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PETITIONER: RAM DASS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ISHWAR CHANDER AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT09/05/1988

BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) PATHAK, R.S. (CJ) NATRAJAN, S. (J)

CITATION:  1988 AIR 1422            1988 SCR  Supl. (1) 239  1988 SCC  (3) 131        JT 1988 (2)   426  1988 SCALE  (1)1137  CITATOR INFO :  R          1991 SC 744  (10)

ACT:      Constitution of  India, 1950-Article  136-Bonafide need of  landlord   of   accommodation-Eviction   of   tenant-All conclusions  drawn   from  primary   facts-Not   necessarily questions of  law-Often are  pure questions of fact-Bonafide requirement is one such.      East Punjab  Rent Restrictions  Act, 1949:  Section 15- Tenant-Eviction of-On  ground of  bonafide need of landlord- High Court-Jurisdiction  of-To interfere  in  revision-Court can take  cautious cognizance  of subsequent events to mould relief.

HEADNOTE:      The appellant  and  the  respondents  were  tenants  of separate portions  of the  premises which  was later sold by the landlord to the respondents, who were four brothers. The respondents filed  a petition  for eviction of the appellant on the  ground of  bonafide requirement. They contended that they were in all 10 brothers, who, alongwith their families, were  living   together   with   their   father,   and   the accommodation in their occupation was insufficient for their needs.      The  Rent   Controller  upheld   the   claim   of   the respondents.  The   Appellate  Authority  (District  Judge), however, allowed  the appellant’s appeal. The High Court, in revision  under   section  15(5),   reversed  the  appellate judgment and restored that of the Court of first instance.      Before this Court the appellant contended:      (1) That  the High  Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction was  precluded from  re-opening the findings of fact recorded  by the  appellate authority; and (2) that the findings of  the High  Court on reappraisal of evidence were wholly erroneous.      Dismissing the appeal, it was, ^      HELD: (1)  It was,  no doubt,  true that  the  question whether the  requirement of the landlord was bonafide or not was essentially one of

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240 fact, notwithstanding  the circumstance  that a  finding  of fact in  that behalf  was a  secondary and  inferential fact drawn from other primary or perceptive ones. All conclusions drawn from  primary facts were not necessarily, questions of law. They  could be, and quite often were, pure questions of fact. The  question as to bonafide requirement was one such. [242G-H]      (2)  The  landlord’s  desire  for  possession,  however honest it  might otherwise  be, had  inevitably a subjective element in  it, and  that "desire" to become a "requirement" in law must have the objective element of a "need". [243C]      (3) Statute  had been  enacted to  afford protection to tenants  from   eviction.  In   considering  the  reasonable requirement of the landlord the court must take all relevant circumstances into  consideration  so  that  the  protection afforded by  law to  the  tenant  was  not  rendered  merely illusory or whittled down. [243A, C-D]      (4)  Subject  to  the  well-known  limitations  of  all revisional jurisdictions,  the  scope  of  revisional  power essentially turned  on the language of the statute investing the revisional jurisdiction. [243E]      (5) Section  15(5) of the Act enabled the High Court to satisfy itself  as to  the "legality  and propriety"  of the order under  revision, which  was quite  obviously,  a  much wider jurisdiction  in the exercise of which, an appropriate case, the  High Court  could reappraise  the evidence if the finding of  the appellate  court was  found to  be infirm in law. [243G; 244F]      (6) Courts  could take  a ’cautious-cognizance’  of the subsequent-events in order to mould the relief. [245F-G]      Mattulal v.  Radhe  Lal,  [1975]  1  SCR  127;  Phiroze Bamanji Desai  v. Chandrakant  M. Patel,  [1974] 3  SCR 267; Bell &  Co. Ltd.  v. Waman  Hemraj, AIR  1938 Bom. 223; Hari Shankar v.  Girdhari  Lal  Chowdhury,  (AIR  1963  SC  698); Dattonpant Gopalvarao  Devakata v.  Vithalrao Marutirao, AIR 1975  SC  1111  and  M/s  Ranalakshmi  Dyeing  &  Others  v. Rangaswamy, referred to.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2969 of 1984.      From the  Judgment and  Order dated  29.5.1984  of  the Punjab 241 and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 1934 of 1982.      Harbans Lal and Balmokand Goyal for the Appellant.      V.C. Mahajan and K.R. Nagaraja for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:      VENKATACHALIAH, J.  This appeal,  by special  Leave, by the tenant  arises  out  of  the  proceedings  for  eviction instituted  against   him  under   the  East   Punjab   Rent Restriction Act  1949 and is preferred against the judgment, dated, 29.5.1984  in Civil  Revision No. 1934 of 1982 of the Punjab and  Haryana  High  Court,  reversing  the  judgment, dated,  30.4.1982   made   by   the   Appellate   Authority, Kapurthala, in Rent Appeal No. 130 and restoring that of the Rent Controller,  dated, 17.12.1978  in rent  case no. 47 of 1977, granting possession to the Respondent-landlords.      2. Appellant  was a tenant of the premises concerned in the proceedings  on a  monthly  rent  of  Rs.3  having  been inducted into possession on 9.12.1965 by the then owner Smt. Manohar  Kaur.   The  premises  in  the  occupation  of  the

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appellant consist  of a  portion of  the ground-floor of the building. On  15.12.1976, the  said Manohar  Kaur  sold  the entire property  in favour  of respondents.  The respondents are  four   brothers.  Prior  to  the  purchase,  they  were occupying, as  tenants, other  portions of the same building both in  the first  floor and the second floor. They were in occupation of  three rooms in the first floor and one in the second.      On 27.9.1977, respondents filed a petition for eviction of the  appellant  on  the  ground  of  their  own  bonafide requirement of  the premises.  They alleged that the portion in their  occupation was  insufficient for  their needs  and that they  required additional accommodation. They said that they were  in all 10 brothers who, alongwith their families, were living together with their father.      3. Appellant  contested  the  claim,  urging  that  the first-respondent one  of the  brothers, was in occupation of other rented-premises  in the  same town  at a  place called Mohalla Malka-na;  that the  respondents’ father was himself in occupation  of  a  separate  rented  premises;  that  the accommodation already available to the respondents was 242 more  than  sufficient  for  their  requirements  and  that, accordingly,  their   projected  need   was  fictitious  and malafide. Appellant  also said  that  the  proceedings  were brought in collusion with the previous owner.      4.  On  an  appreciation  of  the  evidence,  the  Rent Controller upheld  the claim  of the  landlords and  made an order granting possession. The Appellate Authority (District Judge) however, allowed appellants’ appeal and set-aside the order of  eviction. The High Court in revision under Section 15(5)  of  the  Act  reversed  the  appellate  judgment  and restored that  of the court of first instance. The aggrieved tenant has come-up by special leave.      5. In  support of the appeal, Shri Harbans Lal, learned senior advocate,  urged that  the order  of the  High  Court suffers from,  and stands  vitiated, by, two serious errors: The first,  according to  the learned  counsel, is  that the High Court,  in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, was precluded from  reopening findings  of facts recorded by the Appellate-Authority and  substituting fresh  findings of its own on  a reappraisal  of the  evidence even  if  the  fresh findings so  recorded could  be said  to  be  amongst  those possible on the evidence. Learned Counsel placed reliance on Mattulal v.  Radhe Lal, [1975] 1 SCR 127 and Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel & Ors., [1974] 3 SCR 267.      The second is that the findings as to the bonafides, or the lack  of it,  of the  alleged need  for the  additional- accommodation  recorded  by  the  Appellate  Authority  were sound, proper  and supportable on the evidence on record and the High  Court in  exercise of  its revisional jurisdiction could not  have reappraised the evidence afresh and that the findings  so  substituted  by  the  High  Court  are  wholly erroneous.      Sh. V.C.  Mahajan,  learned  senior  advocate  for  the respondent-landlords, however,  sought to  support the order of the High Court.      6. Upon  a consideration  of the  matter, we are of the view that  both the  contentions urged  in  support  of  the appeal are in-substantial.      It is,  no doubt,  true that  the question  whether the requirement  of   the  landlords   is  bonafide  or  not  is essentially one  of fact,  notwithstanding the  circumstance that a  finding of  fact is a secondary and inferential fact drawn from other primary or perceptive ones. All conclusions

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drawn from  primary-facts are  not necessarily, questions of law. They  can be,  and quite  often are,  pure questions of fact. The question as to bonafide requirement is one such. 243      Statutes enacted  to afford  protection to tenants from eviction on  the basis  of contractual rights of the parties make the  resumption of  possession by the land-lord subject to the  satisfaction of certain statutory conditions. One of them is the bonafide requirement of the land-lord, variously described  in   the  statutes  as  "bona-fide  requirement", "reasonable   requirement",    "bona-fide   and   reasonable requirement" or,  as in  the case  of the  present  statute, merely referred  to as  "landlord requires for his own use". But the  essential idea  basic to all such cases is that the need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, conceived in good  faith; and  that,  further,  the  court  must  also consider it  reasonable to  gratify  that  need.  Landlord’s desire for  possession however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably  a subjective  element in  it and  that, that desire, to  become a  "requirement" in  law  must  have  the objective element of a "need". It must also be such that the court considers it reasonable and, therefore, eligible to be gratified. In  doing so,  that court  must take all relevant circumstances into  consideration  so  that  the  protection afforded by  law  to  the  tenant  is  not  rendered  merely illusory or whittled down.      7. On  the first  contention that the revisional powers do not extend to interference with and upsetting of findings of fact,  it needs to be observed that, subject to the well- known limitations  inherent in all revisional jurisdictions, the matter  essentially turns on the language of the statute investing the  jurisdiction. The  decisions relied  upon  by Shri  Harbans  Lal,  deal,  in  the  first  case,  with  the limitations on  the scope  of interference  with findings of fact  in   second-appeals  and   in  the  second,  with  the limitation on  the revisional  powers where the words in the statute limit it to the examination whether or not the order under revision  is "according  to law."  The  scope  of  the revisional powers of the High Court, where the High Court is required to  be satisfied that the decision is "according to law" is  considered by  Beaument C.J.  in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj,  AIR 1938  Bombay 223  a case referred to with approval by  this Court  in Hari  Shankar  v.  Girdhari  Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698.      But here,  Section 15(5)  of the  Act enables  the High Court to  satisfy itself  as to the "legality and propriety" of the  order under  revision, which  is, quite obviously, a much wider jurisdiction. That jurisdiction enables the court of  revision,   in  appropriate   cases,  to   examine   the correctness of  the  findings  of  facts  also,  though  the revisional court  is not  "a second  court of  first appeal" (See Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Marutirao). 244      Referring to  the nature  and scope  of the  revisional jurisdiction and  the limitations inherent in the concept of a ‘Revision’  this Court  in M/s. Ranalakshmi Dyeing Works & Ors. v.  Rangaswamy Chettier,  [1980] 2  RCJ  165  (at  167) observed:           "..... 2.  "Appeal" and "revision" are expressions           of  common   usage  in  Indian  statutes  and  the           distinction between  "appellate jurisdiction"  and           "revisional jurisdiction" is well known though not           well defined.  Ordinarily, appellate  jurisdiction           involves a  rehearing, as  it were, on law as well           as fact  and is  invoked by  an aggrieved  person.

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         Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some           way as,  for instance has been done in the case of           second appeals  under the  Code of Civil Procedure           and  under   some  Rent   Acts  in   some  States.           Ordinarily,  again,   revisional  jurisdiction  is           analogous to  a power  of superintendence  and may           sometimes be  exercised  even  without  its  being           invoked by  a  party.  The  extent  of  revisional           jurisdiction is  defined by the statute conferring           such jurisdiction ..................... Revisional           jurisdiction   as   ordinarily   understood   with           reference to  our statutes  is always  included in           appellate jurisdiction  but not  vice-versa. These           are general  observations.  The  question  of  the           extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction has           to be  considered in  each case  with reference to           the language employed by the statute ......"      The  criticism   of  Sri   Harbans  Lal   that  it  was impermissible  for   the  High   Court  in   its  revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the  appellate authority,  however erroneous  they be, is not, having  regard to  the language in which the revisional power is  couched, tenable. In an appropriate case, the High Court can  reappraise the  evidence if  the findings  of the appellate court are found to be infirm in law.      8. Now  to the second contention. The High Court was of the view  that certain  findings recorded  by the  Appellate Authority  on   the  question   of  the   bonafides  of  the requirement of  the landlords  were based  on material which was not  quite relevant.  Secondly, the High Court took into account certain  subsequent events  brought  on  record.  In regard to the first aspect, the High Court observed:           "......  According   to  the   learned   Appellate           Authority there was no evidence on record to prove           that the landlords were 245           ten brothers  since their  father had  not come in           the witnessbox  to depose  in  this  regard.  This           approach of  the learned  Appellate  Authority  is           without wrong  and illegal.  There was  nothing to           disbelieve Ishwar  Chander when  he says that they           are ten  brothers. No  question was  put to him in           the  cross-examination   to  challenge   the  said           statement of his ......" The High  Court noticed  that so  far as  the premises which were said  to be  in the  occupation of  the Ishwar  Chander (Respondent No.  1)  were  concerned,  the  owner  of  those premises was  seeking resumption  of possession. Further, in respect of  the accommodation  in the  hands of the farther, there were  already proceedings  for  eviction  against  him binding decision in the High Court.      In regard to the subsequent events which the High Court took notice of it said:           "..... Thus,  what has  to be  seen is whether the           accommodation in  their occupation  is  sufficient           for their  requirements or  not. Of course, out of           the four  landlords, one is married and the others           were unmarried  when the ejectment application was           filed in the year 1977. However, about seven years           have passed since then. Mean-while, Surinder Kumar           landlord has  also been married and he has got one           son aged  2 years,  whereas Subhash Chand has also           been recently  married in  March, 1984, as per the           affidavit of Hukam Chand, father of the landlords,           dated 27th  May, 1984.  Thus, there was nothing on

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         the record  to show that the present accommodation           in occupation  of the  landlords was sufficient to           meet their requirements ....." Courts can  take a  ‘cautious-cognizance of  the subsequent- events in  order to  mould the  relief. The  High Court  did that.’ No fault could be found with that.      9. CMP  No. 33347 is filed by the appellant, seeking to bring certain  subsequent  events  on  record.  The  alleged subsequent event  is  that  pursuant  to  an  agreement  for purchase of another residential building entered into by the first respondent  and his wife, a sale deed had subsequently come to  be executed  in favour  of first respondent’s wife. The contention  is that  having regard  to this  subsequent- acquisition, the  present claim for additional accommodation does not survive. 246 We are afraid this circumstance, even if true, will not tilt the balance  in favour of the appellant. Even if the need of the other  three brothers  who are  co-owners is  taken into account, the  order of  eviction is supportable on the basis of ther  need. CMP is, therefore, of no practical assistance to the appellant.      10. In  the result,  we find  no merit  in this  appeal which is  accordingly dismissed,  but without an order as to costs. R.S.S.                                     Appeal dismissed. 247