REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL No. 3608 OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 17525 of 2006)

R. K. Malik & Anr.                            ..…Appellants

Versus

Kiran Pal & Ors.                                              .….Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL No. 3609  OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 1686 of 2007)

And

CIVIL APPEAL No. 3607  OF 2009 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 13397 of 2007)

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Challenge in these appeals is made to the legality and validity of  

the judgment  and order dated 17.05.2006 rendered by a Single  

Judge  of  Delhi  High  Court  in  a  bunch  of  motor  accident  claims  

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petitions bearing MACT Nos. 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201-

202, 203-204, 207-208, 209-210, 213, 214, 215, 217, 221, 222,  

228-229, 231-232, 233-234 and 742-743 of  2005,  whereby and  

whereunder  the High Court  was pleased to  dispose  of  the  claim  

petitions of the appellants herein.

3. In order to decide these appeals, it would be necessary to state few  

basic  facts.  The  appellants  herein  are  claimants  whose  children  

were studying in school.  On 18.11.1997 when these children were  

proceeding to the school in a bus bearing No. DL IP-1644, the bus  

after overrunning the road and breaking the railing got drowned in  

Yamuna  river  at  Wazirabad  Yamuna  Bridge.  Consequent  to  the  

accident, 29 children died.   

4. The  bus  was  being  driven  by  Mr.  Karan  Pal  (respondent  No.1  

herein) and was owned by Mr. Hari Kishan (respondent No.2) and  

was insured with National Insurance Company Ltd. (respondent No.  

3).  It was alleged that the driver was driving the bus in a rash and  

negligent manner and at a very fast speed.  It was further alleged  

that the bus driver lost control of the bus and after breaking the  

railing  of  the  bridge  on  left  side,  the  same  fell  into  the  river  

Yamuna.   

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5. The appellants filed claim petitions individually on account of fault  

liability  and  sought  for  payment  of  compensation  under  Section  

163-A read with Second Schedule of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (in  

short ‘the Act’).  It was pleaded that the deceased-children would  

have earned good amount  per  month in  future  and would  have  

provided financial assistance and pecuniary help to their parents-

appellants.   The  claim  petitions  of  the  appellants  were  heard  

together by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Delhi (in short ‘the  

Tribunal’).   

6. During the course  of  trial  before  the Tribunal,  several  witnesses  

were examined in support of the respective claims.   The appellants  

also  examined  themselves  as  witnesses.  The  Tribunal  by  award  

dated 06.12.2004 held that the accident had taken place due to the  

negligence of the driver (respondent No. 1) and, therefore, the said  

respondent along with respondent Nos. 2 and 3 were jointly and  

severally liable to pay compensation.  The Tribunal by its common  

award  awarded a  sum of  Rs.  1,  55,000/-  to  the  dependents  of  

children between age group of 10 to 15 years and Rs. 1, 65,000/-  

between 15 to  18 years.   Three  of  the  children  namely  Kailash  

Rathi, Neena Jain and Jatish Sharma were less than 10 years.  In  

the  case of  Kailash  Rathi,  compensation  of  Rs.  1,  05,000/-  was  

awarded  and  in  the  cases  of  Neena  Jain  and  Jatish  Sharma,  

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compensation of Rs. 1, 30,000/- and Rs. 1, 31,000/- respectively  

was awarded.  Additional Rs. 1000/- was awarded in the case of  

Jatish  Sharma,  as  in  some other  cases,  for  loss  of  books.   The  

figures mentioned above include Rs. 5,000/- each towards funeral  

and last rites.  It awarded interest @ 6% for four years.  As per the  

Second Schedule of the Act, the balance amount was awarded for  

loss of dependency that was calculated on notional income of Rs.  

15,000/- per annum.  Rs. 5,000/- was deducted towards personal  

living expenses.  The Tribunal applied multiplier of 15 for children  

below 15 years and multiplier of 16 for children between 16 and 18  

years respectively.   

7. Against the said order of the Tribunal, appeals were filed before the  

High Court by the appellants who were heard together by the High  

Court.   It was submitted before the High Court that the amount  

awarded  by  the  Tribunal  was  not  just  and  reasonable  and  the  

Tribunal erred in not awarding interest from the date of petition till  

realization.

8. The High Court by its common order held that the appellants are  

entitled to enhancement of compensation in all  the cases by Rs.  

75,000/- and Rs. 1000/- (if not already awarded by the Tribunal)  

and interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date of filling of the claim  

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petition till payment. It was further held that 50% of the enhanced  

compensation with interest shall be paid and the balance 50% shall  

be kept in the form of fixed deposit or in the post office for a period  

of six years.  The High Court directed that the dependents would be  

entitled to interest but would not withdraw the principal  amount  

during the lock-in period of six years without the permission of the  

Tribunal.

9. Feeling aggrieved, the appellants have preferred the present special  

leave petition contending that the High Court ought to have applied  

the ratio of Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197 to  

the facts of  the case and also that it  failed to award a fair  and  

reasonable  compensation.  It  was  submitted  that  the  High  Court  

ought to have awarded compensation of Rs. 10, 00,000/-. It was  

the further contention that the High Court erred in applying notional  

income of deceased child as Rs. 15,000/- per annum only.  It was  

further  contended that the Tribunal  ought to have enhanced the  

income considering the rise in cost of living as well as inflation.   

10.Undoubtedly, the compensation in law is paid to restore the person,  

who  has  suffered  damage  or  loss  in  the  same  position,  if  the  

tortuous act  or  the breach of contract  had not  been committed.  

The law requires that the party suffering should be put in the same  

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position, if the contract had been performed or the wrong had not  

been committed.   The law in all such matters requires payment of  

adequate, reasonable and just monetary compensation.

11.In  cases  of  motor  accidents  the  endeavour  is  to  put  the  

dependents/claimants in the pre-accidental position.  Compensation  

in  cases  of  motor  accidents,  as  in  other  matters,  is  paid  for  

reparation  of  damages.  The  damages  so  awarded  should  be  

adequate  sum  of  money  that  would  put  the  party,  who  has  

suffered, in the same position if he had not suffered on account of  

the  wrong.   Compensation  is  therefore  required  to  be  paid  for  

prospective  pecuniary  loss  i.e.  future  loss  of  income/dependency  

suffered on account of the wrongful act.

12.However, no amount of compensation can restore the lost limb or  

the experience of pain and suffering due to loss of life.   Loss of a  

child,  life  or  a  limb  can  never  be  eliminated  or  ameliorated  

completely.   To put it simply-pecuniary damages cannot replace a  

human life or limb lost.   Therefore, in addition to the pecuniary  

losses, the law recognises that payment should also be made for  

non  pecuniary  losses  on  account  of,  loss  of  happiness,  pain,  

suffering and expectancy of life etc. The Act provides for payment  

of “just compensation” vide section 166 and 168. It is left to the  

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courts to decide what would be “just compensation” in facts of a  

case.

13.For calculating pecuniary loss or loss of dependency, this Court has  

repeatedly held that it  is  the multiplier  method which should be  

applied.    The said method is  based upon the principle that the  

claimant must be paid a capital sum, which would yield sufficient  

interest  to  provide  material  benefits  of  the  same  standard  and  

duration as the deceased would have provided for the dependents,  

if the deceased had lived and earned.   The multiplier method is  

based upon the assessment that yearly loss of dependency should  

be equal to interest that could be earned in normal course on the  

capital sum invested. The capital sum would be the compensation  

for  loss  of  dependency  or  the  pecuniary  loss  suffered  by  the  

dependents. Needless to say, uniform application of the multiplier  

method ensures consistency and certainty and prevents different  

amounts being awarded in different cases.

14. For calculating the yearly loss of dependency the starting point is  

the wages being earned by the deceased,  less  his  personal  and  

living expenses.   This provides a basic figure. Thereafter, effect is  

given to the future prospects of the deceased, inflation and general  

price rise that erodes value and the purchasing power of money.  

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To the multiplicand so calculated, multiplier is to be applied.  The  

multiplier  is  decided  and  determined  on  the  basis  of  length  of  

dependency, which must be estimated. This has to be necessarily  

discounted  for  contingencies  and  uncertainties.  Reference  in  this  

regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the case of  

Sarla  Dixit  v.  Balwant  Yadav,  (1996)  3  SCC 179;  Managing  

Director TNSTC Ltd. v. K. T. Bindu, (2005) 8 SCC 473;  T. N.  

State Transport Corp. Ltd. v. S. Rajapriya, (2005) 6 SCC 236;  

New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie, (2005) 10 SCC 720  

and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Patrica Jean Mahajan  

(2002) 6 SCC 281.  

15. The real problem that arises in the cases of death of children is that  

they are not earning at the time of the accident. In most of the  

cases they were still studying and not working. However, under no  

stretch  of  imagination  it  can  be  said  that  the  parents,  who are  

appellants herein,  have not  suffered any pecuniary loss.  In fact,  

Loss of dependency by its very nature is awarded for prospective or  

future loss.   In this context, Lord Atkinson aptly observed in Taff  

Vale Rly. Co. v. Jenkins, (1911-13) All England Reporter 160 as  

follows:

“In case of the death of an infant,  there may  have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its  

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parents during the child’s lifetime.  But this will  not  necessarily bar the parents’ claim and prospective loss  will  found  a  valid  claim  provided  that  the  parents  establish  that  they had a  reasonable  expectation of  pecuniary benefit if the child had lived.”

16. Then, how does one calculate pecuniary compensation for loss of  

future  earnings  and  loss  of  dependency  of  the  parents,  grand  

parents etc. in the case of non-working student? Under the Second  

Schedule of the Act in case of a non earning person, his income is  

notionally  estimated  at  Rs.  15,000/-  per  annum.  The  Second  

Schedule is applicable to claim petitions filed under Section 163 A of  

the  Act.  The  Second  Schedule  provides  for  the  multiplier  to  be  

applied in cases where the age of the victim was less than 15 years  

and  between  15  years  but  not  exceeding  20  years.  Even  when  

compensation is payable under Section 166 read with 168 of the  

Act,  deviation  from  the  structured  formula  as  provided  in  the  

Second Schedule is not ordinarily permissible, except in exceptional  

cases.  [see  Abati  Bezbaruah  v.  Dy.  Director  General,  

Geological Survey of India, (2003) 3 SCC 148);  United India  

Insurance Company Ltd. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, (2002) 6  

SCC 281 and UP State Road Transport Corp. v. Trilok Chandra,  

(1996) 4 SCC 362].

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17. Reverting back to the factual position of the present case, the date  

of accident is 18.11.1997. Prior to this, the Second Schedule of the  

Act was already introduced w. e. f.  14.11.1994. Thus, the notional  

income  mentioned  in  the  Second  Schedule  and  the  multiplier  

specified therein can form the basis for the pecuniary compensation  

for the loss of dependency in the present cases.  No fact and reason  

was highlighted during the arguments why the Second Schedule  

should not apply in the present cases. The Second Schedule also  

provides  for  deduction  of  1/3rd consideration  towards  expenses;  

which the victim would have incurred on himself if he had lived.   As  

compensation  for  loss  of  dependency is  to  be  calculated  on  the  

basis of notional income because the deceased was a child.   It by  

necessary implication takes into account future prospects, inflation,  

price rise etc.  

18.Therefore keeping in view of Second Schedule of the Act, this Court  

do not see any reason to differ with the view taken by the Tribunal  

as  well  as  the  High  Court  in  so  far  as  award  of  pecuniary  

compensation to the dependents/claimants is concerned. We must  

point  out  here  that  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  had  

argued that the notional sum of Rs. 15,000/- should be enhanced  

and  increased  as  the  legislature  has  not  amended  the  Second  

Schedule and the same continues to be in existence since it was  

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enacted on 14.11.1994. We are not examining and going into this  

aspect as the accident had taken place in the present case nearly  

three years after the enactment of the Second Schedule.  The time  

difference  between  the  date  of  the  enactment  and  the  date  of  

accident is not substantial.

19.The other issue is with regard to non-pecuniary compensation to  

the  appellants-dependents  on  the  loss  of  human  life,  loss  of  

company,  companionship,  happiness,  pain  and  suffering,  loss  of  

expectation of life etc.  

20. In the Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 12, page 446, it  

has been stated with regard to non-pecuniary loss as follows:

“Non-pecuniary  loss:  the  pattern.  Damages awarded for pain and suffering and loss  of amenity constitute a conventional sum which is  taken  to  be  the  sum  which  society  deems  fair,  fairness being interpreted by the Courts in the light  of previous decisions.  Thus there has been evolved  a  set  of  conventional  principles  providing  a  provisional  guide  to  the  comparative  severity  of  different  injuries,  and  indicating  a  bracket  of  damages into which a particular injury will currently  fall.   The  particular  circumstance  of  the  plaintiff,  including his age and any unusual  deprivation he  may suffer, is reflected in the actual amount of the  award.   

The fall in the value of money leads to  a continuing reassessment of these awards and to  periodic reassessments of damages at certain key  points in the pattern where the disability is readily  

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identifiable  and not  subject  to  large variations in  individual cases.”   

21. In  the  case  of  Ward  v.  James,  (1965)  I  All  E  R  563,  it  was  

observed:

“Although  you  cannot  give  a  man  so  gravely injured much for his ‘lost years’, you can,  however,  compensate  him for  his  loss  during  his  shortened, span, that is, during his expected ‘years  of survival’.  You can compensate him for his loss  of  earnings during that time, and for the cost of  treatment, nursing and attendance.  But how can  you compensate him for being rendered a helpless  invalid?   He  may,  owing  to  brain  injury,  be  rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or,  owing to a back injury, be unable to rise from his  bed.   He  has  lost  everything  that  makes  life  worthwhile.  Money is no good to him.  Yet Judges  and juries have to do the best they can and give  him what they think is fair.  No wonder they find it  well  nigh  insoluble.   They  are  being  asked  to  calculable.  The figure is bound to be for the most  part a conventional sum.  The Judges have worked  out  a  pattern,  and  they  keep  it  in  line  with  the  changes in the value of money.”

22. The  Supreme  Court  in  the  case  of  R.  D.  Hattangadi  v.  Pest  

Control (India) (P) Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 551, at page 556,  has  

observed as follows in para 9:

“9.  Broadly speaking while fixing an amount  of compensation payable to a victim of an accident,  the  damages  have  to  be  assessed  separately  as  pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary  damages are those which the victim has actually  incurred and which are capable of being calculated  in  terms  of  money;  whereas  non-pecuniary  

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damages  are  those  which  are  incapable  of  being  assessed by arithmetical  calculations.  In order  to  appreciate  two concepts  pecuniary  damages  may  include  expenses  incurred  by  the  claimant:  (i)  medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up  to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far  non-pecuniary  damages are concerned,  they may  include (i) damages for mental and physical shock,  pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be  suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for  the loss of  amenities of life which may include a  variety  of  matters  i.e.  on  account  of  injury  the  claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii)  damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on  account  of  injury  the  normal  longevity  of  the  person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience,  hardship,  discomfort,  disappointment,  frustration  and mental stress in life.”

In this case, the Court awarded non-pecuniary special damages of Rs.  

3, 00,000/- to the claimants.

23. In  Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India,  

(1999) 6 SCC 667 @ page 738, it was observed:

“128. The object of an award of damages is to give  the  plaintiff  compensation  for  damage,  loss  or  injury  he  has  suffered.  The  elements  of  damage  recognised  by  law  are  divisible  into  two  main  groups:  pecuniary  and  non-pecuniary.  While  the  pecuniary  loss  is  capable  of  being  arithmetically  worked  out,  the  non-pecuniary  loss  is  not  so  calculable.  Non-pecuniary  loss  is  compensated  in  terms of money, not as a substitute or replacement  for  other  money,  but  as  a  substitute,  what  McGregor  says,  is  generally  more important  than  money:  it  is  the  best  that  a  court  can  do.  In  Mediana,  Re87 Lord  Halsbury,  L.C.  observed  as  under:

“How is  anybody  to  measure  pain  and  suffering in moneys counted? Nobody can suggest  that  you can by arithmetical  calculation  establish  what  is  the  exact  sum  of  money  which  would  

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represent  such a thing as the pain and suffering  which  a  person  has  undergone  by  reason  of  an  accident....  But  nevertheless  the  law  recognises  that as a topic upon which damages may be given.”

24.It is extremely difficult to quantify the non pecuniary compensation  

as it is to a great extent based upon the sentiments and emotions.  

But,  the  same  could  not  be  a  ground  for  non-payment  of  any  

amount  whatsoever  by stating that  it  is  difficult  to quantify  and  

pinpoint  the  exact  amount  payable  with  mathematical  accuracy.  

Human life cannot be measured only in terms of loss of earning or  

monetary losses alone.  There are emotional attachments involved  

and loss of a child can have a devastating effect on the family which  

can  be  easily  visualized  and  understood.  Perhaps,  the  only  

mechanism known to law in this kind of situation is to compensate  

a  person  who  has  suffered  non-pecuniary  loss  or  damage  as  a  

consequence  of  the  wrong  done  to  him  by  way  of  

damages/monetary compensation. Undoubtedly, when a victim of a  

wrong  suffers  injuries  he  is  entitled  to  compensation  including  

compensation for the prospective life, pain and suffering, happiness  

etc., which is sometimes described as compensation paid for “loss  

of expectation of life”.   This head of compensation need not be  

restricted to a case where the injured person himself initiates action  

but is equally admissible if his dependant brings about the action.  

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25.That being the position, the crucial problem arises with regard to  

the quantification  of  such compensation.   The injury  inflicted  by  

deprivation of the life of a child is extremely difficult to quantify. In  

view of  the  uncertainties  and  contingencies  of  human life,  what  

would be an appropriate figure, an adequate solatium is difficult to  

specify. The courts have therefore used the expression “standard  

compensation”  and  “conventional  amount/sum”  to  get  over  the  

difficulty that arises in quantifying a figure as the same ensures  

consistency and uniformity in awarding compensations.

26.While quantifying and arriving at a figure for “loss of expectation of  

life”, the Court have to keep in mind that this figure is not to be  

calculated for the prospective loss or further pecuniary benefits that  

has been awarded under  another  head i.e.  pecuniary  loss.   The  

compensation payable under this head is for loss of life and not loss  

of  future  pecuniary  prospects.  Under  this  head,  compensation  is  

paid  for  termination  of  life,  which  results  in  constant  pain  and  

suffering.   This  pain  and  suffering  does  not  depend  upon  the  

financial  position of the victim or the claimant but rather on the  

capacity and the ability of the deceased to provide happiness to the  

claimant.  This  compensation  is  paid  for  loss  of  prospective  

happiness which the claimant/victim would have enjoyed had the  

child not been died at the tender age.   

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27. In  the  case  of  Lata Wadhwa (supra),  wherein  several  persons  

including  children  lost  their  lives  in  a  fire  accident,  the  Court  

awarded substantial amount as compensation. No doubt, the Court  

noticed that the children who lost their lives were studying in an  

expensive  school,  had  bright  prospects  and  belonged  to  upper  

middle  class,  yet  it  cannot  be  said  that  higher  compensation  

awarded  was  for  deprivation  of  life  and  the  pain  and  suffering  

undergone  on  loss  of  life  due  to  financial  status.   The  term  

“conventional compensation” used in the said case has been used  

for  non pecuniary  compensation payable on account of  pain and  

suffering as a result of death.  The Court in the said case referred to  

Rs.50,  000/-  as  conventional  figure.   The  reason  was  loss  of  

expectancy of life and pain and suffering on that account which was  

common and uniform to all regardless of the status.  Unless there is  

a  specific  case  departing  from  the  conventional  formula,  non-

pecuniary compensation should not be fixed on basis of economic  

wealth and background.   

28. In  Lata Wadhawa case (supra), wherein the accident took place  

on 03.03.1989, the multiplier method was referred to and adopted  

with approval.  In cases of children between 5 to 10 years of age,  

compensation  of  Rs.1.50  lakhs  was  awarded  towards  pecuniary  

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compensation and in addition a sum of Rs.50, 000/- was awarded  

towards  ‘conventional  compensation”.   In  the  case  of  children  

between  10  to  18  years  compensation  of  Rs.4.10  lakhs  was  

awarded including “conventional compensation”.  While doing so the  

Supreme Court held that contribution of each child towards family  

should be taken as Rs.24, 000/- per annum instead of Rs.12, 000/-  

per  annum  as  recommended  by  Justice  Y.  V.Chandrachud  

Committee.   This  was  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  company  in  

question had an un-written rule that every employee can get one of  

his children employed in the said company.

29. In the case of M. S. Grewal v. Deep Chand Sood, (2001) 8 SCC  

151, wherein 14 students of a public school got drowned in a river  

due to negligence of the teachers.  On the question of quantum of  

compensation, this Court accepted that the multiplier method was  

normally to be adopted as a method for assigning value of future  

annual dependency. It was emphasized that the Court must ensure  

that a just compensation was awarded.   

30. In Grewal case (supra), compensation of Rs.5 lakhs was awarded  

to the claimants and the same was held to be justified.  Learned  

Counsel for the respondent no.3, however, pointed out that in the  

said  case  the  Supreme  Court  had  noticed  that  the  students  

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belonged  to  an  affluent  school  as  was  apparent  from  the  fee  

structure and therefore the compensation of Rs.5 lakhs as awarded  

by the High Court was not found to be excessive.  It is no doubt  

true  that  the  Supreme  Court  in  the  said  case  noticed  that  the  

students  belonged to  an upper  middle  class  background but  the  

basis and the principle on which the compensation was awarded in  

that case would equally apply to the present case.   

31. A  forceful  submission  has  been  made  by  the  learned  counsels  

appearing  for  the  claimants-appellants  that  both  the  Tribunal  as  

well as the High Court failed to consider the claims of the appellants  

with  regard to  the future prospects  of  the children.  It  has been  

submitted  that  the  evidence  with  regard  to  the  same has  been  

ignored by the Courts below. On perusal of the evidence on record,  

we  find  merit  in  such  submission  that  the  Courts  below  have  

overlooked that aspect of the matter while granting compensation.  

It  is  well  settled  legal  principle  that  in  addition  to  awarding  

compensation  for  pecuniary  losses,  compensation  must  also  be  

granted with regard to the future prospects of the children. It is  

incumbent  upon  the  Courts  to  consider  the  said  aspect  while  

awarding compensation. Reliance in this regard may be placed on  

the decisions rendered by this Court in General Manager, Kerala  

S. R. T. C. v. Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176; Sarla Dixit  

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v. Balwant Yadav, (1996) 3 SCC 179; and  Lata Wadhwa case  

(supra).

32. In view of discussion made hereinbefore, it is quite clear the claim  

with regard to future prospect should have been be addressed by  

the  courts  below.  While  considering  such  claims,  child’s  

performance in school, the reputation of the school etc. might be  

taken into consideration. In the present case, records shows that  

the children were good in studies and studying in a reasonably good  

school. Naturally, their future prospect would be presumed to be  

good and bright.  Since they were children, there is no yardstick to  

measure  the  loss  of  future  prospects  of  these  children.  But  as  

already  noted,  they  were  performing  well  in  studies,  natural  

consequence supposed to be a bright future.  In the case of  Lata  

Wadhwa (supra) and  M. S. Grewal (supra), the Supreme Court  

recognised  such  future  prospect  as  basis  and  factor  to  be  

considered.  Therefore,  denying  compensation  towards  future  

prospects seems to be unjustified. Keeping this in background, facts  

and circumstances of the present case, and following the decision in  

Lata  Wadhwa (supra)  and  M. S.  Grewal (supra),  we deem it  

appropriate  to  grant  compensation  of  Rs.  75,000/-  (which  is  

roughly half of the amount given on account of pecuniary damages)  

as compensation for the future prospects of the children, to be paid  

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to each claimant within one month of the date of this decision. We  

would like to clarify that this amount i.e. Rs. 75,000/- is over and  

above what has been awarded by the High Court.  

33. Besides, the Courts have been awarding compensation for pain and  

suffering  and  towards  non-pecuniary  damages.  Reference  in  this  

regard can be made to  R. D. Hattangadi case (supra).  Further,  

the said compensation must be just and reasonable. This Court has  

observed as follows in State of Haryana v. Jasbir Kaur, (2003) 7  

SCC 484, at 486:  

“7. It has to be kept in view that the Tribunal constituted  under the Act as provided in Section 168 is  required to  make an award determining the amount of compensation  which is to be in the real sense “damages” which in turn  appears  to  it  to  be “just  and reasonable”.  It  has  to  be  borne in mind that compensation for loss of limbs or life  can hardly be weighed in golden scales. But at the same  time it has to be borne in mind that the compensation is  not  expected  to  be  a  windfall  for  the  victim.  Statutory  provisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be  “just” and it cannot be a bonanza; not a source of profit;  but  the  same should  not  be a pittance.  The courts  and  tribunals  have  a  duty  to  weigh  the  various  factors  and  quantify  the  amount  of  compensation,  which  should  be  just.  What  would  be  “just”  compensation  is  a  vexed  question.  There  can  be  no  golden  rule  applicable  to  all  cases  for  measuring  the value  of  human life  or  a  limb.  Measure  of  damages  cannot  be  arrived  at  by  precise  mathematical  calculations.  It  would  depend  upon  the  particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiar  or special features, if any. Every method or mode adopted  for  assessing compensation has  to be considered in the  background  of  “just”  compensation  which  is  the  pivotal  consideration.  Though  by  use  of  the  expression  “which  appears to it to be just” a wide discretion is vested in the  Tribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done  by a judicious approach and not the outcome of whims,  

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wild  guesses  and  arbitrariness.  The  expression  “just”  denotes  equitability,  fairness  and  reasonableness,  and  non-arbitrary. If it is not so it cannot be just.”

34.So  far  as  the  pecuniary  damage  is  concerned  we  are  of  the  

considered view both the Tribunal as well as the High Court has  

awarded the compensation on the basis of Second Schedule and  

relevant multiplier under the Act. However, we may notice here that  

as far as non-pecuniary damages are concerned, the Tribunal does  

not  award  any  compensation  under  the  head  of  non-pecuniary  

damages.  However,  in  appeal  the  High  Court  has  elaborately  

discussed this aspect of the matter and has awarded non-pecuniary  

damages of Rs. 75,000. Needless to say, pecuniary damages seeks  

to compensate those losses which can be translated into money  

terms  like  loss  of  earnings,  actual  and  prospective  earning  and  

other out of pocket expenses. In contrast, non-pecuniary damages  

include such immeasurable elements as pain and suffering and loss  

of amenity and enjoyment of life. In this context, it becomes duty  

of the court to award just compensation for non-pecuniary loss. As  

already  noted  it  is  difficult  to  quantify  the  non-pecuniary  

compensation, nevertheless, the endeavour of the Court must be to  

provide  a  just,  fair  and  reasonable  amount  as  compensation  

keeping  in  view  all  relevant  facts  and  circumstances  into  

consideration. We have noticed that the High Court in present case  

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has enhanced the compensation in this category by Rs. 75, 000/- in  

all connected appeals. We do not find any infirmity in that regard.

35.With respect to the interest, the Tribunal had directed for payment  

of interest for only four years at the rate of 6% per annum from the  

date of  filing of  the claim petition till  the award and in case of  

payment was not made within 30 days then further interest at the  

rate of 6% from the date of award till payment. In appeal, the High  

Court awarded 7 and ½ % per annum from the date of filing of the  

petition  till  payment.  We find  the  interest  awarded by  the  High  

Court as just and proper, so the same need not be disturbed.

36.The appeals are disposed of in terms of aforesaid order.

…..……………………..J.                                [S.B. Sinha]

  ...……..…………………J.            [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi May 15, 2009  

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