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PETITIONER: RAJA RAM MAHADEV PARANJYPE AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ABA MARUTI MALI AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/12/1961

BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. DAS, S.K. DAYAL, RAGHUBAR

CITATION:  1962 AIR  753            1962 SCR  Supl. (1) 739  CITATOR INFO :  R          1966 SC1085  (4)  E          1968 SC 461  (2)  D          1970 SC 744  (7)  RF         1973 SC1041  (15)  R          1974 SC1613  (2)  R          1983 SC 990  (9)  R          1984 SC1164  (17)

ACT:      Landlord and  Tenani-Ejectment-Non-payment of rent for  three years-Statutory  right, to  eject- Power  of   court  to  grant  relief-Equity-Bombay Tenancy and  Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (Bom. 67 of 1948), ss. 14, 25, 29.

HEADNOTE:      In the  first three  appeals the tenants were in default in paying rents for three years and due notices  had   been  served   by   the   landlords terminating  the  tenancies.  The  landlords  thus acquired statutory rights to eject the tenants and applied to  the Mamlatdar, as required by s. 29 of the Bombay  Tenancy and  Agricultural  Lands  Act, 1948, for possession over the lands. The Mamlatdar refused to  make an  order for  possession on  the ground that  the tenants  were entitled  to relief against forfeiture on equitable principles. In the fourth appeal  also the  tenants had  defaulted in paying rents  for three  years. In  respect of the default in  the first  year the  tenant  had  been granted relief  against forfeiture  under s. 25(1) of the  Act. The tenant contended that the default in the first year had merged in the order under s. 25(1) and  could not  be relied  upon far  holding that he had defaulted for three years. ^      Held, that  the landlords  were  entitled  to orders for  possession in all the four cases. Upon default in  payment of  rent  for  three  years  a statutory right  accrued to the landlords under s. 25(2) to  terminate  the  tenancy  and  to  obtain

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possession. There  was no provision in the Act for granting relief against forfeiture in such a case; the provision  in  s.  29(3)  that  the  Mamlatdar "shall pass  such orders  as he deems fit" did not give him  such a  power. The  Act merely empowered him to  grant relief  where the  tenant was not in arrears for more than two years. No relief against forfeiture could be granted to the 740 tenants on  equitable grounds; relief on equitable grounds  could   only  be   granted  in  cases  of contractual rights  and not  in cases of statutory rights. Nor  could relief  be granted under s. 114 Transfer of  Property Act  as that  provision  was inconsistent with the provisions of the Bombay Act and was therefore inapplicable.      R. V.  Boteler, (1864)  33 L.  I. M.  C. 101, referred to.      Raghuvir, Vyasaraya  Acharya v.  Govind Mogre Bandekar, (1955) I. L. R. Bom. 1069, disapproved.      Held, further,  that in the fourth appeal the default in the first year could also be taken into consideration in  computing of three years inspite of  the   tenant  having   been  relieved  against forfeiture for  that year.  The order granting the relief did  not wipe  out  the  default,  it  only prevented the  termination of the tenancy for that default alone.

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil  Appeals Nos. 258-259 of 59 and 404 of 60.      Appeals by  special leave  from the  judgment and orders dated July 2, 1956, January 9, 1957 and June 16,1958  of the  Bombay High Court in Special Civil Applications  Nos. 1471, 1527 and 2990 of 56 and 1431 of 1958 respectively.      V.M.  Limaye,   V.L.  Narasimha  Moorthy,  E. Udayaratnam and S.S. Shukla, for the appellants.      B.C.  Kamble   and  A.G.   Ratnaparkhi,   for respondents Nos. 1 and 3 (in C. S. No. 258/59).      S.G.  Patwardhan,   B.C.  Kamble   and   A.G. Ratnaparkhi, for  respondent No.  1 ( in C. A. No. 259/59) and  the respondent  in (C.A.  No. 404  of 60).      Rameshwar Nath,  for the  respondent (in C.A. No. 9 of 60).      1961. December  1. The  Judgment of the Court was delivered by      SARKAR,  J.-These   four   appeals   are   by landlords whose  applications to  the  authorities under the  Bombay Tenancy  and Agricultural  Lands Act, 1948  for possession  of the  lands  held  by their tenants, on the grounds had that the tenancy had been terminated by due notices on the tenants’ failure  to   pay  rents  for  three  years,  were dismissed. 741      These authorities  refused in  three of these cases to  make  an  order  for  possession  either because the tenants had paid up all rent which had fallen  in   arrear  or  because  the  authorities thought it proper on the facts of the case to give

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them time  to pay  up. They  felt that the tenants were entitled  to  relief  against  forfeiture  on equitable principles. In the fourth case, which is covered by  Civil Appeal  No. 259  of 1959, it was held that  there had  not been on the facts of the case, default  in payment  of rent for three years and,  therefore   the  tenant   was  entitled   to statutory relief  against eviction  under s. 25(1) of the Act which we shall later set out.      The High  Court at Bombay by a summary order, without stating  any reasons, refused to interfere when moved under Art. 227 of the Constitution. The landlords have  therefore filed these appeals with leave of this Court.      We shall  now deal with the first three cases and later  take up the fourth case. In these three cases relief  was granted  to the  tenants on  the basis of  certain observation of the High Court at Bombay in Sitaram Vithal Chitnis v. Gundu Satyappa Dhade, Special Civil Application No. 1695 of 1955, unreported, which  we quote  here: "Every court of equity will  be extremely  reluctant to enforce an order of  ejectment against a tenant when the only ground on  which the  landlord seeks  ejectment is failure to  pay rent.  Therefore, if the tenant is willing  to  pay  all  arrears  of  rent,  in  our opinion, it  would be  inequitable to  turn  these tenants out  when they  are prepared  to make good the arrears  of rent."  With great  respect to the learned Judges of the High Court, we are unable to assent to the proposition so broadly put.      We now set out the relevant provisions of the Act. 742           S. 5 (1) No tenancy of any land shall be      for a period of less than ten years:           Provided that  at the  end of  the  said      period and  thereafter at  the  end  of  each      period  of   ten  years  in  succession,  the      tenancy shall,  subject to  the provisions of      sub-secs.  (2)  and  (3),  be  deemed  to  be      renewed for  a further period of ten years on      the same terms and conditions notwithstanding      any agreement to the contrary.           (2)  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x   x  x      x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x           (3) Notwithstanding  anything  contained      in sub-sec. (1):           (a) every  tenancy shall, subject to the      provisions of  ss. 24 and 25, be liable to be      terminated at  any time on any of the grounds      mentioned in s. 14.           x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x           x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x           S. 14(1)  Notwithstanding any agreement,      usage, decree,  or order  of a  court of law,      the tenancy  of any  land held  by  a  tenant      shall not be terminated unless such tenant:-           (a)(1) has  failed to  pay in  any year,      with in fifteen days from the day fixed.. the      rent of such land for that year.           x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x           x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x           Provided that  no tenancy  of  any  land      held by  a tenant  shall be terminated on any

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    of the  grounds mentioned in this sub-section      unless  the   landlord  gives  three  months’      notice in  writing intimating  the tenant his      decision to  terminate the tenancy and ground      for such termination. 743           S. 25(1)Where  any tenancy  of any  land      held by  any tenant  is terminated  for  non-      payment of  rent and  the landlord  files any      proceeding to eject the tenant, the Mamlatdar      shall call  upon the  tenant to tender to the      landlord the  rent in  arrears together  with      the costs  of the  proceeding within  fifteen      days from  the date  of  order,  and  if  the      tenant  complies   with   such   order,   the      Mamlatdar shall,  in lieu  of making an order      for ejectment, pass an order that the tenancy      had not  been terminated,  and thereupon  the      tenant shall  hold the land as if the tenancy      had not been terminated:           Provided  that   if  the   Mamlatdar  is      satisfied that  in consequence  of  total  or      partial failure  of crops or similar calamity      the tenant  has been  unable to  pay the rent      due, the  Mamlatdar may,  for reasons  to  be      recorded in  writing, direct that the arrears      of  rent  together  with  the  costs  of  the      proceedings if  awarded, shall be paid within      one year  from the date of the order and that      if before  the expiry of the said period, the      tenant fails  to pay the said arrears of rent      and costs,  the tenancy shall be deemed to be      terminated and  the tenant shall be liable to      be evicted.           (2) Nothing  in this section shall apply      to any tenant whose tenancy is terminated for      non-payment of  rent if he has failed for any      three years  to pay  rent within  the  period      specified in section 14.           S. 29(1)  A tenant  or  an  agricultural      labourer or an artisan entitled to possession      of any  land or  dwelling house  under any of      the provisions  of  this  Act  may  apply  in      writing for such possession to the Mamlatdar.           x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x           x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 744           (2) No  landlord shall obtain possession      of any  land or  dwelling  house  held  by  a      tenant  except   under  an   order   of   the      Mamlatdar. For  obtaining such order he shall      make an  application in  the prescribed  form      and within  a period  of two  years from  the      date on  which the right to obtain possession      of the  land or  dwelling house,  as the case      may be, is deemed to have accrued to him.           (3) On receipt of such application under      sub-section (1)  or (2)  the Mamlatdar shall,      after holding  an enquiry,  pass  such  order      thereon as he deems fit.      We are  not concerned  in these  three  cases with s.  24 mentioned  in s.  5(3)(a).  The  "date fixed" mentioned  in s.  14(1)(a)(i) is  it may be stated the  20th of  March of each year. It is not in dispute in these cases that the tenants were in

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default in  paying rents for three years within s. 14(1)(a)(i) and due notices had been served by the landlords terminating the tenancies as required by the proviso to s. 14(1).      By s.  5, therefore,  a tenancy under the Act is  made   to  have   indefinite  duration   being renewable for  ten years  at the  end of every ten years and  the landlord  cannot put  an end to the tenancy except  under the  provisions of  the Act, one of which is s. 14. This is irrespective of any contract between  the parties.  Under s. 14 on the default in payment of a year’s rent occurring, the landlord may,  if he so chooses, bring the tenancy to end  by giving  the prescribed  notice. If  the tenancy is  terminated, the tenant has, of course, no right to hold the land. The landlord would then be entitled to recover possession of the land from him. In  view however  of s.  29(2), the  landlord cannot do  so except  by an  application made to a Mamlatdar  for  the  purpose.  Now  when  such  an application is  made in  case where the tenant has been in default for not 745 more than  two years,  s. 25(1)  would have  to be applied and  the Mamlatdar  would have to give the tenant a  chance to  pay up  and thereby annul the termination of  the tenancy brought about under s. 14.      In these  three cases there is no controversy that the  tenancies have  been terminated under s. 14. There  is also no dispute that the tenants are not  entitled   to  be   relieved   against   that termination under  sub-s. (1)  of s. 25 because of the provisions of sub-sec. (2) of that section, as in these  cases the  rent had  not been  paid  for three years.  They however  claim  relief  on  the principle on  which equity  grants relief  against forfeiture of tenancies. The authorities under the Act have  granted them the relief by applying this equitable principle.      In our  opinion, the authorities were clearly in error  in thinking that they could grant relief in these  cases on equitable principles. In equity relief may be granted to a tenant who has incurred a forfeiture  under the terms of the tenancy, that is, his  contract with the landlord. Here, that is not  the   position.  The   tenancies  have   been terminated  in   these  cases  under  a  statutory provision.  In   the   circumstances   that   have happened,  the   landlords  have  in  our  opinion acquired a  statutory right  to the  possession of the lands  and, therefore,  to eject  the tenants, the reasons  for which  view we  shall discuss  in some detail  later. In  such a case, no relief can be granted to the tenants on equitable principles. Equity does  not operate  to annul a statute. This appears to  us to  be well  established but we may refer to  white and Tudors Leading Cases in Equity (9th ed.) p. 238, where it is stated,           "Although, in  cases of contract between      parties, equity  will often  relieve  against      penalties and forfeitures, where compensation      can be  granted, relief  can never  be  given      against the provisions of a statute." 746

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The order  of  the  authorities  taking  away  the landlords’  statutory   right  to   possession  by application  of   rules  of   equity   cannot   be supported.      It was  then said  that s.  29(3) gives ample power to  the authorities  to refuse  to  make  an order for  possession in  the landlord’s favour if the tenant  pays up the arrears and the justice of the case  requires that  the tenant  should not be deprived of  the land.  That sub-section  no doubt says that  the Mamlatdar  "shall...pass such order thereon as  he deems  fit". We  are however wholly unable to  agree that  this provision warrants the making of  any order  that the authority concerned thinks in  his individual opinion that the justice of the case requires. We may here refer to      R. v. Boteler  where a  statute which conferred power upon Justices to issue a distress warrant "if they shall think  fit" was considered. In that case the Justices  had   refused  to   issue  the  distress warrant. Cockburn C. J. observed,           "They went  upon  the  ground  that  the      introduction of  this  extra-parochial  place      into the  union was a thing unjust in itself;      in other words, that the operation of the act      of  parliament   was   unjust......I   think,      therefore it amounts virtually to saying,-’We      know that  we ought upon all other grounds to      issue the  warrant, but  we  will  take  upon      ourselves to  say that the law is unjust, and      we will  not carry  out the law’. That is not      such an  exercise of discretion as this Court      will hold, in accordance with the authorities      cited, to  be one upon which it will act. The      Justices  must   not  omit   or  decline   to      discharge a duty according to law." We think that is what the authorities in the three cases before us have done. They have 747 refused to  carry out  the Act  because they  felt that it worked hardship. They have refused to give to the  landlords the  relief which  the Act  said they should have.      Now, we  feel no  doubt that the Act provided that a  tenant should  be granted relief only in a case where  he had  not been  in arrears  with his rents for  more than two years; in other words, if he had  been in arrears for more than two years he was not  to be  given any relief against ejectment and the landlord would be entitled to an order for possession. First,  we have  to point out that the tenancy having  been terminated  in terms  of  the statute, the  statute would  necessarily create  a right in  the landlord to obtain possession of the demised  premises.   The   tenancy   having   been terminated, the  tenant is  not entitled to remain in possession  and the  only person who would then be entitled  to possession  would be the landlord. The statute having provided for the termination of the tenancy  would by necessary implication create a right in the landlord to recover possession. The statute recognises  this right  by providing by s. 29(2) for its enforcement by an application to the Mamlatdar. Indeed,  s. 29(2)  itself mentions this right expressly  for it  says that the application

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shall be  made within  two years  from the date on which "the right to obtain possession of the land" accrued to  the landlord. We repeat that this is a statutory right  because it  is the  statute which fixes the  term of  the tenancy  and also provides for its termination; it is not a contractual right which may be made subject to an equitable relief.      We turn  now to  s. 25.  Under sub-s.  (1) of this section  the tenant  has a  right to an order continuing the  tenancy inspite of its termination by notice  under s.  14 for  non-payment of  rent. Sub-section (2)  however provides  that sub-s. (1) shall not  be available  to a  tenant  if  he  has failed for any three years to pay rent. The result is that the statute itself 748 provides for  relief to  a  tenant  where  such  a termination has  taken place  and  prescribes  the conditions on  which relief would be available. It would follow  that the  statute indicates that the tenant would  not have  the relief  in  any  other circumstances. The result of this would inevitably be  that  the  statute  confers  a  right  on  the landlord to  recover possession  where  the  right under s.  25(1) is  not available  to the  tenant, which  right   he  can   enforce  in   the  manner indicated. That being so, s. 29 (3) cannot be read as conferring  on the authorities a power to annul this intendment  of the Act. The words "in lieu of making an order for ejectment" in sub-s. (1) of s. 25 support  the view  that the  Act  intends  that except in  the circumstances  mentioned in it, the landlord is  entitled as  of right to get an order for possession  from the  Mamlatdar. This  view is further strengthened  by the  proviso to s. 25 (1) which says  that if the default in payment of rent had been  caused by  failure of  crops or  similar reasons, the  Mamlatdar  may  give  the  tenant  a year’s time  to pay  up and  shall then provide in the order  to be  made by him that on the tenant’s failure to  pay within  that  year,  "the  tenancy shall be  deemed to  be terminated  and the tenant shall be liable to be evicted". In such a case the Mamlatdar could  not by  virtue  of  his  supposed powers under  s. 29(3)  give further relief if the tenant failed  to pay  as directed,  for  the  Act makes it  incumbent on him to pass the conditional order  of   ejectment.  There,   of   course,   is possession for  the Act  to have treated the cases under  sub-s.   (1)  and   the  proviso   to   it, differently. This  again  is  another  reason  for saying that  the Act  provides that apart from the circumstances mentioned in sub-s. (1) of s. 25 and the  proviso   to  it,   the  landlord  has  on  a termination of  the tenancy,  a right to obtain an order for  possession in  his favour.  It would be anomalous if the general words in s 29 (3) were to be  construed   as   conferring   power   on   the authorities to deprive him 749 of the right which the other provisions in the Act give him.      We think,  therefore, that  s.  29  (3)  only confers power  to make  an order  in terms  of the statute, an  order which  would give  effect to  a

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right which  the Act  has elsewhere conferred. The words "as  he deems  fit" do not bestow a power to make  any   order  on  considerations  dehors  the statute  which   the  authorities   consider  best according to  their notions of justice. Obviously, the provision  has been  framed in  general  terms because it  covers a  variety  of  cases,  namely, applications by landlords and tenants in different circumstances, each  of  which  circumstances  may call for a different order under the Act.      One other  argument under  a similar  head as dealt with  previously, was  that the tenants were entitled to relief against forfeiture under s. 114 of the  Transfer of Property Act. Section 3 of the Act provides  that "the provisions of Chapter 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 shall in so far as they  are not  inconsistent with the provisions of this  Act, apply to the tenancies and leases of land to  which  this  Act  applies".  The  present contention  of   the  tenents  is  based  on  this section. It  may be  pointed out that ch. 5 of the Transfer of Property Act includes ss. 114 and 117. The last  mentioned section  provides that nothing in ch.  5 shall  apply to  leases for  agriculture purposes except  in so far as the State Government by notification  declare them to be applicable. No such notification  had been  issued by  the  State Government. Therefore,  the landlords  contend, s. 114 does not apply to the present leases which are for agricultural  purposes and the tenants are not entitled to  relief under  it. It does not seem to us necessary  to decide the question so raised. In our view, the provisions in s. 114 of the Transfer of  Property   Act  are   inconsistent  with   the provisions of the Bombay and cannot, 750 therefore, under s. 3 of the latter Act govern the tenancies to  which it  applies. We  have  earlier stated that  the Bombay  Act clearly intended that relief against  termination of  tendency for  non- payment of  rent would  be given only in the cases mentioned in  s. 25(1)  and in no others. Under s. 114 of  the Transfer of Property Act relief may be given  in   other  circumstances.  Therefore,  the provisions of  this section  are inconsistent with the provisions  of the Bombay Act. For this reason we do  not think  that the  tenants in  the  cases before us  are entitled  to claim any relief under s. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act.      We think,  therefore, that  the tenants  were not entitled  to the  relief which the authorities below granted them. Before we pass on to the other appeal raising  a different  question, we  have to refer to the case of Raghuvir Vyasaraya Acharya v. Gobind Mogre  Bandekar were  it had  been held  by Chagla C.J.,  that s.  29 (3)  justifies an  order granting relief to the tenant and refusing to make an order  for possession in favour of the landlord even where  the tenant  has not paid rent for more than two  years.  We  think  that  this  case  was wrongly decided.  Chagla C.J., held that s. 25 did not confer  any substantive  right on the landlord to obtain  possession and  that s. 29(3) conferred on the  Mamlatdar a  discretion to pass any proper order that  he thought  fit.  We  think,  for  the

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reasons earlier stated, that on both these matters the learned Chief Justices was in error. We repeat that under  the Act  the landlord  gets a right to obtain possession  of the  demised premises on the termination of the tenancy under s. 14 and that s. 25 as also s. 29 clearly recognises that right.      We turn  now to  the remaining appeal, namely Civil Appeal  No. 259 of 1959. The question raised here is  whether for  the purposes  of s.  25(2) a tenant 751 is to  be considered  as having failed to pay rent for any  year in  respect of  which  he  had  been granted  relief   under  s.   25(1).  The  Revenue Tribunal, following  a decision  of the High Court at Bombay in Special Civil Application No. 2073 of 1955, unreported,  held that where a landlord made an application  for possession of the demised land on the  failure of  the tenant  to pay  rent for a year within  the time prescribed in s. 14, and the Mamlatdar granted  relief to  the tenant  under s. 25(1), the  default was merged in the order of the Mamlatdar and  could not thereafter be relied upon for the  purposes of s. 25(2). We did not have the original judgment  of the High Court placed before us  and   are  not  aware  of  the  reasons  which persuaded it to the view that it took.      In  our   opinion,  that   view  is   clearly incorrect, Section  25(2) says  that nothing in s. 25-which of  course only  means sub s. (1) of that section-shall apply to any tenant whose tenancy is terminated for  non-payment  of  rent  if  he  has failed for  any three years to pay rent within the period specified  in  s.  14.  We  are  unable  to appreciate the  contention that  when a tenant has been granted  relief under  s. 25(1) in respect of any year’s  default, the  default  merged  in  the order  granting   relief  and  deceased  to  be  a default. How can the default for the year merge in an order?   No doubt relief has been given against the consequence  of the  default for the year, but that does not wipe out the default itself; it only prevents the  termination of  the tenancy, if any, consequent thereon, becoming effective. Inspite of the relief  granted under  s.  25(1),  the  tenant remains a  tenant who  made default in paying rent for the  year within the period specified in s. 14 and that  is the  tenant mentioned in s. 25(2). We find nothing  in s. 25(2) to justify the view that in such a case the year of default cannot be taken into account in computing the 752 three  years   there  mentioned.  It  is  of  some significance to  point out  that s. 25(2) does not require three  successive years  of default but it is satisfied  where the tenant has been in default for any  three years. If the interpretation put by the  High  Court  were  to  be  accepted,  then  a landlord wishing to recover possession of his land would have  to wait  till the tenant has committed default for  three years,  for if  he  took  steps earlier and  relief was  granted to the tenant, he would not  be able to recover possession after two more years  of default  by the  tenant. We  see no justification for  thinking that  the Act intended

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to put so much difficulty in the way of landlords.      We, therefore,  come to  the conclusion  that these appeals  must  succeed.  We  set  aside  the orders of  the High  Court in  the cases  in which that Court  had been  moved  and  of  the  Revenue Tribunal and  other authorities  under the  Bombay Act refusing  to make  an order  for possession in favour  of  the  landlords.  We  direct  that  the respondent tenants  make over  possession  of  the lands held  by them to their respective landlords. The  appellants   will  be   entitled   to   costs throughout.                                   Appeals allowed. 753