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PETITIONER: R. S. PANDIT

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF BIHAR

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/12/1962

BENCH:

ACT: Criminal   Trial-Sanction  for   prosecution-Validity   of-- Defective  charge-Particulars  of persons from  whom  bribes taken not mentioned-Point not mentioned in courts below, not also  mentioned  in special leave petition or  statement  of case-Not allowed to be raised-Prevention of Corruption  Act, 1947 (Act 11), ss. 5, 6-Constitution of India, Art. 136.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was convicted under sub-section (1) read  with sub-section (3) of s. 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947,  and  sentenced  to rigorous  imprisonment  for  three years, The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentences  653 passed on him.  He came to this court by special leave.   It was contended that the sanction given by the Government  for his   prosecution  was  illegal  on  the  ground  that   the sanctioning  authority  had not before it all  the  relevant facts constituting the offence for which sanction was  asked for before giving it the sanction was given for  prosecuting the  appellant under sub-section (2) read  with  sub-section (3) but he was convicted for a different offence under  sub- section  (1)  of  s.  5 read wit  sub-section  (3)  and  the sanction was given under sub-section (3) of s. 5 which  lays down only a rule of evidence on a wrong assumption that  the said sub-section created an offence. was also contended that the’  charge  was defective Rs it did disclose  the  amounts appellant had taken as bribes and also persons from whom  he had  taken them.  On account of this the appellant  was  not given an opportunity to prove his innocence. Held,  that  there  was no merit in the  contention  of  the appellant  that sanction was invalid.  The orders issued  by the  government show that the sanction for  prosecution  was given after considering all the relevant facts necessary  to satisfy  the mind of the sanctioning authority.   The  first information  report and the letter of the Superintendent  of Police  gave all the necessary facts to satisfy the mind  of the sanctioning authority that the appellant was  habitually receiving  gratification other than legal gratification  and by  corrupt  and illegal means or by otherwise  abusing  his position  as  public servant, he had  obtained  for  himself pecuniary  advantage within the meaning of S. 5 (1)  (d)  of the Act.  The contention of the appellant that sanction  was given under s. 5 (2) and not under s. 5 (1) is based upon  a misapprehension  of  the  scope of  the  said  sub-sections. Although  the sanction refers to sub-section (2), in  effect it must be deemed to relate to subsection (1) read with  the sub-section   (2),   because   the   expression    "criminal misconduct"  in sub-section (2) takes in the  definition  of

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criminal misconduct.  The third contention is also based- on a misreading of the sanction.  The sanction was given  under sub-section  (2)  read with sub-section (3) of s. 5  of  the Act.   The phraseology used indicates the  consciousness  on the  part of the sanctioning authority that sub-section  (3) is not a separate offence but is only a supporting provision to  the substantive offence, under subsection (1)  and  (2). Sub-section (3) does not create a separate offence.  It only lays down a rule of evidence.  It marks a departure from the well-established  principle of criminal  jurisprudence  that onus is always on the prosecution to bring home the guilt to the  accused.  When sanction is given nduer  subsection  (2) read with subsection (3), it only means 654 that  on the facts disclosed, a case has been made  out  for drawing  a  presumption  of  guilt  against  the  appellant. Section  6  of the Act does not require the sanction  to  be given  in a particular form.  Though the sanction orders  ex facie  do  not disclose the facts, the documents  which  are exhibited in the case give all the necessary relevant  facts constituting the offence of criminal misconduct. It  is  true that the charge should  have  contained  better particulars so as to enable the appellant to prove his case, but  the appellant never complained that the charge did  not contain  the  necessary particulars.  The  record  disclosed that  the  appellant  understood the case  against  him  and adduced all the evidence which he wanted to place before the court.   The  appellate  court  could  have  set  aside  the conviction  if  the defect in the charge  had  occasioned  a failure  of  justice  but the appellant did  not  raise  any objection  either  before the Special judge or in  the  High Court on the score that the charge was defective and he  was misled  in his defence on the ground that no particulars  of the persons from whom the bribes were taken were  mentioned, No  such objection was taken in the statement of  the  case. The  objection was merely an after-thought and could not  be allowed to be raised at the time of argument. Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, (1948) L. R. 75 1. A. 30, Biswabhushan Naik v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1953  S. C.  359, Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.  I. R.  1954 S. C. 637 and Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab,  A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 124, referred to.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 46  of 1961. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  20,  1960  of the Patna High  Court  in  Criminal Appeal No. 32 of 1958. N.   C.  Chatterjee, R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh, S. C.  Agarwal and M. K. Ramamurthi, for the appellant. S.  P. Varma, for the respondent.  655 1962.   December 4. The judgment of the Court was  delivered by SUBBA  RAO,  J.-This Appeal by Special  Leave  is  preferred against  the  judgment of the High Court  of  judicature  at Patna confirming the conviction of the appellant under s.  5 of  the Prevention of Corruption Act by the  Special  judge, Bhagalpur. The  facts  may  be briefly stated.   The  appellant  joined Government  service in 1942 as a teacher in the  Reformatory School,  Hazaribagh,  on  a pay of Rs. 125/-.   In  1945  he

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became  a  lecturer  in  Mechanics  in  Sabour  Agricultural College,  in which he served till November 30, 1949  in  the scale  of  Rs.  125  to 250/-  till  August  1947  and  from September  1947 to November 1949 in the scale of Rs. 200  to 450  /-.   In December 1949 he became  Mechanical  Assistant Engineer  at Sabour and continued to hold that  office  till August  31, 1952.  During that period he was drawing  salary with  five  advance increments in the scale of  Rs.  220  to Rs.750/-.  Then he was reverted to the post of  lecturer  in mechanics  in the Agricultural College in the scale  of  Rs. 200 to Rs. 450/-.  It would be seen that his salary was only ranging  between Rs. 125/- and Rs. 300/-.  He had two  wives and  had three children by them.  Admittedly his family  was not  in affluent circumstances, and his wives did not  bring him  any fortune.  During the year 1951-52 his Bank  account and other evidence showed that he came into possession of  a sum of Rs. 66,832/7/3. The  case of the prosecution is that during the  years  1950 and  1952  the Government introduced a scheme  called  ’Grow More  Food  Scheme’  subsidized by it.   Under  that  scheme pumping  sets were purchased by the Government and  supplied to  agriculturists  on payment of 50 per cent  of  the  cost incurred by the Government.  The appellant had a hand in 656 the purchase of sets and in the distribution of the same  to various  agriculturists.   In  that connection  he  had  the opportunity  to make money on both ends i.e. when they  were purchased  and  when they were distributed.   The  appellant took  an illegal gratification during the implementation  of the  said scheme.  On March 25, 1957 and April 11, 1957  the Supdt. of Police obtained the sanction of the Government  of Bihar,   Development   Department,  for,   prosecuting   the appellant under s. 5(2), read with clause (3) of s. 5 of the Prevention  of  Corruption  Act,  1947  (Act  11  of  1947), hereinafter  called the Act.  On obtaining the sanction  the appellant  was  put  on  trial  before  the  Special  judge, Bhagalpur,  for an offence punishable under s. 2  read  with sub-ss. (1) and (3) of s. 5 of the Act.  The Special  judge, on  a consideration of the evidence, found in the  light  of the  presumption  laid down in s. 5(3) of the Act  that  the accused  was  taking  "illegal  gain  out  of  his  economic position"  in the scheme during the year 1951-52.   On  that finding  the  learned judge convicted the  appellant  tinder Sub-s.  (1)  read with Sub-s.(3), of S. 5 of  the  Act,  and sentenced  him  to undergo rigorous imprisonment  for  three years,  and to pay a fine of Rs. 5001-.  On appeal the  High Court  accepted  the finding of the Special judge  and  con- firmed the conviction and the sentence passed on him.  Hence the appeal. Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellant  contended  that   the sanction  given  by  the Government was  illegal  for  three reasons :-               1. ,The sanctioning authority had not before               it  all  the relevant facts  constituting  the               offence  for  which  sanction  was  asked  for               before giving the sanction.               2.    The  sanction was given for  prosecuting               the appellant under sub-s. (2) read with  sub-               s.3               657               of  s 5 of the Act, whereas he  was  convicted               for a different offence under sub s.     (1)               of s. 5 read with sub-s. (3).               3.    The  sanction  was  given  under  sub-s.               (3)of s.   5  which lays down only a  rule  of

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             evidence on a wrong assumption that the  said               sub-section.creates an offence. As  the argument turned up-on the scope of the sanction  and the  manner  in which it was given it will be  necessary  to read it in extenso:               "Government   of  Bihar  Development   Depart-               ment...... Patna, April 11, 1957.-               No. 1186D.  Whereas the Governor of Bihar  has               considered  the facts stated in the F.  1.  R.               and  the letter No., 1195/CR, dated March  26,               1957 of the Superintendent of Police,  Bhagal-               pur, addressed to the Secretary to  Government               of   Bihar,  Development  Department   (copies               enclosed) through the Commissioner,  Bhagalpur               Division.               And whereas the Governor of Bihar has  reasons               to  believe, on a consideration of  the  facts               mentioned in the aforesaid documents that Shri               Ram   Sagar   Pandit   Lecturer   (now   under               suspension)   Sabour   Agricultural   College,               Bhagalpur has committed offences under  clause               (2)  read with clause (3) of section 5 of  the               Prevention  of  Corruption  Act  1947  (11  of               1947).               Now,  therefore,  the  Governor  of  Bihar  in               pursuance  of  the  provision  laid  down   in               section 5 of the said Act, 1947 is pleased  to               accord  sanction  to the  prosecution  of  the               aforesaid Shri Ram Sagar Pandit under the said               section,               658               A  copy  each of the letter of the  Supdt.  of               Police Bhagalpur and the F.I.R. of the case is               attached herewith.               By order of the Governor of Bihar               Sd/- H. N. Thakur               Joint Secretary to Government." It  appears that on May 7, 1957, the Supdt. of  Police  sent another  letter to the Secretary of the Government of  Bihar under  s. 1970 of the Criminal Procedure Code as  well.   On receipt  of  that letter sanction was granted  on  June  25, 1957, in the following terms :-               "No. 2250-D.               ,,’Whereas  the Governor of Bihar  has  consi-               dered  the facts stated in the F.I.R. and  the               letter No. 1195 Cr.  Dated March 25, 1957,  of               the  Supdt. of Police, Bhagalpur addressed  to               the  Secretary  to  the  Government  of  Bihar               Development Dept, (copy enclosed) through  the               Commissioner  Bhagalpur Division  and  whereas               the  Governor of Bihar has reasons to  believe               on the consideration of the facts mentioned in               the  aforesaid documents, that  Shri  Ramsagar               Pandit, Lecturer (now under suspension) Sabour               Agricultural College, Bhagalpur has  committed               offences under clause (2) read with clause (3)               of  section 5 of the Prevention of  Corruption               Act 1947 (Act 11 of 1947).               Now, therefore, in partial modification of the               sanction  accorded in Govt.  Order No. 1136  D               dated  April 11, 1957, the Governor of  Bihar,               in  pursuance of the provisions laid  down  in               (6)  of  the  said Act and  under  s.  197  of               Criminal Procedure Code, is pleased to Accord                656

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             sanction  to the prosecution of the  aforesaid               Shri Ram Sagar Pandit under the said sanction.               A  copy  each of the letter of the  Supdt.  of               Police,  Bhagalpur, and the First  Information               Report of the case is ;attached herewith.               By  order of the Governor of Bihar  (Sd)  H.N.               Thakur, 25.6.57 Joint Secretary to Government,               Govt. of Bihar, Development Deptt." The said sanctions show that the sanctioning’ authority  has considered the facts stated in the First Information  Report and the letter No. 1195 Criminal, dated 25.3.1957 written by the  Supdt.  of Police.  The First  Information  Report  was lodged  by the Sub-Inspector of Police.  It was  written  by the  said  Sub Inspector of the  Officer  Incharge,  Kotwali Police  Station.  That letter in detail gives the  financial position of the appellant, his meagre resources, large  Bank balances  and  his  possession  of  other  funds.   It  also narrates how during the years 1950 and 1952 huge  quantities of  pumping sets worth Rs. 58 or 59 lakhs were purchased  by the  Agricultural Department of the State of Bihar, how  the accused was in charge of the scheme ofpurchase         and distribution of the same to variousagriculturists   and how he was in a position to take illegal gratification.   It further  states  that  the  accused  was  reported  to  have committed  some acts of commission and omission  by  showing favours  to different firms.  It concludes with an  averment that   the  accused  committed  the  offence   of   criminal misconduct  as  defined  in s. 5 (2) of  the  Prevention  of Corruption  Act, 1947, and was liable to be  punished  under sub-s.  (2)  read with sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the  Act.   The letter  written  by  the Superintendent  of  Police  to  the Secretary  to  the Govt. of  Bihar,  Development  Department gives  again  in datail the said facts.  It also  gives  the appellant’s   inadequate   economic   resources   and    the disproportionately large 660 amounts found in his possession.  It also states that  after the  enquiry had started he withdrew the entire  money  from the  Banks and disposed of the car, which he  had  purchased earlier.  The letter further discloses that huge amounts  of commission  were  debited in the account  books  of  various firms against the agents who received orders for the  supply of  the  Dumping sets to Agricultural  Department  Bihar  It particularises  that  one Baidyanath  Saran,  Proprietor  of Messrs.   Seekers and Co., Patna, stated that he had paid  a sum  of Rs. 400 to the accused as illegal  gratification  in respect  of  the supply of the pumping sets as  demanded  by him.  The explanation offered by the accused for coming into possession  of  such  large  amounts  is  also  given  which appears, on the face of it, to be unacceptable.  The  letter on the said facts purports. to draw the conclusion (a)  that the accused was receiving money by corrupt and illegal means by abusing his position as a public servant; (b) that he was in  possession of pecuniary resources,  disproportionate  to his known resources of income which he was unable to explain and   (c)  that  the  accused  had  committed  an   offence, punishable under subsection (2) read with sub-section (3) of s.  5 of the Act.  The Supdt. of Police, for  the  aforesaid reasons requested the Government to give sanction under s, 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 197 of the Cr. P. Code for the prosecution of the appellant under s. 5 (2) and (3) of the Act in a proper criminal Court of law.  The First Information  Report  and the letter give all  the  necessary facts to satisfy the mind of the sanctioning authority  that the  appellant was habitually receiving gratification  other

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than legal gratification within the meaning of S. 5 (1)  (a) of the Act, and that he by his corrupt and illegal means  or otherwise  was  abusing his position as  public  servant  to obtain for himself pecuniary advantage within the meaning of s.  5  (1)  (d)  of  the Act.   The  orders  issued  by  the Government show that it gave the sanction under sub-s.  (2), read with sub-s (3) of s. 5 661 of  the  Act, after considering the facts disclosed  in  the said two documents. It is therefore clear that the learned counsel is not  right in  his contention that all the relevant facts necessary  to satisfy  the  mind  of the sanctioning  authority  were  not placed before it. The  second contention, namely that the sanction  was  given under  s.  5  (2) but not under s. 5 (1)  is  based  upon  a misapprehension of the scope of the said sub-sections.  Sub- section  (1)  describes the ingredients of  the  offence  of criminal misconduct.  Sub-section (2) is the penal  section, that  is  the section which imposes punishment  for  such  a criminal  misconduct.   The sanction refers  to  sub-s.  (2) which  is  the  provision  that  makes  criminal  misconduct punishable.   The sanction ex-hypothesi must have  reference only  to criminal misconduct as defined in sub-s. (1).   The sanction,  therefore, though in terms it refers to ss.  (2), in  effect must be deemed to relate to sub-s. (1) read  with sub-s  (2), for the expression criminal misconduct  in  sub- s.(2)  takes in the definition of criminal misconduct.   The second contention therefore has no merits. Nor are there any merits in the third contention either.  It is  said  that  the  sanction was  given  to  prosecute  the appellant for committing an offence under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the Act.  On that assumption it is contended that  sub-s. (3)  is  only a rule of evidence and does not deal  with  an offence.  This is again based upon a misreading of the sanc- tion.   The  sanction was given under sub-s. (2)  read  with sub-s.  (3)  of  s.  5 of the  Act.   The  phraseology  used indicates  the consciousness on the part of the  sanctioning authority  that sub-s. (3) is not a separate offence but  it is  only a supporting Provision to the  substantive  offence under  sub-ss. 1 & 2 Sub-s. (3) does not create  a  separate offence.  It only lays down 662 a  rule of evidence which marks a departure from  the  well- established principle of Criminal Jurisprudence that onus is always  on  the Prosecution to bring home ,he guilt  to  the accused.  Under this provision in he circumstances mentioned therein  the  Court shall presume. unless  the  contrary  is proved  that  the  accused  person  is  guilty  of  Criminal misconduct in the discharge of his official duty.  When  the sanction  is given under sub-s. (2) read with sub-s. (3)  it only  means  that  on the facts disclosed in  the  said  two documents,   a  case  has  been  made  out  for  drawing   a presumption of guilt against the appellant. Now we shall proceed to refer to the decisions cited at  the Bar.   The  leading  case  on the subject  is  that  of  the Judicial  Committee in "Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v.  The King". (1) Reliance is placed upon the following passage  in the judgment               "In order to comply with the provisions of Cl.               23,  it must be proved that the  sanction  was               given in respect of the facts constituting the               offence charged.  It is plainly desirable that               the fact should ’be referred to on the face of               the sanction, but this is not essential  since

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             Cl. 23 does not require the sanction to be  in               any  particular  form,  nor  even  to  be   in               writing.   But if the facts  constituting  the               offence  charged are not shown on the face  of               the  sanction, the prosecution must  prove  by               extraneous  evidence  that  those  facts  were               placed before the sanctioning authority." Section  6 of the Act also does not require the sanction  to be  given in a particular form. The principle  expressed  by the Privy Council, namely that the sanction should be  given in  respect of the facts constituting the  :offence  charged equally applies to the sanction under’ s. 6 of the Act.   In the present (1)  A. I. R. 1948 P. C. 83.75 1. A. 30. 663 case  all the facts constituting the offence  of  misconduct with which the appellant was charged were placed before  the Government.   The second principle, namely, that  the  facts should  be  referred to on the face of the sanction  and  if they  do not so, appear, the prosecution must prove them  by extraneous evidence, is certainly sound having regard to the purpose  of the requirements of a sanction.  In the  present case  though  the sanction ex-facie does  not  disclose  the facts,  the documents which are exhibited in the case  given all the necessary relevant facts constituting the offence of criminal  misconduct This Court in Biswabhusan Naik  v.  The State  of Orissa (1) rejected a contention similar  to  that now  raised before us.  There the sanction given under s.  6 of  the Act referred only to sub-s. (2) of s. 5 of  the  Act and it did not specify which of the four offences  mentioned in  s.  5(1) was meant.  This Court adverting to  a  similar contention observed "’It was evident, from the evidence that the facts placed before the Government could only relate  to offences under s. 161 of the Indian Penal Code and clause (a of  s.  5. (1). of the Prevention of Corruption  Act.   They could  not relate to cl. (b) or (c), when the  sanction  was confined  to S. 5 (2) it could not, in the circumstances  of the  case, have related to any.thing but cl. (a)  of  sub-s. (1)  of s. 5. Therefore the omission to mention cl.  (a)  in the sanction did not invalidate it." The aforesaid two decisions therefore answer the  first  two contentions of the learned counsel. Nor does the decision in ’Madan Mohan Singh v.    State   of Uttar Pradesh’ (2) help the appellant. It    is       stated therein  the burden of proving that the  requisite  sanction has  been obtained rests on the prosecution and such  burden includes proof that the sanctioning authority had given  the sanction  in  reference to the facts on which  the  proposed prosecution (1)  A.I.R.  1951 S.C. 359. (2) A.I.R. 1954 S.C.  637  (vol. 41). 664 was  to be based; and these facts may appear on the face  of thesanction or may be proved by extraneous evidence."  The proposition so stated is unexceptionable.  In thepresent case  not only the sanction discloses that  the  sanctioning authority has considered the documents placed before it, but the  documents  so  placed  give  all  the  necessary  facts constituting the offence of criminal misconduct. Reference  is  made to the decision in the case  of  Jaswant Singh  v.  State of Punjab. (1) There this court  held  that after  the  sanction  was granted  for  the  prosecution  in respect  of  one offence, cognizance could not be  taken  in respect of another offence in respect of which there was  no sanction’.   In that case sanction was granted to  prosecute

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Jaswant Singh Patwari for accepting an illegal gratification of Rs. 50/- from one Pal Singh but a charged was framed  for his  habitual  acceptance of  illegal  gratification.   This court  held that the prosecution for the offence under s.  5 (1)  (b) was valid but the offence of  habitually  receiving illegal gratification could not be taken cognizance- of  and the  prosecution  for  that offence was  void  for  want  of sanction.   This decision is relied upon in support  of  the contention  that  the letter of the Supdt.  of  Police  only disclosed  a specific act of bribery.  This decision has  no relevance  to  the question now raised before  us.   In  the present  case  the sanction was given  for  prosecuting  the appellant  for criminal misconduct under s. 5 (1) (a) and  5 (1)  (d)  of the Act.  On the basis of the said  sanction  a charge  was  framed  against the appellant  for  his  having habitually  accepted gratification other  than  remuneration and obtained for himself pecuniary advantage by corrupt  and illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant  and  thereby  committed  the  offence  of  criminal misconduct, an offence punishable under sub-s. (2) read with sub-ss’ (1) & (3) of s. 5 of Act 11 of 1947.  All the  facts necessary (1)  A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 124.  665 therefore to sustain a prosecution under sub-s. (1) (a)  and (d)  were placed before the sanctioning authority and  after having  obtained the sanction the appellant was  charged  in respect  of the said offence.  This decision therefore  does not  help the appellant.  For the aforesaid reasons we  hold that there are no merits in either of the three  contentions raised to invalidate the sanction. Lastly it is suggested that the charge is defective inasmuch as it has deprived the appellant of his opportunity to rebut the presumption raised under sub-s. (3) of s. 5 of the  Act. The charge reads :-               " I, Brahmdev Narain, Special judge, Bhagalpur               hereby charge you Ram Sagar Pandit as follows               That during the period of’ the years 1951  and               1952,   at   Sabour  P.S.  Mofassil   and   at               Bhagalpur,   Town,  P.S.   Kotwali,   District               Bhagalpur,  you, being a public  servant  viz,               Mechanical  Assistant Engineer,  Sabour  Agri-               cultural    College    habitually     accepted               gratification  other than  legal  remuneration               and obtained for yourself pecuniary  advantage               by  corrupt and illegal means or by  otherwise               abusing  your position as public servant  with               the  result  that during the said  period  you               came  in  possession  of a sum  of  about  Rs.               62,000  which  was  disproportionate  to  your               known resources of Income and which you  could               not  satisfactorily  account and  you  thereby               committed the offence of criminal  misconduct,               an offence punishable under sub-section 2 read               with subsections 1 and 3 of s. 5 of Act 11  of               1947 the Prevention of Corruption Act 1947 and               within  my cognizance and I hereby direct  you               be tried by this court on the said charge." 666  Sub-section (3) of s. 5 is:-               "In  any trial of an offence punishable  under               sub-s (2). the fact that the accused person or               any   other  person  on  his  behalf   is   in               possession for which the accused person cannot               satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources

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             or  property  disproportionate  to  his  known               sources of in-come may be proved, and on  such               proof  the  court shall  presume,  unless  the               contrary is proved, that the accused person id               guiltyof criminal    misconduct  in   the               discharge of hisofficial duty  and    his               conviction therefore shall notbe  invalid  by               reason only that isbased   solely  on   such               presumption." This  section  does  not  incorporate  a  separate  head  of offence.  It is only a rule of evidence.  If the accused  is in  possession  of pecuniary resources for which  he  cannot satisfactorily- account, there will be a presumption  unless the contrary is proved that the accused person is guilty  of criminal  misconduct.  But this presumption can  only  apply when  there  is a specific charge  of  criminal  misconduct, visualised  under one or the other of clauses (a) to (d)  of s.  5. To illustrate, if there is a charge that  an  accused has  taken  a bribe of Rs. 10,000 from a  complainant  as  a reward,  the  prosecution can rely upon the  presumption  by establishing that the accused was in possession of pecuniary ’resources or property disproportionate to his known-sources of   income.-   But  the  presumption  so  raised   in   the circumstances  mentioned in the sub-section can be  rebutted by  the  accused in two ways, (1) by  adducing  evidence  to prove that he came into possession of the said resources  in a lawful manner and (2) though he has failed to explain  the circumstances  under  which he came into possession  of  the said  resources, by proving by. other evidence that  he  did not take any illegal gratification.  The presumption  raised under sub-s. (3)  667 cannot  obviously  prevent  an  accused  from  proving   his innocence in respect of the specific charge levelled against him.   On  this legal position it is contended that  as  the charge  does not disclose the amounts he took as bribes  and the  persons from whom he had taken, the appellant  was  not given  an  opportunity to prove his innocence.  But  in  our view this circumstance does not invalidate the charge though it  may be a ground for asking for better particulars.   The charge   as  framed  clearly  stated  that   the   appellant habitually.   accepted   gratification  other   than   legal remuneration  and obtained pecuniary advantage  by  ,corrupt and  illegal means.  The charge contains allegations  making out  an  offence under s. 5 (1) of the Act.  The  charge  no doubt  should  have contained better particulars  so  as  to enable the appellant to prove his case but the accused never complained  that  the charge did not contain  the  necessary particulars.    The  record  discloses  that   the   accused understood the case against him and adduced all the evidence which  he wanted to place before the court.  Section 225  of the  Criminal Procedure Code says ’that no error in  stating either the offence or the particulars required to be  stated in the charge, and no omission to state the offence or those particulars, shall be regarded- at any stage of the case  as material,  unless  the accused was in fact missled  by  such error  or  omission,  and it has  occasioned  a  failure  of justice.’ That  apart  the appellate Court could have set  ,aside  the conviction  if  the defect in the charge  had  occasioned  a failure  of  justice  but the appellant did  not  raise  any objection  either  before the Special judge or in  the  High Court on the score that the charge was defective and that he was misled in his defence on the ground that no  particulars of  the  persons  from  whom  the  bribes  were  taken  were

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mentioned.  Nor  such  an objection has been  taken  in  the special  leave petition, nor in the statement of  the  case. This 668 objection  is  an afterthought and cannot be allowed  to  be raised at this stage of the proceedings. The appeal fails and is dismissed.