RAKHI RAY Vs HIGH COURT OF DELHI .
Case number: C.A. No.-001133-001135 / 2010
Diary number: 31063 / 2008
Advocates: BINA GUPTA Vs
NARESH KUMAR
RAKHI RAY & ORS. v.
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI & ORS. (Civil Appeal Nos. 1133-1135 of 2010)
FEBRUARY 01, 2010 [K.G. Balakrishnan CJI., Deepak Verma and Dr. B.S. Chauhan, JJ.]
2010 (2) SCR 239
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Applications for permission to file Special Leave Petitions are granted.
2. Leave granted.
3. These appeals have been filed for seeking directions to the
respondents i.e. the High Court of Delhi and the Lt. Governor of Delhi to offer
the appointment to the appellants on the posts in the cadre of District Judges
in Delhi Judicial Service.
4. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that in order
to fill up 20 vacancies in the cadre of District Judge in Delhi, the respondent
No.1, the High Court of Delhi, issued an advertisement dated 19.5.2007. Out
of these 20 vacancies, 13 were to be filled up from the General Category
candidates; 3 from Scheduled Castes; and 4 from Scheduled Tribes.
Appellants who belong to General Category, faced the selection process. The
result was declared on 3.1.2008. Appellants found place in the merit list but
much below. All the 13 vacancies in the said category were filled according to
the merit list of General Category candidates. However, two posts reserved
for Scheduled Castes candidates and four posts meant for Scheduled Tribes
candidates could not be filled up for non availability of suitable candidates.
5. Certain unsuccessful candidates approached the Delhi High Court by
filing Writ Petition Nos. 2688/2008, 2913/2008 and 3932/2008 on the ground
that 13 vacancies came into existence between 29.2.2008 and 23.5.2008 i.e.
during the pendency of the selection process which could have also been
filled up from the said select list in view of the judgment of this Court in Malik
Mazhar Sultan & Anr. v. U.P. Public Service Commission & Ors. (2007) 2
SCALE 159. The High Court disposed of all the petitions vide its judgment
and order dated 3.10.2008 taking a view that only three vacancies came into
existence subsequent to the date of Advertisement which could have been
filled up from the said list. Out of the said three vacancies, two could be
offered to General Category candidates and one to the Scheduled Caste
candidate and issued direction to appoint two more candidates whose names
appeared at Serial Nos.14 and 15 in General Category Merit List. Hence,
these appeals are for seeking directions to the respondents for offering
appointment to the appellants also.
6. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants
has submitted that the judgment in Malik Mazhar Sultan’s case (supra) was
delivered by this Court on 4.1.2007. A large number of directions had been
issued in the said case and it also formulated the calendar for conducting the
examinations for filling up the vacancies in the Judicial Service. It also
provided that while determining the number of vacancies, the concerned
Authority would also consider alongwith the existing vacancies, as what
would be the anticipated vacancies that may arise within one year due to
retirement, due to elevation to the High Court, death or otherwise, say 10% of
the number of posts; and to take note of the vacancies arising out of
deputation of Judicial Officers to other departments. It also provided that the
select list so prepared shall be valid till new select list is published. The
examination is to be conducted every year. The High Courts were directed to
give strict adherence to the aforesaid schedule fixed by this Court. So far as
the Delhi High Court was concerned, it was provided that the High Court
would amend its calendar accordingly. In view of the above, it has been
submitted that while making the advertisement, the Delhi High Court had not
taken note of the anticipated vacancies which could be available during the
next year. As per the direction of this Court, as 13 more vacancies came into
existence, those vacancies must be filled up from the select list so prepared.
As the appellants are in the select list they should be offered appointments.
7. On the contrary, Shri A. Mariarputham, learned senior counsel
appearing for the respondents has vehemently opposed the appeals
contending that the law does not permit filling up the vacancies over and
above the number of vacancies advertised. Thirteen vacancies of the General
Category were advertised; the same had been filled up according to merit,
therefore, selection process in that respect stood exhausted. The waiting list
does not survive. The appellants had not challenged the advertisement in
spite of the fact that the judgment in Malik Mazhar Sultan’s case (supra) was
delivered on 4.1.2007 and vacancies were advertised on 19.5.2007. The
appellants were not aggrieved for not offering the appointment to them, as
they did not even approach the High Court for any relief. The Special Leave
Petitions were filed at much belated stage on 24.10.2008, though the result
had been declared on 3.1.2008, and appointments had been made on
3.4.2008. The directions of the Court could not supersede the statutory rules
as there was a direction to fill up the vacancies as per the existing statutory
rules. Appointments had been made according to law. Thus, the appeals
have no merit and are liable to be dismissed.
8. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for
the parties and perused the record.
9. It is a settled legal proposition that vacancies cannot be filled up over
and above the number of vacancies advertised as “the recruitment of the
candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of
the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the
Constitution”, of those persons who acquired eligibility for the post in question
in accordance with the statutory rules subsequent to the date of notification of
vacancies. Filling up the vacancies over the notified vacancies is neither
permissible nor desirable, for the reason, that it amounts to “improper
exercise of power and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in
emergent situation, such a rule can be deviated and such a deviation is
permissible only after adopting policy decision based on some rational”,
otherwise the exercise would be arbitrary. Filling up of vacancies over the
notified vacancies amounts to filling up of future vacancies and thus, not
permissible in law. (Vide Union of India & Ors. v. Ishwar Singh Khatri & Ors.
(1992) Supp 3 SCC 84; Gujarat State Deputy Executive Engineers’
Association v. State of Gujarat & Ors. (1994) Supp 2 SCC 591; State of Bihar
& Ors. v. The Secretariat Assistant S.E. Union 1986 & Ors AIR 1994 SC 736;
Prem Singh & Ors. v. Haryana State Electricity Board & Ors. (1996) 4 SCC
319; and Ashok Kumar & Ors. v. Chairman, Banking Service Recruitment
Board & Ors. AIR 1996 SC 976).
10. In Surinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors. AIR 1998 SC 18,
this Court held as under:
“A waiting list prepared in an examination conducted by the Commission
does not furnish a source of recruitment. It is operative only for the
contingency that if any of the selected candidates does not join then the
person from the waiting list may be pushed up and be appointed in the
vacancy so caused or if there is some extreme exigency the Government
may as a matter of policy decision pick up persons in order of merit from
the waiting list. But the view taken by the High Court that since the
vacancies have not been worked out properly, therefore, the candidates
from the waiting list were liable to be appointed does not appear to be
sound. This practice, may result in depriving those candidates who
become eligible for competing for the vacancies available in future. If the
waiting list in one examination was to operate as an infinite stock for
appointment, there is a danger that the State Government may resort to
the device of not holding an examination for years together and pick up
candidates from the waiting list as and when required. The constitutional
discipline requires that this Court should not permit such improper
exercise of power which may result in creating a vested interest and
perpetrate waiting list for the candidates of one examination at the cost of
entire set of fresh candidates either from the open or even from
service…..Exercise of such power has to be tested on the touch-stone of
reasonableness….It is not a matter of course that the authority can fill up
more posts than advertised.”
(Emphasis added)
11. Similar view has been re-iterated in Madan Lal v. State of J & K &
Ors. AIR 1995 SC 1088; Kamlesh Kumar Sharma v. Yogesh Kumar Gupta &
Ors. AIR 1998 SC 1021; Sri Kant Tripathi v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2001) 10
SCC 237; State of J & K v. Sanjeev Kumar & Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 148; State
of U.P. v. Raj Kumar Sharma & Ors. (2006) 3 SCC 330; and Ram Avtar
Patwari & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. AIR 2007 SC 3242).
12. In State of Punjab v. Raghbir Chand Sharma & Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2900, this Court examined the case where only one post was advertised and
the candidate whose name appeared at Serial No. 1 in the select list joined
the post, but subsequently resigned. The Court rejected the contention that
post can be filled up offering the appointment to the next candidate in the
select list observing as under:–
“With the appointment of the first candidate for the only post in respect of
which the consideration came to be made and select list prepared, the
panel ceased to exist and has outlived its utility and at any rate, no one
else in the panel can legitimately contend that he should have been
offered appointment either in the vacancy arising on account of the
subsequent resignation of the person appointed from the panel or any
other vacancies arising subsequently.”
13. In Mukul Saikia & Ors. v. State of Assam & Ors. AIR 2009 SC 747,
this Court dealt with a similar issue and held that “if the requisition and
advertisement was only for 27 posts, the State cannot appoint more than the
number of posts advertised”. The Select List “got exhausted when all the 27
posts were filled”. Thereafter, the candidates below the 27 appointed
candidates have no right to claim appointment to any vacancy in regard to
which selection was not held. The “currency of Select List had expired as
soon as the number of posts advertised are filled up, therefore, the
appointments beyond the number of posts advertised would amount to filling
up future vacancies” and said course is impermissible in law.
14. In view of above, the law can be summarised to the effect that any
appointment made beyond the number of vacancies advertised is without
jurisdiction, being violative of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India,
thus, a nullity, inexecutable and unenforceable in law. In case the vacancies
notified stand filled up, process of selection comes to an end. Waiting list etc.
cannot be used as a reservoir, to fill up the vacancy which comes into
existence after the issuance of notification/advertisement. The unexhausted
select list/waiting list becomes meaningless and cannot be pressed in service
any more.
15. In the instant case, as 13 vacancies of the General Category had
been advertised and filled up, the selection process so far as the General
Category candidates is concerned, stood exhausted and the unexhausted
select list is meant only to be consigned to record room.
16. So far as the submission made by Shri Ranjit Kumar that directions
issued by this Court in Malik Mazhar Sultan (supra) had to be given effect to
is concerned, the same requires consideration elaborately.
17. In All India Judges’ Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR
1993 SC 2493, several directions had been issued by this Court in respect of
the service conditions of the Judicial Officers. In view thereof, a notification
dated 21st March, 1996 was issued appointing Justice K.J. Shetty
Commission to consider about their service conditions.
18. In All India Judges’ Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR
2002 SC 1752, this Court considered various aspects of Justice Shetty
Commission Report and approved the same. However, the question arose as
to whether the recommendations so accepted by this Court could be
implemented as such or was it required to be incorporated in the statutory
rules governing the service conditions of the Judicial Officers or alteration of
the rules applicable to them? This Court held as under:
“We are aware that it will become necessary for service and other rules to
be amended so as to implement this judgment….”
19. In Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors. v. State of J & K & Ors. (2003) 9
SCC 592, this Court reconsidered the same issue while examining the
appointments to the post of District & Sessions Judges (Selection Grade) in
the State of Jammu & Kashmir and relying upon its earlier judgment in All India Judges’ Association (supra) held as under:
“Reliance placed upon the recommendations of Justice Jagannatha
Shetty Commission or the decision reported in All India Judges’ Assn. v.
Union of India or even the resolution of the Full Court of the High Court
dated 27-4-2002 is not only inappropriate but a misplaced one and the
grievances espoused based on this assumption deserve a mere mention
only to be rejected. The conditions of service of members of any service
for that matter are governed by statutory rules and orders, lawfully made
in the absence of rules to cover the area which has not been specifically
covered by such rules, and so long as they are not replaced or amended
in the manner known to law, it would be futile for anyone to claim for
those existing rules/orders being ignored yielding place to certain policy
decisions taken even to alter, amend or modify them. Alive to this
indisputable position of law only, this Court observed at SCC p. 273, para
38, that “we are aware that it will become necessary for service and other
rules to be amended so as to implement this judgment”. Consequently,
the High Court could not be found at fault for considering the matters in
question in the light of the Jammu and Kashmir Higher Judicial Service
Rules, 1983 and the Jammu and Kashmir District and Sessions Judges
(Selection Grade Post) Rules, 1968 as well as the criteria formulated by
the High Court. Equally, the guidelines laid down by the High Court for the
purpose of adjudging the efficiency, merit and integrity of the respective
candidates cannot be said to be either arbitrary or irrational or illegal in
any manner to warrant the interference of this Court with the same. Even
de hors any provision of law specifically enabling the High Courts with
such powers in view of Article 235 of the Constitution of India, unless the
exercise of power in this regard is shown to violate any other provision of
the Constitution of India or any of the existing statutory rules, the same
cannot be challenged by making it a justiciable issue before courts. The
grievance of the petitioners, in this regard, has no merit of acceptance”.
(Emphasis added)
20. In Malik Mazhar Sultan’s case (supra), this Court made it clear that
appointments in Judicial Service have to be made as per the existing
statutory rules. However, direction was issued to amend the rules for future
selections. This Court considered the correspondences between various
authorities of the States and also the decision taken in the conference of the
Chief Ministers and Chief Justices held on 11.3.2006, and observed as under:
“… Before we issue general directions and the time schedule to be
adhered to for filling vacancies that may arise in subordinate courts and
district courts, it is necessary to note that selections are required to be
conducted by the concerned authorities as per the existing Judicial
Service Rules in the respective States/Union Territories…… As already
indicated, the selection is to be conducted by authorities empowered to
do so as per the existing Rules. … In view of what we have already noted
about the appointments to be made in accordance with the respective
Judicial Services Rules in the States, the apprehension of interference
seems to be wholly misplaced….” (Emphasis added).
21. Therefore, it is clear that this Court clarified that selection was to be
made as per the existing Rules and direction was issued for amending the
existing laws to adopt the recommendations of Justice Shetty Commission as
approved by this Court for the future.
22. So far as the judgment of this Court in Hemani Malhotra v. High Court
of Delhi & Ors. AIR 2008 SC 2103 is concerned, the facts are quite
distinguishable. The Delhi High Court did not frame any statutory rule
providing for cut-off marks in interview for assessing the suitability for
selection. After the selection process had been initiated, such a resolution
was adopted. Therefore, the basic issue for consideration before this Court
had been as to whether it was permissible for the High Court to change the
selection criteria at the midst of the selection process. The Court placing
reliance upon its earlier judgments held that once the selection process
starts, it is not permissible for the competent authority to change the selection
criteria and in that view observation was made that a fresh merit list is to be
prepared ignoring the said resolution of the High Court taking cut-off marks in
interview. Undoubtedly, the Court had taken note of Justice Shetty
Commission Report in this regard and held that such a criteria could not have
been provided. In absence of any statutory rule governing a particular issue,
directions issued by this Court would prevail.
23. Therefore, it is evident from the aforesaid judgment that in spite of
acceptance of the recommendations made by Justice Shetty Commission,
this Court insisted that the existing law/statutory rules in making the
appointment of Judicial Officers be amended accordingly. In Syed
T.A.Naqshbandi (supra), this Court repealed the contention which is being
advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners therein and the Court in
crystal clear words held that appointments have to be made giving strict
adherence to the existing statutory provisions and not as per the
recommendations made by Justice Shetty Commission. Of course, in
absence of statutory rule to deal with a particular issue, the High Courts are
bound to give effect to the directions issued by this Court.
24. The appointments had to be made in view of the provisions of the
Delhi Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1970. The said rules provide for
advertisement of the vacancies after being determined. The rules further
provide for implementation of reservation policies in favour of Scheduled
Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes. As the reservation
policy is to be implemented, a number of vacancies to be filled up is to be
determined, otherwise it would not be possible to implement the reservation
policy at all. Thus, in view of the above, the question of taking into
consideration the anticipated vacancies, as per the judgment in Malik Mazhar
Sultan (supra), which had not been determined in view of the existing
statutory rules could not arise.
25. In view of above, we do not find any force in the submissions that the
High Court could have filled vacancies over and above the vacancies
advertised on 19.5.2007, as per the directions issued by this Court in Malik
Mazhar Sultan’s case (supra). More so, no explanation could be furnished by
Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellants as to why the
appellants could not challenge the advertisement itself, if it was not in
conformity with the directions issued by this court in the said case.
26. It has further been submitted on behalf of the appellants that the Delhi
High Court vide its judgment and order dated 3.10.2008 had issued directions
to offer appointment to two persons implementing the said judgment in Malik
Mazhar Sultan’s case (supra) whose names appeared in select list at SI. Nos.
14 and 15, and, as the High Court had implemented the said directions, the
appellants could not be treated with such hostile discrimination. Undoubtedly,
the directions had been issued to fill up two vacancies over and above the
vacancies notified. However, that part of the judgment is not under challenge
before us. In such a fact situation, it is neither desirable nor permissible in law
to make any comment on that. A person whose name appears in the select
list does not acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment at
the best is a condition of eligibility for purpose of appointment and by itself
does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed. The
vacancies have to be filled up as per the statutory rules and in conformity with
the constitutional mandate. In the instant case, once 13 notified vacancies
were filled up, the selection process came to an end, thus there could be no
scope of any further appointment.
27. In view of the above, we do not find any force in these appeals which
are accordingly dismissed.
JUDGMENT
SLP (C) NO. 28488 and 29248 of 2008.
Navin Kumar Jha
v.
Lt. Governor & Ors.
DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. In view of our judgment pronounced today in CA Nos.
1133-1135 of 2010 @ SLP(C) Nos. 3662-3664/2010@ CC Nos. 14852-14854 of
2008 (Rakhi Ray & Ors. vs. High Court of Delhi & Ors.) these Special Leave
Petitions are dismissed.