equation with  him.   While  imparting training to the Insurance Agents, he was required to fill in the forms  and while doing so, he had filled in the proposal forms which  were rough work, Somebody without his knowledge submitted these  proposals to  implicate him  in the present crime.  He further states that there was neither any loss to the Corporation  nor any  pecuniary gain  to him  from these proposals.   He pleaded  that he  was  innocent  and  he  be acquitted. 6.   The prosecution  in support  of its  case  examined  24 witnesses including  the hand writing expert and produced on record the  original proposal  forms in respect of these two proposals.  The appellant examined five witnesses in support of his defence. 7.   The Special  Judge, Patna,  after scrutinizing the oral and other documentary evidence on record by his judgment and order dated  December 10,  1990, convicted the appellant for the charged  offences and  sentenced him  on each  count for various terms  of sentences  maximum being three years.  All substantive sentences  wee ordered to run concurrently.  The criminal appeal filed by the appellant before the High Court of  Patna   was  dismissed  but,  however,  the  High  Court

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substituted the  sentence of three years RI to two years RI. Subject to  this modification,  the appeal was dismissed. It is against these two concurrent judgments, the appellant has filed this appeal in this Court. 8.   We have  gone through  the judgment of the courts below very carefully  and other  materials on  record.   The  High Court in  its exhaustive  judgment has  discussed threadbare all  the  points  very  carefully  and  concluded  that  the judgment and  order passed by the Special Judge did not call for any  interference subject  to reduction  of sentence  as indicated  above.     All  sentences  were  ordered  to  run concurrently. 9.   It was  contended on  behalf of  the appellant that the prosecution had  failed to  prove  that  the  appellant  had forged the  signatures on  these two  proposals.   The  hand writing expert  had also  opined that the signatures on both these two  proposals could  not be  conclusively said  to be that of  the appellant.   In this view of the matter, it was urged that  the appellant  could  not  have  been  convicted either under  Section 420  or under Sections 68, 4/1 or 477A simplicitor or  with the  aid of  Section 120-B  IPC.   This submission is without any substance because the proposal No. 107705/518 (Ex.6/1)  was admittedly  in the  name  of  anon- existent person.   It was not seriously challenged before us on the  basis of the opinion of the hand writing expert that the contents of this proposal were in the hand writing o the appellant, although  the signature could not be proved to be in the  hand writing  of the  appellant.   This proposal was introduced by  chinta Kumari,  the agent.   Admittedly,  the appellant had  submitted a Moral Hazard Report under his own signature.   It is  true that  Chinta Kumari,  the agent who sponsored this  proposal was  not examined.  This factor was also taken into account by the courts below.  The defence of the appellant was that he was then imparting training to the newly recruited agents and in that process, he had filled in the proposal forms.  It was a rough work which was not to be used for  any purpose much less for sponsoring the proposal. As regards  the defence  plea of  training to  be  given  by Development Officer  (the appellant)  to the newly recruited agents, both the courts below have concurrently held that it was never  the practice  nor  it  was  obligatory  upon  the appellant to  give such  training nor  Fill in  the proposal forms.  The High Court in its judgment has extensively dealt with  this  issue  and  after  discussing  the  evidence  of K.S.S.Sinha (PW  4) and  other materials on record held that the claim  of appellant  that he  was giving training to the newly recruited  insurance agents could not be accepted.  We are in agreement with this finding.  There was not denial on behalf of  the appellant  that he  had submitted  the  Moral Hazard Report.   The  said report  did mention the fact that insurer Suresh Chandra Bajaj was a living person at the time of proposal.   It  could not  be accepted that the appellant had made  no inquiries  about the  existence of the insurer. it was,  therefore, rightly  held that  it was  a deliberate attempt on  the part  of the  appellant and  also a  part of conspiracy to  introduce such  fake proposal  with a view to inflate the insurance business and earn the promotion. 10.  As regards  proposal No.  107913/518 (Ex.6)  on  Sanjay Prasad son  of Ganesh  Prasad, it  was found  by the  courts below that Ganesh Prasad (PW 10) had never consented to such proposal.   He, however,  admitted that  he had  issued  the cheque for  the premium but according to him, he was told by the appellant  that this  premium was  in respect of his own policy.   It was  contended on  behalf of the appellant that Ganesh  Prasad  (PW  10)  had  given  his  evidence  in  the

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departmental enquiry  stating that  he consented to the said policy and  on the basis of this evidence, the appellant was exonerated.   As against  this, in the present trial, Ganesh Prasad pw  10) had  given a contrary statement.  Taking clue therefrom, if  was urged  that the evidence of Ganesh Prasad be rejected.   We  have gone  through the evidence of Ganesh Prasad (PW  10). We  find that  the explanation given by him was acceptable  and the courts below have committed no error in accepting his evidence as credible one. 11.  It was  then contended  in support  of this appeal that there was  no loss  to the  Corporation since  the insurance policies were  not issued.   It  was  also  urged  that  the appellant also  did  not  gain  any  benefit  out  of  these proposals.   It is  true that  policies were not issued and, therefore, no  benefit as  such was accrued to the appellant but the  LIC had  led evidence before the Court to show that the Corporation  had to spend money on stationery as well as the clearance  charge etc.   It  was in these circumstances, the High  Court had  held that  there was  a loss,  might be negligible, to the Corporation but the fact remains that the appellant sought  to take advantage of his inflated business for the year 1974. We are in agreement with this finding. 12.  It was  then contended for the appellant that there was no valid  sanction to  prosecute the  appellant.  To be more precise, the  contention was  that the  letter  of  sanction produced on  record suffers  from non-application of mind to the materials  placed before  the sanctioning authority.  We see no substance in this contention also because sanctioning authority after considering the materials on record accorded the sanction to prosecution the appellant. 13.  It needs  to be  emphasised that  the appellant being a Development Officer  owed a grater responsibility to the LIC as well  as to  the clients  and any  such faked  or  forged proposals bound to harm the reputation of the LIC.  It is in these circumstances,  in our  opinion, the courts below were right in convicting the appellant for the offences for which he was tried. 14.  Coming to  the question  of sentence,  it needs  to  be noted that  the occurrence  took place some time in 1974 and the charge  sheet was  filed in  the year  1977.   More than twenty years  have passed.    Besides  this,  by  reason  of conviction, the  appellant  may  loose  his  job  and  other retrial benefits,  if any.   From  the judgment of the trial court, it  appears that the appellant was then 44 years old. By now,  he might  have been  superannuated or  likely to be superannuated.  Bearing in mind the passaged of time, we are of the  opinion that  in the  facts and circumstances of the case, ends  of justice  would be met if the sentence awarded to appellant  is altered  to  simple  imprisonment  for  six months on  each count  for which  he was found guilty by the courts below. 15.  For the  reasons recorded  hereinabove, we maintain the conviction of  the appellant  on each  count but altered the sentence to  six months  simple imprisonment  on each count. All  sentences   to  run   concurrently.  Subject   to  this modification in the sentence, the appeal to stand dismissed. Appellant to  surrender to  his bailbonds  to serve  out the remaining part of the sentence, if any.