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PETITIONER: RAGHUNATH DASS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 26/07/1968

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BACHAWAT, R.S.

CITATION:  1969 AIR  674            1969 SCR  (1) 450  CITATOR INFO :  R          1984 SC1004  (10,22)

ACT: Code   of  Civil  Procedure,  1908  (Act  5  of  1908),   s. 80---Notice   under  section  sent  under  trade   name   of proprietary firm--Suit filed in name of proprietor--Validity of notice--Suit whether maintainable.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was the sole proprietor of a business  carried on  by him under the name and style of M/s.  Raghunath  Dass Mulkhraj.  He sent a notice under s. 80 C.P.C. on behalf  of ’M/s.  Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj to the General  Manager  East Indian  Railway  Calcutta  in connection with  a  claim  for compensation  for lost goods.  The notice was signed by  him as  proprietor ’for M/s. Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj’.  When  he subsequently   filed   a  suit  against  the   Railway   its maintainability was challenged on the ground that the notice under  s. 80 was invalid, as there was no  identity  between the person who sent the notice and the person who filed  the suit.  The suit was decreed by the trial Court but the  plea that the notice was invalid was accepted by the High  Court. The appellant with certificate, came to this Court.     HELD: The object of the notice contemplated by s. 80  is to  give  to the concerned Governments and  public  officers opportunity  to  reconsider the legal position and  to  make amends or settle the claim, if so advised without litigation so  that  public  time and money may  not  be  wasted.   The provisions in s. 80 Civil Procedure Code are not intended to be  used  as  boobytraps  against  ignorant  and  illiterate persons. [454 B-C]     In  the present case although the notice has  been  sent under  the appellant’s trade name he had  clearly  indicated that  he ’signed it as the proprietor of the business.   The notice  had  to  be  read as a whole and  in  a  manner  not divorced  from common sense.  So read the notice  could  not have  given the Union of India the impression that  it   was issued  on behalf of a partnership concern.  The High  Court had  wrongly held that the notice was invalid. [454  H,  455 E] S.N.   Dutt  v.  Union  of  India,  [1962]  1  S.C.R.   560, distinguished.

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   Dhian  Singh  Sobha  Singh and Anr.  v.  The  Union   of India,  [1958] S.C.R. 781, 795, relied on

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1005 of 1965.     Appeal  from  the judgment and decree  dated  April  24, 1962, of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. 205 of 1950. E.C. Agarwala and P.C. Agarwala, for the appellant. V.A. Seyid Muhammad and S.P. Nayar, for respondent No. 1. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Hegde, J.  The only question that arises for decision in this  appeal  by certificate is whether the  High  Court  is right  in holding that the notice issued by  the  appellant- plaintiff under s. 80, Civil 451 Procedure  Code is defective and therefore the suit  is  not maintainable. The  plaintiff dispatched on July 29, 1947  certain   copper articles from Gujranwala through North Western Railway to  a place  called Aghawanpur near Moradabad.   That  consignment never  reached the destination.  Consequently the  plaintiff claimed a sum of P.s. 13,880 as damages.  The learned  Civil Judge, Moradabad, who tried the suit decreed the  plaintiffs claim  in a sum of Rs. 10,206/9/- with interest at  six  per cent from 15th August 1947 till the date of realisation.  As against that decision, the union of India went up in  appeal to  the  High Court of Allahabad.  The decree of  the  trial court was assailed on several grounds one of them being that the  notice  issued  under s. 80, Civil  Procedure  Code  is invalid.   The  High Court accepted the  contention  of  the Union  of India that the notice in question is  invalid  but rejected  the  other  pleas  advanced  on  its  behalf.   It accordingly allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on the sole  ground that the notice issued did not comply with  the requirements of s. 80, Civil procedure Code.   It  is  not  disputed  that  at  the  relevant  time,  the plaintiff  carried on his business at Gujranwala  under  the name   and   style  of Raghunath Das Mulkhraj.  He  was  the sole proprietor of that concern.  He sent several notices to the   concerned  authorities demanding compensation for  his goods lost in transit.   It is not necessary to refer to all the notices issued  by the  plaintiff.  It  is sufficient for  our  purpose  if  we consider the legality of the last notice sent by him viz. on June 19, 1948.  If that notice is valid then undoubtedly the suit is maintainable.  The notice in question reads thus:               "From: M/s. Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj, C/o.  Dr.               Khamani Singh, Katghar Gan Khana, Moradabad.               To:               The  General Manager, East   Indian   Railway,               Calcutta.               A  notice like this has already   been   given               to  the      Secretary, Central Government  of               India,  New  Delhi and      now  it  is  being               given   to  you  according  to  Amendment   in               the procedure code.                We  have  the honour to serve  you  with  the               following      notice under section 80,  Civil               Procedure  Code.  The      facts leading  upto               the said notice are as follows:                1.  That  we are the refugees  of  Gujranwala               (West        Punjab)  and  now   residing   in

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             Katghar,  Gari  Khana,      Moradabad.               452                     2.  That  under R.R. No.  550240,  dated               29th  July  1947  Ex-Gujranwala  to.  Agwanpur               weighing  52  bundles 73 mds.  29  seers  were               booked from  Gujranwala  to Agwanpur.                     3.  That the aforesaid  consignment  has               not   been delivered to us so far due  to  the               Railway’s  negligence,  misconduct  and  gross               carelessness.                     4.  That  the non-delivery of  the  said               consignment we have suffered a great loss  and               damage.                     5.   That  on  14th  October  1947,   we               preferred  a claim against  the  Railway   and               claimed   the   sum  of Rs. 12,554/1  for  the               loss non-delivery of the aforesaid goods.                 Price of the goods        ..........     Rs.               10206-9                 Our profit 20% thereon  ..........       Rs.               2041-5               Our  damage for the much money locked up @  1%               p.m...  Rs.   306-3               TOTAL:  ......  Rs. 12554-1                     6.  That the Chief Commercial   Manager,               E.  1. Railway by his letter No.  A-2/5196/47,               dated   25th  November 1947  acknowledged  the               receipt of our claim.                     7.  That  thereafter nothing  was  heard               from him in spite of our several reminders and               requests for early payment.                      8. That so far the goods have not  been               delivered  to  us  nor our  claim  in  respect               thereof settled  and  paid. Hence this  notice               is served to you.                      9.  That  now we claim the sum  of  Rs.               1331/10  as detailed above inclusive damage  @               1% till 26th June 1948.                      10.  That the cause of action for  this               notice  and  the suit to be filed  here  after               arose   at  Moradabad  (U.P.)  which  is   the               District  where the goods ought to  have  been               delivered  on or about 13th August  1947  when               the  same  should  have  been  delivered   and               thereafter  on the various dates mentioned  in               the  correspondence and on the expiry  of  the               period of this notice.                      11.  That we nope and will request  you               to please pay to us the amount of the claim at               an early date and not to force us to go to the               law courts in our present and               453               plight in which case you and the Railway  will               be  responsible and liable for all  our  costs               and damages.               Yours faithfully,               For M/s. Raghunath Dass Mulkhraj               Sd./: Raghunath Dass                                            Proprietor Dated:               Copy to: Chief Commercial Manager, Calcutta." The  High  Court held that the notice in question  does  not meet  the requirements of the law as the person  who  issued the notice is not the same person who filed the suit.  In so deciding it heavily relied on the decision of this Court  in S.N. Dutt  v.  Union of India. ( 1 )

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   Section 80, Civil Procedure Code requires,  among  other things, that the notice must state the name, description and place  of residence of the plaintiff.  It is true  that  the notice   purports  to  emanate  from  M/s.  Raghunath   Dass MuLkhraj.  It is also true that in the body of the notice in several  places  the expression ’we’ is used.   Further  the plaintiff  had  purported to sign for  M/s.  Raghunath  Dass Mulkhraj.  But at the same time he signed the notice as  the proprietor  of the concern "Raghunath Dass Mulkhrai".   That is  a  clear  indication of the fact  that  "Raghunath  Dass Mulkhraj" is a proprietary concern and the plaintiff is  its proprietor.   Whatever doubts that might have been  possibly created  in the mind of the recipient of that notice,  after going  through the body of the notice as to the identity  of the  would be plaintiff, the same would have  been  resolved after  going through the notice as a whole.  In the  plaint, the plaintiff definitely stated that he was carrying on  his business  under  the  name  and  style  of  "Raghunath  Dass Mulkhraj"  meaning  thereby  that  the  concern   known   as "Raghunath  Das Mulkhraj" is a proprietary concern  and  the name  given to it is only a trade name.  He had also  stated in the plaint that he had given a notice under s. 80 of  the Civil  Procedure  Code.  In the written statement  filed  on behalf of the Dominion of India, the validity of the  notice issued was not challenged. Regarding the notice in question. the only averment in the written statement is that found. in paragraph 8 therein and the same                     "That  the  suit is. barred  by  s.  80,               C.P.C. as no notice under that section appears               to have been served on this administration." From  this  it follows that the Dominion of  India  did  not challenge  the  validity  of the notice. It is  no  more  in dispute that the notice (1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 560. 454 sent  by  the plaintiff had been served on  the  authorities concerned. The Union of India did not take the plea that the identical  person who issued the notice had  not  instituted the suit.     The object of the notice contemplated by that section is to  give  to the concerned Governments and  public  officers opportunity’  to reconsider the legal position and  to  make amends   or  settle  the  claim,  if  so   advised   without litigation.   The legislative intention behind that  section in  our opinion is that public money and time should not  be wasted on unnecessary litigation and the Government and  the public officers should be given a reasonable opportunity  to examine  the  claim made against them lest  they  should  be drawn  into  avoidable litigations. The purpose  of  law  is advancement  of  justice.  The provisions in  s.  80,  Civil Procedure  Code are not intended to. be used as booby  traps against  ignorant and illiterate persons.  In this  case  we are  concerned  with  a narrow  question.   Has  the  person mentioned  in  the notice as plainsong brought  the  present suit  or  is  he someone else ?  This  question  has  to  be decided  by  reading the notice as a whole in  a  reasonable manner.     In Dhian Singh Sobha Singh and anr. vs.  The  Union   of India(1)  this Court observed that while the terms of s.  80 of  the Civil Procedure Code must be strictly complied  with that  does not mean that the terms of the section should  be construed  in  a pedantic manner or in a  manner  completely divorced from common sense.  The relevant passage from  that judgment is set out below:                     "We are constrained to observe that  the

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             approach  of the High Court to  this  question               was  not  well founded. The Privy  Council  no               doubt  laid  down in  Bhagchand  Dagadusa  rs.               Secretary  of State that the terms of  section               should  be strictly complied with.  That  does               not however mean that the terms of the  notice               should be scrutinised in a pedantic manner  or               in  a manner completely divorced  from  common               sense.  As was stated by Pollock C.B. in Jones               vs. Nicholls, "we must import a little  common               sense  into  notices of this  kind."  Beaumont               C.J.  also observed in Chandu Lal Vadilal  vs.               Government   of  Bombay  "One  must   construe               section  80 with some regard to  common  sense               and  to  the object with which it  appears  to               have been passed."     It is proper to expect that the authorities who received the  notice would have imported some common sense  into  it. At any rate they should have done so and we must assume that they did. The fact that they did not object to the  validity of the notice in (1) [1958] S.C.R. 781, 795.      455. their pleadings shows that they never considered the  person who brought the suit as being someone other than who  issued the notice.     It  is  the contention of Mr.  Seyid  Mohammad,  learned Counsel  for the Union of India that the present case  falls within  the  rule laid down by this Court in  S.N.  Dutt  v. Union  of India(1). We are not persuaded that it is  so.  In S.N. Dutt’s case a notice was. sent by a lawyer on behalf of the concern known as S.N. Dutt & Co.  The notice in question did  not  indicate  either  specifically  or  by   necessary implication  that the concern in question is  a  proprietary concern  and S.N. Dutt was its  sole  proprietor.  Referring to  that  notice,  this  Court  observed  "The  prima  facie impression  from reading the notices would be  that  Messrs. S.N.  Dutt  &  Co. was some kind  of  partnership  firm  and notices  were  being given in the name of  that  partnership firm.   It cannot therefore be said, on a comparison of  the notices in this case with the plaint that there is  identity of  the  person who issued the notice with  the  person  who brought  the  suit."  Further in  that  case  the  defendant challenged  the  validity  of  the  notice  right  from  the beginning.     In  the present case the Union of India could  not  have been  left  with  the impression that the  notice  had  been issued  on  behalf of a partnership firm.  There  are  clear indications in the notice showing that the plaintiff was the sole  proprietor  of the concern known  as  "Raghunath  Dass Mulkhraj".  Hence the decision in S.N. Dutt’s case does  not govern the case before us.     In  the  result  we allow this  appeal,  set  aside  the judgment  of  the High Court and restore  the  judgment  and decree of the trial court.  The Union of India shall pay the costs of the appellant both in this Court as well as in  the High Court. G.C. Appeal allowed. (1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 560. 456