REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO.6286/2009

R. Ravindra Reddy & Ors. .. Petitioners Vs.

H. Ramaiah Reddy & Ors.    .. Respondents

J U D G M E N T

ALTAMAS KABIR, J.

1. One Dodda Appanna Reddy owned vast properties  

in  Halasahalli  Thippasandra  Village,  Sarjapura  

Hobli, Anekal Taluk, Bangalore Urban District.  He  

died in 1968 leaving behind his only son, Pilla  

Reddy,  and  grandson,  H.  Ramaiah  Reddy,  the  

Respondent No.1 herein, to succeed to his estate.

The petitioners herein are the sons of H. Ramaiah  

Reddy.

2. After Appanna Reddy’s death Pilla Reddy and H.  

Ramaiah Reddy constituted a joint family in respect  

of  the  ancestral  properties  and  were  in  joint  

possession and enjoyment of the various properties,  

including the suit schedule properties.

3. In  1972,  there  was  a  partition  of  the  

properties  between  Pilla  Reddy  and  his  son,  H.  

Ramaiah Reddy, in respect of the joint family and  

ancestral  properties.  One  Annaiah  Reddy,  a  

professional document writer at the Sub-Registrar’s  

office at Anekal Taluk, was an attesting witness to  

the  registered  partition  deed.   Pilla  Reddy  

executed two Wills, both scribed by Annaiah Reddy,  

in 1972 and in 1979.  The said Annaiah Reddy filed  

an application on 30th December, 1974, for grant of  

tenancy  rights  in  respect  of  the  suit  schedule  

lands  under  Section  48  of  the  Karnataka  Land  

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Reforms Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as “the  

1961 Act”, claiming occupancy rights on the ground  

that he had been cultivating the suit lands.  Only  

Pilla  Reddy  was  impleaded  as  a  party  to  the  

proceedings, although, the properties were said to  

be ancestral properties.  It appears that on 11th  

December, 1975, the tenancy rights of the lands in  

question  were  recorded  in  the  name  of  Annaiah  

Reddy.

4. In 1986, one Sunkamma claiming to be the second  

wife of Pilla Reddy, filed a partition suit after  

the  death  of  Pilla  Reddy,  seeking  partition  and  

separate possession of his various properties.  In  

1996,  Annaiah  Reddy  sold  some  of  the  lands  in  

favour  of  Respondent  Nos.2  to  5  herein  and  as  

contended by the petitioners, they had no knowledge  

of  the  grant  of  occupancy  rights  in  favour  of  

Annaiah Reddy.  The said matter ultimately reached  

this Court by way of Civil Appeal No.1348 of 2001  

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preferred by H. Ramaiah Reddy.  During the pendency  

of the said appeal, H. Ramaiah Reddy and Sunkamma  

entered into a compromise which was recorded and  

the appeal was disposed of by an order dated 26th  

October, 2004.  Inasmuch as, the Respondent Nos.2  

to  5  tried  to  disturb  the  possession  of  the  

petitioners  on  the  strength  of  their  purported  

purchase of the suit lands from Annaiah Reddy, the  

petitioners filed the above-mentioned suit, being  

No.1457/2005, in the Court of the Principal Civil  

Judge (Senior Division), Bangalore Rural District  

at Bangalore,  inter alia, for a declaration that  

they were coparceners of the undivided Hindu Joint  

Family  of  late  Dodda  Appanna  Reddy  and  for  

partition of the scheduled properties by metes and  

bounds  and  to  put  the  plaintiffs  in  separate  

possession of their legitimate 1/4th share each in  

the  schedule  properties.  They  also  prayed  for  a  

declaration  that  the  order  dated  11th December,  

1975, passed by the Land Tribunal, Anekal Taluk,  

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was illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs and  

their inheritance right and title to the schedule  

properties.  A further declaration was sought for  

that the sale deeds executed by Annaiah Reddy in  

favour of the Defendant Nos.2 to 4 were illegal and  

not binding on the petitioners. Along with the said  

relief, the petitioners also prayed for a mandatory  

injunction to direct the Tahsildar, Anekal Taluk,  

to  effect  the  mutation  and  revenue  entries  in  

respect  of  the  schedule  properties  in  the  joint  

names of the petitioners and the first defendant.  

Consequential reliefs were also prayed for.

5. In the said suit, the petitioners prayed for  

granting  ad-interim  injunction  against  the  

respondents, for the purpose of deciding the suit.  

The  Trial  Court  formulated  11  issues  and  one  

additional issue.  Of the said 12 issues, the 6th  

issue  was  ‘Whether  the  suit  was  barred  by  

limitation?’ and the additional issue was ‘Whether  

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the suit was maintainable in view of Section 132(2)  

of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act?’.

6. The Trial Court decided to hear the said two  

issues  as  preliminary  issues.  After  hearing  the  

parties, the Trial Court answered issue No.6 in the  

affirmative  and  additional  issue  No.1  in  the  

negative  and  held  that  the  suit  was  barred  by  

limitation and was also not maintainable in view of  

the bar of Section 132(2) of the Karnataka Land  

Reforms Act, 1961.  In view of its said findings,  

the  Trial  Court  dismissed  the  plaintiff’s  suit.  

Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree of the  

Trial Court, the petitioners preferred the Regular  

First  Appeal  No.845  of  2006  (PAR)  before  the  

Karnataka High Court at Bangalore.  The High Court  

also dismissed the appeal endorsing the view taken  

by the Trial Court that the petitioners’ suit was  

clearly barred by limitation and also by virtue of  

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Section 132(2) of the 1961 Act and that Civil Court  

had no jurisdiction to entertain and try the same.

7. It is against the said judgment and order of  

the Karnataka High Court in RFA No.845/2006 (PAR)  

that the instant appeal has been filed.

8. On behalf of the petitioners it was urged by  

Mr.  Raju  Ramchandran,   learned  Senior  Advocate,  

that since the petitioners were third parties to  

the proceedings before the Land Tribunal, the order  

passed  therein  did  not  bind  them  and  they  were  

separately entitled to file the suit for partition  

notwithstanding the orders of the Land Tribunal.  

It was also submitted that since the proceedings  

before the Land Tribunal were vitiated by fraud and  

collusion, the bar under Section 132(2) of the 1961  

Act would not apply to the facts of the instant  

case and as such the Trial Court was not justified  

in holding that the suit was barred under the said  

provisions. According to the petitioners, since the  

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suit had been brought within a period of 3 years  

from the date of knowledge of the order of the Land  

Tribunal  and  the  sale  transaction,  it  was  not  

barred by limitation and the Trial Court erred in  

dismissing the same on the ground of limitation.

9.  Elaborating  on  his  submissions,  Mr.  

Ramchandran  submitted  that  in  order  to  be  

recognized  and  recorded  as  an  occupant  under  

Section 45 of the 1961 Act, the person concerned  

would be entitled to make an application to the  

Tribunal constituted under Section 48 of the Act  

and every such application would have to be made  

before the expiry of the period of 6 months from  

the  date  of  commencement  of  Section  (1)  of  the  

Karnataka Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1978.  Mr.  

Ramchandran  contended  that  the  inquiry  by  the  

Tribunal  contemplated  under  Section  48-A(5)  had  

necessarily to be confined to the determination of  

the claim of tenancy of the applicant and in the  

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event such a question arose during the pendency of  

a  civil  or  criminal  proceeding,  no  civil  or  

criminal  Court  or  officer  would  be  entitled  to  

decide  the  question  whether  such  land  was  

agricultural  land  or  not  and  whether  the  person  

claiming  to  be  in  possession  is  or  is  not  the  

tenant of the suit land from prior to 1st March,  

1974, in view of Section 133(1)(i) of the aforesaid  

Act.   

10. Reference  was  also  made  to  Rule  17  of  the  

Karnataka  Land  Reforms  Rules,  1977  (hereinafter  

referred to as the ‘1974 Rules’) which prescribes  

the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal in  

respect of a summary inquiry under Section 34 of  

the 1961 Act. It was urged that since the procedure  

was summary in nature, questions relating to fraud  

or  the  validity  of  a  concession  made  by  the  

petitioners’ grand-father could only be gone into  

by a Civil Court and not in the summary proceedings  

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before  the  Tribunal.   Mr.  Ramchandran  submitted  

that it would be evident from the frame of the suit  

that  no  such  question,  as  contemplated  under  

Section 48-A, was involved in the suit which was  

essentially  one  for  declaration  that  the  

petitioners were coparceners of the undivided Hindu  

Joint  Family  of  late  Dodda  Appanna  Reddy  and  

partition of the scheduled property by metes and  

bounds  and  to  put  the  plaintiff  in  separate  

possession of their legitimate 1/4th share each in  

the  scheduled  properties.   A  further  prayer  was  

made to declare that the order dated 11th December,  

1975, passed by the Land Tribunal, Anekal Taluk, in  

Case No.LRF/A.T.C./154/75-76, was illegal and not  

binding on the petitioners and did not affect their  

inheritance  rights  and  title  to  the  scheduled  

properties.  A further declaration was sought that  

the sale deeds executed by Late Annaiah Reddy in  

favour  of  the  defendant  Nos.2  to  4  was  a  sham  

transaction  and  not  binding  on  the  petitioners.  

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Mr. Ramchandran submitted that the Tribunal was not  

competent  to  determine  the  said  questions  which  

could only be decided by the Civil Court.

11. In  support  of  his  aforesaid submissions,  

Mr. Ramchandran firstly referred to the decision of  

this Court in Saraswati & Ors. vs. Lachanna [(1994)  

1 SCC 611], in which a similar provision in the  

A.P.  (Telangana  Area)  Tenancy  and  Agricultural  

Lands  Act,  1950,  where  the  Civil  Court’s  

jurisdiction  had  been  barred,  fell  for  

consideration and it was held that a suit relating  

to redemption of usufructuary mortgage filed in the  

Civil Court was not barred and was maintainable,  

having regard to the provisions of Section 9 of the  

Code of Civil Procedure.  This Court held that bar  

on the power of the Civil Court to entertain a suit  

could not be inferred with, where the statute did  

not create a right or after creating a right did  

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not provide a forum for adjudication of any dispute  

arising out of such right.     

12. Mr. Ramchandran also referred to the decision  

of this Court in the case of Shiv Kumar Chadha vs.  

Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors. [(1993) 3 SCC  

161], where the same principle was reiterated and  

it was held that the Court’s jurisdiction to go  

into the question as to whether the order was a  

nullity being vitiated by jurisdictional error was  

not barred.

13. Reference was also made to the decision of this  

Court in the case of Swamy Atmananda & Ors. vs. Sri  

Ramakrishna Tapovanam & Ors. [(2005) 10 SCC 51],  

where a dispute over title under the Tamil Nadu  

Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973,  

was claimed to be barred under Section 53 of the  

Act.  This Court held that such a dispute was not  

one  that  was  required  to  be  decided  under  the  

provisions of the aforesaid Act, and, accordingly,  

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the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in terms of  

Section 9 of the Civil Procedure was not excluded.  

It  was  emphasized  that  the  ouster  of  the  Civil  

Court’s  jurisdiction  was  not  to  be  readily  

inferred.

14.  Mr.  Ramchandran  lastly  referred  to  the  

decision of this Court in  Sudhir G. Angur & Ors.  

vs. M. Sanjeev & Ors. [2006 (1) SCC 141], wherein,  

while  considering  the  provisions  of  the  Mysore  

Religious  and  Charitable  Institutions  Act,  1927,  

this Court held that the jurisdiction of the Civil  

Court  in  regard  to  matters  containing  serious  

allegations  of  forgery,  fraud  and  diversion  of  

trust properties, could not be inquired into in a  

summary manner and could only be gone into by a  

Court.  

                             15. On the question of limitation, Mr. Ramchandran  

submitted that the High Court erred in deciding the  

question  of  limitation  without  considering  the  

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fraudulent nature of the consent said to have been  

given  by  Pilla  Reddy,  although,  he  had  no  

independent  right  or  title  over  the  property  to  

give  consent  for  granting  occupancy  rights  in  

favour of Annaiah Reddy.  Mr. Ramchandran submitted  

that the High Court erred in holding that the suit  

was barred by limitation without taking evidence in  

that  regard.  In  support  of  his  aforesaid  

submission,  Mr.  Ramchandran  referred  to  the  

decision of this Court in Jatinder Singh & Anr. vs.  

Mehar Singh & Ors. [AIR 2009 SC 354], in which this  

Court set aside the decision of the High Court for  

having  failed  to  take  notice  of  an  application  

filed by the Appellant therein under Order 41 Rule  

27 CPC while deciding the second appeal.   This  

Court  held  that  when  such  an  application  was  

pending, it was the duty of the High Court to deal  

with the same on merits and not having been done  

so,  there  was  no  other  alternative,  but  to  set  

aside the judgment of the High Court and to remit  

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the  appeal  for  a  fresh  decision  in  the  second  

appeal  after  taking  into  consideration  the  

application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC.   

16.   In the same context, reference was also made  

to a subsequent decision of this Court in Balawwa &  

Anr. vs.  Hasanabi & Ors. [(2000) 9 SCC 272], in  

which the question of ouster of the Civil Court’s  

jurisdiction fell for consideration in view of the  

Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961.  This Court held  

that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted  

only in respect of such reliefs as could be granted  

by the Special Tribunal under the Special Statute  

but in other respects the jurisdiction of the Civil  

Court was not ousted.  

17. Mr. Ramchandran submitted that the preliminary  

issue relating to the bar of jurisdiction of the  

Civil Court, as envisaged under Section 133 (2) of  

the 1961 Act, could not have been decided without  

taking evidence as to the character of the lands in  

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question. Mr. Ramchandran submitted that the order  

of  the  High  Court  was  not  capable  of  being  

entertained and was liable to be set aside.   

18. On the other hand, appearing for the Respondent  

No.1, Mr. Kailash Vasudev, learned Senior Advocate,  

pointed out from the plaint of OS No.1457 of 2005,  

filed  by  R.  Ravindra  Reddy  in  the  Court  of  

Principal Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bangalore  

Rural District, Bangalore, that a fraud had been  

perpetrated  by  the  said  Annaiah  Reddy  only  to  

deprive the plaintiffs of their right and share in  

the scheduled properties.  Mr. Vasudev pointed out  

that in the same breath it had also been admitted  

that  Pilla  Reddy  had  conceded  grant  of  tenancy  

rights  in  favour  of  late  Annaiah  Reddy,  though  

without knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs.  

Mr.  Vasudev  submitted  that  the  question  of  

obtaining the consent of the plaintiffs by their  

grandfather,  Pilla  Reddy,  for  grant  of  tenancy  

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rights in favour of Annaiah Reddy, did not arise  

since he was holding the tenancy rights in respect  

of the said land.   

19. Mr. Vasudev also referred to paragraph 16 of  

the plaint where it was stated that the cause of  

action for the suit arose in January 2005 as the  

plaintiffs/respondents were continuously demanding  

partition and separate possession of their share in  

the scheduled properties and the petitioners herein  

failed  to  effect  partition,  but  the  other  

respondents  were  continuing  to  make  attempts  to  

trespass/interfere  with  and  to  disturb  the  

Respondent No.1’s possession and enjoyment of the  

scheduled properties.   

20.  Mr. Vasudev then brought to our notice the  

proceedings  before  the  Land  Tribunal,  Bangalore  

District, Anekal Taluk, in Case No.LRF/A.T.C./154/  

75-76  dated  11th December,  1975,  in  which  the  

Petitioner was shown as M. Annaiah Reddy and H.  

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Pilla Reddy was shown as the Respondent.  In the  

proceedings under Section 48-A of the 1961 Act, the  

application filed by M. Annaiah Reddy was disposed  

of by the following order :-

“All the above mentioned Sy. Nos. lands are  situated at Halasahalli Thippasasndra Village,  Sarjapura  Hobli.   The  petitioner  claims  occupancy right in the above mentioned Sy. Nos.  and  produced  the  order  copy  dated  30.12.74.  The date for enquiry was fixed on 11.12.75 and  on the same day the enquiry was conducted and  the  respondent  agreed  that  occupancy  rights  claimed by the petitioner in the above said Sy.  Nos.  Therefore all the members of the Tribunal  have unanimously accepted the contention of the  petitioner and the respondent and resolved to  grant occupancy rights in favour of petitioner  to the extent of lands in the above-said Sy.  Nos. as per possession.”  

21.  Mr. Vasudev submitted that it would be amply  

clear  from  the  said  order  that  Pilla  Reddy  had  

agreed  to  the  claim  of  occupancy  rights  by  M.  

Annaiah Reddy.  Furthermore, such order had never  

been  questioned  by  H.  Pilla  Reddy  as  being  

fraudulent or having been obtained by fraudulent  

means.  

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22.   Mr. Vasudev referred to the decision of this  

Court in K.D. Sharma vs.  Steel Authority of India  

Ltd. [(2008)  12  SCC  481],  in  which  the  issue  

relating  to  fraud  perpetrated  on  Court  was  

considered in detail and it was held that fraud  

practised on the Court would vitiate all judicial  

acts, since fraud is an act of deliberate deception  

with  the  design  of  securing  something  by  taking  

unfair advantage of another.   

23. Mr. Vasudev also referred to the decision of  

this Court in  Mudakappa vs.  Rudrappa [AIR 1994 SC  1190], in which this Court held that the Tribunal  

under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act was entitled  

to  decide  the  question  as  to  whether  the  joint  

family  or  one  of  its  members  was  a  tenant  in  

respect  of  the  land  in  question  and  that  such  

decision was subject to review under Articles 226  

and 227 of the Constitution.   

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24. Mr.  Vasudev  submitted  that  since  the  

preliminary  objections  made  on  behalf  of  the  

Respondent  No.1  herein  had  been  duly  accepted  

relating  to  the  maintainability  of  the  suit,  on  

account of the bar imposed under Section 133(1)(i)  

and (2) of the 1961 Act and the bar of limitation,  

no interference was called for with the impugned  

judgment of the High Court.   

25. As has been mentioned hereinbefore, out of 11  

issues and the additional issue formulated by the  

Trial Court, issue No.6 and the additional issue  

relating  to  the  bar  of  limitation  and  

maintainability in view of Section 132(2) of the  

1961  Act,  were  taken  up  for  consideration  as  

preliminary  issues.  In  fact,  in  view  of  the  

decision on the said two issues, no other issue was  

either taken up for consideration or decided. Our  

inquiry in this petition is, therefore, confined to  

the said two issues alone.   

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26. The  Trial  Court  answered  issue  No.6  in  the  

affirmative  and  additional  issue  No.1  in  the  

negative  holding  that  the  suit  was  barred  by  

limitation and was not maintainable in view of the  

bar of Section 132(2) of the 1961 Act.  We have  

considered the submissions made on behalf of the  

respective parties in respect of the two issues and  

we  agree  with  the  views  expressed  by  the  Trial  

Court  as  also  the  High  Court  on  the  said  two  

issues.  

27.   As  far  as  the  question  of  limitation  is  

concerned, the order of the Land Tribunal, Anekal,  

was passed on 11th December, 1975, whereas the suit  

was filed by the Petitioners herein in 2005 seeking  

declaration, partition and permanent injunction in  

respect of the properties which were the subject  

matter of the order of the Tribunal.   An attempt  

has been made to bring the said suit within the  

period  of  limitation  by  indicating  that  the  

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Respondent  Nos.2  to  5  had  tried  to  disturb  the  

possession of the Petitioners during the year 2004-

05 on the ground of their alleged purchase of the  

suit lands from Annaiah Reddy.   It was sought to  

be urged that Pilla Reddy had admitted the claim of  

the Respondents on having acquired occupancy rights  

before  the  Tribunal,  without  the  knowledge  and  

consent of the Petitioners.  Both the Trial Court,  

as well as the High Court, have dealt with this  

aspect of the matter and have found that it was on  

record that notice of the proceedings before the  

Land  Tribunal  had  been  given  in  the  village  in  

respect of the application filed by Annaiah Reddy.  

It  is  also  on  record  that  the  father  of  the  

Petitioners was quite aware of the orders of the  

Land Tribunal as in OS No.75 of 1986 he had taken a  

specific  stand  that  one  of  the  suit  properties,  

namely, Survey No.46, is a tenanted property, and  

that  the  Land  Tribunal,  Anekal,  had  conferred  

occupancy  rights  in  favour  of  M.  Annaiah  Reddy.  

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The High Court has observed that inspite of the  

same,  the  father  of  the  Petitioners  did  not  

question  the  correctness  of  the  order  of  the  

Tribunal. It is on that basis that the Courts below  

held  that  the  Petitioners  had  knowledge  of  the  

concession made by Pilla Reddy in favour of Annaiah  

Reddy and negated their contention that they were  

not  aware  of  the  same  till  they  signed  the  

compromise petition before this Court in the appeal  

arising out of OS No.75 of 1986.   

28. We  are,  therefore,  unable  to  accept  Mr.  

Ramchandran’s submissions that the cause of action  

for  the  suit  arose  only  in  2004-05  when  the  

Respondent  Nos.2  to  5  purportedly  attempted  to  

disturb the possession of the Petitioners.  

29. As  far  as  the  second  issue  is  concerned,  

although ouster of jurisdiction of the Courts is  

not to be readily inferred, it is quite clear from  

the provisions of Sections 132(2) and 133(1)(i) of  

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the 1961 Act that the jurisdiction of the Civil  

Court in matters to be decided by the Tribunal, and  

to  question  a  decision  of  the  Tribunal  stands  

ousted  by  Section  132  of  the  1961  Act  which  

provides as follows :-

“132.  Bar of jurisdiction – (1) No civil court  shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or  deal with any question which is by or under  this Act required to be settled, decided or  dealt  with  by  the  Deputy  Commissioner,  an  officer authorized  under  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  77,  the  Assistant  Commissioner,  the  prescribed  authority  under  Section  83,  the  Tribunal,  the  Tehsildar,  the  Karnataka  Appellate Tribunal or the State Government in  exercise of their powers of control.  

(2)   No order of the Deputy Commissioner, an  officer authorized  under  sub-section  (1)  of  Section  77,  the  Assistant  Commissioner,  the  prescribed  authority  under  Section  83,  the  Tribunal,  the  Tehsildar,  the  Karnataka  Appellate Tribunal or the State Government made  under this Act shall be questioned in any civil  or criminal court.”

Furthermore, Section 133(1)(i) and (2) of the  

Act read as follows :-

“133. Suits, proceedings, etc., involving  questions  required  to  be  decided  by  the  

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Tribunal.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in  any law for the time being in force.-

(i) no  civil  or  criminal  court  or  officer or authority shall, in any  suit, case or proceedings concerning  a land decide the question whether  such  land  is  or  not  agricultural  land and whether the person claiming  to be in possession is or is not a  tenant of the said land from prior  to 1st March, 1974;

(ii)  x x x  

(ii)   x x x

(iii) x x x

(2)   Nothing  in  sub-section  (1)  shall  preclude the civil or criminal court or the  officer or authority from proceeding with the  suit, case or proceedings in respect of any  matter other than that referred to in that sub- section.”

30. It  is  clear  from  the  above  that  the  

jurisdiction  of  the  Civil  or  Criminal  Court  or  

Officer or Authority stood ousted in matters where  

a decision had to be taken as to whether the land  

in  question  was  agricultural  land  or  not  and  

whether the person claiming to be in possession is  

or is not a tenant of the said land from prior to  

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1st April, 1974.   In the instant case, the question  

as to whether Annaiah Reddy was an occupancy tenant  

or  not  and  whether  Pilla  Reddy  had  given  his  

consent to such claim is in the domain of the Land  

Tribunal  and  it  has  been  correctly  held  by  the  

Courts  below  that  the  Civil  Court  had  no  

jurisdiction to decide such a question.  

31.  As far as fraud is concerned, it is no doubt  

true, as submitted by Mr. Ramchandran, that fraud  

vitiates all actions taken pursuant thereto and in  

Lord Denning’s words ‘fraud unravels everything’.  

However, in the instant case, there is nothing on  

record to suggest that Annaiah Reddy committed any  

fraud on Pilla Reddy, who willingly accepted the  

claim of Annaiah Reddy to occupancy rights over the  

land in question.   

32. In that view of the matter, we see no reason to  

interfere with the judgment and order of the High  

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Court impugned in these proceedings and the Special  

Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.  

33. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

________________J. (ALTAMAS KABIR)

________________J. (CYRIAC JOSEPH)

New Delhi Dated:17.02.2010

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