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PETITIONER: RAKESH KUMAR & SHRI SHAKTI KUMAR

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: HINDUSTAN EVEREST TOOL LTD.

DATE OF JUDGMENT07/03/1988

BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) BENCH: MUKHARJI, SABYASACHI (J) RANGNATHAN, S.

CITATION:  1988 AIR  976            1988 SCR  (3)  88  1988 SCC  (2) 165        JT 1988 (1)   619  1988 SCALE  (1)556

ACT:      Delhi Rent  Control Act,  1958:  s.  14(1)(a)-Eviction- Notice of  demand by  landlord for  arrears of rent-Validity of-To be construed as understood by common man.

HEADNOTE: %      Section 14(1)(a)  of the  Delhi Rent  Control Act, ,958 provides for recovery of possession of the demised premises, where the  tenant has  failed to  pay the  arrears  of  rent recoverable from  him within two months of the date on which notice of  demand had  been served  on  him  in  the  manner provided in s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.      Under the  lease agreement  the  respondent-tenant  was required to  pay rent in advance by the 5th of-each calendar month. The  appellant-landlords by  their notice  dated  8th March, 1982  reminded the  respondent that  the rent for the months of  February and March, 1982 was due as per the lease agreement  and   requested  for   immediate   payment.   The appellants again  served a  notice on the respondent on 19th April,1982 that  it had  not paid the rent for the months of February, March  and April,1982  for the  two shops  and  it having  committed  violation  of  the  terms  of  the  lease agreement they  do not  wish to  keep it as their tenant any longer and  thereby terminated  the tenancy  requesting  the tenant  to   handover  peaceful  vacant  possession  of  the premises by  31st May,  1982. The respondent by their letter dated 1st  June, 1982 acknowledged the arrears of rent as on that date.      On a petition filed by the appellants under s. 14(1)(a) of the Act, the Rent Controller passed an order of eviction, which was  upheld by  the Rent  Control Tribunal.  The  High Court, however,  set aside  that order  on the  ground  that there was  no proper notice of demand to pay arrears of rent in terms of proviso to s. 14(1)(a) of the Act.      Allowing the appeals, ^      HELD: 1.  The High  Court was in error in setting aside the judgement of the Rent Control Tribunal. [96F] 89      2.1 For  obtaining recovery of possession under the Act

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there must  be relationship  of landlord  and tenant between the parties, the tenant must have been in arrears of legally recoverable rent  on the date of the notice of demand, and a notice of  demand had  been served  upon the  tenant in  the manner provided  under s.  106 of  the Transfer  of Property Act, but the tenant neither pays nor tenders the rent within two months of the notice of demand. [93E-F]      2.2 The  notice of  the landlord  stating therein about the arrears  of rent  must be  read in common sense point of view bearing  in mind  how such  notices are  understood  by ordinary people. [93G]      In the instant case if the two notices dated 8th March, 1982 and  19th April,  1982 are  read alongwith  the  letter dated 1st  June, 1982 it is clear that the respondent was in arrears of  rent for  the months mentioned therein and there was a  demand to  pay rent.  There were  intimations that in default  of   payment  of   rent  an  eviction  petition  as consequence thereof would follow. That is how the appellants understood the  notices. If  that was  so, there  was  clear notice of demand and the relevant requirement of the proviso to s. 14(i)(a) of the Act was fulfilled. [93G; H; 94G]      Shri Ram  Sarup v.  Shri Sultan  Singh etc., [1977] All India Rent Control Journal, Vol. II 522, approved.      Mangoo Singh v. The Election Tribunal, Bareilly & Ors., [1958] SCR  418; Chimanlal  v. Mishrilal, [ 1985] SCC 14 and Mangat Ram  Anr. v.  Sardar Meharban  Singh, A.I.R.  ;987 SC 1656, distinguished.      (The decree  for eviction  not to be executed till 30th September, i988  provided the  respondent  files  the  usual undertaking in this Court within four weeks.) [96G]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTloN: Civil Appeal Nos. 933-934 of 1988      From the  Judgment and  order dated  8.10.1985  of  the Delhi High Court in S.A.O. No. 142 of 1985      Soli J. Sorabji, S. Kumar and Mrs. Rani Chhabra for the Appellants.      Shankar Ghosh, Rajiv Endlow, Sandeep Narain and Praveen Kumar for the Respondent. 90      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SABYASACHI MUKHARJI,  J. Special  leave granted in both the matters and the appeals are disposed of hereunder.      The facts  in both  these cases  are  identical.  These appeals are  directed against the judgment and orders of the High Court  of Delhi,  dated. the  8th October, 1985 setting aside the  order of  eviction affirmed  by the  Rent Control Tribunal. In  order to  appreciate the controversy it may be mentioned here  briefly that the appellant is the owner of a flat in Dohil Chambers, 46 Nehru Place, New Delhi. It is the case of  the appellant that the appellant had duly appointed Shri Hardev  Dohil as  the general  attorney for  and on his behalf to  do all  the acts  and deeds including renting out the premises  in question.  Shri H.  Dohil entered  into  an agreement of  lease with  respondent No. 1 Hindustan Everest Tools Ltd.,  to take  the premises  situated at Nehru Place. Clause 21  of the said agreement amongst others specifically provided that  the respondent herein would not be in arrears of rent and there was a specific obligation imposed upon the respondent by virtue of the agreement between the parties to regularly pay  the rent  of the premises without default and without notice  from the  appellant. The  respondent started

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defaulting, according to the appellant, not only towards the arrears of  rent but also towards payment of maintenance and other charges.  It is  the case  of the  appellant that  the respondent was  occupying a  number of  flats  in  the  said building and  the appellant  further  alleges  that  on  one pretext or  the other,  respondent had  been avoiding to pay their admitted  liability under  the terms of the agreement. It is  alleged by  the appellants  that the  respondent  was using a number of air-conditioners which had put the builder in great  difficulties and  it had come to a situation where the electric supply to the building was disconnected. It was under the orders of the High Court of Delhi and trial courts that  the   electricity  could   be  got  restored  and  the respondent was  directed to  make certain  payments.  It  is alleged by  the appellants  that the respondent had not made payment of rent despite various notices issued.      The  appellant  had  filed  a  petition  under  Section 14(1)(a) and  (j) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, hereinafter called  as   ’the  Act’.  The  respondent  filed  a  written statement to  the said  petition and  took up the stand that rent was  attached by  M.C.D. and  had also  raised  certain frivolous objections.  It is  the case of the appellant that the appellant  had verified  from the  Corporation and found that the  respondent had  been wrongfully  with-holding  the payment of the rent of the appel- 91 lant. The  learned Additional  Rent  Controller  during  the pendency of  main petition  under Section  15(c) of the Act, had directed  the respondent  to deposit  the arrears within one month  from the date of order and to continue depositing the monthly  rent by  15th of  each  succeeding  month.  The respondent did  not deposit the arrears of rent and filed an appeal before  the Rent  Control Tribunal.  The Rent Control Tribunal dismissed  the appeal and even after passing of the said order, did not deposit the arrears of rent and filed an appeal before  the High  Court  of  Delhi.  The  High  Court dismissed the  said appeal.  In  the  meantime,  it  may  be mentioned that  the  petition  for  eviction  under  Section 14(1)(a) of  the Act  proceeded and the Rent Controller duly passed an  order of eviction on that which was upheld by the Rent Control  Tribunal. In  appeal the  High Court  has  set aside the  said order on the ground that there was no proper notice of  demand to pay arrears of rent in terms of proviso to Section 14(1)(a) of the Act. It is from this order of the High Court  these matters  have come  to this Court. But, in order to  complete  the  narration  of  events  it  must  be mentioned that  against the  striking off  of the defence of the respondent  in default  of payment  of arrears  of  rent which was duly confirmed by the High Court the appellant had come up  in Special  Leave Petition  to this Court being SLP (C) No.  8120/84 and  this Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition on 18.11.1984. It is important in the background of the facts  of this case to emphasise that so far as striking off the  defence is concerned by the order of dismissal that order stands  confirmed i.e.,  the striking  off the defence was validly  done because  of the failure to pay the arrears of rent. This is an important aspect of the matter.      In  the   special  leave   petition  preferred  by  the appellant,  it  had  specifically  raised  the  question  of legality and  validity of  a notice  dated 19th  April, 1982 issued by  the appellant.  While the  receipt  of  the  said notice was  duly admitted,  ground (C) of that special leave petition read as follows:           "C. Because  no valid  notice demanding arrears of           rent as  required under  Section 14(1)(a)  of  the

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         D.R.C. Act  had been  received by  the  petitioner           (Annexure P-3)  the question  of issuing any order           under Section  15(1) of the said Act did not arise           and the orders issued by the lower court, as such,           were ultra vires."      It appears from these words that the precise point that there was  no valid  notice demanding the arrears in view of the facts  and circumstances of these cases, is concluded by the dismissal of the Special 92 Leave Petition as mentioned hereinbefore.       The relevant provisions of Section 14(1)(a) of the Act are as follow:           "14.(1) Notwithstanding  anything to  the contrary           contained in  any other  law or contract, no order           or decree  for the  recovery of  possession of any           premises shall  be made by any court or Controller           in favour of the landlord against a tenant:                Provided  that  the  Controller  may,  on  an           application made  to him in the prescribed manner,           make an  order for  the recovery  of possession of           the premises  on one  or  more  of  the  following           grounds only, namely:           (a) that  the tenant has neither paid nor tendered           the whole  of the  arrears  of  the  rent  legally           recoverable from him within two months of the date           on which  a notice  of demand  for the  arrears of           rent has  been served  on him  by the land lord in           the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer           of Property Act, 1882;"       The  notice upon which the eviction was sought for was the notice  dated the 19th April, 1982. The relevant portion of the said notice read as follows:           "That for  both these  shops, FF-I  and FF-2,  you           have not paid the rent for the months of February,           March and  April, 1982.  Therefore, a  sum of  Rs.           7,800 is  due from  you as  rent for the said shop           No. FF-2  and a sum of Rs.12,214.50 is due as rent           in respect  of shop  No. FF-l.  However I have the           instruction to  say that  you have  demolished the           internal wall  of the  premises under your tenancy           without the  con sent  of my  client in writing or           otherwise  and   have  therefore,   committed  the           violation of  the  terms  of  the  lease  and  the           agreement executed  between my  client and M/s. H.           Dohil Construction  Co. Pvt. Ltd., Dohil Chambers,           Nehru Place,  New  Delhi,  the  promoters  of  the           buildings.                5. That  in  view  of  the  above  facts  and           circumstances my clients do not wish to keep you a           tenant in its premises any longer and they clearly           show their intention by means 93           of this  notice to terminate your tenancy which is           hereby terminated by means of this notice. You are           no longer  tenant of  my client. You are requested           to hand over the peaceful vacant possession of the           two shops  i.e., FF-1  and FF-2,  Dohil  Chambers,           46-Nehru   Place,    New   Delhi,    under    your           tenancy/occupation on 31st May, 1982. You are also           requested to place the premises under your tenancy           in the  same condition  as they  were at  the time           when the possession was given to you.                Further my client reserves its right to claim           damages for  causing damage, to the property of my

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         client."      In reply to the aforesaid notice the respondent wrote a letter dated  1st June,  1982 wherein  the respondent stated inter alia as follows:           "Without prejudice  to the above, we have to state           that a sum of Rs. 10,400 and a sum of Rs.16,286 is           due from  us to  Sarvashri Shakti Kumar and Rakesh           Kumar as  on date  in respect of rent of Flat Nos.           F-1 and F-2 at Dohil Chambers, 46-Nehru Place, New           Delhi, and  we are  arranging  to  send  the  rent           directly to them."      In view  of the  statutory provision which has been set out  before  it  appears  that  for  obtaining  recovery  of possession under  the Act  there  must  be  relationship  of landlord and tenant between the parties, and that the tenant must have been in arrears of legally recoverable rent on the date of  the notice  of demand,  and that a notice of demand had been served upon the tenant in the manner provided under section 106  of the Transfer of Property Act, but the tenant neither pays nor tenders the rent within two months from the service of demand.      On reading  the notice  along with the letter dated 1st June, 1982  it appears that the respondent was in arrears of rent for the months mentioned hereinbefore and was intimated that in default of payment of rent the eviction would follow in accordance  with law.  This is  the proper way of reading the notice  and in  our view  the appropriate logical way in which notices  of such  type should  be read.  These notices must be  read in  common sense point of view bearing in mind how such  notices are understood by ordinary people. That is how the  appellant,  it  appears  from  the  reply  and  the background  of   the  previous   letter  to   be   mentioned hereinafter understood the notice. 94      More or  less, a  similar notice  was considered by the Delhi High  Court in  Shri Ram  Sarup v.  Shri Sultan  Singh etc., (1977)  All India  Rent Control  Journal, Vol.  II 552 where Mr.  Justice V.S.  Deshpande,  as  the  learned  Chief Justice then  was, held  that the  notice  of  the  landlord stating therein about the arrears of rent and threatening to file  a   petition  for  eviction  against  the  tenant  was sufficient and  the learned  Judge held  that the  notice of demand could  be expressed or implied and the conduct of the landlord showed  that the  demand was  implied.  We  are  in respectful agreement  with the  approach  to  such  type  of notices taken by the High Court in that case.       It  may be  mentioned in  these cases  that there  was another notice  prior thereto  dated  the  8th  March,  1982 wherein it was clearly stated as follows:           "This is  to bring  to your attention that you are           again behind with the payment of your monthly rent           of FF-1  & FF-2  premises occupied  by you  on the           first floor at Dohil Chambers, 46-Nehru Place, New           Delhi- 110  019. As  per the  lease agreement with           you, you  are to  pay your  rent in advance by the           5th of  each calendar month. Rent for February was           due and  you kept  on delaying this payment on one           pretence or  another. Finally,  you agreed about a           fortnight age  that you  will  pay  the  rent  for           February and  March, 1982  by 5th March, 1982. You           still have not paid.                You are,  therefore, requested  to please pay           your rent  arrears immediately  and in  future  to           make your  payment promptly  and regularly  as per           the lease agreement."

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    If these two notices are read together, in our opinion, as it  must be,  it is  clear that  the  respondent  was  in arrears for  payment of  rent and  there was a demand to pay rent. There  were intimations  that in default of payment of rent an  eviction  petition  as  consequence  thereof  would follow.  If  that  was  so  in  our  opinion,  the  relevant requirement of  the proviso  to section  14(1)(a) of the Act was fulfilled in this case.       Dr.  Shanker Ghosh,  Counsel for  the  respondent  had contended before  us that  the notice  dated the  8th March, 1982 as  referred to  hereinbefore, was  not a  notice  upon which the  eviction order  was passed.  That is true. He has further submitted  that the notice was not proper in as much as notice regarding rent for the month of February could not be issued on 8th March, 1982. It may be so. We are not 95 concerned with the facts of this case whether the notice was legal but  how the  parties have  understood. There is clear notice of  demand as  it appears  from  the  terms  set  out hereinabove. We  have been shown the chart at Page No. 77 of the present records which indicate how belated attempts were made to pay certain arrears.      Dr. Shanker  Ghosh, however,  placed strong reliance on the three  decisions of  this Court  and contended  that the notice in  this question  was not  valid and  the High Court was, therefore,  right in  dismissing the  eviction petition while setting  aside the  order of  eviction affirmed by the Rent Control Tribunal.      The first  decision to which our attention was drawn is Mangoo Singh  v. The  Election Tribunal,  Bareilly  &  Ors., [1958] SCR  418. That decision, however, was not on the Rent Act but was a decision on an election dispute. The appellant therein was  elected by  the Municipal  Board under the U.P. Municipalities Act,  1916. He  was in arrears in the payment of Municipal  Tax in  excess of  one year’s  demand to which section 166  of the  Act applied,  at the  time of filing of nomination, but  made the  payment before  the date  of  the poll. Under  section 13D,  clause (g)  of the  Act "a person shall be  disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of  a Board  if he  is in  arrears in  the payment of Municipal tax  or other  dues in excess of one year’s demand to  which   Section   166   applies,   provided   that   the disqualification shall  cease as  soon as  the  arrears  are paid."  on   an  election   petition  filed  by  a  defeated candidate, the  election  was  set  aside  by  the  Election Tribunal on  the ground  that the appellant was not entitled to the  benefit of  the proviso  to s.  13-D, Cl. (g) of the Act. It  was contended  for the  appellant that the relevant date for  the operation of the disqualification was the date of the poll and that in any case, he did not come within the mischief of  the disqualification clause in that section, as a bill  for payment of the tax was not presented to him, nor a notice  of demand  served on him under section 168. It was held so  far as  relevant for  the present  purpose that the word "demand"  in S.  13-D, Cl. (g) of the Act meant "claim" or "due"  and only referred to the amount of arrears or dues on which  the disqualification  depended did not attract the operation of Section 168 of the Act.      In the  facts of  that case this Court observed at page 427 of the report that the word ’demand’ in that context and in the  collocation of  the words in which it had been used, could only  mean ’in  excess of  one year’s municipal tax or other dues’.  The Court  referred to several meanings of the word ’demand’ in standard English dictionaries and 96

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law lexicons.  When the  context makes the meaning of a word quite clear, it becomes unnecessary to search for and select a particular  meaning out  of the diverse meanings a word is capable of,  according to  lexicographers. It was sufficient for the  Court to  state that  even in standard dictionaries and law  lexicons, it  was well  recognised  that  the  word ’demand’ might  mean  simply  a  ’claim’  or  ’due’  without importing any  further meaning  of calling  upon the  person liable to  pay the  claim or  due. The said observations are against the  appellant, in  the light  of the  actual demand mentioned in the letters as aforesaid.      The next  decision  to  which  reference  was  made  is Chimanlal v.  Mishrilal, [1985]  1 SCC  14, wherein  it  was found by this Court that the notice of demand did not relate to the  premises in question. In the background of the facts of that  case the  said decision  cannot  also  be  of  much assistance  to  the  appellant  and  the  observations  made therein must be understood in that background. This Court at page 18  of the  report reiterated  in the background of the relevant  statutory  provision  with  which  the  Court  was concerned, that  there must be notice demanding rent and the arrears must  be legally  recoverable. In  the light we have read the notice in these cases the two ingredients have been fulfilled.      The last  decision upon  which reliance  was placed  is Mangat Ram  & Anr.  v. Sardar Meharban Singh, A.I.R. 1987 SC 1656-1987 4 SCC 319 where the facts were entirely different. Indeed the  Court recorded  that the  tenant had to pay more rent than  what was  due. The  Court, however, recorded that there was  no prior notice of demand. But the notice in this case was differently worded.      In the  context and  facts of  this case  we are of the opinion that  the High  Court was  in error in setting aside the judgment  of the  Rent Control Tribunal. In the premises these appeals are allowed and the judgment and orders of the High Court are set aside. The parties, however, will pay and bear their respective costs.      Since, however,  the respondent is in possession of the premises for sometime, in the interests of justice we direct that the  decree for eviction will not be executed till 30th September, 1988  provided the  respondent  files  the  usual undertaking in  this Court  within four  weeks from today to the following effect:      1.  That  the  respondent  will  hand-over  vacant  and      peaceful  possession   of  the  suit  premises  to  the      appellant on or before 30th September, 1988. 97      2. That  the respondent  will  pay  to  the  appellants      arrears of rent, if any, within one month from today.      3. That the respondent will pay to the appellant future      compensation  for   use  and  occupation  of  the  suit      premises month by month before 10th of every month.      4. That the respondent will not induct any other person      in the suit premises.      We further  direct that  in default  of compliance with any one or more of these conditions or if the undertaking is not filed as required within the stipulated time, the decree shall become executable forthwith. P.S.S.                                      Appeals allowed. 98