http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: RAM NARAIN ARORA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ASHA RANI & ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       31/08/1998

BENCH: A.S. ANAND, S. RAJENDRA BABU.

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                 THE 31ST DAY OF AUGUST, 1998 Present:                Hon’ble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand                Hon’ble Mr. Justice S. Rajendra Babu Ranjit Kumar, Chandra Bhushan Prasad, Ms. Binu Tamta and Ms. Anu Mohla, Advs. for the appellant Gopal  Subramanianiam,   Sr.  Adv.,  S.K.  Mathur  and  V.B. Saharya, Advs.  for M/s.  Saharya &  Co., advs. with him for the Respondents                       J U D G M E N T      The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:      Rajendra Babu, J.      This is  a  tenant’s  appeal  arising  out  of  certain proceedings initiated  under  the  Delhi  Rent  Control  Act (hereinafter referred  to as  "the  Act").  the  respondent- landlord filed  a petition  under section 14(1)(e) read with Section 258  of the  Act seeking  for the  possession of the house by  evicting the appellant as he required the same for his bona  fide need  and occupation. The appellant before us filed his written statement contending that the landlord has alternate  accommodation   at  Subzi   Mandi  and   he   has deliberately  shifted  to  the  disputed  premises  with  an ulterior motive  to make  out a case for the eviction of the respondent  and  this  fact  of  availability  of  the  said premises in subzi Mandi had not disclosed in the petition.      In the  course  of  the  proceedings  before  the  Rent Controller a finding was recorded by him as to the bona fide requirement of the respondent in the following terms:-      "If the accommodation in occupation      of the  petitioner  on  the  ground      floor of  the house  in dispute  is      compared with  the  extent  of  the      family members  of  the  petitioner      excluding of  course  Kisahn  Sarup      Bhatnagar, the  petitioner would be      said   to    be   too    short   of      accommodation and if the petitioner      does not  have any  other  suitable      residential accommodation he should      be entitled to an eviction order.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

    On the  question whether  the respondent  had disclosed the full  fats necessary  for the  disposal of  the petition filed by  him, the  Rent Controller  noticed that  from  the evidence recorded, the allegation of respondent No. 1 in the written  statement   in  respect  of  the  accommodation  in possession and  available to  respondent in  No. 2772, Subzi Mandi, Delhi  stands proved.  And, therefore he has not come to the  Court  with  clean  hands.  He  had  suppressed  the information  which   was  in   his  possession   as  to  the availability of  the house  at Subzi  Mandi at  the time  of filing of  the petition  and as  well  as  filing  of  their replication.  He  surrendered  this  accommodation  only  on 21.8.1984, that is, during the pendency of the petition. The respondent No.  1 has  alleged that the appellant shifted to the ground  floor of the house in dispute about a year prior to 1.1.1983  and the  petition was  filed on  24.7.1983.  he accepted the  stand of the appellant that the respondent had done so with the mala fide intention to avict him.      Matter was  carried to  the High Court in Revision. The High Court agreed with the finding of the Rent Controller as regards bona fide requirement of the landlord-respondent. On the controversy of the non-mentioning of the availability of accommodation at  2772, Subzi  Mandi and  that there was not true disclosure  of the  facts, the  High court examined the matter in  detail. The High Court noticed that father of the respondent Din  Dayal Bhatnagar  had rented  the premises at 2772, Subzi  Mandi  from  a  Trust  in  the  year  1944  and thereafter he  was residing  in the  said premises  with his family. Din  Dayal Bhatnagar  died in  the month  of  August 1980.  After  his  death,  Rameshwar  Sarup  Bhatnagar,  the original petitioner  in the  eviction petition  continued to reside in that accommodation at Subzi Mandi where his father was a  tenant. Rameshwar  Sarup Bhatnagar  shifted from  the said accommodation  to the  ground floor  accommodation when the same  became available  to him  sometime  in  1982.  The landlord of  Subzi Mandi  property had  served a notice upon the respondent  to vacate  the premise in the year 1981. The actual possession  of the  Subzi Mandi house was handed over to the landlord in March 1984 as per receipt at Ex. AW1/1 to AW1/3. The  said receipts  disclose the  name of  Din  Dayal Bhatnagar though  he had  demised long  back  and  thus  the landlord  did   not  accept   or  recognize  the  respondent Rameshwar Sarup  Bhatnagar as  a tenant. For about two years prior to  the actual  handing over  of the possession of the premises, the  same remained  locked an in possession of the respondent, Since  Rameshwar Sarup  Bhatnagar had shifted to the suit  property along  with his  family in the year 1982. The High  Court felt that in the peculiar facts of this case it was  necessary to  examine whether the said accommodation could be  said to  be "other reasonably suitable residential accommodation available  to the respondent" and held firstly that the  respondent had shifted to the in the suit premises long before  filing of the present eviction petition and the Subzi  Mandi   accommodation  was  not  reasonably  suitable residential accommodation  available for him and his family. Secondly in  view of  the notice  of eviction  served on the respondent by  the landlord  of the subzi Mandi property. he was under  pressure of being evicted from the said premises. The High Court was of the view that the respondent could not be said  to have other reasonably suitable accommodation and therefore non-disclosure  thereof could  not be fatal to the petition and on that basis allowed the petition.      Shri Ranjit  Kumar, learned  counsel for  the appellant submitted that  the landlord  had not  approached the  Court with  the   necessary  candor  required  under  law  in  not

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

disclosing the availability of the premises. In the petition filed before  the Rent  Controller by the landlord at column No. 18, he has claimed that the suit premises is required by him for  his occupation for himself and member of his family dependent on  him and  he has  no other  reasonably suitable residential accommodation.  Again in  column No.  19 at para (vi), the respondent states that he has no other residential accommodation except  the suit  property. In  the  affidavit filed by  the respondent, the appellant has no answer to the petition filed  by the  respondent for  his eviction. He has referred to  the accommodation  in house No. 2772, Gali Lala Ram Roop,  Subzimandi in the 1st floor and the 2nd floor. He also refers  to one  more accommodation  in Subzimandi which the respondent has deliberately concealed from the Court. It is claimed  that in  the written  statement this position is reiterated.  In   the  Rejoinder   Affidavit  filed  by  the respondent, he  stated that it is wrong to state that he has any residential  accommodation in  House No. 2772, Gali Lala Ram Roop,  Subzi Mandi  as alleged  and he has no portion in his possession  and he has also denied that he has any other residential house in Subzi Mandi. The Secretary of the Trust who own  the property at No. 2772, Subzi Mandi, Delhi stated that the  property had  been originally let out to Din Dayal Bhatnagar and  he died  about three years back. The original respondent was  the son  of Din Dayal Bhatnagar and the same remained locked for about two years and thereafter Rameshwar Sarup Bhatnagar delivered vacant possession to them in 1984. He  stated   that  he  has  no  personal  knowledge  of  the accommodation available in the suit premises.      In the  course of  the  affidavit  of  Rameshwar  Sarup Bhatnagar, it  was stated  that he  was not in possession of any part  of the  property and  Din Dayal  Bhatnagar  was  a tenant of  the property  which he  has vacated on 21.3.1984. His father  was a  tenant of the first floor and the barsati on the  second floor. Three rooms with kitchen and bath were in tenancy  of his father and he cannot say that the size of one room was 14" x 18" and that the barsati was a pucca room and had  a door.  The trust  has given  a notice  to him  to vacate the premises in 1981.      Shri Ranjit  Kumar, learned  counsel for  the appellant contended that  under Section  25B(8) proviso, the powers of revision of the High Court were limited and would not extend to the  re-examination of  findings of  fact in the case and suppression of  the fact  as  to  the  availability  of  the premises was  one such  finding. The  rent  Controller  also found that with a mala fide intention to evict the appellant from the  suit premises  he shifted  the suit  premises from Subzi Mandi. In support of his contention he relied upon the decision in Hari Shankar vs. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury 1962 (Supp- 1)  SCR 933,  and Sushila Devi and Others vs. Avinash Chandra Jain  and Others (1987) 2 SCC 219. He submitted that unless the  findings are  manifestly unjust  the High  Court could not have interfered in the matter.      Shri Gopal  Subramaniam, learned Senior Advocate in his reply  submitted   that  the   power  of  revision  includes correction of  errors of  law and on occasions would include intervention of findings of facts where the right of a party is involved  which is  conferred on  a party;  that when the bona fide  requirement of  the landlord was established, the fact that  there was  suppression of  certain  fact  becomes extraneous;  that   the  trial   court  having   taken  into consideration the  accommodation available  in  Subzi  Mandi premises came  to the conclusion that the requirement of the landlord  was  bona  fide,  but  even  so  it  came  to  the conclusion that the suppression would not affect the case at

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

all; that  pleas are  raised in order to put the other party to notice  and when  the  other  party  is  already  in  the knowledge of  such information, the relevance of the lack of pleadings is  of no  effect; that ascertainment of facts for the purpose  of finding are requirement whether bona fide or not is a matter of detail and that exercise has been done in this case.  Therefore, he submitted relying on the decisions in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (Mrs) vs. Traders & Agencies and another (1996)  5 SCC  344, and  Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander and Others (1988) 3 SCC 131, that the view taken by the High Court must be upheld.      Section 141(1) (e) of the Act reads as follows : -      " Sec. 14(1) (e). that the premises      let for  residential  purposes  are      required bona  fide by the landlord      for occupation  as a  residence for      himself or  for any  member of  his      family dependent  on him,  if he is      the  owner   thereof,  or  for  any      person  for   whose   benefit   the      premises  are  held  and  that  the      landlord  or  such  person  has  no      other      reasonably      suitable      residential accommodation:      In making  a claim  that the  suit premises is required bona fide  for his own occupation as a residence for himself and other members of his family dependent on him and that he has  no   other  reasonably   suitable  accommodation  is  a requirement of  law before  the Court  can state whether the landlord requires  the premises  bona fide  for his  use and occupation. In  doing so,  the  Court  must  also  find  out whether the  landlord or such other person for whose benefit the premises  is required  has no  other reasonably suitable residential  accommodation.  It  cannot  be  said  that  the requirement of  the landlord  is  not  intermixed  with  the question of  finding out whether he has any other reasonably suitable accommodation.  If he has other reasonably suitable accommodation, then  necessarily it  would mean that he does not require the suit premises and his requirement may not be bona fide.  In such  circumstances further  inquiry would be whether  that  premises  is  more  suitable  than  the  suit premises. Therefore,  the questions  raised before the Court would not  necessarily depend  upon only  the pleadings.  It could  be  a  good  defence  that  the  landlord  has  other reasonably suitable  residential accommodation  and  thereby defend the claim of the landlord.      There cannot  be a  pedantic or  a dogmatic approach in the matter  of analysis  of pleadings  or  of  the  evidence adduced thereto.  It is  no doubt true that if the pleadings are clearly  set out,  it would  be easy  for the  Court  to decide the  matters. But  if the  pleadings are  lacking  or vague and  if both parties have understood what was the case pleaded and  put forth  with reference to requirement of law and placed  such material before the court, neither party is prejudiced. If  we analyses from this angle, we do not think that the  High Court  was not  justified in interfering with the order made by the Rent Controller.      It is no doubt true that the scope of revision petition under Section  25B(8) proviso  of the Delhi Rent Control Act is very  limited one,  but even so in examining the legality or propriety  of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, the High Court could examine the facts available in order to find out  whether he  had correctly  or on  firm legal basis approached the  matters on  record to  decide the case. Pure findings of  fact may not be open to be interfered with, but

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

in a  given case  the finding  of fact  is given  on a wrong premise of law, certainly it would be open to the revisional court to  interfere with  such a  matter. In  this case, the Rent Controller  proceeded to  analyses the matter that non- disclosure  of  a  particular  information  was  fatal  and, therefore, dismissed  the claim  made by the landlord. It is in these  circumstances it  became necessary  for  the  High Court to  re-examine the  matter and  then decide the entire question. We do not think that any of the decisions referred to by  the learned  counsel decides the question of the same nature with  which we  are  concerned.  Therefore,  detailed reference to them is not required.      In the result, this appeal stands dismissed, but in the circumstances of  the case,  parties shall  bear  their  own costs.      In the facts and circumstances of the case. it would be appropriate that the appellant be allowed time to vacate the premises till  31st of  May, 1999  subject to his furnishing the usual  undertaking in  the Court  within four weeks from today.