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PETITIONER: R.P. KAPUR AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: SARDAR PRATAP SINGH KAIRON  AND OTHERS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/10/1960

BENCH: DAS, S.K. BENCH: DAS, S.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. GUPTA, K.C. DAS SHAH, J.C. AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1961 AIR 1117            1961 SCR  (2) 143  CITATOR INFO :  F          1980 SC 326  (12)

ACT: Criminal  Procedure-Investigation of  offences-Investigation by   Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police  under   orders   of Inspector-General of Police  Validity  Allegations against Chief  Minister--Necessity of affidavit by  Chief  Minister- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898), ss. 154,  156, 157 and 551-Constitution of India, Art. 14.

HEADNOTE: One  S sent a complaint against the first petitioner to  the Chief  Minister  who sent it to  the  Additional  Inspector- General  of  Police who in his turn sent it  to  the  Deputy Superintendent  of  Police C.I.D., with  the  endorsement  " Register  a  case and investigate personally ".  The  Deputy Superintendent of Police drew up a first information report. There  were  also three other cases instituted  against  the petitioners  or some of them, which were being  investigated into  by  the  C.I.D.  Police  officers.   The   petitioners contended  that the respondents had violated the  provisions of  ss. 154, 156 and 157 of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure and  had  adopted a procedure unknown to law  and  had  thus singled out the petitioners for unequal treatment in  viola- tion of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Held, that the procedure adopted was authorised by S. 551 of the  Code  and in the first case the  Inspector-General  had power to deal with the complaint and to direct investigation of the same by the Deputy Superintendent of Police.  Even if the  reason given for the Inspector-General making over  the investigation  to the Deputy Superintendent of  Police  that the  case was of a technical nature was not correct, it  was open  to  him to make over the investigation to  the  Deputy Superintendent  of  Police  in view of  the  status  of  the petitioners.  The procedure adopted in the other three cases was also not illegal, and there was no unequal treatment  of the  petitioners  in  the  matter  of  the  institution   or investigation  of the cases so as to entitle them to  invoke in aid Art. 14 of the Constitution.

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H.   N.  Rishbud  and  Inder Singh v. The  State  of  Delhi, [1955]  1 S.C.R. 1150, King Emperor v. Nilkantha, I.L.R.  35 Mad.  247, Pulin Bihari Ghosh v. The King, I.L.R.  [1950]  1 Cal. 124 and Textile Traders Syndicate Ltd. v. The State  of U. P., A.I.R. 1959 All. 337, referred to. Since  allegations were made against the Chief  Minister  by the  petitioners,  he owed a duty to the Court  to  file  an affidavit stating what the correct position was so far as he remembered it. 144

JUDGMENT: ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Petition No. 59 of 1960. Petition  under Article 32 of the Constitution of India  for enforcement of-Fundamental Rights. A.   S. R. Chari, S. N. Andley, J. B. Dadachanji,  Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the Petitioners. S.   M. Sikri, Advocate-General for the State of Punjab,  H. S.  Doabia,  Additional Advocate-General for  the  State  of Punjab,  M. S. Punnu, Deputy Advocate-General for the  State of Punjab and D. Gupta, for the Respondents. 1660.  October 28.  The Judgment of the Court was  delivered by S.   K.   DAS  J.-This  is  a  writ  petition.   The   three petitioners before us are (1) R. P. Kapur, a member of was  serving as a Commissioner in the State of Punjab, (2)     Sheila Kapur, his wife, and (3) Kaushalya Devi, his  mother-in-law. They have moved this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for the enforcement of their rights under Arts. 14 and 21 of the  Constitution, which rights they say have been  violated by  the  respondents  who are the State  of  Punjab,  Sardar Pratap  Singh  Kairon, Chief Minister thereof,  and  certain officials,  police, administrative and magisterial who  have been conducting, or are connected with, the investigation or inquiry into a number of criminal cases. instituted  against the petitioners.  We shall refer to some of these  officials later  in this judgment in relation to the part  which  they have played or are playing in those criminal cases. Briefly   stated  the  case  of  the  petitioners  is   that petitioner  no. 1 had the misfortune to incur the  wrath  of the  Chief  Minister of the State.  It is alleged  that  the Chief  Minister was annoyed with petitioner no.  1,  because the  latter did not show his readiness to give evidence  for the  prosecution in a case known as the Karnal  Murder  Case (later  referred to as the Grewal case) in which one  D.  S. Grewal,  then  Superintendent of Police,  Karnal,  and  some other  police officials were, along with others, accused  of some  serious offences.  That case was transferred  by  this Court to a Special 145 Judge,  at  Delhi,  who  commenced  the  trial  sometime  in May/June  1959.   Petitioner  no. 1 was  at  the  time  Com- missioner of Ambala, and he alleges that he was told by  the Chief  Minister  that  it was proposed to  cite  the  Deputy Commissioner  and the Deputy Inspector-General of Police  as prosecution  witnesses in the said case and it would  be  in the  fitness  of things that petitioner no.  1  should  also figure   as  a  prosecution  witness;  to  this   suggestion petitioner no. 1 gave a somewhat dubious reply to the effect that his appearance as a prosecution witness might or  might not   help   the  prosecution.   Another  reason   for   the displeasure  of  the  Chief  Minister,  as  alleged  in  the petition, related to certain orders which petitioner no.   1

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had  passed as Commissioner, Patiala Division, in a  revenue case  known  as the Sangrur case.  We shall  presently  give more  details of that case, but it is enough to  state  here that  the allegation is that in that case petitioner  no.  1 passed certain orders, involving the disposal of  properties worth  about Rs. 9 lacs, which were adverse to one  Surinder Kairon,  son of the Chief Minister.  It is stated that as  a result  of  the  displeasure  which  petitioner  no.  1  bad incurred  for  the two reasons mentioned  above,  a  special procedure  was adopted in the investigation of the  criminal cases instituted against the petitioners; and some new cases were  started  through the instrumentality of the C.  1.  D. Police with a view to subject the petitioners to  harassment and  persecution.  The substantial allegation, to quote  the language  of the petition, is that " a special procedure  or rather  a technique has been devised for  circumventing  the mandatory  provisions  of  the  law  (meaning  the  Code  of Criminal Procedure) as regards the petitioners, two of  whom are  ladies  and who are being dragged  about  unnecessarily because they happen to be related to petitioner no.  1".  It is  stated that there has been a deliberate  departure  from the normal and legal procedure in the matter of  institution and investigation of criminal cases against the petitioners- a  departure  said  to be the result of " an  evil  eye  and unequal hand " which the petitioners allege constitutes 146 a  denial  of  the right of equal  protection  of  the  laws guaranteed  to them under Art. 14 of the Constitution.   The special  procedure  or technique of  which  the  petitioners complain  is said to consist of, several items, such as  (1) entertainment  of  a criminal complaint  personally  by  the Chief  Minister; (2) institution of complaints by the C.  1. D. police; (3) registration of first informations after such complaints   ;   (4)  investigations  in  advance   of   the complaints;  (5)  investigation by specially  chosen  (hand- picked as learned Counsel for the petitioners has suggested) C.I.D. officials, not necessarily of high rank, who have  no power  to  investigate;  (6) the arrangement  of  a  special C.I.D.   squad  to  "  unearth  something  "   against   the petitioners, etc.  In the petition four criminal cases  were referred  to as illustrative of the special procedure,  said to  be unwarranted by law, adopted against the  petitioners, and in a supplementary petition filed on June 9, 1960,  some more  cases  were  referred to.  After we  had  conveyed  to learned  Counsel  for  the petitioners  that  we  could  not consider the supplementary petition which the respondent had no  opportunity of meeting, the supplementary  petition  was withdrawn.   Therefore,  we do not propose to  say  anything about  the cases which are referred to in the  supplementary petition.  The four cases mentioned in the original petition are :- (1)  F.I.R.  no.  304 of 1958, given by  one  M.  L.  Sethi, referred to hereinafter for brevity as Sethi’s case ; (2)  F.I.R.  no. 39 of 1959, instituted on the complaint  of one M. L. Dhingra, called hereinafter as Dhingra’s case; (3)  F.I.R. no. 135 of 1959, instituted on the complaint  of the  Civil Supply Officer, Karnal, the accused in this  case being the State Orphanage Advisory Board of which petitioner no.   I was Vice-President at the relevant time  and  Kartar Singh, farm manager of Kaushalya Devi, called the  Orphanage case; and (4)  F.I.R. no. 26 of 1960, instituted on the  complaint  of Daryao Sing, D.S.P., C.I.D., Karnal, (one of the  respondent police officials) in which there are three 147

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accused  persons  including  petitioner no.  1,  called  for brevity the Ayurvedic Fund case. We may say at once that we are not concerned with the merits of  any  of the aforesaid cases : that is a  question  which will fall for consideration if and when the cases are  tried in Court.  Therefore, nothing said in this judgment shall be construed  as  affecting  the  merits  of  the  cases.   Two questions  have  been posed before us in relation  to  these cases:   one  is  if  in  the  matter  of  institution   and investigation of these cases a special procedure unknown  to law  has been adopted; and the other is if  the  petitioners have been singled out for unequal treatment in administering the  law  relating to the institution and  investigation  of criminal  cases in the State.  The two questions are in  one sense  connected, for if a special procedure unknown to  law has  been  adopted against the petitioners, that  by  itself will be a denial of the right of the equal protection of the ’laws.   Learned Counsel for the petitioners  has,  however, argued  the  second question somewhat independently  of  the first  question,  and  he has submitted  that  even  if  the procedure  adopted against the petitioners is  warranted  by law,  it  is a departure from the normal procedure  and  has been adopted with " an evil eye and unequal hand " so as  to put the petitioners to harassment and persecution.  We shall consider  both these questions in relation to the  procedure adopted in the four cases referred to above. It  is  necessary  to  state  that  the  petition  has  been contested  by  the  respondents.   The  Chief  Minister  has himself made no affidavit in respect of the allegations made against him ; but affidavits in reply have been made by  the Chief  Secretary  and  the  Home  Secretary  to  the  Punjab Government  and some of the respondent officials.  To  these affidavits we shall advert later in somewhat greater detail. We shall also have something to say about the failure of the Chief Minister to make an affidavit.  It is enough to  state here that the respondents have seriously contested both  the allegations  made on behalf of the petitioners, namely,  (1) that a special procedure unknown to law was 148 adopted  against them or (2) that the procedure adopted  was motivated  by  "  an evil eye and unequal hand "  so  as  to persecute and harass the petitioners.  The respondents  have said that the procedure adopted was warranted by law and the employment of the C. 1. D. officials in the investigation of the  cases  against the petitioners was due to  the  special nature  of the cases.  The respondents have  also  contested the correctness of the allegation that petitioner no. 1  had incurred the displeasure of the Chief Minister on account of the two reasons stated in the petition.  In brief, the claim of  the respondents is that there has been no  violation  of the rights of the petitioners guaranteed under Arts. 14  and 21, and there are no grounds for interference by this  Court under  Art. 32 of the Constitution.  It has been  stated  on behalf  of  the  respondents that in the  two  cases  called Setbi’s  case and Dhingra’s case, the petitioners had  moved the High Court without success for quashing the  proceedings and  in  Sethi’s case, an appeal to this Court  against  the order  of  the High Court also proved unsuccessful.   It  is also pointed out that a petition made by petitioner no. 1 in the  High Court for proceeding by way of contempt  of  court against  the Chief Minister on some of the  allegations  now raised  or allegations similar in nature, was  dismissed  in limine  and the learned Advocate-General of the  Punjab  has taken  us through the order of the High Court in respect  of some of the allegations made.

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Having stated the respective cases of the parties before us, we  shall proceed now to a more detailed examination of  the procedure  adopted in the four cases instituted against  the petitioners.  But before we do so, it is necessary to say  a few  words  about Grewal’s case and Sangrur case  which  are stated to furnish the reasons why petitioner no. 1  incurred the  displeasure of the Chief Minister.  It is alleged  that in Grewal’s case petitioner no. 1 was asked to give evidence for  the  prosecution,  but he gave a  dubious  reply  which displeased  the  Chief  Minister.  It  is  worthy  of  note, however, that the trial in Grewal’s case began in  May-June, 1959; Sethi’s complaint was made in 149 December, 1958 and Dhingra’s in February, 1959.   Obviously, those  two cases could not be the result of any  refusal  by petitioner no.  1 to give evidence in Grewal’s case.  On May 28,  1959,  petitioner no.  1 wrote to the  Chief  Secretary about Sethi’s case and Dhingra’s case, but no allegation was made   therein  against  the  Chief  Minister.    What   the petitioner  wanted  then was that an opportunity  should  be given  to  him to explain his position.  On  June  9,  1959, petitioner  no. 1 again wrote to the Chief  Secretary  about the  complaints  of  Sethi and Dhingra-again  there  was  no allegation  against the Chief Minister.  On June  29,  1959, petitioner  no.   1 filed two petitions in the  Punjab  High Court  for  quashing  the proceedings in  Sethi’s  case  and Dhingra’s case; in this petition an allegation was made that powerful influences were operating against the petitioner  " to harm him and debar him officially " and Sethi’s case  and Dhingra’s case were the result of such influences, but there was no specific mention of Grewal’s case and of any  request to the petitioner to give evidence in that case.  It was for the  first  time  on July 20, 1959, when  the  petition  for contempt  proceedings was filed that a  specific  allegation against  the Chief Minister was made in paragraphs 35 to  37 thereof (this is annexure 1 to the present petition).   This petition was dismissed in limine, the High Court saying that it  was  not prima facie satisfied that the  allegation  was made  out.  We do not think that petitioner no.  1 has  been able  to advance his case any further in spite of  the  fact that  the Chief Minister has made no affidavit, a matter  to which we shall advert later. As  to  the Sangrur case, that was also referred to  in  the petition of July 20, 1959, and the High Court did not accept the  allegation of petitioner no. 1. What happened  in  that case  was this.  The late Sardar Mukan Sing of Sangrur  left two  widows, Sardarni Pritam Kuar and Sardarni Pavitar  Kaur Sardarni  Pavitar Kaur had three daughters one of  whom  was married to Surinder Singh Kairon, son of the Chief Minister. The Sangrur estate was in charge of the Court of Wards, that is, the Financial Commissioner, Punjab.  On June 150 19, 1958, the Court of Wards decided to release the   estate after  partitioning the immovable property between  the  two widows.   At  one time a question arose as  to  whether  the immovable  properties should be partitioned into five  equal shares  for the two widows and three daughters or  into  two shares  only  for the two widows.  Sometime  before  May  6, 1959,  it  was decided that the partition would  be  of  two shares only and thereafter a detailed mode of partition  was agreed to between the parties.  This is clear from the  note of  petitioner no.  1 dated May 6, 1959.   Thereafter  there was  no more dispute left, and the case of  petitioner  no.1 that he was arrested on July 18, 1959, because- he  dictated an  adverse order some days previously which had been  typed

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but  not  yet  signed  does not prima  facie  appear  to  be correct,   apart  altogether  from  the   question   whether petitioner  no. 1 was acting merely as the  channel  between the Deputy Commissioner, and the Financial Commissioner, the latter  being  the only authority competent  to  pass  final orders in the matter. We  have,  therefore,  come  to  the  conclusion  that   the petitioners  have  not established what they  have  alleged, namely,  that  R.  P. Kapur, one  of  the  petitioners,  had incurred the displeasure of the Chief Minister by reason  of what  happened  in  the Grewal case and  the  Sangrur  case. Whether   there  were  other  reasons,   administrative   or otherwise,  for the displeasure of the Chief ’Minister is  a matter  which  is not germane to the present case.   In  the affidavits  filed before us some reference has been made  to the past record of R. P. Kapur.  We consider it  unnecessary to refer to that record ; firstly , because it is not  rele- vant  to the case before us, and secondly because  we  think that  it is not fair to refer to the confidential record  of an officer unless the circumstances in which certain adverse remarks were made are known. We  proceed now to consider the four criminal cases  pending against the petitioners or some of them, in relation to  the two  points  urged:  (1)  whether  in  the  institution  and investigation of these cases a special procedure unknown  to law has been adopted and (2) 151 if  the  petitioners  have  been  singled  out  for  unequal treatment   in  administering  the  law  relating   to   the institution  and  investigation  of criminal  cases  in  the State. The first two cases, namely, Sethi’s case and Dhingra’s case need be dealt with at some length.  Sethi’s case started  on a  complaint which it was said was sent direct to the  Chief Minister.    Four  material  allegations  about   fraudulent misrepresentation  were  made  in that  complaint.   It  was alleged that R. P. Kapur had fraudulently misrepresented  to Sethi  that a particular piece of land which he had sold  to Sethi ’had been purchased by him at Rs. 10 per square  yard; that  he had fraudulently concealed from Sethi the  pendency of   certain   proceedings  before  the   Land   Acquisition Collector,  Delhi, and of the acquisition of the  said  land under  s.  17  of  the relevant Act;  that  he  had  made  a fraudulent  misrepresentation  as  regards  the  scheme   of housing  with  regard  to the area in which  the  land  lay. Though the complaint was dated December 10, 1958, it appears to  have been made over to the Additional Inspector  General of  Police on December 23, 1958.  The  Additional  Inspector General  of Police then appears to have passed an  order  to the  following  effect: " Register" a case  and  investigate personally  ". This was addressed to Sardar Hardayal  Singh, D.   S.   P.  Thereupon  Sardar   Hardayal   Singh,   Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., Amritsar, appears to  have drawn up a first information report.  The original complaint which Sethi filed has not been produced before us.  What was produced before us was a carbon copy and on that carbon copy was the order of the Additional Inspector General of  Police to  which we have already made a reference.  The  allegation of the petitioners was that the original complaint had  been sent to the Chief Minister and the Chief Minister had passed certain orders thereon.  On behalf of the petitioners it was suggested  that  the original was not produced in  order  to conceal  from the Court the orders which the Chief  Minister had  passed thereon.  We have stated earlier that the  Chief Minister  had  filed  no  affidavit  in  respect  of   these

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allegations.   An  affidavit  has been filed  by  A.N.  Home Secretary 152 to the Government but obviously he was not in a position  to say  anything about the allegations made against  the  Chief Minister.   We, therefore, proceed on the basis that so  far as  Sethi’s case is concerned, a complaint was made or  sent to  the  Chief  Minister  who  thereupon  sent  it  to   the Additional Inspector General of Police who in his turn  sent it  to  Sardar  Hardayal  Singh,  Deputy  Superintendent  of Police, C. I. D., at Amritsar.  The short question before us is-does  this amount to adopting a procedure unknown to  law or even to unequal treatment so as to attract Art. 14 of the Constitution ? Learned Counsel for the petitioners has taken us  through the relevant provisions in Part V, Chapter  XIV, of  the  Code of Criminal Procedure and has  submitted  that under  s. 154 of the Code every information relating to  the commission  of  a cognizable offence should be given  to  an officer  in charge of a police station and under s. 156  any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of  a  Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case  which  a Court  having  jurisdiction over the local area  would  have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XV  relating to the place of inquiry or trial.  He has  also referred  to s. 157 under which the officer in charge  of  a police  station, shall forthwith send a report of the  first information to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance  of the offence and shall proceed in person, or shall depute one of his subordinate officers not being below such rank as the State Government may, by general or special order, prescribe in  this behalf, to proceed to the spot to  investigate  the facts  and  circumstances of the case, and if  necessary  to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the  offender. It is contended that the provisions of ss. 154, 156 and  157 of  the  Code  have been violated in the  case  against  the petitioners; and thus the petitioners have been subjected to a  special  procedure  unknown to law or, at  any  rate,  to unequal  treatment, treatment different from that  of  other persons  against whom informations of a  cognizable  offence ape made. We are unable to accept these contentions as 153 correct.  First of all, s. 154, Code of Criminal  Procedure, does not say that an information of a cognizable offence can only  be made to an officer in charge of a  police  station. That  section  merely  lays down,  inter  alia,  that  every information  relating  to  the commission  of  a  cognizable offence, if given orally to an officer in charge of a police station,  shall  be reduced to writing by him or  under  his direction, and be read over to the informant; and every such information shall be signed by the person giving it and  the substance  thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept  by such  officer  in  such form as  the  State  Government  may prescribe  in  that behalf.  Section 156 gives power  to  an officer in charge of a police station to investigate without the order of a Magistrate any cognizable case which a Court, having jurisdiction in the local area etc. would have  power to inquire into or try; sub-s. (2) of s. 156 lays down  that no proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall  at any stage be called in question on the ground that the  case was  one  which such officer was not  empowered  under  this section to investigate.  There has been some argument before us  as  to the meaning of the expression " any such  case  " occurring  in sub-s. (2) of s. 156.  As we are  not  resting our  decision  on  sub-s. (2) of s. 156,  Code  of  Criminal

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Procedure,  we  consider  it unnecessary to  embark  upon  a discussion as to the true scope and effect of sub-s. (2)  of s.  156.   Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure  Code  lays down  the procedure which an officer in charge of  a  police station  must  follow  where  information  of  a  cognizable offence is made.  Now, there is another important  provision in  the  Code which is of great relevance in this  case  and must  be read.  That provision is contained in s. 551  which is in these terms : "S. 551. Police officers superior in rank to an  officer  in charge  of  a police station may exercise the  same  powers, throughout  the local area to which they are  appointed,  as may  be exercised by such officer within the limits  of  his station." The Additional Inspector General of Police to whom 20 154 Sethi’s  complaint  was sent was, without  doubt,  a  police officer superior in rank to an officer in charge of a police station.   Sardar Hardayal Singh, Deputy  Superintendent  of Police,  C.I.D., Amritsar, was also an officer  superior  in rank  to  an officer in charge of a  police  station.   Both these  officers  could,  therefore,  exercise  the   powers, throughout  the local area to which they were appointed,  as might  be  exercised  by an officer in charge  of  a  police station within the limits of his police station.  It is  not disputed  that  the jurisdictional area  of  the  Additional Inspector General of Police was the whole of the State.   As to  the jurisdictional area of the Deputy Superintendent  of Police,  C.I.D., the contention on behalf of the  respondent State  is  that  though  he  was  posted  at  Amritsar,  his jurisdictional  area  extended over the  whole  State.   The learned Advocate-General for the respondent State has  drawn our  attention  to Police Rule 21.28 in  the  Punjab  Police Rules, 1934, Vol.  III, issued by and with the authority  of the State Government under ss. 7 and 12 of the Police Act (V of   1861).    That  rule  lays  down  that   the   Criminal Investigation  Department has no separate  jurisdiction  and the  Deputy Inspector General of Police,  Criminal  Investi- gation  Department, may decide to take over the  control  of any  particular investigation himself or depute one or  more of  his officers to work directly under the control  of  the Superintendent of Police of the district.  Police Rule 21.32 enumerates some of the cases in which the assistance of  the Criminal  Investigation  Department may be  sought.   Police Rule  25.14 says that the Criminal Investigation  Department is able to obtain expert technical assistance, and in  cases where  such  assistance is required the  assistance  of  the Criminal  Investigation Department may be obtained.  In  the affidavit made by Sardar Hardayal Singh, he has stated  that he  was  entrusted with the investigation  of  Sethi’s  case because of its technical nature and also because his  sphere of  duty  as  a Gazetted Officer attached  to  the  Criminal Investigation Department was the whole of the State in  view of the memorandum no. 9581-H-51/7912 dated October 155 26,  1951.  That memorandum shows that the Deputy  Inspector General,  C.I.D. and all gazetted officers of  the  Criminal Investigation  Department have jurisdiction  extending  over the  whole of the Punjab State.  This is also  supported  by the affidavit made by Shamshere Singh, Additional  Inspector General of Police.  Learned Counsel for the petitioners  has pointed   out  that  Sethi’s  case  involved  no   technical questions  and  the  ground  stated  in  the  affidavits  of Shamshere Singh and Sardar Hardayal Singh is not, therefore,

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correct.   The question before us is not whether the  reason for which the investigation was made over to Sardar Hardayal Singh is correct or not.  The question before us is, whether in making over the investigation to Sardar Hardayal Singh  a special  procedure unknown to law was adopted or the law  as to the investigation of cases was administered with an  evil eye  or  unequal  hand.  If  the  police  officer  concerned thought that the case should be investigated by the C. 1. D.   even though  for a reason which does not appeal  to  us-it cannot  be said that the procedure adopted was illegal.   We are unable to agree with learned Counsel for the petitioners that  any of these two contentions has been made out in  the present  case.  We are satisfied that the Inspector  General of  Police, C.I.D. had power to deal with Sethi’s  complaint and had further power to direct investigation of the same by Sardar  Hardayal Singh who as a police officer  superior  in rank  to  an  officer incharge of  a  police  station  could exercise powers of an officer in charge of a police  station in respect of the same.  It cannot, therefore, be said  that the  procedure  adopted  was unknown to  law.   Nor  are  we satisfied  that the procedure adopted was motivated  by  any evil  purpose,  though  we are not quite  impressed  by  the reason  given  by Shamshere Singh or Sardar  Hardayal  Singh that Sethi’s case was of a technical nature and,  therefore, required the assistance of the C.I.D. Even if it was not  of a technical nature, it was open to the Additional  Inspector General of Police to make over the investigation to a Deputy Superintendent  of  Police  in view of  the  status  of  the petitioners.  In paragraph 31 of his affidavit 156 A.   N. Kashyap, Home Secretary, has said that the Inspector General  of  Police on receiving the  complaint  from  Sethi ordered on his own the registration of the case without  any order or direction from the Chief Minister.  The correctness of this statement has been very seriously commented on.   In the absence of any affidavit from the Chief Minister and  of the original complaint, we have preferred to proceed in this case on the footing that the Additional Inspector General of Police  got the complaint from the Chief Minister  and  then passed  necessary orders thereon.  Even on that  footing  we are  unable  to hold that there has been  any  violation  of legal  procedure or that an unfair discrimination  has  been made against the petitioners. Learned  Counsel for the petitioners has relied on   certain observations  made by this Court in H. N. Rishbud and  Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi (1).  The observations occur  at page 1160 of the report and are to the effect that it is  of considerable  importance  to  an  accused  person  that  the evidence  collected  against  him  during  investigation  is collected  under  the responsibility of  an  authorised  and competent  investigating officer.  These  observations  were Made in a case where the question that fell for decision was whether the provisions in s. 5(4) and the proviso to s. 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Act II of 1947)  and the  corresponding  s. 5A of the  Prevention  of  Corruption (Second  Amendent)  Act,  1952  (Act  LIX  of  1952),   were mandatory or not.  It :was held that they were mandatory and an investigation conducted in violation thereof was illegal. It was also held that an illegality committed in the  course of  an  investigation  did not  affect  the  competence  and jurisdiction  of the Court for trial; but if any  breach  of the  mandatory pro- visions relating to  investigation  were brought to the notice of the Court at an early stage of  the trial,  the  Court  would have to consider  the  nature  and extent of the violation and pass appropriate orders for such

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re.  investigation as might be called for.  We do not  think that the observations made and the decision are of any (1)  [1955] (1) S.C.R. 1150. 157 assistance to the petitioners.  We have held that there  has been  no  violation  of  any  mandatory  provisions  as   to investigation  in Sethi’s case against the  petitioners  and the   investigation  procedure  followed  is   legal.    Our attention  has been drawn to King Emperor v. Nilkantha  (1). On  a  certificate  by the Advocate-General,  the  case  was considered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court and  one of  the questions for decision was-" Is an Inspector of  the Criminal  Investigation  Department  an  authority   legally competent to investigate the facts within the meaning of  s. 157,  Evidence  Act  ? " The question was  answered  in  the affirmative  by the majority of judges, Abdur Rahim, J.  and Sundara  Ayyar,  J.,  dissenting.   In  the  course  of  the arguments  before  their  Lordships, one  of  the  questions mooted was whether Inspectors of the Criminal  Investigation Department  were  appointed  to any local  area  within  the purview of s. 551, Code of Criminal Procedure.  Some of  the Judges held that the whole Presidency was their local  area; some held that that was not so.  On the materials before us, we   have   no  hesitation  in  holding  that   the   Deputy Superintendent of Police entrusted with the investigation of Sethi’s  case  bad  the  necessary  authority  to  hold  the investigation.   The decision in Pulin Bihari Ghosh  v.  The King(1) on which also some reliance has been placed does not appear to us to be in point: that was a case s.   202 and s. 156(3), Code of Criminal Procedure, and it   was  held  that proceedings under s. 202 and investigation under rb.  156(3) could not proceed simultaneously; it was further held that a direction  under s. 156(3) could only be made to an  officer in  charge of a police station.  No question arose there  of the  exercise of powers under s. 551, Code of Criminal  Pro- cedure,  and  the  decision  does  not  establish  what  the petitioners  are seeking to establish in the  present  case. More  in point is the decision in Textile Traders  Syndicate Ltd.  v.  State  of  U. P. (3) where it  was  held  that  an Inspector of Police in the Criminal Investigation Department was superior in rank to that of an (1) I.L.R, 35 Mad. 247.       (2) I.L.R. [1950] 1 Cal. 124. (3) A.I.R. 1959 All. 337. 158 officer in charge of a police station and under s. 551, Code of  Criminal Procedure, he could exercise the powers  of  an officer in charge of a police station throughout the State. Turning  now  to  Dhingra’s  case,  the  position  is  this. Admittedly  a complaint dated February 27, 1959, was sent to the  Chief Minister with a covering letter in which  it  was stated that " R. P. Kapur had already started tampering with the evidence and 1, therefore, request that orders be passed that   the   Police  should  take  in   hand   investigation immediately  and collect all material evidence ". The  Chief Minister  wrote  on this: " Inspector  General,  Police,  is sick.   Will Add1.  Inspector General please take  immediate action  in  taking over papers from  Government  departments concerned  and the papers with Sri Dhingra.  Please  give  a prima  facie report." The Additional Inspector General  then made  the  following endorsement: "  Please  take  immediate necessary  action.  Depute one of your officers  to  contact Sri  Dhingra  and  get  the  necessary  records  from   him. Immediate  action may be taken to take over the record  from the various departments.  A case may be registered.  I  have informed Chief Secretary and he agrees with this." This  was

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addressed  to the Deputy Inspector General, C.I.D., and  the latter wrote-" Case should be regis. tered and  investigated by  Bir  Singh, D.S.P., under your  supervision.   Immediate steps  should  be taken to get the salient  records  of  Sri Dhingra." This was addressed to Ujager Singh, Superintendent of  Police,  C.I.D. The case was then registered  by  Sardar Sampuran   Singh,  Inspector  of  Police,   Police   Station Chandigarh,  and the investigation was in charge  of  Sardar Bir Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D. The  legal position as to the institution of Dhingra’s  case and  its investigation is the same as in Sethi’s case.   The legal  sanction  for  both  is  s.  551,  Code  of  Criminal Procedure,  and the reasons which we have given for  holding that the procedure followed in instituting and investigating Sethi’s case is legally valid apply to Dhingra’s case  also. On behalf of the 159 petitioners it has been submitted that the hand of the Chief Minister  is  no longer concealed in  respect  of  Dhingra’s case.  It is pointed out that in 1959, a complaint is  made in respect of offences alleged to have been committed  about five  years ago in 1954 and the Chief Minister, without  any enquiry whatsoever, says " Please give a prima facie report, " and the same C.I.D. machinery is again set in rapid motion as in Sethi’s case, and this at a time when Sethi’s case was kept  " hanging as a sword " over the petitioners.   It  has been further submitted that the direction as to the  seizure of  papers was not justified in law, as the  Chief  Minister had  no legal power to give such a direc. tion.  We  do  not think that these submissions establish what the  petitioners have  to  establish  in  order  to  succeed  on  their  writ petition, namely, that in the institution of Dhingra’s  case and  its investigation, a procedure unknown to law has  been followed  or that the petitioners have been singled out  for an unfair and discriminating treatment.  We do not know what reasons  led the Chief Minister to make the  endorsement  on the  complaint  of  Dhingra as he did  and  why  instead  of referring  the  complaint to the officer in  charge  of  the police  station  concerned,  a reference  was  made  to  the Additional  Inspector General or the Criminal  Investigation Department.  These are matters within his special knowledge, and  he  has chosen to throw no light  on  them.   Shamshere Singh has said in his affidavit that he dealt with Dhingra’s case  in  exercise  of  his powers under  s.  551,  Code  of Criminal  Procedure.   Sardar  Bir Singh  has  said  in  his affidavit that this case was also of a technical nature  and so the investigation was entrusted to him.  As we have  said in  Sethi’s case this reason does not appear to us to  be  a convincing  reason,  but the Police officers  concerned  may honestly  have thought that the case should be  investigated by the Criminal Investigation Department.  We are not called upon to express any opinion on the merits of Dhingra’s case, and all that we say now is that the petitioners have  failed to  establish either of their two contentions-(1)  that  the procedure  adopted was illegal, or (2) that the  petitioners were unfairly discriminated against. 160 We go now to the remaining two cases, the Orphanage Case and the  Ayurvedic  Fund,  case.   One  was  instituted  on  the complaint of the Civil Supply Officer, Karnal, and the other on  the statement of Daryao ’Sing, Deputy Superintendent  of Police, C. 1. D., Karnal.  The Orphanage case is against the Orphanage  Advisory Board of which R. P. Kapur was the  Vice President  at  the  relevant time,  and  Kartar  Sing,  farm manager  of  Kaushalya  Devi.  It  related  to  the  alleged

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violation of certain Control Orders in the matter of a brick kiln.   The Ayurvedic Fund case is against R. P.  Kapur  and certain  other persons, who are not petitioners  before  us. It  alleged  criminal  breach of trust etc.  in  respect  of certain  funds in the hands of the persons accused  therein. As  we  are  not  deciding these  cases  on  merits,  it  is unnecessary to give further details of the allegations  made in those cases. No  specific illegality has been brought to our notice  with regard to the institution of the Orphanage case except  some allegations  of high-handedness in the matter of seizure  of records  of  the Orphanage in spite of the  protest  of  the General  Manager  of  the  Orphanage  and  some  allegations against  Choudhuri Ram Singh, who was then Deputy  Inspector General,  Ambala Range.  These allegations, be they true  or not,  do not establish any such illegality as would lead  us to quash the investigation. As  to  the  Ayurvedic Fund case, Daryao Sing  said  in  his affidavit: " I say that the Audit Report contained details of  meddling with  Orphanage  funds and of having made  payments  to  one Kartar  Sing,  an employee of the petitioner  no.1  and  the attorney of Shrimati Kaushalya Devi.  It appears that  there was  excess  and  double  payment  of  funds.   There   were purchases  of  timber  and  wood  without  calling  for  any quotations.   It disclosed the issue of Orphanage  funds  to Madhuban  Co-operative Society and that the  materials  like cement,  iron and steel which were under control  were  also used  in the construction of private building of Shri  Kapur and  his  family and the use of such materials  went  up  to 20,000 Rupees." 161 Here  again  we  do  not  express  any  opinion  as  to  the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made.  All  that need  be said at this stage is that the institution  of  the case  is not illegal, nor is its investigation  vitiated  by discrimination. It is indeed true that the investigation of these cases  has been   entrusted  to  certain  officers  of   the   Criminal Investigation Department, whether for good reason or not  we cannot  say.  But that circumstance does not by itself  make the  investigation  bad in law.  The officers  can  exercise their powers of investigation under s. 551, Code of Criminal Procedure.  Daryao Singh, it may be stated, was an Inspector of  the  Criminal  Investigation Department  at  Karnal  and became  a  Deputy  Superintendent of Police, C.  I.  D.,  in December, 1959.  He also could exercise the powers under  s. 551, Code of Criminal Procedure. For the reasons given above, we have come to the  conclusion that  the  petitioners are not entitled to succeed  and  the writ  petition  must be dismissed, in the  circumstances  of this case there will be no order for costs. Before  parting with this case we consider it  necessary  to make  some  observations with regard to a matter  which  has caused  us  some anxiety and concern.   Serious  allegations have been made against the Chief Minister in this case.   He is  a  party respondent and had notice  of  the  allegations made.   In  Sethi’s  complaint it was alleged  that  he  had passed  certain orders on the original complaint, which  was sent  to  the Additional Inspector General  of  Police  with those orders.  The original complaint was not made available to  us  on  the ground that it could  not  be  traced.   The Additional Inspector General of Police said in his affidavit that  on  receiving the complaint from Sri M. L.  Sethi,  he ordered  the investigation of the case without any order  or

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direction from the Chief Minister.  He did not  specifically say  if  he  received the complaint  direct  from  Sethi  or through  the  Chief Minister.  In Dhingra’s case  the  Chief Minister  passed  an order which might either mean  that  he ordered the 21 162 submission of a prima facie report or merely directed that a report  should be submitted if a prima facie case  was  made out.   It is not clear why he ordered the seizure of  papers before even a prima facie report was given, in respect of an offence  said to have been committed five years ago.   These are  all matters on which the Chief Minister alone was in  a position  to enlighten us. In view of the  allegations  made against him, we consider that the Chief Minister owed a duty to this Court to file an affidavit stating what the  correct position was so far as he remembered it.  We recognise  that it may not be possible for a Chief Minister to remember  the circumstances  in which a document pass through  his  hands; there must be many papers which a Chief Minister has to deal with  in the day to day business of administration.  If  the Chief Minister did not remember the circumstances, it  would have  been  easy for him to say so.  If  he  remembered  the circumstances,  he could have refuted the  allegations  with equal ease.  This is not a case where the refutation  should have been left to Secretaries and other officers, who  could only  speak from the records and were not in a  position  to say  why  the  Chief Minister passed  certain  orders.   The petitioners   are  obviously  suffering  from  a  sense   of grievance that they have not had a fair deal.  We have  held that  there is no legal justification for that  grievance  ; but  in  an  executive as well  as  judicial  administration justice  must  not  only be done but  it  must  appear  that justice is being done.  An affidavit from the Chief Minister would have cleared much of the doubt which in the absence of such an affidavit arose in this case.                          Petition dismissed. 163