REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3027 OF 2007

R.S.R.T.C. & Ors.               …Appellants

Versus   Deen Dayal Sharma                                            …Respondent

JUDGEMENT

R.M. Lodha, J.

The jurisdiction of civil court to order reinstatement  

of the respondent and grant of financial benefits of service to  

him has been questioned in this appeal.  

2. The respondent was appointed as conductor by the  

Rajasthan  State  Road  Transport  Corporation  –  (for  short,  

‘appellants’) on October 11, 1982.  On January 17, 1983, while

the respondent was on duty on Badi Chopad – Amer route, a  

surprise inspection was done and six passengers were found  

travelling  in  the  bus  without  tickets.   The  respondent  was  

dismissed from service vide order dated January 24, 1983.  The  

respondent preferred departmental appeal against the order of  

dismissal  dated  January  24,  1983  but  the  said  appeal  was  

dismissed on September 5, 1985.  He preferred review before  

the reviewing authority which too was dismissed on April  13,  

1987.   The respondent  then filed  a civil  suit  in  the Court  of  

Additional  Munsif  and  Judicial  Magistrate  No.2,  Jaipur  City,  

Jaipur against the appellants praying therein that the order of  

dismissal dated January 24, 1983 be declared unlawful, illegal,  

void and ineffective being contrary to the Standing Orders as no  

departmental enquiry was held and he be held to be entitled to  

all benefits as if he continued in service.      

3. Although  no  written  statement  was  filed  by  the  

appellants, they challenged the jurisdiction of civil  court orally  

and submitted that the dispute being an industrial dispute, it can  

only be resolved by the Industrial Tribunal.  

4. The Trial Judge after recording the evidence of the  

respondent, heard parties and overruled the objection raised by  2

the appellants about the jurisdiction of the civil court and vide  

judgement and decree dated March 6, 1991 declared the order  

of  dismissal  dated  January  24,  1983  illegal  and  ordered  

reinstatement of respondent and other financial benefits to him.  

5. The  appellants  challenged  the  judgement  and  

decree passed by the Trial Court in appeal before the District  

Judge,  Jaipur  City  but  that  was dismissed on the  ground of  

delay on January 20, 2001.   

6. The  second  appeal  preferred  by  the  appellants  

before  the  High Court  was  dismissed on November  7,  2005  

holding  that  concurrent  finding  of  facts  by  the  courts  below  

warranted  no interference.   It  is  from this  order  that  present  

appeal by special leave arises.  

7. In  The  Premier  Automobiles  Ltd.  v.  Kamlekar  

Shantaram  Wadke  of  Bombay  and  Others1,  a  three  Judge  

Bench of this Court considered Section 9 of the Civil Procedure  

Code, 1908, the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and  

large number of decisions by this Court, as well as English and  

other Indian Courts and summed up the principles applicable to  

1 (1976) 1 SCC 496 3

the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court  in  relation  to  an  industrial  

dispute thus :

“23. …. (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it  relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act  the remedy lies only in the civil court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a  right or liability under the general or common law and  not  under the Act,  the jurisdiction of  the civil  court  is  alternative,  leaving  it  to  the  election  of  the  suitor  concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is  competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of  a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the  only  remedy  available  to  the  suitor  is  to  get  an  adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right  created  under  the  Act  such  as  Chapter  VA  then  the  remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or the  raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.”

In paragraph 24 of the report, this Court further clarified:

“We may, however, in relation to principle No. 2 stated  above hasten to add that there will hardly be a dispute  which will be an industrial dispute within the meaning of  Section 2(k) of the Act and yet will be one arising out of  a right or liability under the general or common law only  and not under the Act. Such a contingency, for example,  may arise in regard to the dismissal of an unsponsored  workman which in view of the provision of law contained  in  Section 2A of  the Act  will  be an  industrial  dispute  even though it may otherwise be an individual dispute.  Civil  courts, therefore, will  have hardly an occasion to  deal with the type of cases falling under principle No. 2.  Cases  of  industrial  disputes  by  and  large,  almost  invariably, are bound to be covered by principle No. 3  stated above.”

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8. In  the  case  of  Rajasthan  State  Road  Transport   

Corporation  and  Another  v.  Krishna  Kant  and  Others2,  this  

Court  was  concerned  with  the  question,  where  the  dispute  

between  the  employer  and  the  workmen  involves  the  

recognition, application or enforcement of the certified Standing  

Orders, whether  jurisdiction of  civil court to entertain a suit with  

respect  to  such  dispute  is  barred.   A  three  Judge  Bench  

extensively considered the nature of the Standing Orders; the  

scope of  ‘Industrial  Dispute’  and a long line of  cases of  this  

Court,  including  Premier  Automobiles1,  and  summarized  the  

legal position as follows:

“1)  Where  the  dispute  arises  from  general  law  of  contract, i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of  the  general  law of  contract,  a  suit  filed  in  civil  court  cannot  be  said  to  be  not  maintainable,  even  though  such  a  dispute  may  also  constitute  an  “industrial  dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(k) or Section 2- A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (2)  Where,  however,  the  dispute  involves recognition,  observance  or  enforcement  of  any  of  the  rights  or  obligations created by the Industrial  Disputes Act,  the  only remedy is to approach the forums created by the  said Act. (3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition,  observance  or  enforcement  of  rights  and  obligations  created  by  enactments  like  Industrial  Employment  (Standing  Orders)  Act,  1946  — which  can  be  called  “sister  enactments”  to  Industrial  Disputes  Act  — and  which  do  not  provide  a  forum  for  resolution  of  such  disputes,  the  only  remedy  shall  be  to  approach  the  forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided  

2 (1995) 5 SCC 75 5

they constitute industrial disputes within the meaning of  Section 2(k) and Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act  or where such enactment says that such dispute shall  be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it  shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the  Industrial  Disputes  Act.  Otherwise,  recourse  to  civil  court is open. (4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by  the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for  the reason that  access to the forum depends upon a  reference being made by the appropriate Government.  The  power  to  make  a  reference  conferred  upon  the  Government is to be exercised to effectuate the object  of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to  make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised  is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is  the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it  may  be  that  the  Government  is  entitled  to  examine  whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an  adjudication. (5)  Consistent  with  the  policy  of  law  aforesaid,  we  commend to Parliament and the State Legislatures to  make a provision enabling a workman to approach the  Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly — i.e., without  the requirement of a reference by the Government — in  case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2-A of the  Industrial  Disputes  Act.  This  would  go  a  long way  in  removing  the  misgivings  with  respect  to  the  effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial  Disputes Act. (6) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in  accordance  with  the  Industrial  Employment  (Standing  Orders) Act, 1946 are statutorily imposed conditions of  service and are binding both upon the employers and  employees,  though  they  do  not  amount  to  “statutory  provisions”.  Any  violation  of  these  Standing  Orders  entitles an employee to appropriate relief either before  the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the  civil  court  where  recourse  to  civil  court  is  open  according to the principles indicated herein. (7) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes  Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative  dispute-resolution  mechanism  to  the  workmen,  a  mechanism which is speedy, inexpensive, informal and  unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and  appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil  courts. Indeed, the powers of the courts and tribunals  

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under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive  in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think  appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to  an industrial dispute.”

9. In  Rajasthan  State  Road  Transport  Corpn.  and  

Others v. Zakir Hussain3, this Court held that the employees of  

the  State  Road Transport  Corporation  are  not  civil  servants,  

and they are not entitled to protection of Article 311 (2) of the  

Constitution.  While dealing with the question of jurisdiction of  

civil court in the matters of industrial dispute, this Court applied  

the principles enunciated in Krishna Kant2 in the following words  

:

“35..…This  Court  has  very  explicitly  summarised  the  principles flowing from the discussion in the judgment in  para  35 and applying  the  above principles  this  Court  has  categorically  held  that  the  suits  filed  by  the  employees in those appeals were not  maintainable  in  law……  

36. For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  hold  that  the  respondent  ought  to  have  approached  the  remedies  provided  under  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act.  He  has  miserably failed to do so but approached the civil court,  which on the facts and circumstances of the case has  no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit.”

10. A three Judge Bench of this Court  in the case of  

Rajasthan SRTC and Others v. Khadarmal4, again considered  

the question regarding jurisdiction of civil court in the matter of  

termination  of  service  of  a  probationer  and  following  the  3 (2005) 7 SCC 447  4 (2006) 1 SCC 59

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judgments  of  this  Court  in  Zakir  Hussain3 and  Krishna Kant2  

held :  

“6. In our view, as the civil court had no jurisdiction, the  decrees which were passed have no force of law. They  are accordingly set aside. In our view, there can be no  direction to reinstate or to continue reinstatement….”

11. It appears that in the case of Rajasthan State Road  

Transport Corporation and another v. Bal Mukund  

Bairwa5,  a two Judge Bench of this Court  noticed  

some  conflict  in  the  judgments  of  this  Court  in  

Krishna  Kant2 and  Khadarmal4 and,  accordingly,  

referred  the  matter  to  a  larger  Bench.   A  three  

Judge  Bench  of  this  Court  in  its  decision  titled  

Rajasthan  State  Road Transport  Corporation  and  

Another  v.  Bal  Mukund  Bairwa  (2)6,  revisited  the  

issue  with  regard  to  jurisdiction  of   civil  court  to  

entertain suits questioning the orders of termination  

and held as follows :

“36. If an employee intends to enforce his constitutional  rights  or  a right  under a statutory regulation,  the civil  court will have the necessary jurisdiction to try a suit. If,  however,  he  claims  his  right  and  corresponding  obligations  only  in  terms  of  the  provisions  of  the  Industrial Disputes Act or the sister laws so called, the  civil court will have none. In this view of the matter, in  

5 (2007) 14 SCC 41 6 (2009) 4 SCC 299

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our  considered  opinion,  it  would  not  be  correct  to  contend that only because the employee concerned is  also a workman within the meaning of the provisions of  the  1947  Act  or  the  conditions  of  his  service  are  otherwise  governed  by  the  Standing  Orders  certified  under the 1946 Act, ipso facto the civil court will have no  jurisdiction. This aspect of the matter has recently been  considered by this Court in  Rajasthan SRTC v.  Mohar  Singh [(2008) 5 SCC 542]. The question as to whether  the  civil  court’s  jurisdiction  is  barred  or  not  must  be  determined having regard to the facts of each case. 37. If the infringement of the Standing Orders or other  provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act are alleged, the  civil court’s jurisdiction may be held to be barred but if  the  suit  is  based  on  the  violation  of  principles  of  common  law  or  constitutional  provisions  or  on  other  grounds, the civil court’s jurisdiction may not be held to  be barred. If no right is claimed under a special statute  in  terms  whereof  the  jurisdiction  of  the  civil  court  is  barred, the civil court will have jurisdiction. 38. Where  the  relationship  between  the  parties  as  employer  and  employee  is  contractual,  the  right  to  enforce the contract of service depending on personal  volition of an employer is prohibited in terms of Section  14(1)(b)  of  the  Specific  Relief  Act,  1963.  It  has,  however,  four  exceptions,  namely,  (1)  when  an  employee enjoys a status i.e. his conditions of service  are  governed  by  the  rules  framed  under  the  proviso  appended to Article 309 of the Constitution of India or a  statute  and  would  otherwise  be  governed  by  Article  311(2)  of  the  Constitution  of  India;  (2)  where  the  conditions  of  service  are  governed  by  statute  or  statutory  regulation  and  in  the  event  mandatory  provisions thereof  have been breached;  (3)  when  the  service  of  the  employee  is  otherwise  protected  by  a  statute;  and  (4)  where  a  right  is  claimed  under  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  or  sister  laws,  termination  of  service having been effected in breach of the provisions  thereof. 39. The appellant Corporation is bound to comply with  the  mandatory  provisions  of  the  statute  or  the  regulations  framed under  it.  A  subordinate  legislation  when validly framed becomes a part of the Act. It is also  bound to follow the principles of natural justice. In the  event it is found that the action on the part of the State  is  violative  of  the  constitutional  provisions  or  the  mandatory requirements of a statute or statutory rules,  

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the  civil  court  would  have  the  jurisdiction  to  direct  reinstatement with full back wages.”

12. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted  

that controversy with regard to the jurisdiction of civil court in  

entertaining  a  suit  wherein  the  order  of  termination  is  

challenged on the ground of  violation of  principles of  natural  

justice has been set at rest in Bal Mukund Bairwa (2)6.  She  

heavily relied upon paragraph 39 of the report  quoted above  

and  contended  that  civil  court  rightly  entertained,  tried  and  

decreed the suit in the present matter.  

13. We  shall  first  notice  the  case  set  up  by  the  

respondent in the plaint.  It was averred :

“(kha) That defendants did not  hold any departmental  enquiry against the plaintiff in respect of the said remark  and nor  in  this  regard the plaintiff  was  accorded any  opportunity of  defence and hearing.   The plaintiff  has  been dismissed from service on the basis of the said  false remark without  according him the opportunity  of  defence and hearing.   As per section 35 of  Standing  Orders if there is any allegation of misconduct against  any  employee  then  holding  departmental  enquiry  against him is necessary and thereafter on proving the  charges  against  him he  may  be  punished  but  in  the  instant case Defendants did not hold any departmental  enquiry for the said false remark put against the Plaintiff  and  nor  the  plaintiff  was  accorded  opportunity  of  defence  and  hearing  and  order  of  dismissal  of  the  plaintiff  from  service  has  been  passed  which  being  contrary to Section 35 of Standing Orders and principles  of natural justice is liable to be quashed.  

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(ga) That  the  order  of  dismissal  of  service  of  the  Plaintiff is of Penal nature.  In the order of dismissal of  service issued against the plaintiff the plaintiff’s service  being  not  satisfactory  and  breach  of  the  terms  and  conditions  of  appointment  due to  which  he  has  been  dismissed from service which is a blot on the character  of  the  Plaintiff.   Which  of  the  Conduct  has  been  breached by the Plaintiff is not clear from the order of  dismissal  of  service  of  Plaintiff.   In  this  regard  any  departmental enquiry was not held against the Plaintiff  and before passing the dismissal order, the plaintiff was  not accorded opportunity of defence and hearing which  being contrary to law and Section 35 of Standing orders  is liable to be quashed.”

14. The case of the respondent as set up in the plaint,  

therefore,  is  that  in  the  absence of  departmental  enquiry  as  

contemplated in Standing Orders, the order of dismissal is bad  

in  law.  It  is  true that  respondent  pleaded that  he has been  

dismissed  from  service  without  affording  any  opportunity  of  

defence  and  hearing  and  in  breach  of  principles  of  natural  

justice but the said plea has to be understood in the backdrop  

of  his  pleading  that  the  dismissal  order  has  been  passed  

contrary to Standing Orders without holding any departmental  

enquiry.   The  legal  position  that  Standing  Orders  have  no  

statutory  force  and  are  not  in  the  nature  of  delegated  /  

subordinate legislation is clearly stated by this Court in Krishna  

Kant2.   In  that  case  (Krishna  Kant2),  this  Court  while  

summarizing the legal principles in paragraph 35(6) stated that  11

the certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance  

with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 are  

statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both  

upon  the  employers  and  employees,  though  they  do  not  

amount  to  ‘statutory  provisions’  and  any  violation  of  these  

Standing  Orders  entitles  an  employee  to  appropriate  relief  

either before the forum created by the Industrial Disputes Act or  

the civil court where recourse to civil court is open according to  

the principles indicated therein.  In Bal Mukund Bairwa (2)6, in  

para 37 of the report, the position has been explained that if the  

infringement of the Standing Orders is alleged, the civil court’s  

jurisdiction may be held to be barred but if the suit is based on  

the  violation  of  principles  of  common  law  or  constitutional  

provisions or on other grounds, the civil court’s jurisdiction may  

not be held to be barred.  In our opinion,  nature of right  sought  

to  be  enforced  is  decisive  in  determining  whether  the  

jurisdiction of civil court is excluded or not.  In the instant case,  

the  respondent  who  hardly  served  for  three  months,  has  

asserted  his  right  that  the  departmental  enquiry  as  

contemplated under the Standing Orders, ought to have been  

held  before  issuing  the  order  of  dismissal  and  in  absence  

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thereof  such order  was liable to  be quashed.   Such right,  if  

available, could have been enforced by the respondent only by  

raising an industrial  dispute and not  in  the  civil  suit.   In  the  

circumstances,  it  has  to  be  held  that  civil  court  had  no  

jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit filed by the respondent.  

15.  In the result, appeal is allowed and impugned order  

of the High Court and judgements of the courts below are set  

aside.  No order as to costs.   

…..…….……………..J            (R. V. Raveendran)

…..…….……………..J                  (R. M. Lodha)

New Delhi May  5, 2010.   

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