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PETITIONER: R.C. POUDYAL AND ANR.  ETC.  ETC.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.  ETC.  ETC.

DATE OF JUDGMENT10/02/1993

BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) BENCH: VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J) SHARMA, L.M. (CJ) VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) REDDY, K. JAYACHANDRA (J) AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)

CITATION:  1993 AIR 1804            1993 SCR  (1) 891  1994 SCC  Supl.  (1) 324 JT 1993 (2)     1  1993 SCALE  (1)489

ACT: Representation of People Act, 1950: Sections  7(1-A)  and  25A (As  inserted  by  Election  Laws Extension to Sikkim) Act, 1976 and Representation of  People (Amendment) Act, 1980-Constitutional validity of. Representation of People Act, 1951: Section  5A(2) (As inserted by the Representation of  People (Amendment)) Act, 1980-Constitutional validity of. Sikkim Assembly-Reservation of 12 seats out of 32 seats  for Sikkimese  of  "Bhutia-Lepcha" origin-Whether  violative  of Articles 14, 170(2) and Clause (f) of Article  371-F-Whether violative  of Indian Constitutionalism-Whether violative  of Principle  of Republicanism-Extent of reservation of  seats- Whether disproportionate and violative of Article 332(3). Reservation  of  one seat in favour  of  ’Sangha’  (Buddhist Lamaic Religious Monastries) with provision for election  on the  basis of separate electoral roll-Whether based on  pure religious  distinction-Whether violative of  Articles  15(1) and  325-Provision of reservation of Sangha seat-Whether  to be construed as a nomination. Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 1(3) (c), 2, 3, and 4. Admission  of  a  new  State  into  Indian  Union-Power   of Parliament  to  impose terms  and  conditions-Constitutional limitations  on  power  of  Parliament-What  are-Terms   and conditions  of  admission of  new  State-Justiciability  of- Doctrine of Political question-Applicability of. Expression "as it thinks fit" in Article 2-Meaning of. 892 Articles 15 and 325: State Legislature-Reservation of seats in favour of ’sangha’ (Buddhist  Lamaic Religious Monastries) with  provision  for maintenance of separate electoral roll-Whether violative  of Articles 15 and 325. Article 371-F-Non-obstante clause-Scope and effect of. Clause (f)-Whether violative of Basic Features of Democracy- Whether  violates  ’one person one vote’ rule  enshrined  in Article   170(2)-Whether  enables  departure  from   Article 332(3). Article  332-State  Legislature-Reservation  of  seats   for

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Scheduled  Castes and Scheduled Tribes-Clause (3)-Words  ’As nearly  as  May be’-Scope of-Whether permit  deviation  from prescribed proportion of Reservation. Words and Phrases: ’Democratic  Republic’-’Democracy’ and  ’Democratic’-Meaning of.

HEADNOTE: On May 8, 1973, a tripartite agreement was executed  amongst the Chogyal (Ruler) of Sikkim, the Foreign Secretary to  the Government of India and the leaders of the political parties representing  the people of Sikkim which envisaged right  of people  of  Sikkim  to  elections  on  the  basis  of  adult suffrage, contemplated setting up of a Legislative  Assembly in  Sikkim to be reconstituted by election every four  years and  declared a commitment to free and fair elections to  be overseen  by a representative of the Election Commission  of India.   Para  (5) of the said agreement provided  that  the system  of  elections shall be so organised as to  make  the Assembly  adequately representative of the various  sections of  the population The size and composition of the  Assembly and  of  the  Executive  Council shall be  such  as  may  be prescribed  from  time to time, care being taken  to  ensure that  no  single  section  of  the  population  acquires   a dominating  position  due mainly to its ethnic  origin,  and that the rights and interests of the Sikkimese Bhutia Lepcha origin and of the Sikkimese Nepali, which includes Tsong and Scheduled Caste origin. are fully protected.  This agreement was   effectuated  by  a  Royal  Proclamation   called   the Representation  of Sikkim Subjects Act, 1974, issued by  the Ruler  of’  Sikkim.   It directed the  formation  of  Sikkim Assembly consisting of 32 elected members  31 to be elected from territorial constituencies and One Sangha  constituency to elect one member through on electoral college of 893 Sanghas.   Consequently, elections for the  Sikkim  Assembly were held in April 1974.  The Sikkim Assembly so elected and constituted  passed  the  Government of  Sikkim  Act,  1974. Section 7 of the said Act gave recognition to paragraph 5 of the tripartite agreement dated May 8, 1973.  In pursuance of this  development the Constitution of India was  amended  by the   Constitution   (Thirty-Fifth  Amendment)   Act,   1974 inserting Article 2A which made Sikkim an "Associate  State" with  the Union of India.  On 10th April, 1975,  the  Sikkim Assembly  passed a resolution abolishing the institution  of Chogyal  and  declared  that Sikkim would  henceforth  be  a constituent  unit of India enjoying a democratic  and  fully responsible   Government.   A  request  was  made   in   the resolution to the Government of India to take the  necessary measures.   By  an  opinion poll  the  said  resolution  was affirmed   by  the  people  of  Sikkim.   Accordingly,   the Constitution   was  further  amended  by  the   Constitution (Thirty-Sixth  Amendment) Act, 1975 whereby Sikkim became  a full-fledged  State in the Union of India and Article  371-F was  inserted  in the Constitution which  envisaged  certain special  conditions  for the admission of Sikkim  as  a  new State in the Union of India.  Clause (f) of the said Article empowered  Parliament to make provision for  reservation  of seats  in the Sikkim Assembly for the purpose of  protecting the  rights and interests of the different sections  of  the population of Sikkim. Thereafter  Parliament enacted the Election Laws  (Extension to  Sikkim) Act, 1976 which sought to extend,  with  certain

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special  provisions, the Representation of the  People  Act, 1950  and  the  Representation of the People  Act,  1951  to Sikkim.   Further,  the  Bhutia-Lepchas  were  declared   as Scheduled  Tribes  in relation to the State of Sikkim  by  a Presidential   Order  issued  under  Article  342   of   the Constitution of India, and they thus became entitled to  the benefits of reservation of seats in the State Legislature in accordance with Article 332.  The consequential  reservation in the State Legislature were made in the Representation  of People  Act, 1950 and Representation of People Act, 1951  by the  1976 Act and the Representation of  People  (Amendment) Act,  1980.   Twelve seats out of thirty-two  seats  in  the Sikkim Assembly were reserved for Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin;  and one seat was reserved for Sanghas, election  to which  was  required  to  be conducted on  the  basis  of  a separate electoral roll in which only the Sanghas  belonging to monasteries recognised for the purpose of elections  held in Sikkim in April, 1974 were entitled to be registered. 894 The petitioners, Sikkimese of Nepali origin, filed petitions challenging  the  reservation of 12 seats for  Sikkimese  of "Bhutia-Lepcha" origin and one seat for "sangha". Objections  as to the maintainability of the writ  petitions were taken on behalf of the State of Sikkim and the Union of India  on the grounds : (a) that a law made under Article  2 containing the terms and conditions on which a new State  is admitted  in  the  Indian  Union is,  by  its  very  nature, political  involving matters of policy and,  therefore,  the terms  and  conditions  contained  in such  a  law  are  not justiciable on the political question doctrine; (b) in  view of the non-obstante clause in Article 371-F, Parliament  can enact  such a law in derogation of the other  provisions  of the  Constitution  and  the said law would not  be  open  to challenge  on the ground that it is violative of  any  other provisions of the Constitution. On  behalf of the petitioners it was contended (1) that  the reservation of one seat in favour of the ’Sanghal (Bhuddhist Lamaic  Religious Monasteries) is purely based on  religious considerations and is violative of Articles 15(1) and 325 of the  Constitution  and offends the secular  principles;  the said  reservation  based on religion with a  separate  elec- torate  at the religious monasteries is violative  of  basic structure  of the Constitution; (2) that the  provisions  in clause  (f) of Article 371-F enabling reservation  of  seats for sections of the people and law made in exercise of  that power  providing  reservation of seats  for  Bhutias-Lepchas violate    fundamental   principles   of    democracy    and republicanism   under  the  Indian  Constitution;  (3)   the reservation  of seats for Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha  origin without making a corresponding reservation for Sikkimese  of Nepali  origin  is  violative  of  the  right  to   equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution; (4) in view of  the Constitution (Sikkim) Scheduled Tribes  Order,  1978 declaring Bhutias-Lepchas as Scheduled Tribes, the extent of reservation  of seats is disproportionate and  violative  of Article  332  (3)  of the Constitution. and  (5)  that  this departure  from the provisions of Article  332(3)  derogates from the principle of one man, one vote enshrined in Article 170(2) of the Constitution. On  behalf  of  the respondents it was  contended  (1)  that although basically the monasteries are religious in  nature, yet  they form a separate section of the society on  account of  the social services they have been rendering  mainly  to the Bhutia-Lepcha section of the population.  Viewed in 895

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this  background  they  should  not  be  treated  as  merely religious institutions for the purposes of reservation;  (2) since the Constitution permits nomination to be made in  the legislatures, the creation of a separate electorates for the Sangha   seat   cannot  be  objected  to;   (3)   that   the constitutional  amendment  bringing in Article  371F(f),  as also  the relevant amended provisions of the  Representation of  the  People Acts are legal and valid because  a  perfect arithmetical   equality   of  value  of  votes  is   not   a constitutionally   mandated  imperative  of  democracy   and secondly,  that  even  if the  impugned  provisions  made  a departure from the tolerance limits and the constitutionally permissible  latitudes,  the  discriminations  arising   are justifiable  on the basis of the  historical  considerations peculiar to and characteristic of the evaluation of Sikkim’s political institutions. Dismissing the petitions, this Court, HELD : By the Court (i)  The questions raised in the petitions pertaining to the terms   and  conditions  of  accession  of  new  State   are justiciable. [975B] (ii) Clause  (f)  of Article 371-F of  the  Constitution  of India, is not violative of the basic features of  democracy. [986C] (iii)     That impugned provisions providing for reservation of  12  seats,  out of 32 seats in  the  Sikkim  Legislative Assembly   in  favour  of  Bhutias  Lepchas,   are   neither unconstitutional  as  violative  of the  basic  features  of democracy  and republicanism under the  Indian  Constitution nor are they violative of Articles 14, 170(2) and 332 of the Constitution.  The impugned provisions  are  also not  ultra vires of Clause (f) of Article 371-F.                               [986E-H, 987A-H, 988A] (iv) The extent of reservation of seats is not violative  of Article 332(3) of the Constitution. [987A-B, 988A] (v)  The reservation of one seat for Sangha to be elected by an  Electoral  College of Lamaic monasteries  is  not  based purely  on  religious distinctions and  is,  therefore,  not unconstitutional  as violative of Articles 15(1) and 325  of the Constitution. [989A-H] Quaere (i) Whether the terms and conditions of admission  of a new State are justiciable? 896 1.   The  power  to admit new States into  the  Union  under Article  2  is, no doubt, in the very nature of  the  power, very  wide and its exercise necessarily guided by  political issues  of considerable complexity many of which may not  be judicially  manageable.  But for that reason, it  cannot  be predicated  that  Article  2 confers on  the  Parliament  an unreviewable  and  unfettered  power  immune  from  judicial scrutiny.   The power is limited by the fundamentals of  the Indian  constitutionalism  and those  terms  and  conditions which  the  Parliament  may deem fit to  impose,  cannot  be inconsistent   and  irreconcilable  with  the   foundational principles of the Constitution and cannot violate or subvert the  Constitutional  scheme.  Therefore, if  the  terms  and conditions  stipulated  in a law made under Article  2  read with clause (f) of Article 371-F go beyond the constitution- ally permissible latitudes, that law can be questioned as to its  validity.   Consequently  it cannot be  said  that  the issues are non-justiciable.                                  [974D-F, 975B-E] A.K. Roy, v. Union of India, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 272; Madhav Rao v. Union of India, [1971] 3 S.C.R. 9 and State of  Rajasthan v. Union of India, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 11, referred to.

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Vinod  Kumar  Shantilal  Gosalia  v.  Gangadhar   Narsingdas Agarwal & Ors., [1982] 1 S.C.R. 392, Held inapplicable. Marbury, v. Madison 1 Cr. 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803); Martin  v. Mott, 12 Wheat  25 US 19 (1827); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dail.  3 U.S. 199 (1796); Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 48 U.S. 1  (1849); Baker  v. Carr 369 U.S. 186; Powell v. McCormack,  395  U.S. 486 and Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society 478 (1986) U.S. 221, referred to. A.K.  Pavithran,  Substance  of  Public  International   Law Western  and  Eastern, First Edition, 1965  pp.  281-2;  The Constitution  of the United States of American Analysis  and Interpretation and Congressional Research Service Liberty of Congress 1982 Edn. p.703, referred to. 2.   Article  2  gives  a wide latitude  in  the  matter  of prescription of terms and conditions subject to which a  new territory   is   admitted.   There  is   no   constitutional imperative  that  those terms and conditions  should  ensure that  the new State should, in all respects, be the same  as the other 897 States  in  the  Indian  Union.   However,  the  terms   and conditions should not seek to establish a form or system  of Government or political and governmental institutions  alien to  and fundamentally different from those the  Constitution envisages. [984C-D] Constitutional  Law  of India, Edited by  Hidayatullah,  J., referred to. 3.   In  judicial review of the vires of the exercise  of  a constitutional  power such as the one under Article  2,  the significance  and importance of the political components  of the  decision deemed fit by Parliament cannot be put out  of consideration  as long as the conditions do not violate  the constitutional  fundamentals.   In the interpretation  of  a constitutional  document,  ’words are but the  framework  of concepts   and   concepts  may  change   more   than   words themselves’.  The significance of the change of the concepts themselves  is vital and the constitutional issues  are  not solved by a mere appeal to the meaning of the words  without an acceptance of the line of their growth.  It is aptly said that  "the intention of a Constitution is rather to  outline principles than to engrave details". [985A-C] 43 Aust.  Law Journal, p.256, referred to. 4.   Article  371-F cannot transgress the basic features  of the  Constitution.   The  non  obstante  clause  cannot   be construed as taking clause (f) of Article 371-F outside  the limitations on the amending power itself.  The provision  of clause  (f)  of  Article  371-F and Article  2  have  to  be construed  harmoniously  consistent  with  the  foundational principles  and basic features of the  Constitution.  [974H, 975A] Mangal Singh & Anr. v. Union of India, [1967] 2 S.C.R.  109, relied on. Per S. C Agrawal, J. (Concurring) 1.   While  admitting a new State in the Union,  Parliament, while making a law under Article 2, cannot provide for terms and conditions which are inconsistent with the scheme of the Constitution and it is open to the Court to examine  whether the  terms and conditions as provided in the law enacted  by Parliament   under  Article  2  are  consistent   with   the constitutional scheme or not.  Power conferred on Parliament under  Article  2 is not wider in ambit  than  the  amending power under Article 368 and it would be of little  practical significance  to  treat Article 371-F as a  law  made  under Article 2 of the Constitution or introduced by way of 898

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amendment  under Article 368.  In either event, it  will  be subject  to the limitation that it cannot alter any  of  the basic features of the Constitution.  The scope of the  power conferred  by  Article  371-F,  is  therefore,  subject   to judicial  review.   So, also is the law that is  enacted  to give  effect to the provisions contained in  Article  371-F. [1005E-H] Baker v. Carr, 1962 (369) U.S. 186 and Powell v.  McCormack, 395 U.S. 490, referred to.      A.K Roy v. Union of India, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 272;  Madhav Rao v.    Union  of  India,  [1971] 3  S.C.R.  9;  State  of Rajasthan v. Union of India,  [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1; S.P.  Gupta v. Union of India, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 365 and   Mrs.   Sarojini Ramaswami  v. Union of India & Ors., Writ  Petition  (Civil) No. 514 of 1992 decided on August 27, 1992, referred to.      2. It is not doubt true that is the matter of admission of a new State      in  the  Indian Union, Article  2  gives considerable  freedom to Parliament to prescribe  the  terms and  conditions on which the new State is being admitted  in the  Indian Union. But at the same time, it cannot  be  said that   the  said  freedom  is  without  any   constitutional limitation. The power conferred on Parliament under  Article 2 is circumscribed by the overall constitutional scheme  and Parliament, while prescribing the terms and  conditions   on which  a new State is admitted in the Indian Union,  has  to act  within the said scheme. Parliament cannot admit  a  new State  into the Indian Union on terms and  conditions  which derogate  from  the basic features of the  Constitution.  To hold  otherwise would mean that it would be permissible  for Parliament to admit to the Union new States on terms   and conditions enabling those State to be governed under systems which  are inconsistent with the scheme of the  Constitution and thereby alter the basic features of the Constitution. It would  lead to the anomalous result that by an ordinary  law enacted by Parliament under Article 2 it would be possible to  bring  about  a  change which cannot  be  made  even  by exercise       of  the  constituent power to  amend  to  the Constitution,  viz., to after any of the basic  features  of the Constitution. The words ’as it thinks fit’ in Article  2 of  the  Constitution  cannot, therefore,  be  construed  as empowering  Parliament to provide terms and  conditions  for admission  of  a new State which are inconsistent  with  the basic features of the Constitution. The said words can  only mean that within the framework of the Constitution,   it  is permissible for Parliament to prescribe terms and conditions on 899 new State is admitted in the Union. [1003G-H, 1004A, C-E] Mangal  Singh  v.  Union  of India,  [1967]  2  S.C.R.  109, referred to. R.D.  Lumb, The Constitution of Commonwealth  of  Australia, (1986) 4th Edn. p. 736, referred to. 3.   There  is  no doubt that the non-obstante clause  in  a statute gives overriding effect to the provisions covered by the  non-obstante  clause over the other provisions  in  the statute  to  which it applies and in that  sense,  the  non- obstante clause used in Article 371-F would give  overriding effect  to  clauses (a) to (p) of Article 371-F  over  other provisions  of the Constitution.  But at the same  time,  it cannot be ignored that the scope of the non-obstante clauses in  371-F cannot extend beyond the scope of the  legislative power  of Parliament under Article 2 or the  amending  power under Article 368.  Therefore, the non-obstalite clause  has to be so construed as to conform to the aforesaid limitation or    otherwise    Article   371-F   would    be    rendered

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unconstitutional.   A  construction which leads  to  such  a consequence  has  to be eschewed.  Thus as a result  of  the non-obstante clause in Article 371-F, clauses (a) to (p)  of the said Article have to be construed to permit a  departure from other provisions of the constitution in respect of  the matters  covered  by clauses (a) to (p)  provided  the  said departure  is not of such a magnitude as to have the  effect of  altering any of the basic features of the  Constitution. [1006B-G] 4.   It  cannot  be  said  that  Article  371-F  contains  a political element in the sense that it seeks to give  effect to  a  political agreement relating to admission  of  Sikkim into the Indian Union. [1003D] Per L.M. Sharma, CJ. (Concurring) 1.   The courts are not only vested with the jurisdiction to consider  and  decide  the  points  raised  in  these   writ petitions,  but  are under a duty to do so.   If  steps  are taken to grant legitimacy to a state of affairs repulsive to the basic features of our Constitution, the Courts are under a duty to judicially examine the matter. [925C, H] 2.   There  is  a  vital  difference  between  the   initial acquisition of additional territory and the admission of the same  as a full-fledged State of the Union of India  similar to the other States. [921G] 900 3.   Special provisions for any State can certainly be  made by  an  amendment  of the Constitution,  as  is  evident  by Article  371A  371  B,  371C  at  cetera,  but  it  is   not permissible to do so in derogation of the basic features  of the  Constitution.   So  far the  power  of  sovereignty  to acquire  new territories is concerned, there cannot  be  any dispute.   The  power is inherent, it  was,  therefore,  not considered  necessary to mention it in express terms in  the Constitution.  It is also true that if an acquisition of new territories  is made by a treaty or under an  agreement  the terms of the same will be beyond the scrutiny of the courts. The  position,  however,  is  entirely  different  when  new territory  is  made  part of India, by giving  it  the  same status  as  is  enjoyed  by  an  existing  State  under  the Constitution of India.  The process of such a merger has  to be  under  the  Constitution.  No  other  different  process adopted can achieve this result.  And when this exercise  is undertaken,  there is no option, but to adopt the  procedure as prescribed in conformity with the Constitution.  At  this stage  the Court’s jurisdiction to examine the  validity  of the adopted methodology cannot be excluded. [921H, 922A-C] 4.   So far the present case is concerned the decision  does not admit of any doubt that when the Thirty-Sixth  Amendment of the Constitution was made under which Sikkim joined India as  a  full-fledged  State  like  other  States,  power   of amendment  of the Constitution was invoked, and this had  to be  done  only  consistent with the basic  features  of  the Constitution.   Sikkim became as much a State as any  other. Considered   in  this  background,  the  objection  to   the maintainability of the writ petitions cannot be upheld.                               [922D, H, 923A] Mangal  Singh & Anr. v. Union of India, [1967] 2  S.C.R.109, referred to. 5.   It is true that in case of acquisition Article 2  comes into play but that is only at the initial stage when the new territory  joins  and becomes the territory of  India  under Article  1(3)  (c).   In the present case  the  power  under Article   2  was  not  exercised  at  any  point  of   time. Initially,  Sikkim  joined India as an  Associate  State  by Article  2A introduced in the Constitution by an  amendment.

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When  further steps of its complete merger with  India  were taken, the methodology under Article 3 was not available  in view  of  the  observations  in  Berubari  case.   Correctly assessing  the situation, fresh steps for amendment  of  the Constitution once more were taken and Sikkim was granted the status  of a full Statehood at par with the other States  by the Thirty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.  Once this 901 was done it had to be consistent with the basic features  of the Constitution. [924E-G] The Berubari Union and Exchange of Enclaves, [1960] 3 S.C.R. 250, relied on.               Quaere  (ii) Whether the  impugned  provisions               providing for reservation of Sangha seat  with               provision  for  separate  electoral  roll  and               Sangha constituency are unconstitutional? Per  M.N.  Venkatachaliah (For himself, J.S. Verma  and  KJ. Reddy, JJ.). 1.   A  separate  electorate for  a  religious  denomination would  be  obnoxious to the fundamental  principles  of  our secular Constitution.  If a provision is made purely on  the basis. of religious considerations for election of a  member of  that  religious  group  on  the  basis  of  a   separate electorate, that would, indeed, be wholly  unconstitutional. But in the case of the Sangha, it is not merely a  religious institution.   The literature on the history of  development of  the political institutions of Sikkim tend to  show  that the Sangha had played an important role in the political and social  life of the Sikkimese people.  It had made  its  own contribution   to  the  Sikkimese  culture   and   political development.   Thus,  there  is  material  to  sustain   the conclusion that the ’Saughal had long been associated itself closely  with the political developments of Sikkim  and  was inter-woven  10th  the  social and  political  life  of  its people.   In  view  of  this  historical  association,   the provisions  in the matter of reservation of a seat  for  the Sangha  recognises  the  social and political  role  of  the institution  more than its purely religious  identity.   The provision  can be sustained on this  construction.  [989C-H, 990A] 2.   In the historical setting of Sikkim and its social  and political evolution the provision has to be construed really as  not  invoking  the  impermissible  idea  of  a  separate electorate  either.  Indeed, the provision bears  comparison to  Article 333 providing for representation for the  Anglo- Indian  community.   It  is to be looked at  as  enabling  a nomination  but the choice of the nominee being left to  the ’Sangha’ itself [989E-F] Per S. C Agrawal, J. (Dissenting) 1.   The   impugned  provision  providing  for  a   separate electoral roll for 902 Sangha Constituency contravenes Article 325 and  reservation of one seat for Sanghas contravenes Article 15(1).   Article 371-F  does  not  permit  a  departure  from  the  principle contained  in  Articles  325 and 15(1)  while  applying  the Constitution to the newly admitted State of Sikkim.   Clause (f)  of  Article  371-F,  cannot  be  construed  to   permit reservation of a seat for Sanghas and election to that  seat on  the  basis  of a separate  electoral  roll  composed  of Sanghas only.  Consequently, clause (c) of sub-section (1-A) of Section 7 and Section 25-A of the 1950 Act and the  words ’other than constituency reserved for Sanghas’ in clause (a) of  sub-section  (2) of Section 5-A and clause (c)  of  sub- section (2) of Section 5-A of the 1951 Act are violative  of

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the provisions of Articles 15(1) and 325 of the Constitution and are not saved by Article 371-F of the Constitution.  The said  provisions,  are  however, severable  from  the  other provisions which have been inserted in the 1950 Act and  the 1951  Act by the 1976 Act and the 1980 Act and the  striking down of the impugned provisions does not stand in the way of giving to the other provisions. [1023H, 1024A-B, D-E] 2.   Since  only a Buddhist can be a Sangha, the  effect  of the reservation of a seat for Sanghas and the provision  for special electoral roll for the Sangha Constituency  %,herein only  Sanghas are entitled to be registered as electors,  is that a person who is not a Buddhist cannot contest the  said reserved  seat and he is being discriminated on  the  ground only of religion.  Similarly, a person who is not a Buddhist is rendered ineligible to be included in the electoral  roll for Sangha Constituency on the ground only of religion.  The historical    considerations    do    not    justify    this discrimination. [1018E-G] 2.1. The  reservation  of  one seat for  Sanghas  in  Sikkim Council  and subsequently in the Sikkim Assembly was in  the context of the administrative set up in Sikkim at that  time wherein  Sanghas were playing a major part in the taking  of decisions in the Council.  The said reason does not  survive after  the admission of Sikkim as a new State in the  Indian Union.   The continuation of a practice which  prevailed  in Sikkim  with regard to reservation of one seat  for  Sanghas and the election to the said seat on the basis of a  special electoral   college  composed  of  Sanghas   alone   cannot, therefore,   be  justified  on  the  basis   of   historical considerations and the impugned provisions are violative  of the  Constitutional mandate contained in Article  15(1)  and Article 325 of the Constitution. [1019D-E] 903 Nain  Sukh  Das and Anr. v. The State of Uttar  Pardesh  and Ors.,  [1953] S.C.R. 1184; Punjab Province v.  Daulat  Singh and Ors., 1946 F.C.R. 1; State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society  and  Ors.,  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 568 and  The  State  of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] S.C.R.  525, relied on. 3.   In  so  far as clause (1) of Article  15  is  concerned express  provision  has  been made in clauses  (3)  and  (4) empowering the State to make special provisions for  certain classes  of persons.  Sanghas, as such, do not  fall  within the  ambit  of  clauses  (3)  and  (4)  of  Article  15  and therefore,   a  special  provision  in  their   favour,   in derogation  of clause (1) of Article 15 is not  permissible. [1020C] 4.   Article 325 is of crucial significance for  maintaining the   secular   character   of   the   Constitution.     Any contravention  of  the  said provision cannot  but  have  an adverse  impact  on the secular character  of  the  Republic which is one of the basic features of the Constitution.  The same is true with regard to the provisions of clause (1)  of Article  15  which  prohibits reservation of  seats  in  the legislatures on the ground only of religion. [1023A-B]  Smt. Indira  Gandhi v. Raj Narain, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 347 and  Kesa- vanalida Bharati v. State of Kerala, [1973] Supp.  S.C.R. 1, referred to. 5.   It  is  no  doubt true that  the  impugned  provisions, relate  to only one seat out of 32 seats in the  Legislative Assembly  of  Sikkim.  But the  potentialities  of  mischief resulting  from  such provisions cannot be  minimised.   The existence  of  such  provisions is bound  to  give  rise  to similar demands by followers of other religions and  revival of the demand for reservation of seats on religious  grounds

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and for separate electorates which was emphatically rejected by  the  Constituent Assembly.  It is poison which,  if  not eradicated from the system at the earliest, is bound to  eat into the vitals of the nation.  It is, therefore, imperative that  such  provision should not find place in  the  statute book  so that further mischief is prevented and the  secular character  of  the  Republic  is  protected  and  preserved. [1023C-E] Kedar  Nath  Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal,  [1954]  5 S.C.R. 30, referred to. 904 Shiva   Rao,   Framing  of  India’s   Constitution,   Select Documents,  Vol.II, p.412 and Constituent Assembly  Debates, Vol.  V. p. 202, 224, 225, referred to. Per L.M. Sharma, C.j (Dissenting) 1.   The provisions of Section 25A of the Representation  of the People Act, 1950 are ultra vires the Constitution.   The provisions  of.   Section 7(1A)(c) and the  other  connected amendments  are  also ultra vires the  Constitution.  [941B, 935G] The Buddhist Monasteries, which are the beneficiaries of the reservation, are admittedly religious institutions.  If  the entire  Constitution is considered harmoniously  along  with all  the other materials, relevant in law for  this  purpose including  the ’Enacting History’, there is no  escape  from the conclusion that any weightage at the poll in favour of a group  on the ground of religion is strictly prohibited  and further, that this is a basic feature, which is not amenable to amendment. [931D, 935G] B.K. Mukherjee, Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trust; George  Kotturan, The Himalayan Gatewa); J.C. White,  Sikkim and Bhutan Twenty One Years on the North East Frontier  887- 1908;  J.S.  Lall, The Himalaya  Aspects of  change,  1981; Geoffrey Georer, Himalayan Village and A.C. Sinha,  Politics of Sikkim  A Sociological Study referred to. 3.   If the Constitution is so interpreted as. to permit, by an amendment a seat to be reserved in the legislature for  a group   of   religious  institutions   like   the   Buddhist Monasteries, it will follow that such a reservation would be permissible  for institutions belonging to  other  religions also.    And  all  this  may  ultimately  change  the   very complexion  of the legislatures.  The effect that  only  one seat  has been reserved today for the Monasteries in  Sikkim is the thin edge of the wedge which has the potentiality, to tear  apart,  in the course of time,  the  very  foundation, which  the democratic republic is built-upon.  All  this  is prohibited  as being abhorrent to the basic features of  the Constitution. [932H, 933A-D] 3.1. Today a single seat in the legislature of one State  is not  conspicuously  noticeable  and may  not  by  itself  be capable  of  causing irreparable damage, but  this  seed  of discord  has  the potentiality of developing into  a  deadly monster.   It  is true that some special  rights  have  been envisaged 905 in  the  Constitution for handicapped classes but  this  has been done only to offset the disadvantage the classes suffer from,  and  not for bringing another kind  of  imbalance  by making  virtue  out of minority Status.   The  Constitution, therefore,  has taken precaution to place rigid  limitations on  the  extent to which this weightage can be  granted,  by including  express provisions instead of leaving the  matter to  be dealt with by subsequent enactments limitations  both by  putting  a ceiling on the reservation of  seats  in  the legislatures   and  excluding  religion  as  the  basis   of

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discrimination.  To ignore these limitations is to encourage small  groups and classes  which are in good number in  our country on one basis or the other  to stick to and rely  on their  special  status  as members of  separate  groups  and classes and not to join the main-stream of the nation and be identified   as  Indians.   It  is,  therefore,   absolutely essential that religion, disguised by any mask and concealed within  any cloak must be kept out of the field  exclusively reserved for the exercise of the State powers. [955D-H] 4.   There  is also another serious flaw in the  reservation for  the Sangha rendering the same to  be  unconstitutional. By  the  impugned  provisions of the  1950  Act,  a  special electorate  has been created for this seat which  is  highly abhorrent  to  the fundamental tenets of  the  Constitution. [935H, 936A] 4.1. From the entire scheme of the Constitution, it is clear that its basic philosophy eloquently rejects the concept  of separate electorate in India.  This conclusion is reinforced by  the  historical  background,  the  celebrations  of  the Advisory  Committee, and the discussion which took place  in the  Constituent Assembly before giving final shape  to  the Constitution.   There is no reason for assuming  that  while inserting  Article 371 F(f) in the Constitution there was  a complete  reversal of faith on this basic and vital  matter, which  was otherwise also not permissible.  It follows  that consistent   with   the  intention  of  the  rest   of   the Constitution the provision regarding the delimitation of the Assembly  constituencies  in  Article 371  F(f)  has  to  be interpreted  in the same sense, as the expression  has  been used  in the other provisions.  Clause (f) of  Article  371F neither  by  its  plain  language  nor  intendment   permits separate  electorates  and any attempt to give  a  different construction  would  not  only  be  highly  artificial   and speculative  but also would be violative of a basic  feature (if the Constitution. [940G-H. 941A] B.   Shiva  Rao’s Framing of Indian constitution, Vol.   II, pp. 56-57, 392, 906 412, referred to. Constituent.Assembly  Debates,  Vol.  V,  P.225,  224,  202, referred to. 5.There is no parallel between the nominations  permitted by  the Constitution to be made In the legislatures and  the creation  of a separate electorates for the  Sangha.   After the establishment of a democratic government at every  level in  the country in one form or the other,  nomination  under the Constitution amounts to exercise of a power to induct  a member  in the legislature by an authority,  who  ultimately represents   the  people,  although  the  process   of   the representation  may be a little involved.  So far a  handful of  the Buddhist Monasteries in Sikkim are  concerned,  they cannot  be  said to represent the people of  Sikkim  in  any sense  of the term.  Allotting a seat in the legislature  to represent  these  religious institutions is  bad  enough  by itself-,  and then, to compound it by vesting the  exclusive right  in them to elect their representative to  occupy  the reserved  seat  is to aggravate the evil.   This  cannot  be compared  with  any of the provisions  in  the  Constitution relating to nominations. [940D-F]               Quaere  (iii) Whether the impugned  provisions               providing  for reservation of twelve seats  in               favour of Bhutia-Lepchas are unconstitutional? Per  M.N.  Venkatachaliah (For himself, J.S. Verma  and  KJ. Reddy, JJ.). 1.Article  371F(f)  cannot be said to violate  any  basic

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feature   of  the  Constitution  such  as   the   democratic principle. [986C] 1.1.The provisions of clauses (f) of Article 371 F and  the consequent  changes in the electoral laws were  intended  to recognise  and  accommodate the pace of the  growth  of  the political institutions of Sikkim and to make the  transition gradual and peaceful and to prevent dominance of one section of  the  population  over another on  the  basis  of  ethnic loyalties    and   identities.    These   adjustments    and accommodations  reflect  a political  expediencies  for  the maintenance  of  social equilibrium.  Indeed,  the  impugned provisions,  in their very nature, contemplate  and  provide for  a  transitional  phase in the  political  evolution  of Sikkim   and   are  thereby  essentially   transitional   in character.   The impugned provisions have been found in  the wisdom  of  Parliament necessary in the admission of  a  new State  into  the Union.  The departures are not such  as  to negate  fundamental  principles. of  democracy.   Thus,  the provisions in the particular situa- 907 tion  and the. permissible latitudes, cannot be said  to  be unconstitutional.                             [986E-H, 987H, 988A, H] 1.2. It  is true that the reservation of seats of  the  kind and the extent brought about by the impugned provisions  may not,  if applied to the existing States of the  Union,  pass the  Constitutional  muster.   But  in  relation  to  a  new territory  admitted to the Union, the terms  and  conditions are   not   such  as  to  fall   outside   the   permissible constitutional   limits.   Historical   considerations   and compulsions  do  justify inequality  and  special  treatment [987A-B] Lachhman  Dass etc. v. State of Punjab & Ors.,  A.I.R.  1963 S.C.  222  and  State  of Madhya  Pradesh  v.  Bhopal  Sugar Industries Ltd., [1964] 6 S.C.R. 846, referred to. 2.   An  examination  of  the  constitutional  scheme  would indicate that the concept of ’one person one vote’ is in its very   nature  considerably  tolerant  of   imbalances   and departures  from a very strict application and  enforcement. The provision in the Constitution indicating proportionality of  representation  is  necessarily  a  broad,  general  and logical  principle  but not intended to  be  expressed  with arithmetical  precision.   The  principle  of   mathematical proportionality  of representation is not a  declared  basic requirement  in  each  and every part of  the  territory  of India.   The systemic deficiencies in the plenitude  of  the doctrine  of full and effective representation has not  been understood  in the constitutional philosophy  as  derogating from  the democratic principle.  The inequalities in  repre- sentation  in  the  present  case  are  an  inheritance  and compulsion  from the past.  Historical  considerations  have justified a differential treatment. [985G-H, 986A-B] Reynolds  v. Sims, 377 U.S. 506 and Attorney  General  (CTH) Ex.  Rei. Mckinlay v. The Commonwealth, 135 C.LR. (1975)  1, referred to. 2.1. Article   170  incorporates  the  rule  of  ’fair   and effective  representation’.Though the rule ’one  person  one vote’  is  a  broad principle of democracy,  it  is  more  a declaration  of  a  political  ideal  than  a  mandate   for enforcement with arithmetical accuracy.  These are the usual problems  that arise In the delimitation of  constituencies. In   what  is  called  "First  past-  the-post’  system   of elections,  the  variations in the size and  in  the  voting populations  of  different constituencies,  detract  from  a

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strict 908 achievement  of  this ideal.  The system has  the  merit  of preponderance  of ’decisiveness" over  "representativeness". [976E-F] Keith Graham, The Battle of Democracy.  Conflict,  Consensus and the Individual, referred to. 2.2. The   concept  of  political  equality   underlying   a democratic  system is a political value.  Perfect  political equality is only ideological. [977D] Rodney Brazier, Constitutional Reform Reshaping the  British Political System, referred to. Brazier,  Constitutional Practice (Clarendon  Press  (Word), referred to. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies’ Howard D. Hamilton, Legislative Appointment: Key to Power; Gordon E. Baker,  One Person,   One  Vote:  Fair  and  Effective   Representation? (Representation  and Misrepresentation  Rand McNally &  Co. Chicago), referred to. 3.   The  contention that clause (f) of Article 371 F  would require  that whichever provisions for reservation of  seats are  considered necessary for the purpose of protecting  the rights and interests of different sections of the population of  Sikkim,  such reservations are to be made for  all  such sections  and  not, as here, for one of them  alone  ignores that the provision in clause (f) of Article 371 F is  merely enabling.  If reservation is made by Parliament for only one section  it  must,  by implication,  be  construed  to  have exercised  the  power  respecting the other  sections  in  a negational sense.  The provision really enables  reservation confined only to a particular section. [988B-C] 4.   Clause  (f) of Article 371 F is intended to  enable,  a departure   from   Article  332(2).   This  is   the   clear operational  effect  of the non obstante clause  with  which Article 371 F opens. [988F] 5.   Mere  existence of a Constitution, by itself, does  not ensure constitutionalism or a constitutional culture.  It is the  political  maturity  and traditions of  a  people  that import  meaning  to a Constitution  which  otherwise  merely embodies political hopes and ideals. [986E] Per S.C. Agrawal, J. (Concurring) 909 1.   Clause  (a)  of sub-section (1-A) of Section 7  of  the 1950  Act which provides for reservation of 12 seats  in  an Assembly  having  32 seats for  Sikkimese  of  Bhutia-Lepcha origin does not transgress the limits of the power conferred on  Parliament under Article 371 F(f) and it cannot be  said that  it  suffers  from. the  vice  of  unconstitutionality. [1014E] 2.   The  reservation  of seats for Bhutias and  Lepchas  is necessary  because  they constitute a minority  and  in  the absence of reservation they may not have any  representation in  the  Legislative Assembly.  Sikkimese of  Nepali  origin constitute the majority in Sikkim and on their own electoral strength  they can secure representation in the  Legislative Assembly against the unreserved seats.  Moreover,  Sikkimese of  Bhutia  and Lepcha origin have a  distinct  culture  and tradition  which  is  different from that  of  Sikkimese  of Nepali origin.  Keeping this distinction in mind Bhutias and Lepchas have been declared as Scheduled Tribes under Article 342  of the Constitution.  The Constitution in  Article  332 makes  express  provision for reservation of  seats  in  the Legislative Assembly, of a State for Scheduled Tribes.  Such a reservation which is expressly permitted by the  Constitu- tion  cannot be challenged on the ground of denial of  right

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to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. [1008B-D] 3.   Clause  (3) of Article 332 has to be considered in  the light of clause (f) of  Article  371-F.   The   non-obstante clause  in  Article  371-F  enables  Parliament  to  make  a departure  from  the ratio contemplated  by  Article  332(3) within  the  limitation  which  is  inherent  in  the  power conferred  by Article 371-F, i.e., not to alter any  of  the basic features of the Constitution.                             [1008E-F, 1009B] 3.1. By  providing for reservation to the extent of  38%  of seats  in the Legislative Assembly for Sikkimese of  Bhutia- Lepcha  origin  Parliament has sought to  strike  a  balance between  protection of the extent of 50% that was  available to  them  in the former State of Sikkim and  the  protection envisaged  under Article 332 (3) of the  Constitution  which would have entitled them to reservation to the extent of 25% seats in accordance with the proportion of their  population to the total population of Sikkim. [1010C-D] 4.   The principle of one man, one vote envisages that there should be parity in the value of votes of electors.  Such  a parity  though  ideal  for  a  representative  democracy  is difficult  to  achieve.  There is some  departure  in  every system  following  this democratic path.  In the  matter  of delimitation of 910 constituencies, it often happens that the population of  the one constituency differs from that of the other constituency and  as a result although both the constituencies elect  one member,  the  value  of  the vote  of  the  elector  in  the constituency having lesser population is more than the value of  the  vote of the elector of the  constituency  having  a larger population. [1010G-H, 1011A] Reynolds v. Sims, (1964) 377 U.S. 533; Mahan v. Howell,  410 U.S.  315 and Attorney General (CTH) Er.  Rel.  Mckinlay  v. The Commonwealth, 135 C.L.R. [1975] 1, referred to. H.W.R.   Wade:  Constitutional  Fundamentals,   The   Hamlyn Lectures, 32nd Series, 1980, p.5, referred to. 4.1. Provisions   of  Delimitation  Act,  1962   show   that population,  though  important, is only one of  the  factors that   has  to  be  taken  into  account  while   delimiting constituencies which means that there need not be uniformity of  population  and  electoral strength  in  the  matter  of delimitation of constituencies.  In other words, there is no insistence  on strict adherence to equality of votes  or  to the principle one vote-one value. [ 1013H, 1014A] 4.2.   The  words  "as nearly as may be" in  clause  (3)  of Article 332 indicate that even in the matter of  reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes it  would be  permissible  to have deviation to some extent  from  the requirement  that  number of seats  reserved  for  Scheduled Castes  or the Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative  Assembly of  any  State shall bear the same proportion to  the  total number of seats as the population of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in the State in respect of which  seats are so reserved, bears to the total population of the state. The  non-obstante clause in Article 371-F read  with  clause (f)  of the said Article enlarges the field of deviation  in the matter of reservation of seats from the proportion  laid down  in  Article  332 (3).  The  only  limitation  on  such deviation  is  that it must not be to such an extent  as  to result  in  tilting the balance in favour of  the  Scheduled Castes  or  the  Scheduled Tribes for  whom  the  seats  are reserved and thereby convert a minority into majority.  This would  adversely  affect the democratic functioning  of  the

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legislature in the State which is the core of representative democracy. [1014B-D] 4.3. The non-obstante clause in Article 371-F when read with clause  (f) of Article 371-F envisages that Parliament  may, while protecting the rights 911 and interests of the different sections of the population of Sikkim  deviate  from the provisions  of  the  Constitution, including Article 332. [101 OF] 5.   In  view of the vast differences in their  numbers  the Sikkimese  of Nepali origin can have no  apprehension  about their  rights and interests being jeopardised on account  of reservation  of  12 seats for  Sikkimise  (of  Bhutia-Lepcha origin  in  the Legislative Assembly composed of  32  seats. Therefore,  it cannot be said that reservation of seats  for Sikkimese of Nepali origin was required in order to  protect their  rights and interests and in not making any  provision for  reservation  of seats for Sikkimese  of  Nepali  origin Parliament  has failed to give effect to the  provisions  of clause (f) Article 371-F of the Constitution. [1025E-H] Per L.M. Sharma, CJ. (Dissenting) 1.   The   impugned   provisions   are   ultra   vires   the Constitution including Article 371F(f). [954E] 2.   The problem of Bhutia-Lepcha Tribe is identical to that of the other Tribes of several States where they are greatly out-numbered  by the general population, and which has  been effectively dealt with by the provisions for reservation  in their  favour included in Part XVI of the Constitution.   It cannot  be  justifiably  suggested that  by  subjecting  the provisions of the reservations to the limitations in  clause (3)  of  Article  332, the Tribes in India  have  been  left unprotected at the mercy of the overwhelming majority of the general  population.   The  reservations in  Part  XVI  were considered adequate protection to them.  Therefore, adequate safeguard  in  favour  of the  Bhutia  Lepchas  was  already available under the Constitution and all that ’was  required was to treat them as Tribes like the other Tribes which  was done  by  a  Presidential Order issued  under  Article  342. Therefore. the object of clause (f) was not to take care  of this problem and it did not authorise the Parliament to pass the  Amendment (Act 8 of 1980) inserting Section  7(1A)  (a) ill  the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and  Section ;A  in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and  other related   amendments.    They   being   violative   of   the Constitutional  provisions including those in  Article  371F (f) are ultra  [948F-H, 949A-C] 3.   Clause  (f)  permits the Parliament to take  only  such steps  which would be consistent with the provisions of  the Constitution  coming  from  before,  so  that  Sikkim  could completely merge with India and be placed it 912 par with the other States.  This conclusion is  irresistible if  the  facts and circumstances which led to  the  ultimate marger  of Sikkim in India are kept in mind.  If clause  (f) of  Article  371F  is  so  construed  as  to  authorise  the Parliament  to  enact  the impugned provisions  it  will  be violative  of  the basic features of the  Constitution  and, therefore, void. [946E-F, 953C] 3.1. The choice of the candidate and the right to stand as a candidate  at the election are inherent in the principle  of adult  suffrage, that is, one-man one-vote.  By telling  the people  that  they have a choice to elect any  of  a  select group  cannot be treated as a free choice of the  candidate. This  will only amount to lip service, too thinly veiled  to conceal the reality of an oligarchy underneath.  It will  be

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just  an apology for democracy, a subterfuge; and if  it  is permitted to cross the limit so as to violate the very  core of the principle of one-man-one- vote, and is not controlled by  the constitutional safeguards as included in clause  (3) of Article 332 of the Constitution it will amount to a  huge fraud perpetrated against the people. [950E-G] 3.2. The very purpose of providing reservation in favour  of a  weaker  class  is  to  aid  the  elemental  principle  of democracy  based  on  one-man.  one-vote  to  succeed.   The disproportionately    excessive   reservation   creates    a privileged class, not brought to the same plane with  others but put on a higher pedestal, causing unhealthy competition, creating  hatred and distrust between classes and  fostering divisive forces. [950H, 951A] 3.3. The unequal apportionment of the role in the polity  of the  country  assigned to different groups tends  to  foster unhealthy  rivalry impairing the mutual feeling of  goodwill and fellowship amongst the people, and encouraging  divisive forces. [955B] 3.4.  As explained by the Preamble the quality of  democracy envisaged  by  the  Constitution does not  only  secure  the equality  of opportunity but of status as well, to  all  the citizens.  This equality principle is clearly brought out in several Articles in the different parts of the Constitution, including  Part  XVI having special provisions  relating  to certain  classes.   The  sole  objective  of  providing  for reservations in the Constitution is to put the principle  of equal  status  to  work  So  far  the  case  of   inadequate representation of a backward class in State services is con- cerned,  the problem is not susceptible to be solved in  one stroke;  and consequently the relevant provisions  are  kept flexible  permitting  wider discretion so as to  attain  the goal of adequate proportionate repre- 913 sentation.   The situation in respect to  representation  in the  legislature  is  entirely different.   As  soon  as  an election  takes place in accordance with the provisions  for proportionate  representation,  the  objective  is  achieved immediately,  because there is no problem of backlog  to  be tackled.   On the earlier legislature  disappearing,  paving the  way  for  new election, the people get  a  clean  slate before  them.  The excessive reservation in  this  situation will bring in an Imbalance  of course of another kind  but defeating  the  cause  of equal status all  the  same.   The pendulum  does not stand straight  it swings to  the  other side.   The casualty In both cases is the  equality  clause. Both  situations  defeat  the  very  object  for  which  the democratic  forces waged the war of independence;  and  they undo  what has been achieved by the Constitution.   This  is clearly violative of the basic features of the Constitution. [952B, F-H, 953A-B] 4.   A  perusal of the Agreement dated 8th May, 1973  dearly indicates  that  the  spirit  of  the  Indian   Constitution pervaded  through  out the entire Agreement  and  the  terms thereof were drafted respecting the main principles embodied in  our Constitution.  It must, therefore, be held  that  an interpretation  cannot be given to the Agreement which  will render  it as deviating from the constitutional  pattern  of the Indian Constitution.                                      [945A-B]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Transfer Case (C) No. 78 of 982

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etc. etc. (Under Article 139A of the Constitution of India.) Vepa  Sharathy, Attorney General, G.  Ramaswamy,  Additional Solicitor  General,  R.K.  Jain, B.N. Bhat,  K.  Lahiri,  K. Parasaran,  A.K.  Ganguli.  F.S. Nariman, Uday  Lalit,  A.C. Manoj  Goel,  K.M.K. Nair, Kailash  Vasudev,  Sudhir  Walia, Mohit Mathur, Ms. A. Subhashini, K. Swamy, T. Topgay, Rathin Das,  Ajit Kumar Sinha, S.C. Sharma, Amlan Ghosh,  Ms.  J.S. Wad,  Mayakrishnan, D.P. Mukherjee, G.S. Chatterjee, and  K. N. Bhat for the appearing Parties. The Judgments of the Court were delivered by SRARMA,  CJ.   The  two constitutional  questions  of  vital importance which arise in this case are : (i) whether a seat can be earmarked at all in the Legislature of a State  after its complete merger in India for a repre- 914 sentative of a group of religious institutions to be elected by them, and (ii) whether seats can be reserved in favour of a  particular  tribe far in excess of  its  population.   My answer to both the questions is in the negative. 2.   These  cases relate to the constitution of  Legislative Assembly  of Sikkim which merged with India in  1975.   They were  instituted as writ petitions under Article 226 of  the Constitution  before  the Sikkim High Court  and  have  been later  transferred to this court.  The main case being  Writ Petition No. 4 of 1980 registered as Transfer Case No. 78 of 1982  after  transfer  to  this  Court  was  filed  by   the petitioner R.C. Poudyal in person and he was conducting this case  himself, and will be referred to as the petitioner  or the writ petitioner in this judgment.  During the course  of the hearing of the case, Mr. R.K. Jain assisted the Court as amicus  curiae and pressed the writ petition on his  behalf. Transfer Case No. 84 of 1982 was filed by Somnath Poudyal as Writ  Petition  No. 12 of 1980 in the High Court,  taking  a similar stand as in writ petition No. 4 of 1980.  The  third case  being  Writ  Petition No. 15 of 1990  filed  by  Nandu Thapa,  also  challenging  the  impugned  reservations,   is Transfer Case No. 93 of 1991.  During the hearing,  however, the   stand  taken  by  his  counsel,  Mr.  K.N.  Bhat   was substantially  different  from  the case of  the  main  writ petitioner, and he lent support to some of the arguments  of the  contesting respondents.  The case in Writ Petition  No. 16  of 1990 of the High Court (Transfer Case No. 94 of  1991 here)  is similar to that in Transfer Case No. 93  of  1991. The  writ petition has been defended mainly by the State  of Sikkim,  represented  by Mr. K. Parasaran,  Union  of  India appearing  through  Mr. Attorney General and by  Mr.  F.  S. Nariman on behalf of certain other parties. 3.   The  relevant  provisions  relating  to  the   impugned reservations are those as included in the Representation  of the People Acts, 1950 and 1951, by the Representation of the People  (Amendment) Act, 1980 (Act 8 of  1980))  purportedly made   by  virtue  of  Article  371F(f),  inserted  in   the Constitution  in  1975  by  the  Constitution  (Thirty-Sixth Amendment)  Act,  1975 and consequential amendments  in  the Delimitation  of Parliamentary and  Assembly  Constituencies Order, 1976.  The writ petitioner contends that the impugned provisions  of  the Representation of the  People  Acts  arc ultra  times  of’ the Constitution and cannot  be  saved  by Article  37IF(f).  Alternatively it has been argued that  if the  provision,;  of  Article  371F(f)  are  interpreted  as suggested  on behalf of the respondents, the same  would  be violative  of  the basic features of  the  Constitution  and would, therefore, itself be rendered invalid.  Another  line which was pursued during the argument was that assuming  the

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inter- 915 pretation  of  the Act and the Constitution as  put  by  the respondents  is  correct,  still the  circumstances  do  not justify the impugned reservations in the Assembly which are, therefore, fit to be struck down. 4.   The  case  of the respondents who are  challenging  the stand  of  the writ petitioner, is that  the  constitutional amendment bringing in Article 371F(f), as also the  relevant amended provisions of the Representation of the People  Acts are  legal and valid, and having regard to all the  relevant circumstances  in which Sikkim became a part of  the  Indian Union  the  writ  petition of the petitioner is  fit  to  be dismissed. 5.   For appreciating the points arising in the case and the arguments  addressed  on behalf of the parties  it  will  be necessary  to briefly consider the historical background  of and  the constitutional position in Sikkim before and  after its merger with India.  Sikkim, during the British days, was a princely State under a hereditary monarch called  Chogyal, subject to British paramountcy.  The Chogyal, also described as Maharaja, was a member of the chamber of Princes entitled to  gun salute of 15.  The provisions of the  Government  of India Act, 1935 were applicable and Sikkim thus did not have any   attribute   of  sovereignty  of  its  own.    On   the independence  of India in 1947 there was a public demand  in Sikkim  for  merger  with India which was  resisted  by  the Rulers.   The  statements  made in paragraph 3  (v)  in  the counter  affidavit of the Union of India, respondent No.  1, sworn by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs,  is illuminating.  It has been inter alia said that there was  a strong  and clearly expressed sentiment on the part  of  the people of Sikkim favouring closer relations with India  and’ growth of genuine democratic institutions which led to large scale agitations demanding merger with India.  However,  the Government  of India did not favour an immediate  change  in Sikkim’s  status, and, therefore, only a treaty was  entered into  between Sikkim and the Government of India  whereunder the  latter assumed the responsibility with respect  to  the defence, external affairs and communication of Sikkim on the terms  detailed  in the document dated  3.12.1950.  Chogyal, thereafter,  took  several steps towards sharing  his  power with  the people by providing for elections, which  will  be dealt with later.  The public demand developed into  violent demonstrations  leading  to complete breakdown  of  law  and order,  which  forced  the  then  Chogyal  to  request   the Government  of  India  to  assume  the  responsibility   for establishment  of law and order and good  administration  in Sikkim.  Ultimately a formal agreement was signed on May  8, 1973 to which the Government of India, the then 916 Chogyal   and   the  leaders  of   the   political   parties representing  the  people of Sikkim, were parties.   I  will have to refer to this agreement in greater detail later  but it  will  be  useful even at this stage to see  one  of  the clauses of the Agreement which reads as follows:-               "(1)  The three parties hereby  recognize  and               undertake to ensure the basic human rights and               fundamental freedoms of the people of  Sikkim.               The  people of Sikkim will enjoy the right  of               election  on  the basis of adult  suffrage  to               give  effect to the principles of one man  one               vote."                                     (emphasis added) 6.   The  population of Sikkim has bee., constituted  mainly

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by  three  ethnic  groups  known  as  Lepchas,  Bhutias  and Nepalis.   People  from India also have been  going  to  and settling  in Sikkim but their number was small before  1973. Although the population of Nepalis has been far larger  than the  Lepchas and the Bhutias, their influence in the  polity was  considerably  less as Chogyal was a Bhutia and  with  a view  to perpetuate his hold, there was a consistent  policy for uniting Lepchas and Bhutias as against the rest.  On the lapse   of  British  paramountcy  and  in  its   place   the substitution  of  the protectorate of India, Chogyal  in  an attempt   to   assuage  the  public  sentiment,   issued   a Proclamation providing for establishment of a State  Council of 12 members, allocating 6 seats to Bhutia and Lepchas  and 6  to Nepalis, all to be elected by the voters divided in  4 territorial  constituencies.   Only  after a  few  months  a second Proclamation followed on March 23, 1953, adding seats for  6  more members with one of them as  President  of  the Council  to  be nominated by the  Maharaja,  i.e.,  Chogyal. Thus  the  total  number rose  to  18.   Maharaja,  however, reserved  his right to veto any decision by the Council  and to substitute it by his own.  Another Proclamation which was issued  in 1957 again maintained the parity of 6 seats  each for  Bhutia-Lepchas and Nepalis.  By a further  Proclamation dated  16.3.1958, there was an addition of 2 more  seats  to the  Council,  one described as Sangha  seat  earmarked  for religious  Budhist Monasteries run by Monks who  arc  Lamas, and  another declared as general seat.  Thus, for the  first time  in 1958 Chogyal, by creating a general seat took  note of  the presence of the immigrants who were neither  Bhutia- Lepchas  nor  Nepalis  and were  mostly  Indians.   He  also introduced the Lamas in the Council as he was sure of  their support  for  him, as will be seen later.  Appended  to  the Proclamation, there was a Note of the Private Secretary to 917 the Chogyal which has been referred to by the respondents in their  arguments  in support of the  impugned  reservations. The Note is in three sub-paras dealing with the Sangha seat, the  general  seat and the question of  parity  between  the Bhutia-Lepchas  and the Nepalis.  It has been  mentioned  in the  first sub-para (a) that the Sangha constituted a  vital and  important role in the life of the community  in  Sikkim and  had played a major part in taking of decisions  by  the Councils  in the past.  In sub-para (b) it has  been  stated that the political parties have been demanding one-third  of the  total seats in the Council to be made available to  all persons  having  fixed  habitation in  Sikkim  although  not belonging  to any of the categories of  Bhutias-Lepchas  and Nepalis,  and  the  Maharaja by  a  partial  concession  had allowed one seat for the general people.  The last  sub-para declares  the desire of the Maharaja that the Government  of Sikkim should be carried on equally by the two groups of the Bhutia-Lepchas  and Nepalis, without one community  imposing itself or encroaching upon the other. 7.   By  a  later Proclamation dated December 21,  1966  the Sikkim  Council was reconstituted with a total number of  24 members,  out  of  whom  14  were  to  be  elected  from   5 territorial  constituencies, reserving 7 seats  for  Bhutia- Lepchas  and  7  seats for Nepalis;  one  by  the  Scheduled Castes,  one by the Tsongs, and one was to be treated  as  a general seat.  The Sangha seat was maintained, to be  filled up by election through an electoral College of the Sang  has and the remaining 6 seats to be nominated by the Chogyal  as before.  It appears that it was followed by another  similar Proclamation in 1969, which has not been placed before us by the parties.

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8.   In  spite of the establishment of the  Sikkim  Council, the  ultimate power to govern remained concentrated  in  the hands of Chogyal, who besides having the right to nominate 6 members in the Council, reserved to himself the authority to veto  as also of taking final decision in any  matter.   The people could not be satisfied with this arrangement, and  as said  earlier, there was widespread  violent  demonstrations and  complete  collapse of law and order  which  forced  the Chogyal to approach the Government of India to take  control of  the  situation.  The 3 parties namely the  Chogyal,  the people of Sikkim represented by the leaders of the political parties, and the Government of India were ultimately able to arrive at the terms as included in the Tripartite  Agreement of  8.5.1973 and the authority of Chogyal  was  considerably reduced.    The  preamble  in  the  agreement   specifically mentioned that the people of Sikkim had decided to adopt, 918               "A system of elections based on adult suffrage               which  will give equitable  representation  to               all sections of the people on the basis of the               principle of one man one vote."               (emphasis supplied) It  was  further  said  that with a  view  to  achieve  this objective, the Chogyal as well as the representatives of the people  had  requested  the  Government  of  India  to  take necessary steps.  The first paragraph dealing with the Basic Rights  declared that the people of Sikkim would  enjoy  the right  of  election on the basis of adult suffrage  to  give effect  to  the  principle of one  man  one  vote.   Another provision  of this agreement which is highly  important  for decision of the issues in the present case is to be found in the 5th paragraph which reads as follows:-               "The system of elections shall be so organised               as    to   make   the   Assembly    adequately               representative of the various sections of  the               population.   The size and composition of  the               Assembly and of the Executive Council shall be               such  as may be prescribed from time to  time,               care  being  taken to ensure  that  no  single               section   of   the   population   acquires   a               dominating  position due mainly to its  ethnic               origin, and’ that the rights and interests  of               the Sikkimese Bhutia Lepcha origin and of  the               Sikkimese  Nepali,  which includes  Tsong  and               Scheduled Caste origin, are fully protected." Strong  reliance has been placed on the above  paragraph  on behalf of the respondents in support of their stand that the Bhutia-Lepchas who contribute to less than one-fourth of the total population of the State, are entitled to about 40%  of the  seats  in  the  Council  as  allowed  by  the  impugned provisions. 9.   The next Proclamation which is relevant in this  regard was issued on the 5th of February, 1974 and was named as the Representation  of Sikkim Subjects Act, 1974.   It  directed the  formation of Sikkim Assembly consisting of  32  elected members    31   to  be  elected   from   31   territorial constituencies  and  one Sangha constituency  to  elect  one member through an electoral College of Sanghas.  The  break- up of the 32 seats is given in section 3, directing that  16 constitutencies including one for the Sangha 919 were to be reserved for Bhutia-Lepchas, and the reamining 16 including  one  for  Tsongs and another  for  the  Scheduled Castes   for  Nepalis.   As  a  result  the   general   seat disappeared.  A further Act was passed the same year in  the

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month  of  July  by the newly  constituted  Sikkim  Assembly emphasising once more the decision of the people to hold the elections  to  the  Assembly "on the basis of  one  man  one vote",  that  is to say every person who on  the  prescribed date  was a Subject of Sikkim, was not below the  prescribed age  and  was not otherwise disqualified under the  Act  was entitled to be registered as voter at any future election. 10.  The  Assembly which was established under the 1974  Act was vested with larger powers than the Council earlier  had, and  the fight for effective power between Chogyal  and  the people  entered the crucial stage.  The main  party,  Sikkim Congress,  representing  the people captured 31  out  of  32 seats  at the poll at the election held in pursuance of  the agreement,   and  it  is  significant  that  its   elections manifesto went on to state:               "We also aspire to achieve the same democratic               rights  and  institutions that the  people  of               India have enjoyed for a quarter of century."               (emphasis added) Ultimately  a  special  opinion poll was  conducted  by  the Government of Sikkim and an unambiguous verdict was returned by  the people in favour of Sikkim’s joining and becoming  a part of the Indian Union.  In pursuance of this  development the  Constitution of India was amended by  the  Constitution (Thirty-Fifth  Amendment)  Act, 1974, inserting  Article  2A which  made  Sikkim associated with the Union  of  India  on certain terms and conditions.  The amendment came into force in  February  1975.  On the 10th of April, 1975  the  Sikkim Assembly passed another momentous resolution abolishing  the institution  of  Chogyal  and declaring  that  Sikkim  would henceforth  be  a  constituent unit  of  India,  enjoying  a democratic and fully responsible government.  A request  was made  in the resolution to the Government of India  to  take the  necessary measures.  Accordingly the  Constitution  was further amended by the Constitution (Thirty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 1975 which became effective in May, 1975.  As a  result of this constitutional amendment Sikkim completely merged in the Union of India. 11.  By  the  Thirty-Fifth Amendment  of  the  Constitution, Sikkim was, 920 as  mentioned earlier, merely associated with the  Union  of India by insertion of Article 2A on the terms and conditions set  out  separately  in  a  schedule  added  as  the  Tenth Schedule.   Certain amendments were made in Articles 80  and 81 also.  By the Thirty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution, a full merger of Sikkim with Union of India was effected  by adding  Sikkim  as  Entry 22 in the First  Schedule  of  the Constitution  under the heading "1.  The  State’.   Further, some  special provisions were made in a newly added  Article 371F,  and strong reliance has been placed on behalf of  the respondents on the provisions of clause (f) in Article  371F as  authorising  the  impugned  amended  provisions  in  the Representation  of the People Acts.  Article 2A,  the  Tenth Schedule,  and  certain  other provisions  in  some  of  the Articles were omitted. 12.  In  1978 the Bhutia-Lepchas were declared as  Scheduled Tribes in relation to the State of Sikkim by a  Presidential Order  issued  under  clause  (1)  of  Article  342  of  the Constitution of India, and they thus became entitled to  the benefits of reservation of seats in the State legislature in accordance with Article 332.  The consequential  reservation in the state legislature were made in the Representation  of the  People Act, 1950 and the Representation of  the  People Act,  1951,  twice by the Act 10 of 1976 and the  Act  8  of

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1980,  but  not consistent with clause (3)  of  Article  332 which is in the following terms               "332 Reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes               and   Scheduled  Tribes  in  the   Legislative               Assemblies of the States.--                (1)..........................................               (2)...........................................               (3)   The  number  of seats reserved  for  the               Scheduled  Castes or the Scheduled  Tribes  in               the  Legislative Assembly of any  State  under               clause  (1) shall bear, as nearly as  may  be,               the  same  proportion to the total  number  of               seats in the Assembly as the population of the               Scheduled  Castes  in  the  State  or  of  the               Scheduled  Tribes in the State or part of  the               State, as the case may be, in respect of which               seats  are  so reserved, bears  to  the  total               population of the State." 921 Out  of  the total seats of 32 in the House,  12  have  been reserved for Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin and one  seat for  the Sanghas by clauses (a) and (c) respectively of  the newly  inserted  sub-section  (1A)  in  section  7  of   the Representation  of  the People Act, 1950.   Dealing  further with  the Sangha seat it is provided in section 25A  of  the 1950  Act that there would be a Sangha constituency  in  the State and only Sanghas belonging to Monasteries  recongnised for  the purpose of elections held in Sikkim in April,  1974 shall  be entitled to be registered in the  electoral  roll, and the said electoral roll shall be prepared or revised  in such a manner as may be directed by the Election Commission. Consequently amendments were made by inserting section 5A in the  Representation of the People Act, 1951.  The extent  of each   constituency  and  the  reservation  of  seats   were initially directed to follow the position immediately before the   merger  under  the  Thirty-Sixth  Amendment   of   the Constitution, and later amendments were made in this  regard in   the   Delimitation  of   Parliamentary   and   Assembly Constituencies Order, 1976.  The amended provisions of  sub- section  (3) of section 7 dealt with (besides  dealing  with Arunachal  Pradesh) this matter.  These  special  provisions have  been  challenged  by the writ  petitioner  on  various grounds. 13.  The first objection taken on behalf of the  respondents is  to  the  maintainability of the writ  petitions  on  the ground  that  the  dispute raised by the  petitioner  is  of political  nature and the issues are not  justiciable.   The argument proceeds thus.  To acquire fresh territories is  an inherent  attribute of sovereignty and this can be  done  by conquest,  treaty or otherwise on such conditions which  the sovereign   considers  necessary.   Any  question   relating thereto entirely lies within the political realm and is  not amenable to the court’s jurisdiction.  Referring to Articles 2  and  4  of the Constitution it has been  urged  that  the admission  into the Union of India is permissible without  a constitutional  amendment  and the terms and  conditions  of such  admission  are  not open to scrutiny  by  the  courts. Article 371F must, therefore, be respected, and the impugned amendments of the Representation of the People Acts must  be held  to  be legally valid on account of the  provisions  of clause (f) of Article 371F.  I am afraid this argument fails to  take  into  account the  vital  difference  between  the initial   acquisition  of  additional  territory   and   the admission  to the same as a full-fledged State of the  Union of India similar to the other States.

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14.  Special provisions for any State can certainly be  made by an 922 amendment  of  the Constitution, as is evident  by  Articles 371A. 371B, 371C et cetera, but it is not permissible to  do so in derogation of the basic features of the  Constitution. So  far the power of sovereignty to acquire new  territories is  con  territories  is  concerned,  there  cannot  be  any dispute.   The  power is inherent, it  was,  therefore,  not considered  necessary to mention it in express terms in  the Constitution.  It is also true that if an acquisition of new territories  is made by a treaty or under an  agreement  the terms of the same will be beyond the scrutiny of the courts. The  position,  however,  is  entirely  different  when  new territory  is  made  part of India, by giving  it  the  same status  as  is  enjoyed  by  an  existing  State  under  the Constitution of India.  The process of such a merger has  to be  under  the  Constitution.  No  other  different  process adopted can achieve this result.  And when this exercise  is undertaken,  there is no option, but to adopt the  procedure as prescribed in conformity with the Constitution.  At  this stage  the court’s jurisdiction to examine the  validity  of the adopted methodology cannot be excluded. 15.  So far the present case in concerned the decision  does not admit of any doubt that when the Thirty-Sixth  Amendment of the Constitution was made under which Sikkim joined India as  a  full-fledged  State  like  other  States,  power   of amendment  of the Constitution was invoked, and this had  to be  done  only  consistent with the basic  features  of  the Constitution.   As  mentioned  earlier  when  Sikkim  became associated  with  India  as a  result  of  the  Thirty-Fifth Amendment of the Constitution, it did not become a State  of the  Union  of  India.  A special status  was  conferred  on Sikkim  by Article 2A read with Tenth Schedule but,  without amending  the  list  of the States in  the  First  Schedule. Although  the  Status,  thus bestowed on  Sikkim  then,  was mentioned  as Associate, it could not be treated as  a  mere protectorate of India.  The protectorateship had been  there in  existence from before under the earlier treaties and  by Article  2A  read  with Tenth Schedule  something  more  was achieved.    This,   however,  was   short   of   Statehood. Consequently  Sikkim  was  not  enjoying  all  ,he  benefits available  under the Constitution of India.  By the  Thirty- Sixth  Amendment there came a vital change in the Status  of Sikkim.   It was included as the 22nd Entry in the  list  of the  States in the First Schedule without  any  reservation. Article 2A. the Tenth Schedule and other related  provisions included in the Constitution by the Thirty-Fifth  Amendment, were  omitted from the Constitution.  Thus, as a  result  of the Thirty-Sixth Amendment Sikkim became as much 923 a  State as any other.  Considered in this  background,  the objection  to  the  maintainability of  the  writ  petitions cannot  be  upheld.   Further, the  challenge  by  the  writ petitioner   is   to  the  amendments  introduced   in   the Representation  of the People Acts by the Central Act  8  of 1980 as being unconstitutional and not protected by  Article 371F(f) and this point again has to be decided by the Court. If the conclusion be that clause (f) of Article 371F permits such  amendments  the further question whether  clause  (f)) itself   is   violative  of  the  basic  features   of   the Constitution  will  have  to be examined.  In  my  view  the position  appears  to have been settled by  the  Constituted Bench  of  this Court in Mangal Singh and Anr. v.  Union  of India, [1967] 2 SCR 109, at page 11.2 in the following terms

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:-               "The  law  referred  to in Arts.  2  &  3  may               therefore alter or amend the First Schedule to               the  Constitution which sets out the names  of               the  States  and  description  of  territories               thereof  and  the  Fourth  Schedule  allotting               seats  to the States in the Council of  States               in  the Union Parliament.  ............  Power               with which the Parliament is invested by Arts.               2 and 3, is power to admit, establish, or form               new  States  which conform to  the  democratic               pattern envisaged by the Constitution and  the               power which the Parliament may exercise by law               is  supplemental, incidental or  consequential               to  the admission, establishment or  formation               of   a   State   as   contemplated   by    the               Constitution,  and is not power-  to  override               the constitutional scheme.               (emphasis added) 16.  It  would  be  of considerable help to  refer  also  to several observations made by Gajendragadkar, J. on behalf of the  Bench  of  8 learned Judges of this Court  in  Re:  The Berubari  Union and Exchange of Enclaves: [1960] 3 SCR  250, although  the facts of that case were not similar  to  those before  us.   Dealing  with the treaty  making  power  of  a sovereign State the learned Judge observed at pages  283-284 of  the  report  that  it  is  an  essential  attribute   of sovereignty  that a State can acquire foreign territory  and in  case  of necessity cede the parts of  its  territory  in favour  of  the foreign State, but this power is  of  course subject  to  the limitations which the Constitution  of  the State  may  either  expressly of  by  necessary  implication impose in that 924 behalf Article 1 (3) (c) does not confer power or  authority in  India  to  acquire  territories,  and  what  the  clause purports to do is to make a formal provision for  absorption and  integration  of any foreign territories  which  may  be acquired by virtue of its inherent rights to do so.  In this background  Articles  1, 2, 3 and 4 were  examined  and  the question was concluded thus:-               "The  crux of the problem, therefore, is:  Can               Parliament   legislate   in  regard   to   the               Agreement under Art. 3?"               "There can be no doubt that foreign  territory               which after acquisition becomes a part of  the               territory  of  India under Art. 1 (3)  (c)  is               included in the last clause of Art. 3 (a)  and               that    such   territory   may,   after    its               acquisition,  be  absorbed in  the  new  State               which  may be formed under Art. 3  (a).   Thus               Art.  3  (a)  deals with the  problem  of  the               formation  of  a new State and  indicates  the               modes by which a new State can be formed." Dealing with the nature of the power of ceding a part of the territory,  it was held that such a power cannot be read  in Article  3 (c) by implication, and in the case of a part  of the  Union Territories there can be no doubt that Article  3 does  not  cover them.  The conclusion arrived at  was  that this  was  not  possible by a law under  Article  3  and  an amendment  of  the Constitution was essential.  It  is  true that  in case of acquisition Article 2 comes into  play  but that  is  only at the initial stage when the  new  territory joins  and  becomes the territory of India under  Article  1 (3)(c).   In the present case the power under Article 2  was

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not  exercised at any point of time.  Initially, as  pointed out  earlier, Sikkim joined India as an Associate  State  by Article  2A introduced in the Constitution by an  amendment. When  further steps of its complete merger with  India  were taken, the methodology under Article 3 was not available  in view  of  the  observations  in  Berubari  case.   Correctly assessing  the situation, fresh steps for amendment  of  the Constitution once more were taken and Sikkim was granted the status  of a full Statehood at par with the other States  by the  Thirty-Sixth Amendment of the Constitution.  Once  this was done it had to be consistent with the basic features  of the Constitution. 17.  If  we  assume  that the stand of  the  respondents  as mentioned earlier on this aspect is correct, the result %ill be that in a part of India, 925 joining  the nation later, a different rule may have  to  be allowed  to  prevail.  This is not  a  fanciful  hypothesis. Even  during this last decade of the present  century  there are  Tribes,  in  isolation  from the  rest  of  the  world, maintaining  a social order of primitive  nature  completely oblivious  of  the  long  strides  of  civilisation  through history.  In case of illness, the treatment is entrusted  to the  witch doctor and the trial of an alleged crime is  left to  certain  persons  supposed to  be  having  super-natural powers  employing  bizzare  methods  for  decision  on   the accusation.   Without  any regard for human  dignity,  women accused  of being possessed of witchery are burnt alive  and many such customs are followed which are highly abhorrent to every concept of justice, liberty, equality and every  other quality for which our civilisation stand,, today.  If  steps are  taken  to  grant  legitimacy  to  a  state  of  affairs repulsive  to  the basic features of our  Constitution,  the Courts are under a duty to judicially examine the matter. 18.  Mr. Parasaran, in the course of his argument  fervently appealed lo this Court to decline to consider the  questions raised  by the petitioner on merits, on the ground that  the issues are political.  He proceeded to contend, in the  form of a question, that if one of our neighbouring countries (he discreetly  omitted to identify it) wishes to join India  on certain  conditions inconsistent with the philosophy of  our Constitution,  should we deny ourselves the  opportunity  of forming  a larger and stronger country, and in the  process, of  eliminating  the unnecessary tension  which  is  causing grave concern internationally.  If I may say so, the fallacy lies  in  this line of thought due to  the  assumption  that there is only one process available in such a situation  and that is by way of a complete merger under our  Constitution, as  has been adopted in the case of Sikkim, by  the  Thirty- Sixth Amendment.  The plea ignores other alternatives  which may  be  adopted, for example, by forming  a  confederation. However, this question is highly hypothetical and is  surely political  in nature and I do not think it is  necessary  to answer it in precise terms. 19.  The maintainability of the writ petitions has also been questioned  by  Mr.  Attorney General  and  Mr.  Nariman  on similar   grounds.    I   have  considered   the   plea   of unjusticiability  of the dispute raised in the light of  all the  arguments addressed before us, but since I do not  find any  merit  therein,  I hold that the courts  are  not  only vested  with  the jurisdiction to consider  and  decide  the points raised in the writ petitions, but are under 926 a duty to do so. 20.  On  the  merits  of the writ  petitions  let  us  first

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consider  the position with respect to Sangha seat.   It  is not  in dispute that the reserved seat is earmarked for  the representative  of  a number of Buddhist Monasteries  to  be elected by an electoral college of Lamas in which the entire population  of  Sikkim  excepting  the  registered  Buddhist Priests,  have  been  denied any say.  For  the  purpose  of explaining Sangha, Mr. Parasaran has referred to the book on Hindu  law of Religious and Charitable Trusts by  B.K.  Muk- herjee, dealing with Buddhism and stating that Buddhism  was essentially  a monastic religion and the Buddhist  Order  or congregation  of monks was known by the name of  Sangha  and this  Sangha  together with Buddha and Dharma  (sacred  law) constituted  three jewels which were the highest objects  of worship  among the Buddhists.  With a view to show that  the Sangha  could be given an exclusive voting right to  a  seat reserved for this purpose, further reliance was placed on  a passage  saying that the Sangha was undoubtedly  a  juristic person  and was capable of holding property in the same  way as  a  private person could.  Further as a  corporation  the Sangha  enjoyed a sort of immortality and  was  consequently fit to hold property for ever.  In other words, Sangha  also described as a Buddhist congregation has, like the Christian Chruch, a corporate life and a jural existence.  Maths  were founded  by Adi Shankaracharya and other Hindu  ascetics  on the  model  of these Buddhist vihars.  Now,  coming  to  the impugned  provision of the Act it will be seen that  section 7(1A)(c)  of  the  Representation of the  People  Act,  1950 allots  one  seats for Sanghas referred to in  section  25A. Section  25A states that notwithstanding anything  contained in  sections 15 and 19, the Sanghas belonging only  to  such Monastries as were recongnised for the purpose of  elections held  in  April 1974 for forming the  Assembly  for  Sikkim, shall  be entitled to be registered in the  electoral  roll. The Election Commission has to prepare or revise the same in consultation  with the Government of Sikkim.  Before  Sikkim joined   India,  Buddhism  was  the  State  religion.    The Gazetteer  1864  of  Sikkim stated that  "Lamas  or  Tibetan Buddhism  is  the State religion of Sikkim".   The  position continued  till 1974 when the elections for Constituent  As- sembly  were held.  The case of the writ petitioner is  that the  reservation in favour of the Sangha based on  religious with  a separate electorate of the religious monasteries  is violative  of  the basic structure of  the  Constitution  of India, and is not permissible after Sikkim joined India as a full-fledged State.  It is further contended that the number of the persons actually 927 entitled to exercise the right being considerably very small (about   30   only).   their   share   works   out   to   be disproportionately very high. 21.  In reply Mr. Parasaran contended that Sangha has played a vital role in the life of the community for a long time in the  past, and a body consisting of Lamas and  laity  Lhade- Medi   has  contributed  towards  cultural,  social   and political  development of the people of Sikkim.  The  Sangha seat  was,  therefore, introduced in order  to  provide  for their representation.  Their interest is synonymous with the interest  of the minority communities and this  reservation, which  is  coming  from  the  time  of  Chogyal,  should  be maintained.  He quoted from the Book ’the Himalayan Gateway’ by George Kotturan, dealing with the history and culture  of Sikkim,  which states that the author found the  monasteries everywhere  looking  after the spiritual needs  of  a  small community.   The  Chogyal also allowed the Lamas to  play  a role   in  the  administration  and  this  arrangement   is,

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therefore,  not  fit to be disturbed.  The  learned  counsel explained  the position in his own way as asserting that  in substance  the reservation is not in favour of  a  religious body and it is not based solely on religious  consideration. The  Buddhist priests were rendering useful service  to  the people  and  the reservation must, therefore. be  upheld  as valid  and  the  fact  that  they  belong  to  a  particular religious body should be ignored. 22.  Similar  was the approach of the Attorney  General  and Mr.  Nariman  but no further light was thrown  during  their arguments.  Mr. Phur Ishering Lepcha who was added later  in these  cases  as  a  party-respondent  on  an   intervention application,  filed his written argument inter alia  stating that  Sangha is a distinct identity which has played a  very vital  role in the life of the community since the  earliest known  history  of  Sikkim and has played a  major  part  in deciding  the  important  issues.  The  Lhadi-Medi,  a  body consisting  of  all  the Lamas  and  laity  has  contributed towards  cultural,, social and political development of  the people  of Sikkim, and the reservation in favour  of  Sangha was  introduced in order to provide for  the  representation of’ a section which was responsible for the basic culture of the Sikkimese Bhutia-Lepchas including some sections of  the Nepali  community  of Sikkim.  Reliance has been  placed  on many  passages from the book ’Himalyan Gateway’  by  Georage Kotturan, referred to earlier.  In substance the stand taken in  the  argument by Mr. Parasaran and supplemented  by  his written submissions, has been re-emphasised by Phur Ishering Lepcha.   The  excerpts from the book give  the  history  of Buddhism, and 928 described  how the religion got modified from time  to  time under  the  guidance  of many Saints going  to  Sikkim  from India.   It  is further stated that the  culture  of  Sikkim under  the Chogyal was essentially religious and the  patron saint of Sikkim Lhatsum Chhembo, believed to be an  incarna- tion  of  an Indian Saint, is according to  the  traditional belief,  incarnated more than once; and that the  late  12th Chogyal  of Sikkim, Palden Thondup Namgyal (referred  to  in the book as ’Present Chogyal’) was (according to the belief) and incarnate of Chogyal Sidkeong who himself was an  incar- nate  Lama.   There is a list of Monasteries  of  Sikkim  as given  at  page  481  which  indicates  that  the   separate electorate  contains  only a little more  than  30  Sanghas. Some passages from other books have also been quoted in  the written  argument and what is stated at page 15  of  ’Sikkim and  Bhutan  Twenty-One years on the  North-  East  Frontier 1887-1908"  by  J.C.  White, C.I.E.  (Political  Officer  of Sikkim  1889-1908) indicates that ’as a rule the  Lamas  are ignorant,  idle  and useless, living at the expense  of  the country, which they are surely dragging down.  There are, of course,  exceptions  to every rule and I  have  met  several lamas"  who  appeared to be thoroughly capable,  ’but  I  am sorry  to say that such men were few and far  between.   The majority  generally lead a worldly life and only  enter  the priesthood as, a lucrative profession and one which  entails no trouble to themselves". Another  book  ’The Himalaya  Aspects of Change,  1981’  by J.S.  Lall  (Dewan of Sikkim, 1949-1952) mentions  at  pages 228-229  that ’Though Lamaist Buddhism continues to  be  the official  religion,  it is professed mainly by  the  Butias, Lepchas  and  Newars, along with a few of the  other  tribal groups  such as Tamangas, and the Buddhistic  overlay  wears thin in Dzongu where nun traditions survive".  It is further mentioned   that  the  influence  of  the  Monasteries   was

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diminishing  and fewer and fewer young boys were being  sent by  their families as novices for the priesthood.  The  last Chogyal,  who  was  himself an incarnate  Lama  was  greatly concerned  at  this loss of interest and set up  a  training school  for  attracting more novices.  Fresh  impetus  in  a different  way  was  also given to  the  "Buddhist  revival’ through  the presence of a renowned teacher and mystic  from Tibet.   All  this  was happening  quite  late  probably  in 19.50s. Reliance has also been placed on ’Himalayan Village’, a book by Geoffrey Gorer which at pages 192-193 reads thus "Finally lamaism is a social Organisation.  The lamas (to a 929               lesser  extent  the nuns) are  arranged  in  a               disciplined hierarchy.  They are a section  of               society  which performs for the whole  society               its religious functions; in return the rest of               society  should give material support  to  the               lamas.    In  Tibet  this  social  aspect   is               extremely  important,  the lamas  possess  the               greater  part  of the temporal power  and  are               also  as  a  group an  exploiting  class;  the               monasteries own land and the peasants attached               to  the land are practically monastery  serfs.               The  lower-ranking  lamas also  work  for  the               benefit  of  those  of  higher  rank  and  are               possibly  as much exploited as  the  peasants,               but  they  have,  at  least  in  theory,   the               possibility  of  rising to the  higher  ranks,               which  possibilities are completely  shut  out               from  the laymen.  In Sikkim, as far as I  can               learn,  the social influence of the  lamas  is               considerably less;".                       (emphasis added) Another  book  by  A.C.  Sinha  "Politics  of  Sikkim   A Sociological Study"  describes the system of Sikkim thus               "The political system of Sikkim is a typically               Himalayan theocratic feudalism parallel to the               Tibetan  Lamaist  pattern.  The ruler  is  not               only  the secular head of the State, but  also               an incarnate lama with responsibility to  rule               the subjects in accordance with the tenets  of               the "Choos"  the Dharma.  The basic tenets of               the  Lamaist polity in Sikkim ever since  1642               are  the  Chos  (Chhos)  as  the   established               religion  and  the rulers  (rGyalpo)  who  are               instrumental   in   upholding   the   doctrine               justifying  the appellation, the  "Chos-rGyal"               (Chogyal)."                                (emphasis added) This  book  goes on to record how the  Buddhist  Monasteries having the patronage of the Chogyal came to wield  authority in  Sikkim.  The Monks, however, "Were drawn from the  high- born Bhotias and Lepchas".  The Lamas did not confine  their participation only to the administration but also controlled the  electorate.   At page 78 it is stated  that  the  major portion 930 of  the trans-Himalayan trade was in the hands of  Marwaris, the aristocracy and some of the Lamas. 23.  Another  intervenor  which placed its  case  is  Sikkim Tribal  Welfare Association, a registered  Organisation  for the  purpose of inter alia "to effectively  and  efficiently establish  and promote a strong and healthy Organisation  of the  Bhutias, Lepchas and Sherpas of Sikkim at Gangtok,  and

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subsequently  to build up similar organisations in the  four districts  of  Sikkim".  In its written argument  very  long excerpts have been given from a book by Joseph Dalton Hooker who visited Sikkim in 1848 (the book was published in 1854), giving  detailed  descriptions  of  the  features,   habits, customs  et cetera of the Lepchas which are  certainly  very interesting  but, of little relevance in the present  cases. The intervenor has relied on this book for showing that  the Lepchas  were inhabiting Sikkim earlier than the arrival  of the  Nepalis  who were inducted by the  British  rulers  and others.   The customs followed by them, as mentioned in  the book, indicate that "their existence was primitive in nature so much so that every tribe had a priest doctor; who neither knew or practised the healing art, but was a pure  exorcist; all  bodily ailments being deemed the operations of  devils, who  are  cast  out by prayers  and  invocations".   On  the question as to who are the early settlers in Sikkim there is serious  controversy, the other view being that so  far  the Bhutias   are  concerned  they  could  not  be  treated   as aboriginals.  I do not think anything turns on the  question as  to  the  order in which the different  sections  of  the population  settled  in  Sikkim and  I,  therefore,  do  not propose  to consider the affidavits filed by the parties  on this aspect.  From the records, however, it is clear that  a seat  in  the Council was allotted to the  Sanghas  for  the first  time  in 1958 and the Lamas manning the  Sanghas  are drawn from the minority section of the population (less than 25%)  belonging  to Bhutia and Lepcha  tribes.   The  reason given  by  the  different  respondents  in  support  of  the reservation of the Sangha seat is the historical  background showing  that  the Lamas, besides performing  the  religious rites  and  discharging the religious and  spiritual  duties were  rendering  social service and with  the  patronage  of Chogyal  were permitted to take part in the  administration. It   is  argued  that  although  the  Chogyal   might   have disappeared,  the participation by these Buddhist  Monks  in the  administration  should  not be denied.   The  issue  is whether  this is permissible after Sikkim joined India as  a full-fledged State. 931 24.  It is firmly established and needs no elaboration  that an  amendment of the Constitution which violates  the  basic features  of  the Constitution is not permissible.   It  has been  contended  on  behalf  of  the  respondents  that  the provisions  of clause (f) of Article 371F do not in any  way offence  any  of  the basic features and  since  the  clause permits  the impugned reservations in the Representation  of the People Acts, they have to be. upheld. 25.  So far the reservation of Sangha seat is concerned, the question is whether this violates Article 15 as also several other  provisions of the Constitution; and  further  whether these   constitutional   provisions   are   unalterable   by amendment.  If they are basic in nature they will have to be respected  and  clause  (f) must be construed  not  to  have violated them in spite of the non-obstante clause with which the Article begins. 26.  Let  us  first  consider  Article  15  which  prohibits discrimination  on  the ground of  religion.   The  Buddhist Monasteries, which are the beneficiaries of the reservation, are admittedly religious institutions.  What the respondents have  tried  to  suggest  is  that  although  basically  the Monasteries  are religious in nature, they form  a  separate section  of  the society on account of the  social  services they have been rendering mainly to the Bhutia-Lepcha section of  the population.  Further emphasis has been laid  on  the

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fact  that they were participating in the administration  by the blessings of the Chogyals for about 17 years  yes, only 17 years  as the, seat in their favour was created for  the first  time  in  1958 before the  merger  with  India.   The argument  is  that  in this background they  should  not  be treated as merely religious institutions for the purposes of reservation, and in any event religion is not the only basis for  putting them in a separate group.  The  classification, therefore,  is not unconstitutional.  I do not find.  myself in a position to agree with the respondents.  The  Buddhist, Monasteries  are  religious  in nature  out  and  out,  and, besides  taking care, of the spiritual needs of  the  people and looking after the ritual side of the Buddhist  religion, they are also trying to do all what their religion  expects, from  them.   The  concern for the people  and  the  society stands high on the  agenda of Buddhism, and for that matter, of  all religions.  But it is only in the capacity of  Monks that  they have been trying to help a minority  section’  of the people of Sikkim and that is their true  identification. The  position could have been different if  the  reservation had  been  in  favour of a social group  devoted  to  public service, which for identification had led to 032 religious groups including these Monks as well.  But that is not so.  The position is just the other way.  The attempt of the  respondents  is to defend reservation in  favour  of  a particular  religious body and by way of  justification  for the  same to bring in the element of social  service.   They forget  that  the role of the Sanghas  in  rendering  social service to a section of the public is not a feature  special for  these Monasteries.  The self-less services rendered  by the  Christian  Missionaries to the helpless  sick  persons, specially in many under-developed parts of the world, and to the badly injured soldiers in the war; or, for that  matter, the  all round care of the society which has been  taken  by the  innumerable  Hindu  Maths and temples  trusts)  in  the different parts of India for ages cannot be ignored.  A very large  number  of charitable institutions run by  Hindu  and Muslim religious bodies have been always helping the  people in  many  ways.  Learned and selfless religious  saints  and leaders have made significant contributions in establishment of  civilised society for centuries and history  shows  that this has been done through the instrumentality of  religious institutions  and  organisations.  Similar is  the  position with respect to the other religions in India.  The  positive role  religion has played in lifting humanity from  barbaric oblivion  to the present enlightened and cultured  existence should  not be belittled.  But, at the same time, it  cannot be  forgotten  that  religion has been from  time  to  time, misused to bring on great misfortunes on mankind.  In modern times, therefore, social and political thinkers do not  hold unanimous view on the question of the desirability to  allow religion  to  influence and control politics and  the  State instrumentality.   The difference in the two perceptions  is vital and far-reaching in effect, and generally one view  or the  other  has been accepted as  national  commitment,  not subject  to a change.  When I proceed to examine  the  issue further I will not be using the expression ’religion’ in its pure and true sense spreading universal compassion and love, but  in the ordinary concept as it is  popularly  understood today  and accepted by the general man in the  modern  time, sometimes as a spiritual experience, sometimes as  customary rituals  but  most  of .he time as a  social  and  political influence  on  one  segment  of  the  population  or  other, bringing with it (although not so intended) mutual  distrust

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between  man  and  man,  and  hostility  amongst   different religious groups.  In .his process the very welfare of  the society,  which  is  of  prime  consideration  becomes   the casualty. 27   .  It has to be remembered that if the Constitution  is so  interpreted as to permit, by an amendment a seat  to  be reserved in the legislature for 933 a   group  of  religious  institutions  like  the   Buddhist Monasteries, it will follow that such a reservation would be permissible  for institutions belonging to  other  religions also.   There will not be any justifiable  reason  available against  a  similar provision for the  Christian  Missionary institutions in the country on the ground of their services, to  the cause of upliftment of Adivasis, their  contribution in  the  field of education, and their efforts  for  medical assistance  to the underprivileged; or, for the  innumerable other  religious institutions of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs  and other religions providing invaluable relief to the helpless. And  all this may ultimately change the very  complexion  of the  legislatures.  The effect that only one seat  has  been reserved  today  for the Monasteries in Sikkim is  the  thin edge of the wedge which has the potentiality, to tear apart, in  the  course  of time, the  very  foundation,  which  the democratic  republic is built-upon.  In this background  the question  to ask is whether all this is prohibited as  being abhorrent to the basic feature of the Constitution.  I  have no  hesitation in answering the issue in the positive.   Now let us have a brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Constitution. 28.  The  Preamble,  which  is the  key  to  understand  the Constitution,  emphasises  by the very  opening  words,  the democratic  nature of the Republic guaranteeing equality  of status  to  all which the people of India  had  resolved  to constitute  by adopting, enacting and giving  to  themselves the  Constitution.  The personality of the  Constitution  is developed  in Part III dealing with the Fundamental  Rights, and  the framers of the Constitution, even  after  including Article 14 ensuring equality before law, were not  satisfied unless they specifically prohibited religion as a ground for differential  treatment.   The  freedom  of  propagation  of religion and the right to manage religious affairs et cetera were  expressly recognised by Articles 25 to 28 but when  it came  to  deal  with the State, the verdict  was  clear  and emphatic that it must be free from all religious influence. 29.  Mr.   Nariman  claimed  that  a   prohibition   against discrimination  on  the ground of religion is  not  a  basic feature of a democratic State.  He placed strong reliance on the constitutions of several countries with special emphasis on  the  Constitution  of  Cyprus.   The  argument  is  that although  Cyprus  is an independent and  sovereign  republic with a democratic Constitution, the seats in the legislature are  divided  between  the Greek  population  following  the Greek-Orthodox  Church  and the  Muslim  Turkish  community. There is a division even at the highest level, the President 934 always  to  be a Greek Christian and  the  vice-president  a Muslim  Turk.   Mr.  Nariman  emphasised  on  the   separate electorate  provided by Cyprus Constitution and  urged  that these provisions do not render the Constitution undemocratic or  illegal.  He also referred to the Statesman’s Year  Book (containing statistical and historical annual of the  States of  the  world  for  the  year  1985-86)  showing  that  the population  of  the  Christian  community  following  Greek- Orthodox Church was in 1983, 5,28,700 but was allotted  only

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70% of the seats in the legislature, and the Turkish Muslims with  a  population of only 1,22,900, the remaining  30%  of seats.  In other words the Muslims forming only about 20% of the total population., were allotted 30% of the seats.   The fallacy  in  the  argument of the  learned  counsel  is  the erroneous  assumption  that  fundamental  features  of   all constitutions are same or similar.  The basic philosophy  of a  constitution  is related to  various  elements  including culture and tradition, social and political conditions,  and the  historical background.  If the partition of  India  had not taken place in 1947 and the people belonging to all  the religious   communities  had  decided  to  agree   on   some arrangement  like  the  people  of  Cyprus.  by  adopting  a constitution  providing  for sharing of power  on  religious basis, the Constitution of Cyprus could have been  relevant. There  was  a  sustained effort on the part  of  the  Indian National Congress and of’ several other political and social groups, by and large representing the people who remained in divided  India and proceeded to frame the present  Constitu- tion, to avoid the partition of the country on the basis  of religion,  but  they could not succeed.   Unfortunately  the struggle  for  maintaining  the unity  of  the  country  was defeated  by  religion used as a weapon.   The  country  was visited  by  a grave national tragedy resulting in  loss  of human   life   on   a   very   big   magnitude.    Religious fundamentalism  triumphed,  begetting and  encouraging  more such fundamentalism.  In the shadow of death and destruction on an unprecedented scale the making of the Constitution was taken   up.  The  Constitution  of  Cyprus  or   any   other constitution  framed in circumstances different  from  those obtaining in this country, therefore cannot be relevant  for understanding   the  basic  philosophy  and  ethos  of   our Constitution.  Although it is not strictly relevant for  the decision  in  the present case, it may be  noted  that  this patchwork  Constitution  of  Cyprus  of  which  the  parties represented  by Mr. Nariman seem to be so enamoured of,  has completely failed to keep the country together. The   learned  counsel  also  referred  to  the   provisions contained in Articles 239A, 240 and 371A with respect to the Union Territories and 935 State of Naggaland; and Article 331 permitting the President to nominate one or two members of Anglo Indian Community  to the  House  of  People  if he is of  the  opinion  that  the Community is not adequately represented in the House.  I  do not  see  how  these  Articles can be of  any  help  to  the respondents  in the present case.  None of these  provisions are  linked  with  any particular religion  at  all.   There should not be any misapprehension that an ’Anglo Indian’ has to  be a Christian [see the definition of the expression  in Article 366 (2)]. 30.  Religion not only became the cause of partition of  the country,  it  led to wide-spread bloodshed  which  continued even  later and in which people belonging to  the  different communities died in very large numbers.  The people of India are convinced that this tragedy was the direct result of the policy  of  the British rulers to divide the people  on  the basis  of the religion and give them differential  political treatment.    During   their  earlier  resistance   to   the establishment  of  the  British rule,  the  Hindus  and  the Muslims  were  working  together, and  the  combination  was proving  to be dangerous to the foreigners, and in 1857  the Empire  had  to  face  a  serious  threat.   That  in   this background the principles of divide and rule was adopted and an  atmosphere  of  distrust and  hatred  between  the  main

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communities  of  the country on the basis  of  religion  was created,  are undisputed facts of history.  The people,  who made  exemplary  sacrifices, unfortunately failed  in  their fight for independence of the undivided nation and were left with  no alternative but to be reconciled with partition  of the  country.  These were the people who proceeded to  frame the present Constitution, and despite the Net back they  had suffered, they reiletrated their firm belief in a democratic republic  where religion has no role to play.  All  this  is what  has been described as ’Enacting History,’  by  jurists and  is  available  as  aid to  the  interpretation  of  the Constitution. 31.  If  we  proceed  to consider  the  entire  Constitution harmoniously along with all the other materials, relevant in law for this purpose including the ’Enacting History,  there is  no escape from the conclusion that any weightage at  the poll  in  favour  of a group on the ground  of  religion  is strictly  prohibited  and  further, that  this  is  a  basic feature, which is not amenable to amendment.  The provisions of  section  7 (1A)(c) and the  other  connected  amendments must, therefore, be held to be ultra vires. 32.  There  is also another serious flaw in the  reservation for the 936 Sangha  rendering the same to be unconstitutional.   By  the impugned  provisions of the 1950 Act, a  special  electorate has been created for this seat which is highly abhorrent  to the  fundamental tenets of the Constitution.   Much  thought was  bestowed  in the Constituent Assembly on  the  question whether  separate  electorate could be permitted  under  the Constitution.   An  Advisory Committee  was  constituted  on January  24, 1947 for determining the fundamental rights  of citizens, minorities, et cetera.  The Advisory Committee was empowered  to  appoint  sub-committees see  B.  Shiva  Rao’s Framing  of  Indian Constitution, Vol.  II, pp.  56-571  and accordingly  a Sub-Committee on Minorities was appointed  on February  27, 1947, to consider and report, inter  alia,  on the  issue  whether  there  should  be  joint  or   separate electorates.   The  Sub-Committee by a majority of 28  to  3 decided  that  there should be no separate  electorates  for election  to the legislatures. Shiva Rao’s Vol.  II, p  3921 The Report of the Sub-Committee was accepted by the Advisory Committee and the following observations were made :-               "The  first  question we tackled was  that  of               separate  electorates; we considered  this  as               being  of  crucial  importance  both  to   the               minorities  themselves  and to  the  political               life  of  the  country  as  a  whole.   By  an               overwhelming   majority,   we  came   to   the               conclusion   that  the  system   of   separate               electorates  must  be  abolished  in  the  new               Constitution.   In our judgment,  this  system               has in the past sharpened communal differences               to  a dangerous extent and has proved  one  of               the  main stumbling blocks to the  development               of   a  healthy  national  life.    It   seems               specially necessary to avoid these dangers  in               the   new  political  conditions   that   have               developed  in the country and from this  point               of   view  the  arguments   against   separate               electorates  seem to us  absolutely  decisive.               We recommend accordingly that all elections to               the Central and Provincial Legislatures should               be held on the basis of joint electorates."                (emphasis added)

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              [Shiva Rao’s Vol.  II, p. 412]  I think that the Advisory Committee was right in suggesting that   the   decision  against  separate   electorates   was absolutely decisive for all times 937 to come.  Sardar Patel, after referring to the suffering and the  heavy  penalty  the nation had to pay  on  this  count, expressed his satisfaction "that there has been unanimity on the point that there should be no more separate  electorates and we should have joint electorates hereafter.  So this  is a  great  gain".   Replying  to  the  Debate  Sardar   Patel expressed his views in the following words :-               "I  had not the occasion to hear the  speeches               which  were  made in the initial  stages  when               this  question  of  communal  electorates  was               introduced in the Congress; but there are many               eminent Muslims who have recorded their  views               that  the greatest evil in this country  which               has  been  brought  to pass  is  the  communal               electorate.  The introduction of the system of               communal  electorates  is a poison  which  has               entered into the body politic of our  country.               Many Englishmen who were responsible for  this               also admitted that.  But today, after agreeing               to  the separation of the country as a  result               of  this communal electorate, I never  thought               that  that proposition was going to  be  moved               seriously, and even if it was moved seriously,               that it would be taken seriously.                (emphasis added)                (Constituent  Assembly Debates; Vol.   V,  p.               225) I,  however,  find  that the  impugned  amendment  was  made without  bestowing serious thought and the  respondents  are supporting  the  same  so determinedly that  it  has  become necessary  for  this  Court  to  consider  the   proposition ’seriously’.  Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, opposing an amend- ment  moved by B. Pocker Sahib Bahadur of the Muslim  League providing for separate electorate for Muslims, expressed his indignation thus               We all have had enough of this experience, and               it  is somewhat tragic to find that  all  that               experience  should  be lost and  still  people               should   hug  the  exploded  shibboleths   and               slogans."                (emphasis added) 938 [Constituent Assembly Debates; Vol.  V, p.224] Shri  V.I.  Muniswami Pillai, on  this  occasion  reiterated these sentiments and said with a sigh of relief :-               "...Sir, which I would like to tell this House               is  that  we got rid of the  harmful  mode  of               election by separate electorates. It has  been               buried  seven fathom deep, never more to  rise               in  our  country.  The  conditions  that  were               obtaining  in the various provinces  were  the               real  cause  for  introducing  the  system  of               separate electorates.  The Poona Pact gave  us               both  the separate and joint  electorates  but               now  we have advised according to this  report               that   has  been  presented  here   that   the               Depressed  Classes  are doing to  enjoy  joint               electorates.   It is hoped, Sir, that, in  the               great  Union that we are all  envisaging  that               this Country will become in the years to come, joint elector

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ates will give equal opportunity               for   the  Caste  Hindus  and   the   Minority               communities to come together and work together               and produce a better India."               [Constituent Assembly Debates; Vol. V,p.202] Unfortunately, the firm belief of Mr. Pillai was not  shared when the reservation in question was introduced by amendment three decades later in 1980. It will be helpful, for appreciating the reference by Sardar Patel to the opinions of even Englishmen in his reply and to the  Poona  Pact  by  Shri Pillai,  to  recall  briefly  the developments  during  the  British  Rule  relevant  to  this aspect. 33.  In  order  to  break the united front  of  the  Indians against foreign domination, one of the most effective  steps taken  on  behalf of the regime was  to  introduce  separate electorates  with weightage for the Muslims.   The  occasion was  provided by the demand of the separate  electorate  for the Muslims by a deputation headed by Aga Khan presented  to the then, Viceroy, Lord Minto, in 1906.  Lord Minto not only supported him but added that in view of the service that the Muslims had rendered to the Empire, their position  deserved to "be estimated not merely on "their" 939 numerical   strength  but  in  respect  of   the   political importance  of "the" community and the service that  it  had rendered to the Empire".  The demand was accepted in 1909 by Minto  Morley Reforms.  The matter was again  considered  in 191.9  by the Montague-Chenisford Committee.   Their  report disapproved the idea of separate electorates by stating that such electorates "were opposed to the teaching of history  : that they perpetuated class division : that they stereotyped existing relations; and that they constituted a very serious hindrance   to   the  development  of   the   self-governing principle".   Sardar  Patel was, in  his  reply,  presumably referring  to these expressions and similar other  opinions: Unfortunately,   however,   the   principle   of    communal electorates  was adopted for the Muhammadans in the  country and in Punjab for Sikhs. 34.  Having,  thus  succeeded  in  introducing  this  highly undesirable  system of separate electorates on the basis  of religion,  the British rulers proceeded to extend  the  same with  a  view  to divide the  people  further  by  proposing separate  elector ate.% for the "Depressed Classes" in  1932 under   the,  Communal  Award  of  Prime   Minister   Ramsay MacDonald.   By that time the leadership of the country  was in  the  hands  of Mahatma Gandhi, who  fully  realised  the dangerous  fall-out of the proposed measure.  Rejecting  the suggestion of the British Prime Minister to accept the  same even for a temporary period, he staked his life for fighting out  the menace by deciding to go on fast unto  death.   The rulers  conceded and backed out, and the matter  was  sorted out by the famous Yarvada Pact.  Separate electorate for the Muslims, however, could not be undone, and was given  effect to in the Government of India Act, 1935, ultimately  leading to the partition of the Country. 35.  In  this  background  the  Debate  in  the  Constituent Assembly took place, and the recommendations of the Advisory Committee in favour of joint electorate both at the  Central and  the State levels were accepted.  It is  significant  to note here that in the original draft Constitution there  was no  express pro-vision declaring that the elections  to  the Parliament  and  to the State legislatures would be  on  the basis  of joint electorates and the matter had been left  to be  dealt with by auxiliary legislation under  Articles  290

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and  291  of the draft Constitution Shiva  Rao,  Framing  of India’s  Constitution,  Vol.   IV,  p.  1411.   On  a   deep deliberation on the issue it was realised that any provision for  separate  electorates would be a deadly virus  for  the health  of the nation.  The Constituent Assembly  considered it right 940 to reject the idea once for all and not leave the. matter to be dealt with later.  Accordingly Article 325 adopted in the following terms:-               "325.    No  person  to  be   ineligible   for               inclusion in, or to claim to be included in  a               special,   electoral   roll  on   grounds   of               religion, race, caste or sex  There shall  be               one   general   electoral   roll   for   every               territorial   constituency  for  election   to               either House of Parliament or to the House  of               either House of the Legislature of a State and               no person shall be ineligible for inclusion in               any  such roll or claim to be included in  any               special  electoral  roll  for  any  such  con-               stituency  on grounds only of religion,  race,               caste, sex or any or them." 36.  During  the hearing it was also contended that  if  the Constitution   permits  nominations  to  be  made   in   the legislatures how can the creation of a separate  electorates for  the  Sangha  seat be objected to.  I do  not  find  any parallel  between  the two.  After the  establishment  of  a democratic  government at every level in the country in  one from or the other, nomination under the Constitution amounts to exercise of a power to induct a member in the legislature by  an  authority,  who ultimately  represents  the  people, although  the process of the representation may be a  little involved.   So far a handful of the Buddhist Monasteries  in Sikkim  are concerned, they cannot be said to represent  the people of Sikkim in any sense of the term.  Allotting a seat in the legislature to represent these religious institutions is bad enough by itself; and then, to compound it by vesting the exclusive right in them to elect their representative to occupy the reserved seat is to aggravate the evil.  I do not think this can be compared with any of the provisions in the Constitution relating to nominations. From the entire scheme of the Constitution, it is clear that its  basic  philosophy  eloquently rejects  the  concept  of separate electorate in India.  This conclusion is reinforced by   the  historical  background  referred  to  above,   the delebrations  of the Advisory Committee, and the  discussion which  took place in the Constituent Assembly before  giving final  shape  to the Constitution.  I do  not  discover  any reason for assuming that while inserting Article 371F(f)  in the  Constitution  there was complete reversal of  faith  on this  basic and vital matter, which was otherwise  also  not permissible.  It follows that consistent with the  intention of the rest of the Con- 941 stitution  the provision regarding the delimitation  of  the Assembly  constituencies  in  Article  371F(f)  has  to   be interpreted  in the same sense, as the expression  has  been used  in the other provisions.  Clause (f) of  Article  371F neither  by  its  plain  language  nor  intendment   permits separate  electorates  and any attempt to give  a  different construction  would  not  only  be  highly  artificial   and speculative  but also would be violative of a basic  feature of   the  Constitution.   I,  accordingly,  hold  that   the provisions  of  section  25A of the  Representation  of  the

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People  Act, 1950 are also ultra vires the Constitution  and this furnishes another ground to strike down section 7 (1 A) (c). 37.  So  far  the reservation of 12 seats in favour  of  the Bhutia- Lepchas is concerned, the ground relied upon by  the respondents  for  upholding  the  same  is  the   historical background  coupled with the 5th term under the  head  BASIC RIGHTS  in  the Tripartite agreement of the 8th  May,  1973, which reads as follows:-               "(5)  The  system  of elections  shall  be  so               organised  as to make the Assembly  adequately               representative of the various sections of  the               population.   The size and composition of  the               Assembly and of the Executive Council shall be               such  as may be prescribed from time to  time,               care  being  taken to ensure  that  no  single               section   of   the‘  population   acquires   a               dominating  position due mainly to its  ethnic               origin,  and the rights and interests  of  the               Sikkimese  Bhutia  Lepcha origin  and  of  the               Sikkimese  Nepali,  which includes  Tsong  and               Scheduled Caste origin, are fully protected." It is further said that in view of this Tripartite Agreement the  Proclamation  dated  5.2.1974  was  made  reserving  16 constituencies  out of the total number of 32 in  favour  of Bhutia-Lepchas, and when the Government of Sikkim Act,  1974 was passed, which came into force on 4.7.1974, the following provision was included in section 7:-               "7.  (1) For the purpose of elections  to  the               Sikkim  Assembly Sikkim shall be divided  into               constituencies  in  such  manner  as  may   be               determined by law.               (2)   The Government of Sikkim may make  rules               for the purpose of providing that the Assembly               adequately repre-               942               sents the various sections of the  population,               that  is  to say, while fully  protecting  the               legitimate  rights and interests of  Sikkimese               of Lepcha or Bhutia origin and of Sikkimese of               Nepali  origin and other Sikkimese,  including               Tsongs and Scheduled Castes no single  section               of  the  population is allowed  to  acquire  a               dominating  position in the affairs of  Sikkim               mainly by reason of its ethnic origin.’ In  these  circumstances the Thirty-Fifty Amendment  of  the Constitution  of India was made which became effective  from 23.2.1975  and Sikkim was thus Associated with the Union  of India.   The  Thirty-Sixth  Amendment  of  the  Constitution inserting  the  new Article 371F was  thereafter  made  with clause (f) which reads as follows:-               "(f)  Parliament  may,  for  the  purpose   of               protecting  the  rights and interests  of  the               different sections of the population of Sikkim               make provision for the number of seats in  the               Legislative  Assembly of the State  of  Sikkim               which may be filled by candidates belonging to               such sections and for the delimitation of  the               assembly constituencies from which  candidates               belonging to such sections alone may stand for               election  to the Legislative Assembly  of  the               State of Sikkim".               and clause (k) in the following terms:-               "(k) all laws in force immediately before  the               appointed day in the territories comprised  in

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             the State of Sikkim or any part thereof  shall               continue to be in force therein until  amended               or  repealed  by a  competent  Legislature  or               other competent authority’. The  argument  is  that  the  impugned  provisions  of   the Representation  of the People Acts are thus fully  protected by the Thirty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment. 38.  I  have not been able to persuade myself to accept  the contention  made  on behalf of the respondents  for  several reasons.   Before  proceeding further it will be  useful  to have  a  survey  of  the  relevant  circumstances  and   the documents relevant to this aspect at a glance. 39.  Chogyal  was an autocratic ruler anxious to relain  his absolute 943 power,  while the people were becoming more aware  of  their rights  in  the  changing  world.  By  the  middle  of  this century,  encouraged by the developments in India which  was not only neighboring country but on which Sikkim was  solely dependent  for its vital needs including defence, they  were able to build up a formidable force demanding  establishment of  a truly democratic government.  The materials on  record fully establish that in this struggle of power, Chogyal  had to heavily rely on Bhutia-Lepchas, who were close to him  as he  was one from that group.  According to the case  of  the respondents the Bhutia-Lepchas had arrived in Sikkim earlier than  the Nepalis and the Nepalis were inducted in the  area mainly  on  account of the policy followed  by  the  British paramountcy.  The records also show that protest in vain was made  to the British General posted in the area,  long  time back  when  the  Nepalis were arriving on  the  scene.   The BhutiaLepchas,  who  were following the  Buddhist  religion, were paying high respect for the Lamas who were enjoying the patronage  of  Chogyal.  Appreciating their  usefulness  the Chogyal  later earmarked a seat for them on the basis  of  a separate  electorate  in  1958.   When  public  demand   for effective participation in the administration grew stronger, the Chogval adopted the line of appeasement by  establishing a  Council where initially 12 members were divided half  and half (vide the Proclamation of 28th December, 1952)  between the  Bhutia-Lepchas on the one hand and the Nepalis  on  the other.   But soon he appreciated that unless he reserved  to himself  the right to induct some more nominees of his  own, his position would be jeopardised.  He, therefore, hurriedly issued  another  Proclamation within 3 months, on  the  23rd March, 1953, declaring that 6 more members would be included in  the  Council to be nominated by him  in  his  discretion including  the President of the Council.  In Article  26  he expressly  declared that notwithstanding the  provisions  of the  other Articles he would be retaining his power to  veto any  decision  made by the Council and  substitute  his  own decision therefore. 40.  The  steps taken by the Chogyal could not  control  the demand for democracy and the public agitation gathered  more support.   Ultimately  the people came out  victorious,  not only in getting rid of the Chogyal, but also in their demand for  democracy to be established on the lines as  in  India. The  Chogyal, of course, in his vain attempt to  retain  his authority,  was  trying  to scuttle  away  the  overwhelming public  opinion  by one method or the other  and  with  that view,  was  trying, to give weightage to  BhutiaLepchas,  to which group he himself belonged and on whose support he 944 could count, and in this situation the Tripartite  Agreement of 8th May, 1973 came to be executed.  The fact that Chogyal

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was going to be a party to it and was desperately trying  to have  something  in  the terms, to build  his  strategy  on, cannot be ignored while assessing the meaning and effect  of paragraph  5  of the Agreement.   The  Tripartite  Agreement described itself in the very opening sentence as  envisaging a  democratic set up for Sikkim, and the Chogyal joined  the people of Sikkim in declaring that he was also convinced and was  in favour of the establishment of a  fully  responsible Government in Sikkim.  The other provisions of the Agreement unmistakably  indicate  that  the intention was  to  have  a democratic  government in Sikkim exactly similar to the  one in India.  It (Agreement) provided guarantee of  Fundamental Rights, the rule of law and independent judiciary, as also.               "a system of elections based on adult suffrage               which  will give equitable  representation  to               all sections of the people on the basis of the               principle of one man one vote".               (emphasis added) All the three parties expressly recognised and undertook  to ensure  the basic human rights and fundamental  freedoms  of the people and that--               "the people of Sikkim will enjoy the right  of               election on the basis of adult suffrage to get               effect to the principle of one man one vote."                (emphasis supplied) Equality  before law and independence of the judiciary  were assured.  It further recited that the Chogyal as well as the representative of the people had requested the Government of India to assume responsibility for the establishment of  law and order and good administration and "to ensure the further development  of  a constitutional Government",  as  also  to provide  the head of the administration described  as  Chief Executive  to  help and achieve the State’s  objectives.   A firm  decision  was taken to hold fair  and  free  elections under  the supervision of a representative of  the  Election Commission  of  India.   The  Chief  Executive  was  to   be nominated  by  the Government of India and it was  only  the passing of the formal order in this regard which was left to the Chogyal.  Towards the end of the Agreement 945 it  was emphasised that the Government of India  was  solely responsible  for  the defence and territorial  integrity  of Sikkim  and for the conduct and regulation of  the  external relations  whether  political, economic  or  financial,  and necessary  powers  for carrying out  these  responsibilities were   reaffirmed.   A  perusal  of  the  document   clearly indicates  that  the  spirit  of  the  Indian   Constitution pervaded  through  out the entire Agreement  and  the  terms thereof were drafted respecting the main principles embodied in  our Constitution.  It must, therefore, be held  that  an interpretation  cannot be given to the Agreement which  will render  it as deviating from the constitutional  pattern  of the Indian Constitution. 41.  A  question  may  be raised that  since  the  Agreement included paragraph  (5) which has been quoted earlier,  does that inject in this Agreement an  element incompatible  with the Indian Constitution.  In my opinion the answer is in the negative.   The  safeguard  under the  scheme  envisaged  in paragraph  (5) was capable of being provided by  the  Indian Constitution.  Many provisions in the different parts of the Constitution including Part III are relevant in this regard. Their representation of all sections has been the concern of the  Constitution also; and with that view  provisions  have been  made  for reservation of seats in  favour  of  certain classes  in  the Parliament and the state  Legislatures  and

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some special rights have been given to the minority.  In  my view  these  constitute adequate  guarantee  against  unfair dominance by the majority.  This of course does not lead  to the conclusion that power would be concentrated in the hands of  the  minority, or that their would be  division  of  the authority  in the matter of’ carrying on the affairs of  the State, on mathematically equal terms, between the  different groups; because the first will result in the abnegations  of democracy itself, and the second will lead to an  unworkable situation ending in chaos.  The principle of adult  suffrage with  one-man-one-vote rule, as repeated again and again  in the  documents referred to above, indicates the  concept  of democracy  which  had to be established in Sikkim.   In  the Proclamation  of  the 5th February 1974 total number  of  32 seats in the Assembly were divided half and half between the two  groups, but it is significant to note that as  soon  as the Assembly was constituted after election. it  immediately modified  the  provision  fixing  the  parity  of  seats  by declaring  in section 6(2) of the Government of Sikkim  Act, 1974  that  the  matter would be  determined  by  law.   The intention  that no single section of the  population  should acquire a "dominating position due mainly to its 946 ethnic  origin"  does not mean that the majority hold  by  a particular  section would not be allowed to be reflected  in the legislature.  The word ’dominating" indicates  something more than merely forming a majority.  What was intended  was to  eliminate  the  chance of a particular  section  of  the population  misusing  its position to the prejudice  of  the legitimate  rights  of  the others.  The  risk  of  such  an undesirable situation could and should have been  eliminated by   adopting  such  methods  as  provided  in  the   Indian Constitution.  It cannot be legitimately contended that  the safeguard in this regard under the Indian Constitution is in any way inadequate.  If at all, the minority in this country are  in  certain  matters  enjoying  special  benefits   not available  to  the  majority’.and this is  the  reason  that repeated  attempts have been and are being made  by  various groups  to claim minority status, as is evident by  reported cases.   The  necessary consequence  of  assuming  otherwise would  be to hold that under the Constitution applicable  to the  rest  of  the  country, the  minorities  here  have  no protection  again  the "dominance of the majority,  and  our stand about the rule of law and equality of status to all in this country is an empty claim made before the world. 42.  The  further point is as to whether the  provisions  of clause  (f)  of  Article 371F  envisage  and  authorise  the Parliament to exercise its power only in such a manner which would  be  consistent with the relevant  provisions  of  the Constitution  applicable to the rest of the country  if  the same  is capable of achieving the object with  reference  to the  special conditions of Sikkim; or, that they  allow  the Parliament  to take any decision in this  regard,  including such measures which would perpetuate the situation obtaining in  Sikkim  in  the  past,  on  the  ground  of   historical background.  For the reasons indicated earlier, I am of  the view  that  clause (f) permits the Parliament to  take  only such steps which would be consistent with the provisions  of the  Constitution coming from before, so that  Sikkim  could completely  merge with India and be placed at per  with  the other States.  This conclusion is irresistible if the  facts and circumstances which led to the ultimate merger of Sikkim in India are kept in mind.  They have been briefly  referred to earlier in paragraph 10 above.  After the Proclamation of the  5th of February, 1974, Sikkim went to polls.  The  main

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representative  of  the people was Sikkim  Congress  as  was proved  by  the  result of the  election.   Sikkim  Congress winning  31  out  of the total of 32  seats.   The  election manifesto   on  the  basis  of  which  the   people   almost unanimously 947 voted  in  favour of Sikkim Congress, inter  alia,  declared thus -               "We also aspire to achieve the same democratic               rights  and  institutions that the  people  of               India has enjoyed for a quarter of century.’               (emphasis added) Respecting  this pledge, solemnly given to the  people,  the Assembly  passed a unanious resolution dated 10.04.1975  and submitted it to the people for their approval.  A plebiscite was  thus  held in which about 64% of  the  electorate  cast their votes.  The Resolution was approved by the 62% of  the total  electorate  and only less than 2%  went  against  the same.    The  Statement  of  Objects  and  Reasons  of   the Constitution  (Thirty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 1975  refers  to the unanimous Resolution of the State Assembly, which  after taking note of the persistent anti-people activities of  the Chogyal  decided to abolish the institution of  the  Chogyal and  to  make  Sikkim a constituent unit  of  India  in  the following terms :               "The  institution  of the  Chogyal  is  hereby               abolished  and  Sikkim shall henceforth  be  a               constituent   unit   of  India,   enjoying   a               democratic and fully responsible Government." In  this  background, the Statement of Objects  and  Reasons further proceeds to declare :-               "5.  Accordingly,  it is proposed  to  include               Sikkim  as a full-fledged State in  the  First               Schedule  to the Constitution and to allot  to               Sikkim  one seat in the Council of States  and               one  seat in the House of the People.   It  is               also   proposed  to  insert  a   new   article               containing the provisions considered necessary               to meet the special circumstances and needs of               Sikkim."                (emphasis added) 43.  The intention was clear that the people of Sikkim, by a near  unanimous  verdict, decided to join India as  a  full- fledged  State with the aspiration of participating  in  the affairs  of the country on the same terms applicable to  the rest  of  India.  The decision to insert a new  Article  was considered  necessary only the limited purpose to  meet  the special cir- 948 cumstances  and needs of Sikkim.  The question is whether  a provision   for   granting   a   disproportionately   higher representation   of   the  Bhutia-Lepchas   in   the   State legislature  was  necessary.  If it was not, clause  (f0  of Article  371F  must  be  construed  as  not  protecting  the impugned statutory amendments. 44.  If we examine the different clauses of Article 371F, we find  that several additional provisions deviating from  the original,  have  been incorporated in the  Constitution,  in view  of the special circumstances peculiar to  Sikkim.   By Article  170  the  minimum  size  of  the  Assembly  of  the States .is fixed at 60 seats which was too large for a small State  like  Sikkim with a total population  of  only  three lacs.   This  was a special feature which  distinguished  it from  the  other  States.  The ratio of the  number  of  the representatives to the population did not justify a House of

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60  and,  therefore, by clause (.a) the minimum  number  was fixed  only at 30.  For obvious reasons clauses (c) and  (e) had to be inserted in the Article as the appointed day  with reference  to  Sikkim could not have been the  same  as  the appointed  day with reference to the other  States.   Clause (d)  also became relevant for allotting a seat to the  State of Sikkim in the House of the People.  So far clause (b)  is concerned, the same became necessary for a temporary  period for   the  smooth  transition  of  Sikkim  from  merely   to associate" status to a full-fledged State of the Union.   In order  to  avoid  a bumpy ride during the  period  that  the effect  of  merger was being  constitutionally  worked  out, there  was  urgent need of special temporary  provisions  to enables  the State functionaries to discharge their  duties. If  the other clauses are also examined closely it  will  be manifest  that  they were necessary in view of  the  special needs  of  the  Sikkim.   The  point  is  whether  for   the protection  of  the  Bhutia-Lepcha  Tribe,  the   safeguards already  provided in the Constitution were inadequate so  as to  call for or justify special provisions  of  reservation, inconsistent  with  the Constitution of India  as  it  stood before  the Thirty-Sixth Amendment.  The problem of  Bhutia- Lepcha  Tribe  is identical to that of the other  Tribes  of several  States where they are greatly out-numbered  by  the general  population,  and which has been  effectively  dealt with  by  the  provisions for reservation  in  their  favour included  in  Part XVI of the Constitution.   It  cannot  be justifiably  suggested that by subjecting the provisions  of the reservations to the limitations in clause (3) of Article 332,  the Tribes in India have been left unprotected at  the mercy   of   the  overwhelming  majority  of   the   general population.   The reservations in Part XVI  were  considered adequate protection to them and 949 it  had  not been proved wrong for about three  and  a  half decades  before  1975, when Sikkim merged  with  India.   It must,  therefore,  be held that the  adequate  safeguard  in favour of the Bhutia-Lepchas was already available under the Constitution and all that was required was to treat them  as Tribes  like  the other Tribes.  As a matter  of  fact  this position   was  correctly  appreciated  in  1978  when   the Presidential Order was issued under Article 342 of Part XVI. The  interpretation  of Article 371.F (f), as  suggested  on behalf of the respondents, is inconsistent with the issuance of  the  said Order. 1, therefore, hold that the  object  of clause  (f) was not to take care of this problem and it  did not authorise the Parliament to pass the Amendment (Act 8 of 1980) inserting section 7(1A) (a)- in the Representation  of the  People Act, 1.950 and section 5A in the  Representation of the People Act, 1951 and other related amendments.   They being  violative of the constitutional provisions  including those in Article 371F (f) are ultra vires. 45.  The  next point is as to whether clause (f) of  Article 371F will have to be struck down on the ground of  violation of  the  basic  features  of  the  Constitution,  if  it  is interpreted as suggested on behalf of the respondents. 46.  The Preamble of the Constitution of India  emphatically declares that. we were giving to ourselves the  Constitution with  a firm resolve to constitute a sovereign,  democratic, republic; with equality of status and of opportunity to  all its  citizens.   The issue which has direct bearing  on  the question under consideration is as to what is the meaning of ’democratic  republic’.   The  expressions  ’democracy’  and ’democratic’  have been used in varying senses in  different countries  and in many places have been subjected to  denote

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the  state of affairs which is in complete negation  of  the meaning  in which they are understood.  During  the  present century   it  progressively  became  more  fashionable   and profitable  to  frequently use those terms  and  accordingly they  have been grossly misused.  We are not concerned  with that  kind  of  so  called democracy, which  is  used  as  a stepping  stone  for  the establishment  of  a  totalitarian regime,  or that which is hypocritically dangled before  the people  under  the name of democracy but is  in  reality  an oligarchical  set up concentrating the power in a  few.   We are also not concerned with the wider theoretical conception in  which the word can be understood.  In our  Constitution, it  refers  to  denote what it  literally  means.  that  is, ’people’s  powers.’  It stands for the  actual,  active  and effective  exercise of power by the people in  this  regard. Schumacher gives 950 a simple definition of democracy as "the ability of a people to  choose  and  dismiss a  government".   Giovanni  Sartori translates the same idea in institutional form and says that democracy  is  a multi-party system in  which  the  majority governs and respects the right of minority.  In the  present context  it  refers to the political  participation  of  the people in running the administration of the government.   It conveys  the  state  of affairs in  which  each  citizen  is assured of right of equal participation in the polity.   The expression  has been used in this sense, both in the  Indian Constitution  and by the people of Sikkim as their  goal  to achieve.   The repeated emphasis that was given to the  rule of  one-man-one-vote  in  the  various  documents  preceding Sikkim’s  merger with India, clearly defines the  system  of government  which the people of Sikkim. by  an  overwhelming majority decided to establish and which was exactly the same as  under  the  Indian Constitution.  This  goal  cannot  be achieved by merely allotting each person one vote which they can  cast in favour of a particular candidate or  a  special group  of persons, selected for this purpose by  others,  in which they have no say.  The result in such a case would  be that while one man of this class is assigned the strength of one  full  vote,  others  have to be  content  with  only  a fraction.   If  there is 90% reservation in the seats  of  a House  in favour of 10% of the population in the State,  and only the remaining 10% of the seats are left to the majority population, then the principle of adult suffrage as included in Article 326 is sacrificed.  By permitting the 90% of  the population to vote not only for 10% seats available to them, but also for the 90% reserved seats the basic flaw going  to the  root  of the matter is not cured.  The  choice  of  the candidate  and  the  right to stand as a  candidate  at  the election  arc inherent in the principle of  adult  suffrage, that is, one-man-one-vote.  By telling the people that  they have  a  choice  to elect any of a select  group  cannot  be treated  as a free choice of the candidate.  This will  only amount  to  lip  service, to thinly veiled  to  conceal  the reality  of  an oligarchy underneath.  It will  be  just  an apology for democracy, a subterfuge; and if it is  permitted to  cross  the limit so as to violate the very core  of  the principle of one-man-one-vote, and is not controlled by  the constitutional  safeguards  as  included in  clause  (3)  of Article 332 (see paragraph 12 above) of the Constitution  it will amount to a huge fraud perpetrated against the  people. So  far the Sangha seat is concerned even  this  transparent cloak has been shed off.  It has to be appreciated that  the very purpose of providing reservation in favour of a  weaker class  is to aid the elemental principle of democracy  based

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on one-man-one-vote to succeed.  The disproportionately                    951 excessive  reservation  creates  a  privileged  class,   not brought  to the same plane with others but put on  a  higher pedestal, causing unhealthy competition, creating hatred and distrust  between  classes and  fostering  divisive  forces. This  amounts to abnegations of the values cherished by  the people  of India (including Sikkim), as told by their  story of  struggle and sufferings culminating into the framing  of the Indian Constitution (and the merger of Sikkim as one  of the  State  in 1975).  This is not permissible  even  by  an amendment of the Constitution. 47.  In a search for constitutions similar to ours, one  may look  towards Canada and Australia and not to  Cyprus.   But the  Canadian and Australian Constitutions also differ  from our  Constitution  in many respects, including some  of  the fundamental   principles  and  the  basic   features.    The unalterable   fundamental  commitments  incorporated  in   a written  constitution  are  like the soul of  a  person  not amenable to a substitution by transplant or otherwise.   And for identifying what they are with reference to a particular constitution,  it  is necessary to consider,  besides  other factors, the historical background in which the constitution has  been framed, the firm basic commitments of  the  people articulated  in the course of and by the contents  of  their struggle  and sacrifice preceding it (if any),  the  thought process  and  traditional beliefs as also  the  social  ills intended to be taken care of.  These differ from country  to country.  The fundamental philosophy therefore, varies  from Constitution  to Constitution.  A Constitution has  its  own personality  and as in the case of a human being, its  basic features   cannot  be  defined  in  the  terms  of   another Constitution.   The expressions ’democracy’  and  ’republic’ have  conveyed not exactly the same ideas through  out  the world,  and  little  help can be obtained  by  referring  to another  Constitution for determining the meaning and  scope of the said expressions with reference to our  Constitution. When  we  undertake the task of  self-appraisal,  we  cannot afford to forget our motto of the entire world being one big family  (Vasudhaiva Kutumbkam) and consequent commitment  to the  cause  of  unity which made the  people  suffer  death, destruction  and devastation on an unprecedented  scale  for replacing the foreign rule by a democratic government on the basis  of equal status for all.  The fact that they lost  in their  effort  for  a untitled independent  country  is  not relevant in the present context, because that did not  shake their faith in democracy where every person is to be treated equal,  and with this firm resolve, they proceeded  to  make the  Constitution.  An examination of the provisions of  the Constitution does not leave room from any doubt that this 952 idea  has been kept as the guiding factor while framing  the Constitution.    ’Democracy’  and  ’republic’  have  to   be understood accordingly.  Let us now examine the Constitution in this light. 48.  As  explained by the Preamble the quality of  democracy envisaged  by  the  Constitution does not  only  secure  the equality  of opportunity but of status as well, to  all  the citizens.  This equality principle is clearly brought out in several Articles in the different parts of the Constitution, including Part III dealing with Fundamental Rights, Part  IV laying  down  the Directive Principles of State  policy  and Part  XVI  having  special provisions  relating  to  certain classes.  The spirit pervades through the entire document as can be seen by the other provisions too.  When the  question

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of  the qualification for election as President arises,  all classes of citizens get same treatment by Articles 58 and 59 (subject  to  certain  qualifications  which  are  uniformly applied)  and  similar is the position with respect  to  the Vice  President and the other constitutional  functionaries. The  protection  in Part III is available to  all,  and  the State has to strive to promote the welfare of the people and the  right to adequate means of livelihood, to  justice  and free  legal  aid,  and to work et  cetera  with  respect  to everybody.  Certain special benefits are, however,  extended or may be extended to certain weaker classes, but this again is  for the sake of placing them on equal footing  with  the others, and not for defeating the cause of equality.  So far the  question  of  equality  of  opportunity  in  matter  of employment is concerned, provisions for reservation of posts are  included  in  favour of backward  classes  who  may  be inadequately represented in the services.  Welfare  measures also  are permitted on the same line, but, when it comes  to the  reservation  of seats in the Parliament  or  the  State Legislature, it is given a different treatment in Part  XVI. Clause (2) of Article 330 and clause (3) of Article 332  lay down   the  rule  for  maintaining  the  ratio,  which   the population of the class bears to the total population.  This is  significant.   The  sole  objective  of  providing   for reservations in the Constitution is to put the principle  of equal status to work.  So far the case of inadequate  repre- sentation   of  a  backward  class  in  State  services   is concerned,  the problem is not susceptibly to be  solved  in one  stroke:  and consequently the relevant  provisions  are kept  flexible permitting wider discretion so as  to  attain the  goal  of adequate  proportionate  representation.   The situation in respect to representation in the legislature is entirely  different.  As soon as an election takes place  in accordance  with  the provisions  for  proportionate  repre- sentation,  the objective is achieved  immediately,  because there is no prob- 953 lem  of backlog to be tackled.  On the  earlier  legislature disappearing,  paving the way for new election,  the  people get a clean slate before them.  The excessive reservation in this  situation  will  bring in an  imbalance-of  course  of another kind-but defeating the cause of equal status all the same.   The pendulum does not stand straight  it swings  to the other side.  The casualty in both cases is the  equality clause.   Both situations defeat the very object  for  which the  democratic  forces waged the war of  independence;  and they undo what has been achieved by the Constitution.   This is   clearly  violative  of  the  basic  features   of   the Constitution.  I hold that if clause (f) of Article 371F  is so  construed  as to authorise the Parliament to  enact  the impugned  provisions  it  will be  violative  of  the  basic features of the Constitution and, therefore, void. 49.  The views expressed above are adequate for the disposal of the present cases, but it may be expedient to examine the matter  from one more angle before concluding the  judgment. It was very strongly contended by the learned advocates  for the  respondents  that  the impugned  provisions  should  be upheld  and  the writ petitions dismissed by reason  of  the historical   background  of  Sikkim.   It   was   repeatedly emphasised  that in view of the 5th term of  the  Tripartite Agreement  and in view of the fact that the Sangha seat  was created by Chogyal as far back as in 1958, the  arrangements agreed  upon by the parties are not liable to be  disturbed. Reference  was made to the several Proclamations of  Chogyal by the counsel for the different respondents and intervenors

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one  after  the  other.   In  my  view  the  impact  of  the historical background on the interpretation of the situation is  to  the contrary.  During the period, referred  to,  the fight  between  the despotic Chogyal trying  to  retain  his authority  and  the  people  demanding  installation  of   a democratic rule was going on.  No importance can, therefore, be  attached to the terms included in the Agreement  at  the instance of the ruler or to his Proclamations.  On the other hand, what is relevant to be considered is the demand of the people  which  ultimately  succeeded.   It’  we  proceed  to interpret  the situation by respecting and giving effect  to the  acts and omissions of Chogyal in his desperate  attempt to cling to, power and subvert to the democratic process set in motion by the people, we may have to rewrite the  history and  deprive the people of Sikkim of what they were able  to wrest from his clutches from time to time ultimately  ending with  the  merger.  The reservation of the Sangha  seat  was also  one of such anti-people acts.  So far the Note to  the Proclamation  of 16 May, 1968 is concerned if it has  to  be enforced, the Nepalis shall also be entitled 954 to  reservation  of equal number of seats  as  the,  Bhutia- Lepchas  and  same number of seats should be  earmarked  for nomination  by the authority in power.  Actually  Mr.  Bhatt appearing  for  some of the  respondents  seriously  pressed before  us  the claim of Nepalis for  reservation  in  their favour.  This entire line of thought is wholly misconceived. We  can  not ignore the fact that as soon  as  the  Assembly vested with effective authority was constituted it proceeded to undo what is being relied upon before us on behalf of the respondents.  When they passed the historic resolution dated April 10, 1975, discussed earlier in detail the 5th terms of the Agreement was given up, and when the people were invited to express. their opinion by holding a plebiscite, they gave their  verdict, unburdened by any such condition, by a  near unanimous voice.  I presume that this was so because it  was known   that   the  in-built  safeguards   of   the   Indian Constitution  were adequate for taking care of this  aspect. This is a complete answer to such an argument.  The history, so  far it may be relevant, condemns in no  uncertain  terms the  excessive reservation in favour of  the  Bhutia-Lepchas and   the  Sangha.   The  Thirty-Sixth  Amendment   in   the Constitution has to be understood in this light. 50.  My   conclusion,  therefore,  is  that   the   impugned provisions  are  ultra  vires  the  Constitution   including Article 371F (f).  Consequently the present Sikkim  Assembly constituted  on  the basis of the election, held  under  the impugned   provisions   has   to   be   declared   illegally constituted.  Therefore, the concerned authorities must take fresh and immediate steps under the law consistent with  the Constitution  as  applied to the rest of the  country.   The writ petitions are accordingly allowed with costs payable to the writ petitioners. 51.  Before finally closing, I would like to say a few words in  the  light  of the opinion of  my  learned  Brothers  as expressed  in  the  majority judgment  disagreeing  with  my conclusions.   In  view of this judgment all  the  petitions have now to be dismissed, but I want to emphasize that  what has  been  held  therein  is that  the  Parliament  has  not exceeded its Constituent and Legislative Powers in  enacting the impugned provisions and consequently the writ  petitions have  to  be  dismissed.   This  does  not  mean  that   the Parliament  is  bound to give effect to  the  discriminatory provisions  by reason of the historical background in  which Sikkim  joined India.  It is within the ’wisdom’ (to  borrow

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the expression from paragraph 30 of the 955 majority  judgment) of the Parliament to take a decision  on the  issue and as hinted in the same paragraph, the  present situation hopefully may be a transitory passing phase.   The provisions  in  clause  (f) of Article 371F  have  been,  in paragraph 31 of the judgment, described as ’enabling’,  that is,  not obligatory.  It, therefore, follows  that  although this Court has not jurisdiction to strike down the  impugned provisions,  it  is  perfectly  within  the  domain  of  the Parliament to undo, what I prefer to call, ’the wrong’.  The unequal  apportionment  of  the role in the  polity  of  the country  assigned  to  different  groups  tends  to   foster unhealthy  rivalry impairing the mutual feeling of  goodwill and fellowship amongst the people, and encouraging  divisive forces.   The  reservation  of a seat for  the  Sanghas  and creation  of  a  separate electorate have  a  still  greater pernicious  portent.   Religion,  as  it  has  come  to   be understood, does not mix well with governance; the resultant explosive  compound  of such an ill suited  combination  has proved  to be lethal for the unity of the nation only a  few decades  ago leading to the partition.  The framing  of  our Constitution  was  taken  up  immediately  thereafter.   Our country has suffered for a thousand years on account of this dangerous  phenomenon resulting in large  scale  internecine struggles and frequent blood spilling.  Today a single  seat in  the  legislature  of  one  State  is  not  conspicuously noticeable  and  may  not by itself be  capable  of  causing irreparable  damage,  but  this  seed  of  discord  has  the potentiality  of  developing into a deadly monster.   It  is true  that  some special rights have been envisaged  in  the Constitution for handicapped classes but this has been  done only  to off-set the disadvantage the classes  suffer  from, and  not  for bringing another kind of imbalance  by  making virtue out of minority status.  The Constitution, therefore. has  taken  precaution  to place rigid  limitations  on  the extent to which this weightage can be granted, by  including express provisions instead of leaving the matter to be dealt with by subsequent enactments  limitations both by  putting a  ceiling on the reservation of seats in  the  legislatures and  excluding religion as the basis of discrimination.   To ignore  these limitations is to encourage small  groups  and classes   which are in good number in our country  on  one basis  or  the other to stick to and rely on  their  special status as members of separate groups and classes and not  to join  the  mainstream  of the nation and  be  identified  as Indians.   It  is’,  therefore,  absolutely  essential  that religion,  disguised  by any mask and concealed  within  any cloak must be kept out of the field exclusively reserved for the exercise of the State powers.  To my 956 mind  the message has been always dear and loud and  now  it remains  for the nation to pay heed to and act  through  its elected representatives. VENKATACHALIAH, J. These petitions under Article 226 of  the Constitution  of India -- which where originally  filed  in the   High  Court  of  Sikkim  and  now  withdrawn  by   and transferred  to  this Court under Article  139-A --  raise certain   interesting   and  significant   issues   of   the constitutional limitations on the power of Parliament as  to the nature of the terms and conditions that it could  impose under Article 2 of the Constitution for the admission of the new  States into the Union of India.  These issues arise  in the context of the admission of Sikkim into the Indian Union under  the  Constitution (36th Amendment) Act, 1975  as  the

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22nd  State  in the First Schedule of  the  Constitution  of India. 2.   Earlier,  in pursuance of the resolution of the  Sikkim Assembly passed by virtue of its powers under the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974, expressing its desire to be  associated with  the political and economic institutions of  India  and for  the representation of the people of Sikkim  in  India’s Parliamentary system, the Constitution [35th Amendment] Act, 1974  had come to be passed inserting Article 2A which  gave the State of Sikkim the status of an ’Associate State’;  but later  Sikkim became, as aforesaid, an integral part of  the Indian Union as a fill-fledged State in the Union by  virtue of  the  Constitution  (36th Amendment)  Act,  1975,  which, however, provided for special provisions in Article 371-F to accommodate certain historical incidents of the evolution of the   political   institutions  of  Sikkim.    It   is   the constitutionality  of the incidents of this special  status, particularly  in  the  matter of reservation  of  seats  for various  ethnic  and  religious groups  in  the  Legislative Assembly   of   the  State  that  have  been   assailed   as "unconstitutional" in these petitions. 3.   Sikkim  is a mountain-State in the North-East of  India of  an area of about 7200 sq. km. on the  Eastern  Himlayas. It  has  a  population of about four lakhs.   Sikkim  is  of strategic location bounded, as it is, on the West by  Nepal, on  the  North by Tibet, on the East by Bhutan  and  on  the Southern  and Western sides by the State of West  Bengal  in the  Indian Union.  It lies astride the shortest route  from India to Tibet.  The State is entirely mountainous.  Covered with  dense forests, it lies in the Northern-most  Areas  in Lachen  and  Lachung.  Mountains rise to 7000  m  and  above Kanchenjunga  (8,579  m) being World’s Third  Highest  Peak. Sikkim has several hundred 957 varieties  of  orchids  and is  frequently  referred  to  as botanist’s paradise’. ("India 1991" page 930). 4.   To  the historian, Sikkim’s history, lore, culture  and traditions  are a fascinating study.  The early  history  of this mountainous land is lost in the mists of time.  But  it is  said  that in 1642, Phuntsog Namgyal  became  the  first Chogyal,  the  spiritual and temporal Ruler in  the  Namgyal dynasty which ruled Sikkim till it joined the mainstream  of Indian polity in 1975. The main inhabitants of Sikkim are the Lepchas, the  Bhutias and  the later immigrants from Nepal.  The Lepchas were  the original  indigenous inhabitants.  The Bhutias are  said  to have  come  from  Kham in Tibet during  the  15th  and  16th centuries.   These  people  of  Tibetan  origin  are  called Bhutias - said to be a derivative from the word  "Bod"  or "Tibet" - and as the tradition has it took refuge  in  the country  after  the  schism  in  Tibet  in  15th  and   16th centuries.    One  of  their  Chieftains  was  crowned   the ’Chogyal’  of Sikkim in 1642.  It would appear  that  Sikkim was  originally quite an extensive country but is stated  to have  lost  large  chunks of its territories  to  Nepal  and Bhutan and finally to the British.  Lepchas and Bhutias  are Buddhists by religion. Sikkim was a British protectorate till 1947 when the British paramountancy  lapsed whereafter under a Treaty of  the  3rd December,   1950   with  India,  Sikkim   continued   as   a protectorate  of  India.  Over the past  century  there  was large  migration into Sikkim of people of  Nepalese  origin. The influx was such that in the course of time, Sikkimese of Nepalese   origin  constituted  almost  2/3rd  of   Sikkim’s population.   There  has been, accordingly,  a  clamour  for

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protection  of  the original Bhutias-Lepchas now  an  ethnic majority from the political voice and expression being  sub- merged by the later immigrants from Nepal. 5. These ethnic and demographic diversities of the Sikkimese people;  apprehensions  of ethnic dimensions  owing  to  the segmental  pluralism  of  the  Sikkimese  society  and   the imbalances of opportunities for political expression are the basis  of -  and  the claimed  justification  for -  the insertion   of  Article  371-F.   The  phenomenon  of   deep fragmentation, societal cleavages of pluralist societies and recognition of these realities in the evolution of pragmatic adjustments  consistent with basic principles  of  democracy are the recurrent issues in political Organisation. 958 In his "Democracy in Plural Societies", Arend Lijphart makes some significant observations at Page 16.               "A    great    many    of    the    developing               countries--particularly  those  in  Asia   and               Africa,   but   also   some   South   American               countries,   such  as  Guyana,  Surinam,   and               Trinidad--are  beset  by  political   problems               arising   from  the  deep  divisions   between               segments of their populations and the  absence               of  a  unifying  consensus.   The  theoretical               literature  on political development,  nation-               building,  and  democratization  in  the   new               states   treats  this  fact  in  a   curiously               ambivalent  fashion.   On the one  hand,  many               writers  implicitly refuse to acknowledge  its               importance.               "Such  communal attachments are  what  Cliffor               Geertz calls primordial" loyalties, which  may               be   based  on  language,  religion,   custom,               region,  race,  or assumed  blood  ties.   The               subcultures  of  the  European  consociational               democracies,    which   are   religious    and               ideological in nature and on which, two of the               countries,  linguistic divisions are  superim-               posed,  may  also be  regarded  as  primordial               groups-if one is willing to view ideology as a               kind of religion."               "At  the  same time, it is  imperative  to  be               alert   to   qualitative   and    quantitative               differences  within  the  broad  category   of               plural    societies:    differences    between               different  kinds  of segmental  cleavages  and               differences  in the degree to which a  society               is plural.               The  second prominent characteristic  of  non-               Western   politics   is   the   breakdown   of               democracy.    After   the   initial   optimism               concerning  the  democratic prospects  of  the               newly independent countries, based largely  on               the  democratic  aspirations voiced  by  their               political leaders, a mood (if  disillusionment               has set in.  And, according to many observers,               there  is a direct connection between the  two               fundamental features of non-Western  politics:               a plural society is incapable of sustaining  a               democratic government." 959 Pluralist societies are the result of irreversible movements of  history.   They cannot be washed  away.   The  political genius  of  a  people should be able to  evolve  within  the democratic system, adjustments and solutions.

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6.   Pursuant   to  Article  371-F  and  the   corresponding consequential changes brought about in the Representation of the  People  Act, 1950, Representation of  the  People  Act, 1951, as amended by the Election Laws (Extension to  Sikkim) Act,  1976 and the Representation of the People  (Amendment) Act, 1980, 12 out of the 32 seats in the Sikkim Assembly are reserved for the Sikkimese of "Bhutia-Lepcha" origin and one seat  for  the  "Sangha", Buddhist  Lamaic  monasteries  the election  to which latter being on the basis of  a  separate Electoral roll in which only the "Sanghas" belonging to  the Lamaic monasteries recognised for the purposes of  elections held   in  Sikkim  in  April,  1974,  are  entitled  to   be registered. These  reservations  of seats for the ethnic  and  religious groups are assailed by the petitioners who are Sikkimese  of Nepali origin as violative of the fundamentals of the Indian constitutionalism  and  as violative of  the  principles  of republicanism  and  secularism forming the  bedrock  of  the Indian  constitutional ethos.  The basic contention is  that Sikkim  citizen is as much as citizen of the Union of  India entitled  to  all  the  Constitutional  guarantees  and  the blessings of a Republican Democracy. 7.   It is necessary here to advert to the movement for  the establishment  of a responsible Government in Sikkim and  of the evolution of its political     institutions. By  a  Royal  Proclamation of  28th  December,  1952,  State Council was set-up in which out of the 12 elected members, 6 were  to  be Bhutias-Lepchas and the other  6  Sikkimese  of Nepalese    origin.    Sikkim   was   divided   into    four constituencies   with  the  following  break-down   of   the distribution  of  seats  between  Bhutias-Lepchas  and   the Nepalis : (i) Gangtok Constituency  2 Bhutia-Lepcha 1 Nepali (ii) North-Central Constituency  2 Bhutia Lepcha 1 Nepali (iii) Namchi Constituency  1 Bhutia Lepcha 2 Nepalis (iv) Pemayangtse Constituency  1 Bhutia Lepcha 2 Nepalis 960 By  "the State Council and Executive  Council  Proclamation, 1953" dated 23rd March, 1953, a State Council of 18  members consisting of 12 elected members, 5 nominated members and  a President  to be nominated by the Maharaja was  constituted. Out  of the 12 elected members, again 6 were to be  Bhutias- Lepchas  and the other 6 of Nepalese origin.  Clauses  1.  2 and 3 of the Proclamation read               "1 This Proclamation may be cited as the State               Council  and Executive  Council  Proclamation,               1953,   and   shall   come   into    operation               immediately  on its publication in the  Sikkim               Government Gazette.               2.    There  shall  be  constituted  a   State               Council for the State of Sikkim.               3.    The State Council shall consist of               (a)   A  president who shall be nominated  and               appointed by the Maharaja;               (b)   Twelve  elected  members,  of  whom  six               shall  be either Sikkim Bhutia, or Lepcha  and               the  remaining six shall be  Sikkim  Nepalese;               and,               (c)   Five  members nominated by His  Highness               the Maharaja in his discretion."               In  1958,  the  strength of  the  council  was               increased  to  20.  The break up  of  the  its               composition was as under :               (1)   Seats reserved for Bhutia & Lepchas  6               (2)   Seats reserved for Nepalis  6

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             (3)   General seat 1               (4)   Seat reserved for the Sangha 1               (5)   Nomination by His Highness 6 By the "Representation of Sikkim Subjects Regulation,  1966" dated 21.12.1966    promulgated  by  the then  Chogyal,  the State Council was to 961      consist of territorial constituencies as under      1. Bhutia-Lepchas                   7      2. Sikkimese Nepalese               7      3. The Sanghas                      1      4. Scheduled Caste                  1      5. Tsong                            1      6. General seat                     1      7. Nominated by the Chogyal         6                                   Total =24 8.The  year  1973  saw the culmination  of  a  series  of successive   political   movements  in  Sikkim   towards   a Government  responsible to the people.  On 8th May, 1973,  a tripartite  agreement  was  executed amongst  the  Ruler  of Sikkim, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and the  political  parties representing the  people  of  Sikkim which gave expansion to the increasing popular pressure  for self-Government and democratic institutions in Sikkim.  This tripartite agreement envisaged the right of people of Sikkim to  elections  on  the basis of  adult  suffrage.   It  also contemplated  the  setting up of a Legislative  Assembly  in Sikkim  to be re-constituted by election every  four  years. The  agreement  declared  a  commitment  to  free  and  fair elections to be overseen by a representative of the Election Commission  of India.  Clause 5 of the Tripartite  agreement said :               "(5)  The  system  of elections  shall  be  so               organised  as to make the Assembly  adequately               representative of the various sections of  the               population.   The size and composition of  the               Assembly and of the Executive Council shall be               such  as may be prescribed from time to  time,               care  being  taken to ensure  that  no  single               section   of   the   population   acquires   a               dominating  position due mainly to its  ethnic               origin,  and that the rights and interests  of               the Sikkimese Bhutia Lepcha origin and of  the               Sikkimiese  Nepali, which includes  Tsong  and               Scheduled Caste origin, are fully protected." This  agreement  was  effectuated by  a  Royal  Proclamation called the Representation of Sikkim Subjects Act. 1974.  The reservations of seats 962 under this dispensation were as under               "3.  The Assembly shall consist of  thirty-two               elected members.               A(i) Sixteen Constituencies shall be  reserved               for Sikkimese of Bhutia Lepcha origin.               A(ii) Out of these sixteen constituencies, one               shall be reserved for the Sangha.               B(i)  The  remaining  sixteen   constituencies               shall  be  reserved for Sikkimese  of  Nepali,               including Tsong and Scheduled Caste, origin.               B(ii)  Out  of  the  above-mentioned   sixteen               constituencies  of reserved for  Sikkimese  of               Nepali  origin,  one  constituency  shall   be               reserved   for   persons  belonging   to   the               Scheduled   Castes  notified  in  the   Second               Schedule annexed hereto."

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9.The Sikkim Assembly so elected and constituted,  passed the  Government  of Sikkim Act, 1974  "for  the  progressive realisation of a fully responsible Government in Sikkim  and for further strengthening close ties with India".  Para  5 of the Tripartite agreement dated 8.5.1973 was  incorporated in Section 7 of the said Act. Sections 30 and 33 of the said Act further provided               "30.  For the speedy development of Sikkim  in               the social, economic and political field,  the               Government of Sikkim may               (a)request  the  Government  of  India   to               include  the  planned  development  of  Sikkim               within the ambit to the Planning Commission of               India while that Commission is preparing plans               for  the  economic and social  development  of               India and to appropriately associate officials               from Sikkim in such work;               (b)   request  the  Government  of  India   to               provide facilities               for   students from Sikkim in institutions for               higher learning and  for  the  employment   of               people from Sikkim in the public               963               services  of  India  (including  All   India               Services),  at  par with  those  available  to               citizens of India;               (c)   seek  participation  and  representation               for  the  people of Sikkim  in  the  political               institutions of India."               "33.   The Assembly which the has been  formed               as a result of the elections held in Sikkim in               April,  1974, shall be deemed to be the  first               Assembly duly constituted under this Act,  and               shall  be entitled to exercise the powers  and               perform   the  functions  conferred   on   the               Assembly by this Act." 10.Article  2A  of  the  Constitution  introduced  by  the Constitution  (35th  Amendment)  Act, 1974  was  the  Indian reciprocation of the aspirations of the Sikkimese people and Sikkim was given the status of an "Associate State" with the Union  of  India under terms and conditions set out  in  the 10th  Schedule  inserted  in the Constitution  by  the  said Constitution (35th Amendment) Act, 1974.  11. The year 1975 witnessed an uprising and dissatisfaction of the people against the Chogyal.  The Sikkim Assembly,  by an  unanimous  resolution,  abolished  the  institution   of "Chogyal"  and declared that Sikkim shall thenceforth be  "a constituent  unit of India enjoying a democratic  and  fully responsible  Government".  The resolution also envisaged  an opinion-poll the matter.  Its resolution was endorsed by the people of Sikkim in the opinion-poll conducted on 14.4.1975. The  Constitution  (36th  Amendment) Act, 1975  came  to  be passed  giving  statehood  to Sikkim in  the  Indian  polity Article  2A was repealed.  Article 371-F introduced  by  the 36th  Constitutional  Amendment, envisaged  certain  special conditions  for the admission Sikkim as a new State  in  the Union of India.  Certain legislative measures for amendments to  the  Electoral  Laws considered necessary  to  meet  the special  situation of Sikkim, were also brought into  force. Clause(f) Article 371F reads :               "(f)  Parliament  may,  for  the  purpose   of               protecting  the  rights and interests  of  the               different   sections  of  the  population   of               Sikkim, make provision for the number of seats               in  the Legislative Assembly of the  State  of

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             Sikkim which may be 964               filled   by  candidates  belonging   to   such               sections  and  for  the  delimitation  of  the               assembly constituencies from which  candidates               belonging to such sections alone may stand for               election  to the Legislative Assembly  of  the               State of Sikkim.’ The Election Laws (Extension to Sikkim) Act, 1976 sought  to extend, with certain special provisions, the  Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to Sikkim. Section 25A of the said Act provides :               "25-A.  Conditions of registration as  elector               in    Sangha   Constituency   in   Sikkim               Notwithstanding anything contained in sections               15 and 29, for the Sangha Constituency in  the               State of Sikkim, only the Sanghas belonging to               monasteries, recognised for the purpose of the               elections  held in Sikkim in April, 1974,  for               forming  the  Assembly for  Sikkim,  shall  be               entitled  to  be registered in  the  electoral               roll,  and  the  said  electoral  roll  shall,               subject  to the provisions of sections  21  to               25,  be prepared or revised in such manner  as               may be directed by the Election Commission, in               consultation with the Government of Sikkim." By the "Representation of the People (Amendment)  Ordinance, 1979"  promulgated by the President of India  on  11.9.1979, amendments  were  introduced to the  Representation  of  the People  Act, 1950 and the Representation of the People  Act, 1951  to  enable fresh elections to the Sikkim  Assembly  on certain  basis considered appropriate to and  in  conformity with  the  historical evolution of  the  Sikkim’s  political institutions.   the   Ordinance  was   later   replaced   by Representation  of the People Amendment) Act, 1980 by  which subsection   (1-A)   was   inserted  in   Section   of   the Representation  of the People Act, 1950.   That  sub-section provides:               "(1-A).  Notwithstanding anything contained in               sub-s.  (1), the total number of seats in  the               Legislative  Assembly of the State of  Sikkim,               to   be  constituted  at  anytime  after   the               commencement  of  the  Representation  of  the               People  (Amendment) Act 1980 to be  filled  by               persons   chosen  by  direct   election   from               assembly  constituencies shall be  thirty-two,               of which               965               (a)twelve   seats   shall  be   reserved   for               Sikkimese of Bhutia Lepcha origin;               (b)two   seats  shall  be  reserved  for   the               Scheduled Caste of that State; and               (c)one seat shall be reserved for the  Sanghas               referred to in Section 25-A.               Explanation   :  In  this   sub-s.    ’Bhutia’               includes  Chumbipa, Dopthapa, Dukpa,  Kagatey,               Sherps, Tibetan, Tromopa and Yolmo." Section 5-A was also introduced in the Representation of the People Act, 1951.  Sub-section (2) of Section 5A provides :               "5A (2) Notwithstanding anything contained  in               Section 5, a person shall not be qualified  to               be  chosen to fill a seat in  the  Legislative               Assembly  of  the  State  of  Sikkim,  to   be               constituted at any time after the commencement

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             of   the   Representation   of   the    People               (Amendment) Act, 1980 unless               (a)in  the  case  of a  seat  reserved  for               Sikkimese  of  BhutiaLepcha origin,  he  is  a               person  either of Bhutia or Lepcha origin  and               is an elector for any assembly constituency in               the State other than the constituency reserved               for the Sanghas’               (b)in  the case of a seat reserved for  the               Scheduled  Castes,  he is a member of  any  of               those castes in the State of Sikkim and is  an               elector  for any assembly constituency in  the               State;               (c)in  the  case  of a  seat  reserved  for               Sanghas,  he  is  an  elector  of  the  Sangha               constituency; and               (d)in the case of any other seat, he is  an               elector  for any assembly constituency in  the               State." 12.Petitioners   assail  the  constitutionality   of   the provisions  for reservation of seats in favour  of  Bhutias- Lepchas and the "Sangha". 966 On  the contentions urged in support of the  petitions,  the points that fall for consideration, are the following               (a)Whether  the  questions  raised  in  the               petitions  pertaining as they do to the  terms               and  conditions of accession of new  territory               are governed by rules of public  international               law and are non-justiciable on the  "political               questions doctrine"?               (b)Whether  clause (f) of Article 371 F  of               the  Constitution of India, introduced by  the               Constitution  (36th  Amendment) Act,  1975  is               violative of the basic features of democracy?               (c)Whether Secton 7(1A) and Section 25A  of               the Representation of the People Act, 1950  as               inserted   by  Election  Laws  (Extension   to               Sikkim)  Act, 19761 and Representation of  the               People (Amendment) Act, 1980 respectively  and               Section  5A(2)  of the Representation  of  the               People   Act,   1951  as   inserted   by   the               Representation of the People (Amendment)  Act,               19801  providing for reservation of 12  seats,               out  of  32 seats in  the  Sikkim  Legislative               Assembly  in favour of  Bhutias-Lepachas,  are               unconstitutional  as  violative of  the  basic               features of democracy and republicanism  under               the Indian Constitution?               (d)Whether the aforesaid provisions and the               reservations made thereunder are violative  of               Article 14,170(2) and 332 of the Constitution?               Whether  they  violate ’one person  one  vote’               rule?   Or are these differences justified  in               the  historical background of Sikkim  and  are               incidental to the political events culminating               in the cession of Sikkim?               (e)Whether the reservation of 12 seats  out               of  32 seats reserved for  Bhutias-Lepchas  is               ultra vires of clause (f) of Article 371-F  in               that   while   that  provision   enabled   the               protection  of  the rights  and  interests  of               different’  sections of population  of  Sikkim               and for the number of seats in the Legislative               Assembly which may be filled by the candidates

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             belonging  to  such  sections,  the   impugned               provisions pro-               967               vide  for  one  section  alone,  namely,   the               Bhutias-Lepchas.               (f)Whether,  at all events in view  of  the               Constitution (Sikkim) Scheduled Tribes  Order,               1978  declaring  Bhutias  and  Lepchas  as   a               Schedule  Tribe, the extent of reservation  of               seats  is  disproportionate and  violative  of               Article  332(3)  of  the  Constitution   which               requires  that  the  number  of  seats  to  be               reserved  shall bear as nearly as may be,  the               same  proportion  to the total number  of  the               seats in the Assembly as the population of               the Scheduled Tribe in the State bears to  the               total population of the State.               (g)Whether the reservation of one seat  for               Sangha  to be elected by an Electoral  College               of  Lamaic  monasteries  is  based  purely  on               religious  distinctions  and  is,   therefore,               unconstitutional  as  violative  of   Articles               15(1)  and  325  of the  Constitution  and  as               violative of the principle of secularism?               Re    Contention (a) 13.  The  territory of Sikkim was admitted into  the  Indian Union by an    act  of  voluntary  cession  by  the  general consent  of  its  inhabitants  expressed  on  a  Referendum. Referring  to  the  acquisition of  title  to  territory  by cession, a learned author says :               "(f) Title by Cession  Title to territory may               also  be acquired by an act of cession,  which               means, the transfer of sovereignty over  State               territory  by the owner (ceding) State to  the               acquiring  State.  It rests on  the  principle               that  the right of transferring its  territory               is a fundamental attribute of the  sovereignty               of a State."               "Plebiscite   The method  of  plebiscite  in               certain  cases was adopted by the Treaties  of               Peace  after the First World War, and  it  had               the  buoyant blessing of President Wilson  who               told the Congress: "No peace can last or ought               to  last, which does not recognise and  accept               the principle that government drive all  their               just powers from the consent of the  governed,               and  that  no right anywhere  exists  to  hand               peoples               968               about   from  sovereignty  as  if  they   were               property."  Article 26 of the Constitution  of               France  (1946) provides that no new  territory               shall be added to France without a plebiscite.               In   certain  cases,  cession  may   be   made               conditional  upon the result of a  plebiscite,               which is held to give effect to the  principle               of  self-determination.   In other  words,  no               cession  shall be valid until the  inhabitants               have   given   their  consent  to  it   by   a               plebiscite.  It is often only a  technicality,               as  in Outer Mongolia, in 1945, and in  South-               West Africa, in 1946.  As Oppenheim  observes,               it is doubtful whether the law of nations will               ever make it a condition of every cession that               it must be ratified by a plebiscite."

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             [See  : Substance of Public International  Law               Western  and  Eastern : A.K.  Pavithran  First               Edition, 1965 at pp. 281-21] Sri Parasaran urged that the rights of the inhabitants of  a territory becoming part of India depend on the terms subject to  which  the territory is admitted and Article  2  confers wide powers on the Parliament.  Sri Parasaran urged that the considerations that guide the matter are eminently political and  are outside the area of justiciability.  Sri  Parasaran said  that  the  inhabitants of a territory  can  claim  and assert  only  those  rights that  the  succeeding  sovereign expressly  confers on them.  Sri Parasaran relied  upon  the following observations of Chief Justice Chandrachud in Vinod Kumar  Shantilal Gosalia v. Gangadhar Narsingdas  Agarwal  & Ors., [1982] 1 SCR 392:               "Before   considering   the  merits   of   the               respective  contentions bearing on the  effect               of  the provisions of the  Administration  Act               and   the  Regulation,  it  is  necessary   to               reiterate  a well-settled legal position  that               when a new territory is acquired in any manner -  be  it by consent, annexation  or  cession               following   upon  a  treaty -  the   new   "               sovereign"  is not bound by the  rights  which               the  residents of the conquered territory  had               against their sovereign or by the  obligations               of  the  old sovereign towards  his  subjects.               The  rights  of the residents of  a  territory               against  their state of sovereign come  to  an               end  with the conquest, annexation or  cession               of  that territory and do not pass on  to  the               new  environment.   The  inhabitants  of   the               acquired territory               969               bring  with  them no rights  which  they   can               enforce  against the new State of  which  they               become  inhabitants.   The new  state  is  not               required,   by  any  positive   assertion   or               declaration,  to repudiate its obligations  by               disowning  such  rights.  The  new  state  may               recongnise the old rights by re-granting  them               which,  in the majority of cases, would  be  a               matter of contract or of executive action; or,               alternatively,  the recognition of old  rights               may  be  made  by  an  appropriate   statutory               provisions whereby rights which were in  force               immediately  before  an  appointed  date   are               saved.  Whether the new state has accepted new               obligations  by recognising old rights,  is  a               question of fact depending upon whether one or               the other course has been adopted by it.  And,               whether  it  is alleged that  old  rights  are               saved  by  a statutory provision,  it  becomes               necessary  to  determine the  kind  of  rights               which  are saved and the extend to which  they               are saved." But, we are afraid these observations are inapposite in  the present  context as the situation is different  here.   What the  argument  overlooks  is that the  petitioners  are  not seeking  to enforce such rights as vested in them  prior  to the  accession.  What they seek to assert and  enforce,  are the  rights  which the Indian Constitution confers  on  them upon the accession of their territory into the Indian  Union and  as  arising  from  the conferment  on  them  of  Indian citizenship.    In  the  present  cases  the   question   of

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recognition   and  enforcement  of  the  rights  which   the petitioners, as residents of the ceded territory had against their  own  sovereign  or  by the  obligations  of  the  old sovereign its people, do not arise. The   principal   questions  are  whether  there   are   any constitutional limitations on the power of Parliament in the matter  of  prescription  of the terms  and  conditions  for admission of a new State into the Union of India; and if so, what these limitations are.               14.   Articles  2  and 4 of  the  Constitution               provide               "2.  Parliament  may  by law  admit  into  the               Union. or establish, new States on such  terms               and conditions as it thinks fit."               970               "4.  (1) Any law referred to in article  2  or               article  3 shall contain such  provisions  for               the  amendment of the First Schedule  and  the               Fourth  Schedule as may be necessary  to  give               effect  to the provisions of the law  and  may               also contain such supplemental, incidental and               consequential provisions (including provisions               as to representation in Parliament and in  the               Legislature  or Legislatures of the  State  or               States affected by such law) as Parliament may               deem necessary.               (2)   No such law as aforesaid shall be deemed               to  be an amendment of this  Constitution  for               the purpose of article 368. Can  the  Parliament  in imposing terms  and  conditions  in exercise  of  power  under Article 2  stipulate  and  impose conditions  inconsistent  with  the  basic  and  fundamental principles of Indian Constitutionalism?  Or is it imperative that  the  newly admitted State should  be  treated  exactly similar  to the States as at the time of the commencement of the  Constitution?   If  not,  what is  the  extent  of  the permissible departure and latitude and do the conditions  in clause  (f)  of  Article  371-F  and  as  expressed  in  the electoral  laws  as  applicable to Sikkim  go  beyond  these constitutionally permissible limits?  These are some of  the questions. 15.The learned Attorney-General for the Union of India and Sri   Parasaran  sought  to  contend  that  the  terms   and conditions of admission of a new territory into the Union of India  are  eminently political questions  which  the  Court should  decline to decide as these questions lack  adjudica- tive  disposition.   This political thickets doctrine  as  a restraint on judicial power has been the subject of forensic debate,  at  once intense and interesting,  and  has  evoked considerable judicial responses. 16.In  "The Constitution of the United States of  America" (Analysis   and   Interpretation;   Congressional   Research Service:  Library  of  Congress 1982  Edn.  at  p.703),  the following statement of the law on the subject occurs:               "  It  may  be  that  there  will  be  a  case               assuredly within the               Court’s jurisdiction presented by the  parties               with standing               971               in which adverseness and ripeness will  exist,               a  case  in  other words  presenting  all  the               qualifications we have considered making it  a               justiciable controversy, which the Court  will               nonetheless refuse to adjudicate.  The "label"               for  such  a  case  is  that  it  presents   a

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             "political question". Tracing  the origins and development of this  doctrine,  the authors refer to the following observations of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 5 US 137, 170 (1803) :               "The  province  of the court  is,  solely,  to               decide  on the rights of individuals,  not  to               inquire   how  the  executive,  or   executive               officers, perform duties in which they have  a               discretion.   Questions   in   their   natural               political,  or which are, by the  constitution               and laws, submitted to the executive can never               be made in this court.                (emphasis supplied)                The authors further say               "But the doctrine was asserted even earlier as               the Court in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 3 US  199               (1796) refused to pass on the question whether               a  treaty had been broken.  And in  Martin  v.               Mott, 12 Wheat. 25 US 19 (1827) the Court held               that the President acting under  congressional               authorization  had exclusive and  unreviewable               power to determine when the militia should  be               called out.  But it was in Luther v. Borden  7               How. 48 US 1 (1849) that the concept was first               enunciated   as  a  doctrine   separate   from               considerations of interference with  executive               functions." 17.Prior  to  the  decision of the Supreme  Court  of  the United  States  in  Baker  v. Carr, 369  US  186  the  cases challenging  the  distribution of  political  power  through apportionment    and   districting,   weighed-voting,    and restrictions  on political action were held to present  non- justiciable political questions.  The basis of this doctrine was  the "seeming conviction of the courts that  the  issues raised  were  well beyond the judicial  responsibility".  In Baker  v. Carr, the Court undertook a major  rationalisation and  formulation of the ’political question doctrine’  which led to considerable narrowing 972 of  its  application.  The effect Baker v.  Carr.,  and  the later decision in Poweel v. McCormack, 395 US 486 is that in the   United   States  of  America   certain   controversies previously  immune from adjudication were  held  justiciable and  decided on the merits.  The rejection of the  political thickets  arguments in these cases marks a narrowing of  the operation of the doctrine in other areas as well. In  Japan  Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean  Society,  478 [1986] US 221 the American Supreme Court said               "We  address first the  Japanese  petitioners’               contention   that  the  present  actions   are               unsuitable  for judicial review  because  they               involve  foreign relations and that a  federal               court, therefore, lacks the judicial power  to               command   the   Secretary  of   Commerce,   an               Executive  Branch  official, to  dishonor  and               repudiate an international agreement.  Relying               on   the  political  question  doctrine,   and               quoting  Baker v. Carr., 369 US 186, 217  7  L               Ed.  2d 663, 82 S Ct. 691 (1969) the  Japanese               Petitioners  argue that the danger of  "embar-               rassment  from multifarious pronouncements  by               various departments on one question" bars  any               judicial    resolution    of    the    instant               controversy." (Page 178)               "We  disagree.   Baker carefully  pointed  out

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             that not every matter touching on politics  is               a political question, id., at 209, 7 L Ed.  2d               663, 82 S.Ct. 691, and more specifically, that               it  is  "error to suppose that every  case  of               controversy  which touches  foreign  relations               lies beyond judicial cognizance." Id., at 211,               7  L Ed. 2d 663, 82 S Ct. 691.  The  political               question   doctrine  excludes  from   judicial               review   those  controversies  which   revolve               around policy choices and value determinations               constitutionally  committed for resolution  to               the  halls of Congress or the confines of  the               Executive    Branch.    The    Judiciary    is               particularly    ill-suited   to   make    such               decisions, as "courts are fundamentally  under               equipped  to  formulate national  policies  or               develop  standards  for matters not  legal  in               nature." (P. 178)               973               "As  Bakerplainly  held, however,  the  courts               have  the authority to construe  treaties  and               executive  agreements,  and  it  goes  without               saying    that   interpreting    congressional               legislation  is a recurring and accepted  task               for  the federal courts.  It is  also  evident               that the challenge to the Secretary’s decision               not to certify Japan for harvesting whales  in               excess  of IWC quotas presents a purely  legal               question  of  statutory  interpretation.   The               Court  must  first determine  the  nature  and               scope  of the duty imposed upon the  secretary               by the Amendments, a decision which calls  for               applying no more than the traditional rules of               statutory construction, and then applying this               analysis  to  the  particular  set  of   facts               presented  below.   We are  cognizant  of  the               interplay  between  these Amendments  and  the               conduct  of this Nation’s  foreign  relations,               and  we recognize the premier role which  both               Congress and the Executive play in this field.               But   under  the  Constitution,  one  of   the               Judiciary’s   characteristic   roles   is   to               interpret  Statutes, and we cannot shirk  this               responsibility merely because our decision may               have  significant political  overtones."  (PP.               178-9)                (emphasis supplied) 18.Our Court has received and viewed this doctrine with  a cautious reservation.  In A.K Roy v. Union of India,  [1982] 2  SCR  272 at 296-7, Chief Justice  Chandrachud  recognised that  the doctrine, which was essentially a function of  the separation   of  powers  in  America,  was  to  be   adopted cautiously and said               "It must also be mentioned that in the  United               States  itself, the doctrine of the  political               question  has come under a cloud and has  been               the  subject matter of adverse criticism.   It               is  said  that all that  the  doctrine  really               means is that in the exercise of the power  of               judicial  review,  the  courts  must  adopt  a               ’prudential’  attitude,  which  requires  that               they should be wary of deciding upon the merit               of  any issue in which claims of principle  as               to  the issue and claims of expediency  as  to               the power and prestige of courts are in  sharp

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             conflict.   The result, more or less, is  that               in America               974               the phrase "political question’ has become  ’a               little more than a play of words". There  is  further  recognition of the  limitation  of  this doctrine in the pronouncement of this Court in Madhav Rao v. Union  of  India, [1971] 3 SCR 9 and State of  Rajasthan  v. Union of India, [1978] 1 SCR 1. 19.It  is urged for the respondents that Article 2 of  the Constitution empowers the Parliament, by law, to admit  into the  Union  new States "on such terms and conditions  as  it finds  fit"  and that these considerations  involve  complex questions   of   political   policy   and   expedience;   of international-relations;  of  security and  defence  of  the realm  etc.  which  do not possess  and  present  judicially manageable standards.  Judicial response to these questions, it is urged, is judicial restraint. The  validity of clause (f) of Article 371 F  introduced  by the  Constitution (36th Amendment) Act, 1975 is assailed  on the  ground that the said clause provides for a  reservation which violates ’one person one vote’ rule which is essential to  democracy which latter is itself a basic feature of  the Constitution.  The power to admit new States into the  Union under  Article  2 is, no doubt, in the very  nature  of  the power,  very  wide and its exercise  necessarily  guided  by political  issues of considerable complexity many  of  which may  not be judicially manageable.  But for that reason,  it cannot   be  predicated  that  Article  2  confers  on   the Parliament an unreviewable and unfettered power immune  from judicial scrutiny.  The power is limited by the fundamentals of   the  Indian  constitutionalism  and  those  terms   and conditions  which  the Parliament may deem  fit  to  impose, cannot   be   inconsistent  and  irreconcilable   with   the foundational  principles  of  the  Constitution  and  cannot violate  or subvert the Constitutional scheme.  This is  not to  say that the conditions subject to which a new State  or territory  is admitted into the Union ought exactly  be  the same as those that govern all other States as at the time of the commencement of the Constitution. It  is, however, urged that Article 371F starts with  a  non obstante  clause and therefore the other provisions  of  the Constitution  do not limit the power of  impose  conditions. But  Article 371-F cannot transgress the basic  features  of the  Constitution.   The  non  obstante  clause  cannot   be construed  as taking clause (f) of Article 371F outside  the limitations on the 975 amending  power  itself  The provisions  of  clause  (f)  of Article   371-F   and  Article  2  have  to   be   construed harmoniously consistent with the foundational principles and basic features of the Constitution.  Whether clause (f)  has the effect of destroying a basic feature of the Constitution depends,  in  turn, on the question whether  reservation  of seats  in  the legislature based on ethnic group  is  itself destructive of democratic principle.  Whatever the merits of the contentions be, it cannot be said the issues raised  are non-justiciable. In  Mangal Singh & Anr. v. Union of India, [1967] 2 SCR  109 at 112 this Court said :               "...  Power  with  which  the  Parliament   is               invested by Arts. 2 and 3, is power to  admit,               establish, or form new States which conform to               the   democratic  pattern  envisaged  by   the               Constitution;   and   the  power   which   the

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             Parliament    may   exercise   by    law    is               supplemental,  incidental or consequential  to               the admission, establishment or formation of a               State as contemplated by the Constitution, and               is  not power to override  the  constitutional               scheme". Even  if clause (f) of Article 371 F is valid, if the  terms and conditions stipulated in a law made under Article 2 read with   clause   (f)   of  Article   371F   go   beyond   the constitutionally  permissible  latitudes, that  law  can  be questioned  as  to its validity.  The  contention  that  the vires  of the provisions and effects of such a law are  non- justiciable cannot be accepted. Contention (a) requires to be and is rejected. Re : Contentions (b), (c) and (d) 20.The  objection of non-justiciability thus out of  their way,  he petitioners urge that the provisions in clause  (f) of  Article 371F enabling reservation of seats for  sections of  the  people  and  law made in  exercise  of  that  power providing  reservation of seats to  Bhutias-Lepchas  violate fundamental principles of democracy and republicanism  under the  Indian  Constitution and violate the  ’one  person  one vote’ rule which, it is urged, is a basic to the  republican principle found in Article 170(2) of the Constitution. 976 Sri  R.K. Jain, learned senior counsel for  the  petitioners said that apart from the invalidity of the power itself  the exercise  of  the power in the matter of the extent  of  the reservations  made  for Bhutias-Lepchas has  the  effect  of whittling  down, correspondingly, the value of the votes  of the  Sikkimese of Nepalese origin and is destructive of  the equality  principle and the democratic  principle.   Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 170 provide               "170. (1) Subject to the provisions of article               333,  the Legislative Assembly of  each  State               shall  consist of not more than five  hundred,               and  not  less than sixty, members  chosen  by               direct      election     from      territorial               constituencies in the State.               (2)For  the  purposes of clause  (1),  each               State   shall  be  divided  into   territorial               constituencies  in such manner that the  ratio               between  the population of  each  constituency               and the number of seats allotted to it  shall,               so  far as practicable be the same  throughout               the State.               Explanation.   In this clause, the  expression               "population"    means   the   population    as               ascertained  at the last preceding  census  of               which   the   relevant   figures   have   been               published:" This provision incorporates the rule of ’fair and  effective representation’.  Though the rule ’one person one vote’ is a broad principle of democracy, it is more a declaration of  a political   ideal  than  a  mandate  for  enforcement   with arithmetical  accuracy.  These are the usual  problems  that arise  in  the delimitation of constituencies.  In  what  is called   "First-past-thepost"  system  of   elections,   the variations  in  the size and in the  voting  populations  of different constituencies, detract from a strict  achievement of this ideal.  The system has the merit of preponderance of "decisiveness" over "representativeness". Commenting on this phenomenon Keith Graham in "The Battle of Democracy.  Conflict, Consensus and the Individual" says :               "This,  in existing systems where  voters  are

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             electing  representatives, examples  of  gross               inequality  between  the powers  of  different               votes occur, either because of disparities  in               constituency size or because of the  anomalies               produced  in  a  first-past-the-post   system.               There was, for instance, an               977               occasion  when one Californian  State  Senator               represented  six million electors and  another               one   fourteen  thousand   electors   (Portter               1981:114); in February, 1974 constituencies in               England varied from 96,380 to 25,007  electors               (Hansard  Society Commission 1976:7);  and  in               the United Kingdom between 1945 and 1976  nine               out of ten of the elected governments acquired               more  than 50 per cent of the seats, but  none               acquired  50  per  cent  of  the  votes   cast               (ibid.:9).  When  the  United  States  Supreme               Court asserted that it had jurisdiction in the               matter  of  huge disparities in the  value  of               citizens’ votes. it did so, significantly,  by               referring  to the Fourteenth Amendment,  which               guarantees  equal  protection  of  the  laws."               (Page 55) 21.The   concept  of  political  equality   underlying   a democratic system. is a political value.  Perfect  political equality  is  only ideological.  Indeed, a,  Rodney  Brazier points  out  in his "Constitutional  Reform:  Reshaping  the British Political System" :               "Inextricably linked in the voting system with               unfairness  is the supremacy  of  decisiveness               over representativeness.  The  first-past-the-               post system has developed into a mighty engine               which can be relied on to produce a government               from one of the two principal parties.  But in               that  development the purpose of  gathering  a               House    of   Commons   which    is    broadly               representative  of the electorate  has  rather               faded.   This  would  be possibly  not  be  as               important  as it is if the  elective  function               worked  on the basis of a majority  of  voters               conferring  a  parliamentary majority  on  the               winning party.  Patently, however, it does not               do  so.   Mrs. Thatcher’s  144-seat  landslide               majority  in  1983,  and  her  huge   102-seat               majority in 1987, were achieved even though on               both occasions some 57 per cent of votes  were               given  to  other parties.  Almost  60  per  of               voting citizens voted against the Conservative               Government.   This  is by no  means  a  recent               phenomenon.   Attlee’s  146-seat  majority  in               1945 was won on under 48 per cent of the vote,               and indeed no winning party has been supported               by  half or more of those going to  the  polls               since the general election of 1935.  Are the               978               virtues  of  the British  electoral  system               simplicity,   decisiveness,  its  ability   to               produce  stable  governments, and so on   so               self-evident as to justify such distortions of               the electoral will?  It is really necessary to               have  voting system predicated either  on  the               representative function, or (as in Britain) on               the elective function?" (Page 46) Again, Brazier in "Constitutional Practice’ (Clarendon Press

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Oxford) says               "The  first-past-the-post system  usually  has               the   advantage   of  producing   a   majority               government  at  a  general  election:  it   is               decisive,   simple,   and  familiar   to   the               electorate.   Yet it is also unfair.   No  one               could  say  that  a  scheme  which  gives  one               political  group three per cent of  the  seats               from  22.6 per cent of the national vote,  but               which  gives another party 36 per cent of  the               seats  with a mere eight per cent more of  the               votes,  does  anything  but  violence  to  the               concept of fair play as the British understand               it.    The  present  system  also   underspins               elective dictatorship in a way that  different               electoral  rules, Which would return more  MPs               from third (and perhaps fourth) parties, would               undermine.    And   we  speak   of   ’majority               governments’ by reference to seats won in  the               House,  but  no government has  been  returned               with  a  majority of the  popular  vote  since               1935." (Page 191)               Arend   Lijphart  in  "Democracy   in   Plural               Societies" observes               "Formidable though the classic dangers are  of               a plurality of sovereign states, these have to               be  reckoned  against those  inherent  in  the               attempt   to  contain  disparate   communities               within  the framework of a single  government.               In  the  field of peace research, there  is  a               similar  tendency to frown on peace  which  is               achieved by separating the potential enemies--               significantly labeled "negative’ peace--and to               strive  for peace based on  fraternal  feeling               within  a single integrated and just  society:               "positive" peace. (P. 47) The  problem  of equality of the value of votes  is  further complicated   by  a  progressive  rural   depopulation   and increasing urbanisation.  In the 979 work  "Legislative Apportionment : Key to Power" (Howard  D. Hamilton) the learned author says :               "But even the right to vote, and its  exercise               does  not in itself insure equal voice in  the               affairs of government.               Today--more  than 175 years after  the  nation               was founded the votes of millions of  citizens               are worth only one-half, one quarter and  even               one-one hundredth the value of votes of others               because  of  the unfair formulas by  which  we               elect  the  Unites  States  Congress  and  the               legislatures  of the forty-eight  states.   As               our  population grows and  moves  continuously               toward urban centres, the ballots of  millions               become  less  and less equal to the  votes  of               others.    Our   system   of    representative               government is being sapped at its roots."               "Who  are  the second-class citizens  in  this               under  represented majority?  They  are  the               millions living in our towns and cities,  says               the   United  States  Conference  of   Mayors,               pointing  to the fact that the 59 per cent  of               all Americans who were living in urban centers               in  1947 elected only 25 percent of the  state               legislators." (Page 74)

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Gordon E. Baker writing on "One Person, One Vote : "Fair and Effective      Representation?"     [Representation      and Misrepresentation  Rand McNally & Co. Chicago] says :               "While population inequality among legislative               districts  is  hardly new, its  has  become  a               major  source of controversy primarily in  the               twentieth century."               "A  statistical  analysis of  the  New  Jersey               Senate  by  Professor Ernest  C.  Reock,  Jr.,               revealed that "The average relative population               deviation rose from 27.7. per cent in 1791  to               80.0 per cent in 1922.  The ratio between  the               largest  and smallest counties  only 7.85  at               the. beginning of that period  reached  33.51               at  the  end.  The minimum percentage  of  the               state’s   population  residing   in   counties               electing a majority of the Senate dropped from               41.0 per cent to 15.9 per cent." (PP. 72-3) 980          22. Sri Jain, however, relied upon the decision  in B-4.  Reynolds v. M.     O. Sims, 377 US 506 at 527 in which it was observed :  "Undoubtedly,  the  right of  suffrage  is  a               fundamental matter   in a free and  democratic               society. Especially since the right      to               exercise   the   franchise  in  a   free   and               unimpaired  manner  is preservative  of  other               basic civil and political rights, any    allege               infringement of the right of citizens to  vote               must    be    carefully    and    meticulously               scrutinized."  "  Legislators represent people, not trees or               acres. Legislators are elected by voters,  not               farms or cities or economic interests. As long               as   ours   is  a   representative   form   of               government,  and  our legislatures  are  those               instruments of government elected directly  by               and directly representative of the  people,               the  right to elect legislators in a free  and               unimpaired   fashion  is  a  bedrock  of   our               political system."                "And,  if  a State should  provide  that  the               votes  of  citizens in one part of  the  State               should  be given two times, or five times,  or               10  times the weight of votes of  citizens  in               another part of the State, it could hardly  be               contended  that  the right to  vote  of  those               residing in the disfavored areas had not  been               effectively    diluted.   It   would    appear               exordinary  to suggest that a State  could  be               constitutionally  permitted  to  enact  a  law               providing  that certain of the State’s  voters               could  vote  two, five or 10 times  for  their                             legislative   representatives,   while   voter s               living elsewhere could vote only once."  Even so, Chief Justice Warren observed               ".... We  realize  that  it  is  a   practical               impossibility to arrange legislative districts               so  that each one has an identical  number  of               residents,    or    citizens,    or    voters.               Mathematical exactness or precision is  hardly               a   workable   constitutional    requirement."               (p.536)  "... So long as the divergences from a strict

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             population  standard are based  on  legitimate               considerations incident to the               981               effectuation  of a rational state policy  some               deviations from the equal-population principle               are constitutionally permissible with  respect               to  the  apportionment of seats in  either  or               both  of the two houses of a  bicameral  state               legislature." (p.537)                (emphasis supplied) 23.Section 24 of the Australian Constitution requires that "the  House of Representatives shall be composed of  members directly  chosen by the people of Commonwealth".   The  High Court  of Australia considered the principle of Reynolds  v. Sims, (supra) somewhat inapposite in the Australian context.In Attorney   General   (CTH)   Ex.   Rel   Mckinlay   v.   The Commonwealth,[1975] 135 CLR 1 at p.22 Barwick CJ  observed :               "It is, therefore, my opinion that the  second               paragraph of s.24 cannot be read as containing               any  guarantee that there shall be  a  precise               mathematical  relationship between the  number               of   members  chosen  in  a  State   and   the               population of that State or that every  person               in   Australia  or  that  every   elector   in               Australia will have a vote, or an equal vote."               Mason, J. said :               "The  substance  of  the matter  is  that  the               conception of equality in the value of a  vote               or equality as between electoral divisions  is               a  comparatively modern development  for-which               no  stipulation  was  made in  the  system  of               democratic representative government  provided               for by our Constitution." (p.62) 24.It  is  true that the right to vote is central  to  the right to participation in the democratic process.   However, there  is less consensus amongst theorists on the  propriety of  judicial  activism in the voting area.   In  India,  the Delimitation Laws made under Article 327 of the Constitution of  India,  are  immune from the  ’judicial  test  of  their validity   and  the  process  of  allotment  of  seats   and constituencies  not liable to be called in question  in  any court by virtue of Article 329(a) of the Constitution.   But the laws providing reservations are made under authority  of other  provisions of the Constitution such as those in  Art. 332 or clause (f) of Article 371F which’ 982 latter is a special provision for Sikkim. 25.The  rationale and constitutionality of clause (f)  and the other provisions of the electoral laws impugned in these petitions  are sought to be justified by the respondents  on grounds that first, a perfect arithmetical equality of value of  votes is not a constitutionally mandated  imperative  of democracy   and,  secondly,  that  even  if   the   impugned provisions  make a departure from the tolerance  limits  and the    constitutionally    permissible    latitudes,     the discriminations arising are justifiable on the basis of  the historical considerations peculiar to and characteristic  of the evolution of Sikkim’s political institutions.  This,  it is urged, is the justification for the special provisions in clause  (f)  which  was specifically intended  to  meet  the special  situation.   It is sought to be  pointed  out  that throughout  the  period  when  the  ideas  of   responsible- Government  sprouted  in Sikkim, there has been  a  vigilant political endeavour to sustain that delicate balance between

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Bhutias-Lepchas  on  the  one  hand  and  the  Sikkimese  of Nepalese  origin  on  the  other  essential  to  the  social stability  of  that mountain-State.  Clause (f)  of  Article 371F  was  intended to prevent the domination of  the  later Nepali  immigrants who had, in course of  time,  outnumbered the  original  inhabitants.  What Article 371-F(f)  and  the electoral laws in relation to Sikkim seek to provide, it  is urged,   is  to  maintain  this  balance  in  the   peculiar historical  setting  of the development of  Sikkim  and  its political institutions. 26.So  far as the ’Sangha’ is concerned it is  urged  that though  it  was essentially a religious institution  of  the Buddhists,  it  however occupied a unique  position  in  the political, social and cultural fife of the Sikkimese society and the one seat reserved for it cannot, therefore, be  said to  be based on considerations ’only’ of religion.   In  the counter-affidavit   filed  by  the  Sikkim  Tribal   Welfare Association, certain special aspects of the position of  the ’Sangha’  in Sikkim’s polity are emphasised.   Reference  to and  reliance  has  been placed on the  extracts  from  "The Himalayan Gateway’ (History and Culture of Sikkim) in  which the following passages occur:               "The  reservation for the Sangha is  the  most               unique feature of the political set up in  the               State.   It is a concession to continuity  and               is admittedly short term.  Before the  revolu-               tion the Buddhist Sangha of the Lamas  wielded               immense  power, both religious and  political.               The  people have come to have great  faith  in               their wisdom and justice.  They are 983               universally   respected  and   still   command               considerable  influence with a section of  the               people   who   would  be   called   poor   and               politically backward.  The presence of onle of               their  representatives in the  Assembly  could               possibly give the illiterate masses a  greater               faith in its deliberations."(P.149)               "Finally  lamaism  is a  social  Organisation.               The  lamas (to a lesser extent the  nuns)  are               arranged in a disciplined hierarchy.  They are               a  section of society which performs  for  the               whole  society  its  religious  functions;  in               return   the  rest  of  society  should   give               material support to the lamas...... (PP.  192-               193)               "It  is calculated that about ten per cent  of               the  combined  Bhutia-Lepcha  population   are               monks.   Could there be anything more  telling               for  the  spiritual heritage  of  the  people.               According to tradition the second son of every               Bhutia  house-hold  is  to be  called  to  the               Sangha   the  order  of  Buddhist  monks.   No               matter  where one goes, one can come across  a               monastery  called  Gompa.  For a  small  state               like  Sikkim  in  which  the  Buddhist  Bhutia               Lepcha   population   hardly   exceed   thirty               thousands,  there are more than thirty  famous                             monasteries.   In  fact most of  the  prominen t               hilltops  of  the country are crowned  with  a               monastery  shrine  or a  temple.   Apart  from               these  at every village there is a Gompa or  a               village monastery with a resident lama looking               after   the   spiritual  needs  of   a   small

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             community.   Frequently, Chorten, the  lamaist               version  of the original Buddhist  stupa,  are               also seen." (pp. 112-3)               "Life  in the countryside  centres  round  the               monastery  of the Buddhist monks,  the  lamas.               Birth, death, sickness  all are occasions  for               the lamas to be called in for the  performance               of appropriate ceremonies.  Just putting up  a               prayer  flag  even  needs  the  attendance  of               lamas."(p. 115)               Since  the  rulers were  also  monk-incarnates               constantly in transaction with the high  Lamas               of  Tibet  and the DebRaja  of  Bhutan,  these               monks were used as emissaries,               984               medioators,  and  settlers  of  various  state               affairs.  In internal administration also, the               monks  held  important positions.   They  were               appointed  to the State Council, they  managed               the  monastery estates,  administered  justice               and even helped the laity in fighting  against               the  enemies.  Though economically  dependent,               they  were very much influential both  in  the               court  and  in public life.  In fact,  it  was               these clergymen who managed the affairs of the               state  in collaboration with Kazis."  (p.  18,               19) 27.As  is noticed earlier Article 2 gives a wide  latitude in  the  matter  of prescription  of  terms  and  conditions subject  to which a new territory is admitted.  There is  no constitutional  imperative that those terms  and  conditions should ensure that the new State should, in all respects, be the same as the other States in the Indian Union.   However, the terms and conditions should not seek to establish a form or  system  of  Government  or  political  and  governmental institutions alien to and fundamentally different from those the Constitution envisages. Indeed,  in  "Constitutional  Law  of  India",  [Edited   by Hidayatullah,  J.  published  by the Bar  Council  of  India Trust], it is observed               "Foreign territories, which after acquisition,               become a part of the territory of India  under               Article  1(3)  (c) can be  admitted  into  the               Union  of India by a law passed under  Article               2.  Such  territory may be admitted  into  the               Union of India or may be constituted into  new               States   on  such  terms  and  conditions   as               Parliament may think fit.  Such territory  can               also be dealt with under clause (a) or (b)  of               Article 3. This means that for admitting  into               the Indian Union or establishing a new  State,               a parliamentary, law is necessary and the  new               State so admitted or established cannot  claim               complete  equality with other  Indian  States,               because  Parliament  has  power  to  admit  or               establish  a  new  State "on  such  terms  and               conditions  as it thinks fit". (Vol.  I,  Page               58)                    (Emphasis supplied]               985               28.In  judicial review of the vires of  the               exercise of a constitutional power such as the               one  under  Article 2,  the  significance  and               importance of the political components of  the               decision  deemed fit by Parliament  cannot  be

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             put  out  of  consideration  as  long  as  the               conditions  do not violate the  constitutional               fundamentals.    In  the   interpretation   of               constitutional  document, "words are  but  the               framework  of concept and concepts may  change               more than words themselves".  The significance               of  the change of the concepts  themselves  is               vital  and the constitutional issues  are  not               solved by a mere appeal to the meaning of  the               words  without  an acceptance of the  line  of               their  growth.   It is aptly  said  that  ’the               intention  of  a  Constitution  is  rather  to               outline principles than to engrave details’.               Commenting  on the approach appropriate  to  a               Constitution,  a  learned author  speaking  of               another federal document says (The  Australian               Law Journal, Vol. 43 at p.256) :               "A  moment’s  reflection  will  show  that   a               flexible approach is almost imperative when it               is sought to regulate the affairs of a  nation               by powers which are distributed, not always in               the  most logical fashion, among two  or  more               classes    of   political    agencies.     The               difficulties  arising  from this  premise  are               much  exacerbated  by  the way  in  which  the               Australian  Constitution came to be  formed  :               drafted  by many hands, then subjected to  the               hazards   of  political  debate,   where   the               achievement  of unanimity is often  bought  at               the  price  of compromise, of  bargaining  and               expediency." 29.An  examination  of  the  constitutional  scheme  would indicate that the concept of ’one person one vote’ is In its very   nature  considerably  tolerant  of   imbalances   and departures  from a very strict application and  enforcement. The provision in the Constitution indicating proportionality of  representation  is  necessarily  a  broad,  general  and logical  principle  but not intended to  be  expressed  with arithmetical  precision.   Articles  332 (3A)  and  333  are illustrative  instances.   The  principle  of   mathematical proportionality  of representation is not a  declared  basic requirement  in  each  and every part of  the  territory  of India.  Accommodations and adjustments, having regard to the political  maturity,  awareness  and  degrees  of  political development  in different parts of India, might  supply  the justification for 986 even  non-elected Assemblies wholly or in part,  in  certain parts  of the country.  The differing degrees  of  political development  and maturity of various parts of  the  country, may  not justify standards based on  mathematical  accuracy. Articles  371A, a special provisions in respect of State  of Negaland, 239A and 240 illustrate the permissible areas  and degrees  of  departure.  The systemic  deficiencies  in  the plenitude   of   the   doctrine   of   fun   and   effective representation has not been understood in the constitutional philosophy  as  derogating from  the  democratic  principle. Indeed  the  argument in the case, in  the  perspective,  is really  one  of violation of the equality  principle  rather than  of  the  democratic principle.   The  inequalities  in representation  in the present case are an  inheritance  and compulsion  from the past.  Historical  considerations  have justified a differential treatment. Article 371F (f) cannot be said to violate any basic feature of the Constitution such as the democratic principle.

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30.From  1975  and onwards, when the  impugned  provisions came  to  be  enacted,  Sikkim  has  been  emerging  from  a political society and monarchical system into the mainstream of a democratic way of life and an industrial  civilisation. The  process  and pace of this political  transformation  is necessarily  reliant on its institutions of the past.   Mere existence  of  a Constitution, by itself,  does  not  ensure constitutionalism  or a constitutional culture.  It  is  the political  maturity and traditions of a people  that  import meaning  to a Constitution which otherwise  merely  embodies political hopes and ideals.  The provisions of clause (f) of the Article 371F and the consequent changes in the electoral laws were intended to recognise and accommodate the pace  of the  growth of the political institutions of Sikkim  and  to make  the  transition gradual and peaceful  and  to  prevent dominance  of one section of the population over another  on the  basis  of  ethnic  loyalties  and  identities.    These adjustments   and   accommodations   reflect   a   political expediencies for the maintenance of social equilibrium.  The political  and social maturity and of  economic  development might  in  course of time enable the people‘  of  Sikkim  to transcend  and  submerge  these  ethnic  apprehensions   and imbalances  and  might in future -- one  hopes  sooner -- usher-in  a  more  egalitarian  dispensation.   Indeed,  the impugned  provisions, in their very nature, contemplate  and provide for a transitional phase in the political  evolution of  Sikkim  and  are  thereby  essentially  transitional  in character. 987 It  is true that the reservation of’ seats of the  kind  and the extent brought about by the impugned provisions may not, if  applied  to the existing States of the Union,  pass  the Constitutional  muster.  But in relation to a new  territory admitted to the Union, the terms and conditions are not such as  to fall outside the permissible  constitutional  limits. Historical  considerations  and compulsions  do  justify  in equality  and special. treatment. In Lachhman Dass  etc.  v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR 1963 SC 222 this court said               "The  law  is  now  well  settled  that  while               Article     14    prohibits     discriminatory               legislation directed against one individual or               class  of  individuals,  it  does  not  forbid               reasonable  classification, and that for  this               purpose  even one person or group  of  persons               can be a class.  Professor Willis says in  his               Constitutional  Law p.580 "a law  applying  to               one   person  or  one  class  of  persons   is               constitutional if there is sufficient basis of               reason    for   it.......   And    if    after               reorganisation  of States and  integration  of               the  Pepsu  Union  in  the  State  of  Punjab,               different laws apply to different parts of the               State, that is due to historical reasons,  and               that  has always been recognised as  a  proper               basis of classification under Article 14."               In  State  of Madhya Pradesh v.  Bhopal  Sugar               Industries Ltd., [1964] 6 SCR 846 at 850  this               court said:               The  Legislature has always the power to  make               special laws to attain particular objects  and               for  that purpose has authority to  select  or               classify persons, objects or transactions upon               which   the  law  is  intended   to   operate.               Differential  treatment becomes unlawful  only               when  it  is arbitrary or not supported  by  a

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             rational  relation  with  the  object  of  the               statute........  where application of  unequal               laws  is reasonably justified  for  historical               reasons, a geographical classification founded               on those historical reasons would be upheld." We  are of the view that the impugned provisions  have  been found in the wisdom of Parliament necessary in the admission of a strategic border- 988 A    State  into the Union.  The departures are not such  as to   negate   fundamental  principles  of   democracy.    We accordingly  hold  and answer contentions (b), (c)  and  (d) also against the petitioners. Re : Contentions (e) and (f)      31. Sri Jain submitted that clause (f) of Article  371F would  require that wherever provisions for  reservation  of seats are considered necessary for the purpose of protecting the  rights  and  interests of  different  sections  of  the population  of Sikkim, such reservations are to be made  for all  such sections and not, as here, for one of them  alone. This contention ignores       that  the provision in  clause (f)  of  Art. 371 F is merely enabling.  If  reservation  is made  by  Parliament  for  only  one  section  it  must,  by implication,  be  construed  to  have  exercised  the  power respecting  the other sections in a negational  sense.   The provision  really  enables reservation confined  only  to  a particular section.      32.  Sri  Jain contended that Bhutias and  Lepchas  had been  declared  as Scheduled Tribes under  the  Constitution [Sikkim Scheduled Tribes] Order, 1978 and that the extent of the  reservation  in  their  favour  would  necessarily   be governed  by  the  provisions  of  Article  332(2)  of   the Constitution  which requires that the number of seats to  be reserved  shall  bear,  as  nearly  as  may  be,  the   same proportion  to the total number of seats in the Assembly  as the population of the Schedule Tribes in the State bears  to the  total  population of the State. But,  in  our  opinion, clause  (f)  of  Article  371F  is  intended  to  enable,  a departure  from Art. 332(2). This is the  clear  operational effect  of the non obstante clause with which  Article  371F opens. Sri   Jain  pointed  out  with  the  help  of   certain demographic statistics that the degree of reservation of 38% in   the   present  case  for  a  population  of   20%,   is disproportionate.  This  again  has  to  be  viewed  in  the historical  development  and the rules of  apportionment  of political  power that obtained between the different  groups prior to the merger of the territory in India. A parity  had been maintained all through. We  are  of  the opinion that  the  provisions  in  the particular  situation and the permissible latitudes,  cannot be said to be unconstitutional.   Re : Contention (g) 989 The contention is that the reservation of one seat in favour of   the  ’Sangha’  which  is  Bhuddhist  Lamaic   religious monasteries, is one purely based on religious considerations and   is  violative  of  Articles  15(1)  and  325  of   the Constitution  and  offends  its  secular  principles.    The reservation  of  one seat for the ’Sangha’, with  a  special electorate  of its own, might at the first blush  appear  to resuscitate   ideas  of  separate   electorates   considered pernicious for the unity and integrity of the country. The  Sangha,  the  Buddha  and  the  Dharma  are  the  three fundamental  postulates  and symbols of Buddhism.   In  that

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sense   they  are  religious  institutions.   However,   the literature  on the history of development of  the  political institutions of Sikkim adverted to earlier tend to show that the Sangha had played an important role in the political and social  life of the Sikkimese people.  It had made  its  own contribution   to  the  Sikkimese  culture   and   political development.   There is material to sustain  the  conclusion that  the ’Sangha’ had long been associated  itself  closely with  the  political developments of Sikkim and  was  inter- woven with the. social and political life of its people.  It view  of this historical association, the provisions in  the matter  of reservation of a seat for the  Sangha  recognises the  social and political role of the institution more  than its purely religious identity.  In the historical setting of Sikkim and its social and political evolution the  provision has to be construed really as not invoking the impermissible idea of a separate electorate either.  Indeed, the provision bears    comparison   to   Articles   333   providing    for representation  for the Anglo-Indian community.  So  far  as the  provision  for  the Sangha is concerned, it  is  to  be looked  at  as enabling a nomination but the choice  of  the nominee  being left to the ’Sangha’ itself We are  conscious that  a  separate electorate for  a  religious  denomination would  be  obnoxious to the fundamental  principles  of  our secular Constitution.  If a provision is made purely on  the basis  of religious considerations for election of a  member of  that  religious  group  on  the  basis  of  a   separate electorate, that would, indeed, be wholly  unconstitutional. But in the case of the Sangha, it is not merely a  religious institution.   It  has  been historically  a  political  and social institution in Sikkim and the provisions in regard to the  seat reserved admit to being construed as a  nomination and the Sangha itself being assigned the task of and enabled to indicate the choice of its nominee.  The provision can be sustained on this construction.  Contention (g) is  answered accordingly. 990 33.For  the  foregoing  reasons,  all  the  petitions  are dismissed without any order as to costs. S.C.  AGRAWAL, J. With due deference to my learned  brethren for whom I have the highest regard, I regret my inability to concur  fully  with the views expressed in either  of  these judgments.   It has, therefore, become necessary for  me  to express  my views separately on the various  questions  that arise for consideration. These   cases  arise  out  of  Writ  Petitions  which   were originally  filed under Article 226 of the  Constitution  in the  High Court of Sikkim and have been transferred to  this Court  for disposal under Article 139A of the  Constitution. They involve challenge to the validity of the provisions in- serted  in  the  Representation  of  the  People  Act,  1950 (hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  ’1950  Act’)  and   the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to  as  the ’1951 Act’) by the Election Laws  (Extension  to Sikkim)  Act, 1976 (10 of 1976) (hereinafter referred to  as the  ’1976  Act’)  and  the  Representation  of  the  People (Amendment)  Act,  1980  (Act No. 8  of  1080)  (hereinafter referred to as the ’1980 Act’), whereby (i) twelve seats out of  thirty-two seats in the Legislative Assembly  of  Sikkim have  been reserved for Sikkimese of  Bhutia-Lepcha  origin; and (ii) one seat has been reserved for Sanghas and election to the seat reserved for Sanghas is required to be conducted on the basis of a separate electoral roll in which only  the Sanghas belonging. to monasteries recognised for the purpose of  elections held in Sikkim in April, 1974 for forming  the

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Assembly for Sikkim are entitled to be registered. For  a proper appreciation of the questions that  arise  for consideration,  it  is  necessary to briefly  refer  to  the historical background in which the impugned provisions  were enacted. Sikkim is mainly inhabited by Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalese. Lepchas  are the indigenous inhabitants.  Bhutias came  from Kham  in  Tibet  some time during  fifteenth  and  sixteenth centuries and one of the chieftains was crowned Chogyal,  or religious  and secular ruler, in 1642.  Lepchas and  Bhutias are  Buddhists.   By  the end of the  last  century,  Sikkim became a British protectorate and it continued as such  till 1947 when British rule came to an end in India.  During this period, while it was British protec- 991 torate,  there was immigration of Nepalese on a large  scale and  as a result, by 1947, Sikkimese of Nepali  origin  out- numbered  other people in a ratio of 2:1.  After the end  of the  British rule in 1947, Sikkim came under the  protection of  the  Government  of India.  On  December  3,  1950,  the Maharaja of Sikkim entered into a treaty with the  President of India whereby it was agreed that Sikkim shall continue to be a Protectorate of India and subject to the provisions  of the  Treaty, shall enjoy autonomy in regard to its  internal affairs. On  December  28,  1952,  the  Ruler  of  Sikkim  issued   a Proclamation  to make provision for election of  members  of the  State Council.  The said Proclamation envisaged  twelve elected  members in the Council out of which six were to  be Bhutia-Lepcha  and  six were to be Nepalese.  On  March  23, 1953,  another Proclamation known as the State  Council  and Executive  Council  Proclamation,  1953,  was  issued.    It provided for a State Council consisting of eighteen  members (a  President to be nominated and appointed by the  Maharaja twelve elected members and five nominated members).  Out  of the  elected members six were to be either Sikkimese  Bhutia or  Lepcha  and  the  remaining six  were  to  be  Sikkimese Nepalese.   By  Proclamation  dated  March  16,  1958,   the strength of the Council was raised to twenty.  The six seats for  nominated members were retained and  while  maintaining the reservation of six seats for Bhutias and Lepchas and six seats for Nepalese, it was provided that there shall be  one general seat and one seat shall be reserved for the  Sangha. It  was provided that voting for the seat reserved  for  the Sangha  will be through an electoral college of the  Sanghas belonging  to  monasteries recognised by the  Sikkim  Darbar (Ruler of Sikkim). Certain  adaptations and modifications in the laws  relating to  election to and composition of the Sikkim  Council  were made  by the Proclamation dated December 21, 1966 (known  as the  Representation  of Sikkim  Subjects  Regulation,  1966) issued  by  the Chogyal (Ruler) of Sikkim.  Under  the  said Proclamation,  for  the purpose of election  to  the  Sikkim Council,   Sikkim   was  divided   into   five   territorial constituencies,  one  General Constituency  and  one  Sangha Constituency.  The General Constituency was to comprise  the whole of Sikkim and the Sangha Constituency was to  comprise the  Sanghas belonging to the monasteries recognised by  the Sikkim  Darbar.   It  was also declared  that,  besides  the President who was to be appointed by the Chogyal, the Sikkim Council was to consist of twenty-four members out 992 of which seven were to be Bhutia-Lepcha and seven were to be Sikkimese   Nepali  who  were  to  be  elected   from   five territorial constituencies; three members were to be elected

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from  the general constituency out of which one seat was  to be  a General seat, the second from the Scheduled Castes  as enumerated   in   the  Second  Schedule   annexed   to   the Proclamation,  and  the third from Tsongs;  and  the  Sangha Constituency  was to elect one member through  an  electoral college  of the Sanghas.  Six seats were to be filled in  by nomination made by the Chogyal at his discretion. On  May 8, 1973, a tripartite agreement was entered into  by the   Chogyal  of  Sikkim  the  Foreign  Secretary  to   the Government of India and the leaders of the political parties representing  the  people of Sikkim, whereby it  was  agreed that the people of Sikkim would enjoy the right of  election on  the  basis  of  adult suffrage to  give  effect  to  the principal  of  one man one vote and that there shall  be  an Assembly  in the Sikkim and that the said Assembly shall  be elected every four years and the elections shall be fair and free,  and  shall be conducted under the  supervision  of  a representative  of  the Election Commission  of  India,  who shall  be  appointed for the purpose by  the  Government  of Sikkim.  Para (5) of the said agreement provided as under :               "(5)  The  system  of elections  shall  be  so               organised  as to make the Assembly  adequately               representative of the various sections of  the               population.   The size and composition of  the               Assembly and of the Executive Council shall be               such  as may be prescribed from time to  time,               care  being  taken to ensure  that  no  single               section   of   the   population   acquires   a               dominating  position due mainly to its  ethnic               origin,  and that the rights and interests  of               the Sikkimese Bhutia Lepcha origin and of  the               Sikkimese  Nepali,  which includes  Tsong  and               Scheduled   Caste  Caste  origin,  are   fully               protected’. This tripartite agreement was followed by Proclamation dated February  5,  1954 issued by Chogyal of  Sikkim.   The  said Proclamation known as the Representation of Sikkim  Subjects Act, 1974, provided that for the purpose of election to  the Sikkim  Assembly,  Sikkim would be divided  into  thirty-one territorial  constituencies and one Sangha constituency  and the Sangha constituency would comprise the Sanghas belong- 993 ing to monasteries recognised by the Chogyal of Sikkim.  The Assembly  was  to  consist of  thirty-two  elected  members. Sixteen Constituencies were to be reserved for Sikkimese  of Bhutia-Lepcha origin, out of which one was reserved for  the Sangha.   The  remaining sixteen constituencies were  to  be reserved  for  Sikkimese  of  Nepali,  including  Tsong  and Scheduled Caste, origin out of which one constituency was to be  reserved for persons belonging to the  Scheduled  Castes notified  in the Schedule annexed to the Proclamation.   The elections to the thirty-one territorial constituencies  were to  be  held on the basis of adult suffrage and  the  Sangha constituency  was to elect one member through  an  electoral college of the Sanghas and a member of the electoral college for  the  Sanghas  was not eligible to vote  for  any  other constituency. Elections  for the Sikkim Assembly were held  in  accordance with  the  Representation of Sikkim Subjects  Act,  1974  in April  1974.  The Sikkim Assembly thus elected,  passed  the Government  of Sikkim Bill, 1974, and after having  received the  assent  of  the Chogyal of Sikkim  the  said  Bill  was notified  as the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974.  As  stated in  the Preamble, the said Act was enacted to  provide  "for the   progressive   realisation  of  a   fully   responsible

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Government in Sikkim and for further strengthening its close relationship  with  India".   Section  7  of  the  said  Act relating   to   elections  to  the  Sikkim   Assembly   gave recognition to paragraph 5 of the tripartite agreement dated May 8, 1973 in sub-s. (2) wherein it was provided:               "(2)  The Government of Sikkim may make  rules               for the purpose of providing that the Assembly               adequately represents the various sections  of               the  population, that is to say,  while  fully               protecting the legitimate rights and interests               of Sikkimese of Lepcha or Bhutia origin and               of  Sikkimese  of  Nepali  origin  and   other               Sikkimese,  including  Tsongs  and   Scheduled               Castes no single section of the population  is               allowed  to acquire a dominating  position  in               the affairs of Sikkim mainly by reason of  its               ethnic origin". Section  30 of the said Act made provision  for  association with  the  Government  of India for  speedy  development  of Sikkim  in the social, ,economic and political  fields.   By section  33  of  the  said Act, it  was  declared  that  the Assembly which had been formed as a result of the  elections held  in  April,  1.974  shall be deemed  to  be  the  first Assembly duly constituted 994 under the said Act. In  order  to  give effect to the wishes of  the  people  of Sikkim for strengthening Indo-Sikkim cooperation and  inter- relationship,  the Constitution of India was amended by  the Constitution  (Thirty-  Fifth  Amendment) Act,  1974,  as  a result  of  which Article 2-A was inserted  and  Sikkim  was associated  with the Union on the terms and  conditions  set out  in the Tenth Schedule inserted in the  Constitution  by the said amendment. It  appears  that  on April 10, 1975,  the  Sikkim  Assembly unanimously passed a resolution wherein, after stating  that the activities of the Chogyal of Sikkim were in violation of the objectives of the tripartite agreement dated May 8, 1973 and  that  the  institution of Chogyal  not  only  does  not promote the wishes’ and expectations of the people of Sikkim but   also   impeded  their   democratic   development   and participation  in the political and economic life of  India, it was, declared and resolved :               "The  institution  of the  Chogyal  is  hereby               abolished  and  Sikkim shall henceforth  be  a               constituent   unit   of  India,   enjoying   a               democratic and fully responsible Government".               It was further resolved :               "1. The Resolution contained in part A"  shall               be submitted to the people forthwith for their               approval.               2.    The   Government  of  India  is   hereby               requested, after the people have approved  the               Resolution contained in part "A" to take  such               measures  as may be necessary and  appropriate               to  implement  this  Resolution  as  early  as               possible". In  accordance with the said Resolution, a  special  opinion poll was conducted by the Government of Sikkim on April  14, 1975 and in the said poll, 59, 637 votes were cast in favour and  1496  votes were cast against the Resolution out  of  a total electorate of approximately 97,000. In  view of the said resolution adopted unanimously  by  the Sikkim  Assembly which was affirmed by the people of  Sikkim in  special  opinion  poll,  the  Constitution  was  further

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amended  by the Constitution (Thirty Sixth  Amendment)  Act, 1975 whereby Sikkim was included as a full- 995 fledged  State in the Union and Article 371-F  was  inserted whereby  special  provisions with respect to  the  State  of Sikkim were made.  By virtue of Clause (b) of Article  371-F the  Assembly of Sikkim formed as a result of the  elections held  in  Sikkim in April 1974 was to be deemed  to  be  the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim duly constituted under  the Constitution and under Clause (c) the  period  of five  years  for  which  the  Legislative  Assembly  was  to function  was to be deemed to have commenced on the date  of commencement  of the Constitution  (Thirty-Sixth  Amendment) Act, 1975.  Clause (f) of Article 371-F empowers  Parliament to   make  provision  for  reservation  of  seats   in   the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim for the  purpose of  protecting  the rights and interests  of  the  different sections of the population of Sikkim. Thereafter  Parliament enacted the 1976 Act to  provide  for the extension of the 1950 Act and the 1951 Act to the  State of  Sikkim and introduced certain special provisions in  the 1950  Act and the 1951 Act in their application  to  Sikkim. Many  of  those provisions were transitory in  nature  being applicable to the Sikkim Assembly which was deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim under the Indian Constitution.   The  only provision which is  applicable  to future  Legislatures of Sikkim is that contained in  Section 25-A which reads as under :               "25-A.  Conditions of registration as  elector               in    Sangha    Constituency    in     Sikkim-               Notwithstanding anything contained in sections               15 and 19, for the Sangha Constituency in  the               State of Sikkim, only the Sanghas belonging to               monasteries, recognised for the purpose of the               elections  held in Sikkim in April  1974,  for               forming  the  Assembly for  Sikkim,  shall  be               entitled  to  be registered in  the  electoral               roll,  and  the  said  electoral  roll  shall,               subject  to the provisions of sections  21  to               25,  be prepared or revised in such manner  as               may be directed by the Election Commission, in               consultation with the Government of Sikkim". In  exercise  of the powers conferred on him by Cl.  (1)  of Article  342 of the Constitution of India, the President  of India promulgated the Constitution (Sikkim) Scheduled Tribes Order, 1978 (C.O.11) on June 22, 1978 and it was  prescribed that  Bhutias  And Lepchas shall be deemed to  be  Scheduled Tribes in relation to the State of Sikkim. 996 Since  the  1976  Act  did  not  make  provision  for  fresh elections  for  the Legislative Assembly of Sikkim  and  the term   of  the  said  Assembly  was  due  to   expire,   the Representation  of  the  People (Amendment)  Bin,  1979  was introduced  in Parliament on May 18, 1979 to amend the  1950 Act  and  the  1951 Act.  While the said  Bill  was  pending before Parliament, Lok Sabha was dissolved and the said Bill lapsed. Thereafter  the  Legislative  Assembly of  Sikkim  was  also dissolved  on  August 13, 1979 and fresh elections  for  the Assembly were to be held.  The Representation of the  People (Amendment)  Ordinance, 1979 (No.7 of 1979) was,  therefore, promulgated  by the President on September 11, 1979  whereby certain  amendments were introduced in the 1950 Act and  the 1951  Act.   Elections for the Sikkim  Legislative  Assembly were  held in October, 1979 on the basis of  the  amendments

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introduced by the said Ordinance.  Thereafter, the 1980  Act was enacted to replace the Ordinance.  By the 1980 Act, sub- s.  (1-A) was inserted in Section 7 of the 1950 Act  and  it reads as under :               "(1-A).  Notwithstanding anything contained in               sub-s.(1),  the total number of seats  in  the               Legislative  Assembly of the State of  Sikkim,               to  be  constituted  at any  time  after  the.               commencement  of  the  Representation  of  the               People  (Amendment) Act, 1980 to be filled  by               persons   chosen  by  direct   election   from               assembly  constituencies shall be  thirty-two,               of which               (a)   twelve  seats  shall  be  reserved   for               Sikkimese of BhutiaLepcha origin;               (b)   two  seats  shall be  reserved  for  the               Scheduled castes of that State; and               (c)   one  seat  shall  be  reserved  for  the               Sanghas referred to in Section 25-A.               Explanation   :  In  this   sub-s.    ’Bhutia’               includes  Chumbipa, Dopthapa, Dukpa,  Kagatey,               Sherpa, Tibetan, Tromopa, and Yohmo".               Similarly,   the   following   provision   was               inserted in Section 5-A of the 1951 Act :               997               "(2)  Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in               Section 5, a person shall not be qualified  to               be  chosen to fill a seat in  the  Legislative               Assembly  of  the  State  of  Sikkim,  to   be               constituted at any time after the commencement               of   the   Representation   of   the    People               (Amendment) Act, 1980 unless               (a)   in  the  case  of a  seat  reserved  for               Sikkimese  of  BhutiaLepcha origin,  he  is  a               person  either of Bhutia or Lepcha origin  and               is an elector for any assembly constituency in               the State other than the constituency reserved               for the Sanghas;               (b)   in  the case of a seat reserved for  the               Scheduled  Castes,  he is a member of  any  of               those castes in the State of Sikkim and is  an               elector  for any assembly constituency in  the               State;               (c)   in  the  case  of a  seat  reserved  for               Sanghas,  he  is  an  elector  of  the  Sangha               constituency; and               (d)   in the case of any other seat, he is  an               elector  for any assembly constituency in  the               State." The  petitioners  in  these cases are  Sikkimese  of  Nepali origin and they are challenging the validity of Section 25-A introducted in the 1950 Act by the 1976 Act and  sub-section (1-A) of Section 7 of the 1950 Act and sub-S. (2) of Section 5-A  of the 1951 Act which were introduced by the. 1980  Act insofar as they relate to :               (1)   Reservation of 12 seats out of 32  seats               in   the  Sikkim  Legislative   Assembly   for               Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin; and               (2) Reservation of one seat for Sanghas. The  petitioners  have not challenged the  validity  of  the Constitution  (Thirty  Sixth Amendment)  Act,  1975  whereby Article 371-F was inserted in the Constitution. In  Transferred  Cases Nos. 78 of 1982 and 84 of  1982,  the case  of  the petitioners is that Article  371-F  should  be construed in a manner that it is

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998 consistent  with the general philosophy of the  Constitution particularly   democracy  and  secularism  and   they   have challenged  the provisions of the 1976 Act and the 1980  Act providing  for  reservation of 12 seats in  the  Legislative Assembly of Sikkim for Sikkimese of Bhutia and Lepcha origin and  reservation of one seat for Sanghas on the ground  that the said provisions fall outside the ambit of Article  371-F and  are violative of the provisions contained  in  Articles 332,  14  and  15  and 325  of  the  Constitution.   In  the alternative, the case of the petitioners is that if  Article 371   F  is  given  a  wider  construction,  it   would   be unconstitutional  being violative of the basic  features  of the Constitution.  The petitioners in Transferred Cases Nos. 93 and 94 of 1991 have taken a different stand.  Instead  of challenging the reservation of seats for Sikkimese of Bhutia and Lepcha origin as well as Sanghas, they have relied  upon clause (f) of Article 371-F to claim similar reservation of’ seats in the Assembly for Sikkimese of Nepali origin. Before  I  proceed  to deal with contentions  urged  by  the learned  counsel  on  behalf of  the  petitioners  in  these matters,  it  is necessary to deal with the  submissions  of Shri K. Parasaran appearing for the State of Sikkim and  the learned  Attorney General appearing for the Union  of  India that the matters in issue being political in nature are  not justiciable.  It has been urged that admission of Sikkim  as a State of Indian Union constitutes acquisition of territory by cession in international law and the terms and conditions on which the said cession took place as contained in Article 371-F,  are  intended  to  give  effect  to  the  tripartite agreement  dated May 3, 1973 which was political in  nature. It   is   further  urged  that  under  Article  2   of   the Constitution,  Parliament is empowered by law to admit  into Union  of India and establish new States on such  terms  and conditions   as  it  thinks  fit  and  that  Article   371-F prescribing  the terms and conditions on which the State  of Sikkim  was admitted into the Union of India is a law  under Article  2  of the Constitutions and merely because  it  was introduced in the Constitution by the Constitution  (Thirty- sixth  Amendment)  Act  enacted under  Article  368  of  the Constitution.   by  way  of  abundant  caution,  is  of   no consequence and that it does not alter the true character of the law.  The submission is further that since the terms and conditions  on which Sikkim was admitted in Union of  India, are  political  in  nature, the said  terms  and  conditions cannot  be made the subject matter of challenge before  this Court  because  the law is well settled that courts  do  not adjudicate upon questions which are political in nature. 999 The  political  question doctrine has been  evolved  in  the United  States  to deny judicial review in  certain  fields. The  doctrine  received a set back in the case of  Baker  v. Carr., [1962] 369 US 186, wherein Brennan, J., rejecting the contention  that the challenge to legislative  apportionment raises a non-justiciable political question, has observed :               "....The  non-justiciability  of  a  political               question  is  primarily  a  function  of   the               separation of powers.  Much confusion  results               from the capacity of the "political  question"               label  to  obscure the need  for  case-by-case               inquiry.  Deciding whether a matter has in any               measure been committed by the Constitution  to               another  branch of government, or whether  the               action   of  that  branch   exceeds   whatever               authority  has  been committed,  is  itself  a

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             delicate     exercise    in     constitutional               interpretation,  and  is a  responsibility  of               this  Court  as ultimate  interpreter  of  the               Constitution".               (pp. 210-211)                                xx xx xx xx               "....Yet  it  is error to suppose  that  every               case  or  controversy  which  touches  foreign               relations  lies beyond  judicial  congnizance.               Our  cases  in this field seem  invariably  to               show   a   discriminating  analysis   of   the               particular  question  posed, in terms  of  the               history  of  its management by  the  political               branches,  of its susceptibility  of  judicial               handling  in  the  light  of  its  nature  and               posture  in  the  specific case,  and  of  the               possible consequences of judicial action."               (pp. 211-212)                                  xx xx xx               "...Prominent on the surface of any case  held               to  involve  a political question is  found  a               textually     demonstrable      constitutional               commitment  of  the  issue  to  a   coordinate               political department; or a lack of  judicially               discoverable  and  manageable  standards   for               resolving it. or the impossibility of deciding               without  an initial policy determination of  a               kind               1000               clearly  for  nonjudicial discretion;  or  the               impossibility  of deciding without an  initial               policy  determination of a kind  clearly  for-               nonjudicial  discretion; or the  impossibility               of    a   court’s   undertaking    independent               resolution  without  expression  lack  of  the               respect due coordinate branches of government;               or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence               to  a political decision already made; or  the               potentiality     of     embarrassment     from               multifarious    pronouncements   by    various               departments  on one question.  Unless  one  of               these  formulations  is inextricable  for  the               case at bar, there should be no dismissal  for               non-justiciability   on   the  ground   of   a               political  question’s presence’. (p.  217)  In               Powell   v.  McCormack,  395  US  490,   after               reiterating the observations of Brennan, J. In               Baker v. Carr (Supra),Warren, CJ has stated               "In order to determine whether there has  been               a   textual   commitment  to   a   co-ordinate               department   of   the  Government,   we   must               interpret  the Constitution.  In other  words,               we   must  first  determine  what  power   the               Constitution  confers upon the  House  through               Art.   I, 5, before we can determine  to  what               extent, if any, the exercise of that power  is               subject to judicial review. ...If  examination               of 5 disclosed that the Constitution gives the               House  judicially  unreviewable power  to  set               qualifications  for memebership and  to  judge               whether   prospective   members   meet   those               qualifications,  further review of  the  House               determination  might  well be  barred  by  the               political  question  doctrine.  On  the  other               hand,  if  the Constitution  gives  the  House

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             power  to judge only whether  elected  members               possess the three standing qualifications  set               forth   in  the  Constitution,  further   con-               sideration  would  be necessary  to  determine               whether  any of the other formulations of  the               political  question doctrine are  inextricable               from the case at bar". (p. 516) In A.K Roy v. Union of India, [1982] 2 SCR 272, Chandrachud, CJ,  has  thus explained the doctrine as applicable  in  the United States:               "The  doctrine of the political  question  was               evolved in the United States of America on the               basis of its Constitution               1001               which  has  adopted  the  system  of  a  rigid               separation  of powers, unlike ours.  In  fact,               that  is one of the principal reasons why  the               U.S.   Supreme  Court  had  refused  to   give               advisory opinions.  In Baker v. Carr, Brennan,               J.   said  that  the  doctrine  of   political               question  was "essentially a function  of  the               separation of powers".  There is also a  sharp               difference  in the position and powers of  the               American  President on one hand and  President               of  India on the other.  The President of  the               United States exercises executive power in his               own  right  and  is  responsible  not  to  the               Congress but to the people who elect him.   In               India,  the  executive power of the  Union  is               vested  in  the President of India but  he  is               obliged  to exercise it on the aid and  advice               of his Council of Ministers.  The  President’s               "satisfaction"  is therefore nothing  but  the               satisfaction  of his Council of  Ministers  in               whom  the  real executive power  resides.   It               must  also  be mentioned that  in  the  United               States  itself, the doctrine of the  political               question  has come under a cloud and has  been               the  subject matter of adverse criticism.   It               is  said  that all that  the  doctrine  really               means is that in the exercise of the power  of               judicial  review,  the  courts  must  adopt  a               ’prudential’  attitude,  which  requires  that               they should be wary of deciding upon the merit               of  any issue in which claims of principle  as               to  the issue and claims of expediency  as  to               the power and prestige of courts are in  sharp               conflict.   The result, more or less, is  that               in America the phrase "political question" has               become  "a little more than a play of  words".               (pp. 296-297) In  Madhav  Rao v. Union of India, [1971] 3 SCR  9,  it  was contended that in-recognising or de-recognising a person  as a Ruler the President exercises "political power" which is a sovereign power and that the relevant covenants under  which the  rights  of the Rulers were recognised  were  ’political agreements’.   Rejecting the said contention, Shah,  J.  (as the  learned  Chief  Justice  then  was)  speaking  for  the majority, observed               "The functions of the State are classified  as               legislative,   judicial  and  executive:   the               executive  function is the residue which  does               not fall within the other two functions.  Con-               1002               stitutional  mechanism in a democratic  policy

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             does not contemplate existence of any function               which  may qua the citizens be  designated  as               political and orders made in exercise  whereof               are not liable to be rested for their validity               before the lawfully constituted courts" (p.75)               Similarly, Hedge, J. has stated               "There is nothing like a political power under               our Constitution in the matter of relationship               between  the executive and the citizens.   Our               Constitution recognises only three powers viz.               the legislative power, the judicial power  and               the  executive power.  It does  not  recognise               any other power. (p.169) In  State  of Rajasthan v. Union of India, [1978] 1  SCR  1, Bhagwati,  J.  as the learned Chief Justice  then  was,  has observed :               "It  will,  therefore,  be  seen  that  merely               because a question has a political colour, the               Court  cannot  hold its hands in  despair  and               declare  judicial  hands off.  So  long  as  a               question arises whether an authority under the               Constitution  has acted within the  limits  of               its power or exceeded it, it can certainly  be               decided by the court.  Indeed, it would be its               constitutional obligation to do so." (p.80) Relying upon these observations and after taking note of the decisions  in Baker v. Carr (supra) and Powell v.  McConmack (supra),  Venkataramiah,  J., as the learned  Chief  Justice then was, in S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, [1982] 2 SCR  365 has laid down :               "In our country which is governed by a written               Constitution also many questions which  appear               to have a purely political colour are bound to               assume  the character of  judicial  questions.               In the State of Rajasthan & Ors. etc. etc,  v.               Union   of  India  etc.  etc.,   (supra)   the               Government’s  claim that the validity  of  the               decision of the President under Article 356(1)               of   the  Constitution  being   political   in               character  was  not justiciable on  that  sole               ground was rejected by this Court." (p. 1248) 1003 The same view has been reiterated by Verma, J. speaking  for the majority in Mrs. Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of India  & Ors.,  Writ  Petition  (Civil) No. 514 of  1992  decided  on August 27, 1992. Sikkim was not admitted in the Indian Union on the basis  of any  treaty or agreement between the Chogyal of  Sikkim  and the Government of India.  It was so admitted in pursuance of the unanimous resolution that was passed by the Assembly  of Sikkim on April 10, 1975, after the said resolution had been approved by majority of the people of Sikkim at the  special opinion  poll  conducted  on  April  14,  1975.   The   said resolution  does  not contain any terms  and  conditions  on which  the people of Sikkim wanted to join the Indian  Union except   stating   that  "Sikkim  shall  henceforth   be   a Constituent  unit of India enjoying a democratic  and  fully responsible Government".  The Tripartite Agreement of may 8, 1973  was  also  not  an  agreement  containing  terms   and conditions for admission of Sikkim in the Indian Union.   It contains  the  framework  for  "establishment  of  a   fully responsible  Government  in Sikkim with  a  more  democratic Constitution".   This  agreement  was  implemented  by   the enactment of the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974.  It cannot, therefore, be said that Article 371- F contains a  political

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element  in  the  sense that it seeks to give  effect  to  a political agreement relating to admission of Sikkim into the Indian Union. It  is,  however,  urged  that  a  law  made  under  Article containing the terms and conditions on which a new State  is admitted  in  the  Indian  Union is,  by  its  very  nature, political  involving matters of policy and,  therefore,  the terms   and  conditions  contained  in  such  law  are   not justiciable.  In this context, emphasis is laid on the words "on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit" in Article 2 and it is contended that Parliament has complete freedom  to lay  down  the terms and conditions for admission of  a  new State in the Indian Union and such terms and conditions  are outside  the scope of judicial review.  I find it  difficult to subscribe to this proposition.  It is no doubt true  that in  the  matter of admission of a new State  in  the  Indian Union, Article 2 gives considerable freedom to Parliament to prescribe the terms and conditions on which the new State is being  admitted in the Indian Union.  But at the same  time, It  cannot  be  said that the said freedom  is  without  any constitutional limitation.  In may view the power  conferred on  Parliament  under  Article 2  is  circumscribed  by  the overall   constitutional   scheme  and   Parliament,   while prescribing, the terms and conditions on 1004 which  a new State is admitted in the Indian Union,  has  to act  within the said scheme.  Parliament cannot admit a  new State  into the Indian Union on terms and  conditions  which derogate  from the basic features of the  Constitution.   It cannot make a law permitting the said State to continue as a monarchy because it would be in derogation to the republican form  of  Government  established  under  the  Constitution. Similarly  it  would not be permissible  for  Parliament  to prescribe  that  the  new State would continue  to  have  an autocratic form of administration when the Constitution  en- visages  a democratic form of Government in all the  States. So  also it would not be open to Parliament to provide  that the  new  State would continue to be a theocratic  State  in disregard of the secular set up prevailing in other  States. To  hold otherwise would mean that it would  be  permissible for Parliament to admit to the Union new States on terms and conditions  enabling  those  States  to  be  governed  under systems  which  are  inconsistent with  the  scheme  of  the Constitution  and  thereby alter the basic feature  of’  the Constitution.  It would lead to the anomalous result that by an  ordinary  law enacted by Parliament under Article  2  it would  be possible to bring about a change which  cannot  be made even by exercise of the constituent power to amend  the Constitution,  viz., to alter any of the basic  features  of the Constitution.  The words "as it thinks fit" in Article 2 of  the  Constitution  cannot, therefore,  be  construed  as empowering  Parliament to provide terms and  conditions  for admission  of  a new State which are inconsistent  with  the basic features of the Constitution.  The said words can only mean  that within the framework of the Constitution,  it  is permissible for Parliament to prescribe terms and conditions on which a new State is admitted in the Union. With  regard  to  the power conferred  on  Parliament  under Articles  and  3 of the Constitution, this Court  in  Mangal Singh v. Union of India, [1967] 2 SCR 109, has laid down               "....Power   with  which  the  Parliament   is               invested by Arts. 2 and 3, is power to  admit,               establish, or form new States which conform to               the   democratic  pattern  envisaged  by   the               Constitution;   and   the  power   which   the

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             Parliament    may   exercise   by    law    is               supplemental,  incidental or consequential  to               the admission, establishment or formation of a               State as contemplated by the Constitution, and               is not power to               1005               override the constitutional scheme".  P. 112 in this context, it may also be mentioned that Article 2  of the   Constitution  is  modelled  on  Section  121  of   the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act which provides :               "S.  121  The  Parliament  may  admit  to  the               Commonwealth or establish new States, and  may               upon  such admission or establishment make  or               impose  such terms and  conditions,  including               the  extent of representation in either  House               of Parliament, as it thinks fit." This  provision has not yet been used and there has been  no occasion  for  the  Courts to construe  this  provision.   A learned  Commentator  on the  Australian  Constitution  has, however, expressed the view that under Section 121 "no terms and conditions could be imposed which are inconsistent  with the  provisions of the Constitution, e.g., nothing could  be done  to prevent the Judicature chapter of the  Constitution from   applying  to  the  new  State’  (R.D.  Lumb   :   The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia (1986) 4th Ed. p. 736) I  am,  therefore, of the view that while  admitting  a  new State  in  the Union, Parliament, while making a  law  under Article 2, cannot provide for terms and conditions which are inconsistent  with the scheme of the Constitution and it  is open  to  the  Court  to  examine  whether  the  terms   and conditions  as  provided in the law  enacted  by  Parliament under  Article  2  are consistent  with  the  constitutional scheme  or  not.  This would mean that  power  conferred  on Parliament  under Article 2 is not wider in ambit  than  the amending  power under Article 368 and it would be of  little practical significance to treat Article 371-F as a law  made under Article 2 of the Constitution or introduced by way  of amendment  under Article 368.  In either event, it  will  be subject  to the limitation that it cannot alter any  of  the basic features of the Constitution.  The scope of the  power conferred  by  Article  371-F,  is  therefore,  subject   to judicial review.  So also is the law that is enacted to give effect  to the provisions contained in Article  371-F.   The contention, raised by Shri Parasaran as well as the  learned Attorney  General, that such an examination is  outside  the scope of judicial review, cannot. therefore be accepted. 1006 Shri  Parasaran and the learned Attorney General  have  laid emphasis  on  the  use of  the  expression  "notwithstanding anything in this Constitution" which precedes clauses (a) to (p) of Article 371-F.  The submission is that as a result of the  said  non-obstante  clause  in  Article  371-F,  it  is permissible  for parliament to enact a law in derogation  of the other provisions of the Constitution while giving effect to  clauses  (a) to (p) of Article 371-F and  the  said  law would  not  be open to challenge on the ground  that  it  is violative   of   any  of  the  other   provisions   of   the Constitution.   There  is  no doubt  that  the  non-obstante clause   in  a  statute  gives  overriding  effect  to   the provisions covered by the non-obstante clause over the other provisions  in the statute to which it applies and  in  that sense,  the non-obstante clause used in Article 371-F  would give overriding effect to clauses (a) to (p) of Article 371- F  over  other provisions of the Constitution.  But  at  the

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same  time, it cannot be ignored that the scope of the  non- obstante  clause in Article, 371-F cannot extend beyond  the scope of the legislative power of Parliament under Article 2 or  the  amending power under Article 368.  As  pointed  out earlier,  the  legislative power under Article  2  does  not enable  Parliament  to make a law providing  for  terms  and conditions  which are inconsistent with  the  Constitutional scheme  and  in  that  sense, the said  power  is  not  very different  from the amending power under Article 368,  which does not extend to altering any of the basic features of the Constitution.  The non-obstante clause in Article 371-F, has therefore, to be so construed as to conform to the aforesaid limitations  or  otherwise Article 371-F would  be  rendered unconstitutional.   A  construction which leads  to  such  a consequence has to be eschewed.  This means that as a result of the non-obstante clause in Article 371-F, clauses (a)  to (p)  of  the said Article have to be construed to  permit  a departure  from  other  provisions of  the  Constitution  in respect  of  the  matters  covered by  clauses  (a)  to  (p) provided the said departure is not of such a magnitude as to have  the effect of’ altering any of the basic  features  of the  Constitution.   In  order to avail  the  protection  of Article  371-F,  it  is necessary that the  law  should  not transcend the above mentioned limitation on the scope of the non-obstante clause. This   takes  me  to  the  question  whether  the   impugned provisions  contained in the 1976 Act and the 1980 Act  make such  a departure from he provisions of the Constitution  as to render them inconsistent with the 1007 Constitutional scheme and have the effect of altering any of the  basic  features  of  the  Constitution.   As  indicated earlier the challenge to the impugned provisions relates  to two  matters,  viz.,  (i) reservation of  twelve  seats  for Sikkimese  of Bhutia-Lepcha origin; and (ii) reservation  of one seat for Sanghas. With regard to the reservation of twelve seats for Sikkimese of  Bhutia and Lepcha origin under sub-s.(1-A)  inserted  in Section  7 of the 1950 Act by Act No. 8 of 1980,  Shri  R.K. Jain, the learned Senior counsel, appearing as amicus curiae for  the petitioner in T.C. No. 78 of 1982, has  advanced  a two-fold  argument.  In the first place, he has  urged  that the  reservation  of seats for  Sikkimese  of  Bhutia-Lepcha origin  without  making  a  corresponding  reservation   for Sikkimese  of  Nepali origin is violative of  the  right  to equality  guaranteed under Article 14 of  the  Constitution. The   other   contention  turns  on  the  extent   of   such reservation.   Shri  Jain  has submitted  that  Bhutias  and Lepchas  have  been declared as Scheduled Tribes  under  the Constitution  (Sikkim)  Scheduled Tribes Order,  1978  dated June 22, 1978 and reservation of seats for Scheduled  Tribes in  the  Legislative  Assembly of a  State  is  governed  by Article 332 of the Constitution.  Shri Jain has referred  to Cl.  (3) of Article 332 which prescribes that the number  of seats  reserved  for the Scheduled Castes or  the  Scheduled Tribes  in the Legislative Assembly of any State  under  Cl. (1) shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion  to the total number of seats in the Assembly as the  population of  the  Scheduled Castes in the State or of  the  Scheduled Tribes  in  the  State.   Shri Jain  has  pointed  out  that according to the 1971 census, the total population was about 2,09,843 out of which Bhutias and Lepchas were around 51,600 and  according  to  1981 census, the  total  population  was around 3,16,385 out of which Bhutias and Lepchas were around 73,623.  The submission of Shri Jain is that keeping in view

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the  fact that Bhutias and Lepchas constitute about  25%  of the  total population, reservation of twelve out of  thirty- two  seats  in  the Legislative  Assembly  for  Bhutias  and Lepchas,  which constitute 38% of the total number of  seats in  the  Assembly,  is far in excess of  the  ratio  of  the population of Bhutias and Lepchas to the total population of Sikkim  and, therefore, the aforesaid reservation of  twelve seats for Bhutias and Lepchas is violative of Clause (3)  of Article  332 of the Constitution.  Shri Jain  has  contended that  the said provision for reservation is  destructive  of Democracy which is a basic feature of the 1008 A    Constitution.  In support of the aforesaid  submission, Shri  Jain has placed reliance on the decision of  the  U.S. Supreme Court in Reynolds v. Sims, 19641 377 US 533. In  my view, both these contentions of Shri Jain  cannot  be accepted.  The reservation of seats for Bhutias and  Lepchas is  necessary because they constitute a minority and in  the absence of reservation they may not have any  representation in  the  Legislative Assembly.  Sikkimese of  Nepali  origin constitute the majority in Sikkim and on their own electoral strength  they can secure representation in the  Legislative Assembly against the unreserved seats.  Moreover,  Sikkimses of  Bhutia  and Lepcha origin have a  distinct  culture  and tradition  which  is  different from that  of  Sikkimese  of Nepali origin.  Keeping this distinction in mind Bhutias and Lepchas have been declared as Scheduled Tribes under Article 342 of the Constitution.  The said declaration has not  been questioned before us.  The Constitution in Article 332 makes express   provision   for  reservation  of  seats   in   the Legislative Assembly of a State for Scheduled Tribes.   Such a   reservation   which  is  expressly  permitted   by   the Constitution cannot be challenged on the ground of denial of right  to  equality  guaranteed  under  Article  14  of  the Constitution. The  second  contention  relating  to  the  extent  of   the reservation of seats for Bhutias and Lepchas is based on the provisions  of Article 332 (3) of the Constitution.   Clause (3)  of  Article  332 postulates that the  number  of  seats reserved  for  Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes  in  the Legislative  Assembly of the State shall bear, as nearly  as may be, the same proportion to the total number of seats  in the  Assembly as the population of the Scheduled  Castes  or the  Scheduled  Tribes  in  the State  bears  to  the  total population  of the State.  The said provision has,  however, to be considered in the light of Clause (f) of Article 371-F which provides               "(f)  Parliament  may,  for  the  purpose   of               protecting  the  rights and interests  of  the               different sections of the population of Sikkim               make provision for the number of seats in  the               Legislative  Assembly of the State  of  Sikkim               which may be filled by candidates belonging to               such sections and for the delimitation of  the               assembly constituencies from which  candidates               belonging to such sections alone may stand for               1009               election  to the Legislative of the  State  of               Sikkim." This   provision  empowers  Parliament  to  make   provision prescribing the number of seats in the Legislative  Assembly in the State of Sikkim which may be filled in by  candidates belonging  to  the different sections of the  population  of Sikkim  with a view to protect the rights and  interests  of those  sections.  The non-obstante clause in  Article  371-F

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enables  Parliament  to  make a  departure  from  the  ratio contemplated by Article 332 (3) within the limitation  which is  inherent in the power conferred by Article 371-F,  i.e., not to alter any of the basic features of the  Constitution. It is, therefore, necessary to examine whether in  providing for reservation of twelve seats out of thirty-two seats  for Bhutias and Lepchas Parliament has acted in disregard of the said  limitation.  While examining this question, it has  to be borne in mind that Lepchas are the indigenous inhabitants of  Sikkim  and  Bhutias migrated to  Sikkim  long  back  in fifteenth  and sixteenth centuries and they follow the  same faith (Budhism).  They have a culture which is distinct from that  of  Nepalese and others who migrated  to  Sikkim  much later.   Since the proportion of Nepalese in the  population of Sikkim was much higher than that of Bhutias and  Lepchas, it became necessary to provide for reservation of seats  for Bhutias  and  Lepchas in the State Council  of  Sikkim  when representative   element   through   elected   members   was introduced  in the administration of Sikkim in  1952.   Ever since  then, till Sikkim was admitted as a new State in  the Indian Union, there was reservation of seats for Bhutias and Lepchas in the Sikkim Council which later became the  Sikkim Assembly.   Since the Ruler of Sikkim was of  Bhutia  origin following the Budhist faith, there was reservation of  seats in  the Sikkim Council and Sikkim Assembly for Sikkimese  of Nepali  origin on the same lines as Bhutias and Lepchas  and in  such  reservations a parity was maintained  between  the seats reserved for Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin on  the one  hand and Sikkimese of Nepali origin on the  other.   On the  date  when  Sikkim was admitted in  the  Indian  Union, Sikkim Assembly was consisting of thirty-two elected members out of which sixteen seats (including one Sangha seat)  were reserved  for Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin and  sixteen seats  (including  one  seat  for  Scheduled  Castes)   were reserved for Sikkimese of Nepali origin.  This parity in the reservation  of  seats  in the  Sikkim  Council  and  Sikkim Assembly  between Sikkimese of Bhutia and Lepcha origin  and Sikkimese of Nepali origin was with a view 1010 to ensure that neither of two sections of the population  of Sikkim  acquires a dominating position due mainly  to  their ethnic origin.  This was expressly provided in para 5 of the Tripartite Agreement of May 8, 1973 and Section 7(2) of  the Government of Sikkim Act, 1974.  Clause (f) of Article 371-F seeks to preserve the said protection which was envisaged by Clause  (5)  of  the Tripartite Agreement  because  it  also provides  for  protecting the rights and  interests  of  the different  sections of population of Sikkim.   The  impugned provision  contained in clause (a) of sub-section  (1-A)  of s.7  of the 1950 Act by providing for reservation of  twelve seats  for Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin seeks  to  give this  protection  in a more limited manner by  reducing  the ratio  of  the seats reserved for Sikkimese  of  Bhutia  and Lepcha  origin  from 50% prevalent in the  Assembly  in  the former State of Sikkim to about 38% in the Assembly for  the State  of  Sikkim as constituted under the  Constitution  of India.    It  would  thus  appear  that  by  providing   for reservation to the extent of 38% of seats in the Legislative Assembly  for Sikkimese of Bhutia-lepcha  origin  Parliament has  sought  to strike a balance between protection  to  the extent of 50% that was available to them in the former State of Sikkim and the protection envisaged under Article  332(3) of  the  Constitution  which would  have  entitled  them  to reservation  to the extent of 25% seats in  accordance  with the  proportion of their population to the total  population

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of  Sikkim.   It  is argued that  this  departure  from  the provisions of Article 332(3) derogates from the principle of one  man,  one  vote enshrined in the  Constitution  and  is destructive  of  Democracy which is a basic feature  of  the Constitution.  This argument proceeds on the assumption that for preservation of Democracy, the principle of one man, one vote  is  inviolable and it fails to take note of  the  non- obstante clause in Article 371-F which when read with clause (f)  of  Article 371-F envisage that Parliament  may,  while protecting  the  rights  and  interests  of  the   different sections  of the population of Sikkim (which  would  include Sikkimese   of  Bhutia-Lepcha  origin),  deviate  from   the provisions of the Constitution, including Article 332. The  principle  of one man, one vote  envisages  that  there should be parity in the value of votes of electors.  Such  a parity  though  ideal  for  a  representative  democracy  is difficult  to  achieve.  There is some  departure  in  every system  following  this democratic path.  In the  matter  of delimitation  of constituencies, it often happens  that  the population of one constituency 1011 differs from that of the other constituency and as a  result although both the constituencies elect one member, the value of the vote of the elector in the constituency having lesser population is more than the value of the vote of the elector of  the constituency having a larger population.   Take  the instance of Great Britain.  There a statutory allocation  of seats between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern  Ireland whereunder Scotland is to have not less than 71 seats; Wales not less than 35 and Northern Ireland 17. It has been  found that Scotland is over represented to the extent of 14  seats and  Wales  to the extent of 5 seats and England  is  under- represented  to the extent of 14 seats.   The  justification that  has  been  offered  for  these  inequalities  is  that constituencies  in  sparsely  populated areas  such  as  the Highlands   would   otherwise   be   inconveniently    large geographically.     Prof.    Wade   has   questioned    this justification  (H.W.P. Wade :  Constitutional  Fundamentals, The  Hamlyan  Lectures,  32nd series,  1980,  p.5).  He  has pointed  out  that within the constituent  counties  of  the United Kingdom, there are great inequalities in the size  of individual constituencies and that the smallest constituency contains  only 25,000 voters and the largest 96,000,  nearly four  times as many.  He has referred to the Report  of  the Blake  Commission on Electoral Reforms (1976) wherein it  is recommended that, the discrepancy should never exceed two to one,  and  has observed  "this is surely the  maximum  which should  be  regarded as tolerable"  (p.7).  Criticising  the existing state of affairs, Prof.  Wade has said               "The British Parliament, addicted though it is               to  the pursuit of equality in so  many  other               ways, does not seem interested in equality  of               representation  between voters any  more  than               between  the  different parts  of  the  United               Kingdom.   Since 1948 it has insisted  rigidly               on  the principle of one man, one vote.   When               will  it accept the correlative principle  one               vote, one value?’ (p.8) The   matter  of  apportionment  of  seats  in   the   State Legislatures  has  come  up for  consideration  before  U.S. Supreme  Court  in a number of cases.  In Reynolds  V.  Sims (supra),  the Court, while examining the said matter on  the touch-stone  of the equal protection clause, has  held  that the equal protection clause requires that the seats in  both houses of a bicameral State Legislature be apportioned on  a

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population  basis  and that such deviations from  the  equal population principle are constitutionally 1012 permissible  so  long  as  such  deviations  are  based   on legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of  a rational state policy.  Chief Justice Warren, expressing the views of six members of the Court, has observed               "....We   realize  that  it  is  a   practical               impossibility to arrange legislative districts               so  that each one has an identical  number  of               residents,    or    citizens,    or    voters.               Mathematical exactness or precision is  hardly               a   workable   constitutional    requirement."               (p.577)                                  xx xx xx               "...So  long as the divergences from a  strict               population  standard are based  on  legitimate               considerations incident to the effectuation of               a rational state policy, some deviations  from               the     equal-population     principle     are               constitutionally  permissible with respect  to               the  apportionment of seats in either or  both               of  the  two  houses  of  a  bicameral   state               legislature". (p.579) Variance to the extent of 16% has been upheld by the  Court. (See: Mahan v. Howell, 410 US 315. The  High Court of Australia, in Attorney General (CTH)  Ex. Rel.  Mckinlay  v.. The Commonwealth, [1975] 135 CLR  1  has considered  the  issue in the context of Section 24  of  the Australian  Constitution which provides that "the  House  of Representatives shall be composed of members directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth".  It was argued that  the words  "chosen by the people of Commonwealth" required  each electoral  division within a State so far as practicable  to contain  the  same number of people or,  alternatively,  the same  number of electors.  The said contention was  rejected and it was held (by Majority of six to one) that Section  24 of the Constitution did not require the number of people  or the  number of electors in electoral divisions to be  equal. The  decisions  of the U.S. Supreme Court  on  apportionment were  held  to  be  inapplicable  in  the  context  of   the Australian Constitution.  Barwick C.J., has observed:               "It is, therefore, my opinion that the  second               paragraph of s.24 cannot be read as containing               any  guarantee that there shall be  a  precise               mathematical relationship between the               1013               numbers  of members chosen in a State and  the               population of that State or that every  person               in  the  Australia or  that  every  elector-in               Australia will have a vote, or an equal vote.’               (p.22)               Similarly,  Mason,  J., as the  learned  Chief               Justice then was, has stated:               "The  substance  of  the matter  is  that  the               conception of equality in the value of a  vote               or equality as between electoral divisions  is               a  comparatively modern development for  which               no  stipulation  was  made in  the  system  of               democratic representative government  provided               for by our Constitution." (p.62) In this regard, the scheme of our Constitution is that under Article  327 Parliament is empowered to make a law  relating to delimitation of constituencies and under Article 329  (a) the validity of such a law or the allotment of seats to such

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constituencies  cannot be called in question in  any  court. In  exercise of the power conferred on it under Article  327 Parliament  has  enacted the Delimitation  Act,  1962  which provides  for constitution of a Delimitation  Commission  to readjust  on  the  basis of the latest  census  figures  the allocation  of  seats  in the House of  the  People  to  the several States, the total number of seats in the Legislative Assembly  of each State and the division of each State  into territorial  constituencies for the purpose of elections  to the  House of People and to the State Legislative  Assembly. In  Section 9(1) of the said Act it is prescribed  that  the Commission shall delimit the constituencies on the basis  of the   latest  census  figures  but  shall  have  regard   to considerations  referred to in clauses (a) to  (d).   Clause (a)  requires  that  all constituencies  shall,  as  far  as practicable,   be  geographically  compact  areas,  and   in delimiting  them regard shall be had to  physical  features, existing  boundaries  of administrative units,  facility  of communication  and public convenience.  Clause (b)  requires that every assembly constituency shall be so delimited as to fall  wholly within on parliamentary constituency.   Clauses (c)  and (d) relate to location of constituencies  in  which seats  are  reserved  for  Scheduled  Castes  and  Scheduled Tribes.   This shows that population, though  important,  is only  one of the factors that has to be taken  into  account while delimiting constituencies which means that there  need not  be uniformity of population and electoral  strength  in the  matter  of delimitation of  constituencies.   In  other words, 1014 there  is no insistence on strict adherence to  equality  of votes or to the principle one vote-one value. In  clause (3) of Article 332, the words "as nearly  as  may be"  has been used.  These words indicate that even  in  the matter  of  reservation of seats for  Scheduled  Castes  and Scheduled  Tribes it would be permissible to have  deviation to  some  extent from the requirement that number  of  seats reserved for Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in the Legislative  Assembly  of  any State  shall  bear  the  same proportion.  to the total number of seats as the  population of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes in the State in  respect  of which seats are so reserved,  bears  to  the total  population of the State.  The non-obstante clause  in Article  371-F  read  with clause (f) of  the  said  Article enlarges   the  filled  of  deviation  in  the   matter   of reservation  of  seats  from the  proportion  laid  down  in Article  332(3).  The only limitation on such  deviation  is that  it  must  not be to such an extent  as  to  result  in tilting the balance in favour of the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes Tribes for whom the seats are reserved  and thereby   convert  a  minority  in  majority.   This   would adversely   affect   the  democratic  functioning   of   the legislature in the State which is the core of representative Democracy.   Clause (a) of sub-s. (I-A) of s.7 of  the  1950 Act provides for reservation of twelve seats in an  Assembly having  thirty-two seats, i.e., to the extent of  about  38% seats  for  Sikkimese  of Bhutia-Lepcha  origin.   The  said provision does not, therefore, transgress the limits of  the power conferred on Parliament under Article 371-F(f) and  it cannot   be   said  that  it  suffers  from  the   vice   of unconstitutionality. The  other challenge is to the reservation of one  seat  for Sanghas.  With regard to this seat, it may be mentioned that Section  25-A  of  the  1950  Act  makes  provision  for  an electoral roll for the Sangha constituency wherein only  the

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Sanghas belonging to monasteries recognised for the  purpose of  elections held in Sikkim, in April 1974 for forming  the Assembly for Sikkim. are entitled to be registered.   Clause (c) of sub- s.(2) of s. 5-A of the 1951 Act prescribes  that a person shall not be qualified to be chosen to fill a  seat in  the Legislative Assembly of Sikkim to be constituted  at any  time after the commencement of the 1980 Act unless,  in the case of the seat reserved for Sanghas, he is an  elector of  the  Sangha  constituency.   The  aforesaid   provisions indicate  that for the one seat in the Legislative  Assembly of  Sikkim  which  is  reserved  for  Sanghas.  a   separate electoral roll 1115 has  to be prepared under Section 25-A of the 1950  Act  and only the Sanghas belonging to monasteries recognised for the purpose  of  elections held in April 1984  for  forming  the Assembly  for  Sikkim are entitled to be registered  in  the said  electoral roll and, in view of Section  5-A(2)(c),  no person other than an elector for the Sangha constituency  is qualified  to be chosen to fill the said reserved  seat  for Sanghas. To  assail  the validity of these provisions Shri  Jain  has urged  that the provision in s.7(1-A)(c) of the 1950 Act  is violative of the right guaranteed under Article 15(1) of the Constitution  inasmuch as by reserving one seat for  Sanghas (Budhist  Lamas),  the  State has  discriminated  against  a person who is not a Budhist on the ground only of  religion. Shri Jain has also urged the provisions contained in  S.25-A of  the  1950  Act  and S.5-A(2)(c)  of  the  1951  Act  are violative  of  Article 325 of the Constitution  inasmuch  as these  provisions provide for election to the seat  reserved for  Sanghas  on the basis of a separate electoral  roll  in which  Sanghas  alone  are entitled  to  be  registered  and exclude  others  from being registered as electors  on  that electoral  roll  on  the  ground  only  of  religion.    The submission  of  Shri  Jain  is  that  these  provisions  are inconsistent with the concept of secularism which is a basic feature of the Constitution. The reservation of one seat for Sanghas and election to  the same  through a separate electoral roll of Sanghas only  has been justified by Shri Parasaran on the basis of  historical reasons.   He has argued that the Sangha has played a  vital role  in  the  life of community since  the  earliest  known history  of  Sikkim  and have also played a  major  part  in deciding  important issues in the affairs of the State.   It has  been pointed out that Lhade-Medi, a body consisting  of the  Lamas  and  laity, has  contributed  towards  cultural, social and political development of the people of Sikkim and that the Sangha seat was introduced in order of provide  for the  representation of a section which was  responsible  for the  preservation  of  the basic culture  of  the  Sikkimese Bhutias  and Lepchas including some sections of  the  Nepali community of Sikkim who are Budhists.  It has been submitted that  their interests are synonymous with the  interests  of the  minority communities of Sikkim and that as such a  seat for the Sangha has always been nominated and later  reserved in   the  Sikkim  State  Council  and  the  State   Assembly respectively. 1016 Clause  (1)  of Article 15 prohibits discrimination  by  the State  against any citizen on the ground only  of  religion, race,  caste,  sex  or any of them.   Clause  (3),  however, permits  the State to make special provision for  women  and children.   Similarly, Clause (4) permits the State to  make special  provision for the advancement of any  socially  and

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educationally  backward  classes  of  citizens  or  for  the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.  Clauses (3)  and (4) do not, however, permit making of special provisions  in derogation of the prohibition against discrimination on  the ground  of  religion.  This Court has laid  down  that  this constitutional  mandate  to the State contained  in  Article 15(1)  extends to political as well as to other  rights  and any  law  providing for elections on the basis  of  separate electorates  for members of different religious  communities offends against this clause. (See Nain Sukh Das and Anr.  v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, [1953] SCR 1184). Similarly  Article  325  requires that there  shall  be  one general  electoral roll for every constituency for  election to  either  House of Parliament or to the  house  of  either House of Legislature of a State and precludes a person being rendered ineligible for inclusion in any such roll or to  be included  in  any  special  electoral  roll  for  any   such constituency  on the grounds only of religion, race,  caste, sex or any of them.  The provisions which permit election on the  basis of separate electorates are, those  contained  in Clauses  (a),  (b)  and (c) of Clause  (3)  of  Article  171 relating  to  Legislative  Council of  a  State.   The  said provisions  provide for separate electorates of  members  of municipalities,  district boards and local  authorities  Cl. (a),  graduates  of universities Cl. (b), and  teachers  Cl. (c).   They  do  not provide  for  preparation  of  separate electoral rolls on the ground of religion.  The question for consideration  is whether the impugned provisions  providing for  reservation of one seat for Sanghas, preparation  of  a special electoral roll for the Sangha constituency in  which Sanghas alone can be registered as electors and a person who is  an  elector  in  the said  electoral  roll  alone  being eligible  to contest for the Sangha seat, can be held to  be violative of the provisions of Articles 15(1) and 325 on the ground that in relation to one seat reserved for Sanghas  in the Legislative Assembly of the State of Sikkim a person who is  a  non-Budhist is being discriminated on the  ground  of religion  only  and  similarly in  the  preparation  of  the special electoral roll for Sangha constituency a person  who is a non-Budhist is rendered ineligible for 1017 inclusion  in the said electoral roll on the ground only  of religion.  For this purpose it is necessary to construe  the words "on grounds only of religion..." in Articles 15(1) and 325.  In this context, it may be pointed out that  sub-s.(1) of s.298 of the Government of India Act, 1935 contained  the words "on grounds only of religion, place of birth, discent, colour......... In Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh and Ors., (1946)  FCR  1  the  provisions of s.  13-A  of  the  Punjab Alienation of Land Act, 1900 were challanged as contravening sub-  s.(1) of s. 298 of the Government of India Act,  1935. In  the  Federal  Court,  Beaumont  J.,  in  his  dissenting judgment, has taken view that in applying the terms of  sub- s.  (1)  of Section 298, it was necessary for the  Court  to consider the scope and object of the Act which was  impugned so  as to determine the ground on which such Act  is  based. This test was not accepted by the Judicial Committee of  the Privy  Council.  Lord Thankerton, delivering the opinion  of the Judicial Committee has observed:-               "Their  Lordship are unable to accept this  as               the correct test.  In their views, it is not a               question of whether the impugned Act is  based               only  on one or more of the grounds  specified               in S. 298, sub-S. 1, but whether its operation               may  result  in a prohibition  only  on  these

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             grounds.  The proper test as to whether  there               is  a contravention of the sub-section  is  to               ascertain the reaction of the impugned Act  on               the  personal  right  conferred  by  the  sub-               section,  and, while the scope and  object  of               the  Act may be of assistance  in  determining               the  effect of the operation of the Act  on  a               proper construction of its provisions, if  the               effect  of the Act so determined  involves  an               infringement of each personal right, object of               the  however  laudable, will not  obviate  the               prohibition of sub-s.1". (p.18) In  State of Bombay v. Bombay Education Society and  Others, [1955]  1  SCR 568, this Court, in the  context  of  Article 29(2)  wherein  also  the expression  "on  grounds  only  of religion........  has been used, has accepted the test  laid down  by  the  Judicial Committee of the  Privy  Council  in Punjab Province v. Daulat Singh and Others (supra). I  may, in this context, also refer to the decision of  this Court in The 1018 State of Madras v. Srimathi Champakam Dorairajan, [1951] SCR 525,  wherein, the question was whether there was denial  of admission  to  Srinivasan, one of the  petitioners,  on  the ground  only  of  caste.  It was found that  the  denial  of admission to the said petitioner, who was a Brahmin and  had secured  higher  marks  than  the  Anglo-Indian  and  Indian Christians  but could not get any of the seats reserved  for the said communities for no fault of his except that he  was a  Brahmin and not a member of the said  communities,  could not  but  be regarded as made on ground only of  his  caste. (p.532) The  validity of the impugned provisions has, therefore,  to be  considered by applying the aforesaid test of  effect  of operation of the said provisions. It   is  not  disputed  that  Sangha,  (Budhist  order’   or congregation  of monks) has an important place  in  Budhism. Sangha  together/with  the Buddha and  Dharma  (sacred  law) constituted the three Jewels which were the highest  objects of worship among the Buddhists and a monk at the time of his ordination had to declare solemnly that he had taken  refuge in  Buddha, Dharma and Sangha. [B.K. Mukherjea on The  Hindu Law of Religious and Charitable Trusts’, Tagore Law Lectures : Fifth Ed. (1983), p.181. In Sikkim, Lamaistic Buddhism was the  official religion and Sanghas (Bhudhist Lamas)  staying in  the Budhist monasteries played an important role in  the administration.   Since only a Budhist can be a Sangha,  the effect  of  the reservation of a seat for  Sanghas  and  the provision   for  special  electoral  roll  for  the   Sangha constituency  wherein  only  Sanghas  are  entitled  to   be registered  as  electors,  is that a, person who  is  not  a Budhist  cannot  contest the said reserved seat  and  he  is being   discriminated  on  the  ground  only  of   religion. Similarly  a  person  who  is  not  a  Budhist  is  rendered ineligible  to be included in the electoral roll for  Sangha constituency on the ground only of religion. The  historical considerations to which reference  has  been made  by  Shri Parasaran do not, in my  view,  justify  this discrimination    of   non-Budhists   because    the    said considerations  which  had  significance at  the  time  when Sikkim  was governed by the Chogyal who professed  Lamaistic Budhism  and ran the administration of Sikkim in  accordance with  the  tenets  of his religion, can  no  longer  have  a bearing on the set up of the functioning of the State  after its admission into the Indian Union.  In this regard, it may

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1019 be  pointed out that the reason for the reservation  of  one seat for Sanghas, as set out in cl. (a) of the note that was appended  to  the  Proclamation of March 16,  1958,  was  as follows :-               "(a)  It  has  long been  felt  that,  as  the               Monasteries  and The Sangha  have  constituted               such a vital and important role in the life of               the community since the earliest known history               of Sikkim, and have played a major part in the               taking  of  decisions in the Councils  of  the               past,  there  should be  a  seat  specifically               reserved for The Sangha in the Sikkim Council.               It  is  for this reason that a seat  has  been               provided      specifically      for      their               representation". This  shows that the reservation of one seat for Sanghas  in Sikkim  Council and subsequently in the Sikkim Assembly  was in the context of the administrative set up in Sikkim at the time wherein Sanghas were playing a major part in the taking of  decisions  in  the Council.  The said  reason  does  not survive after the admission of Sikkim as a new State in  the Indian   Union.   The  continuation  of  a  practice   which prevailed  in  Sikkim  from  1958 to  1976  with  regard  to reservation of one seat for Sanghas and the election to  the said  seat  on  the basis of  a  special  electoral  college composed of Sanghas alone cannot, therefore, be justified on the  basis  of historical considerations  and  the  impugned provisions  are  violative  of  the  Constitutional  mandate contained  in  Article  15  (1)  and  Article  325  of   the Constitution. The next question which arises for consideration is  whether the  departure as made by the impugned provisions  from  the provisions of Articles 15(1) and 325 of the Constitution  is permitted  by  Article 371-F of the  Constitution.   It  has already  been pointed out that Article 371-F, whether it  is treated  as having been inserted in the Constitution by  way of  an  amendment under Article 368 or by way of  terms  and conditions  on  which Sikkim was admitted  into  the  Indian Union under Article 2, does not permit alteration of any  of the  basic  features  of  the  Constitution.   Although  the expression   ’Secular’   did  not  find  a  place   in   the Constitution  prior  to  its insertion in  the  Preamble  by Constitution  (Forty-Second  Amendment) Act, 1976,  but  the commitment of the leaders of our freedom struggle during the course  of freedom movement which find,,, expression in  the various  provisions of the Constitution leaves no  room  for doubt that 1120 secularism is one of the basic features of the Constitution. It was so held in the Kesavananda Bharati case, [1973] Supp. SCR  1 [Sikri, CJ. at pp. 165-6; Shelat and Grover,  JJ.  at p.280;  Hegde and Mukharjea, JJ. at p.314 and Khanna  J.  at p.685] and in Smt.  Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain [1976] 2 SCR 347  [Mathew,  J. at p.503 and Chandrachud, J. at  p.  6591. The  matter  has  now  been  placed  beyond  controversy  by incorporating the expression secular" in the Preamble by the Constitution (Forty- second Amendment) Act, 1976. In  so far as clause (1) of Article 15 is concerned  express provision  has been made in clauses (3) and  (4)  empowering the State to make special provisions for certain classes  of persons.   Sanghas, as such, do not fan within the ambit  of clauses  (3) and (4) of Article 15 and therefore, a  special provision  in their favour, in derogation of clause  (1)  of Article  15 is not permissible.  Article 325 also  does  not

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postulate any departure from the prohibition with regard  to special electoral roll contained therein.  This is borne out by the background in which Article 325 came to be adopted in the Constitution. Under  the British Rule, separate electorates,  for  Muslims were  provided  by  the  Indian  Councils  Act,  1909.   The Communal  Award  announced  in 1932  provided  for  separate electorates for Muslims, Europeans, Sikhs, Indian  Christian and anglo-Indians.  By it, separate electorates were  sought to  be  extended to the depressed classes  also.   This  was opposed by Mahatma Gandhi who undertook fast unto death  and thereupon  the  said proposal was given  up.   The  Congress Working  Committee in its resolution adopted in Calcutta  in October  1937  declared the communal award as  being  ’anti- national,  anti-democratic and a barrier to  Indian  freedom and  development of Indian unity’.  The Congress  felt  that separate electorates was a factor which led to the partition of the country.  When the Constitution was being framed, the question   whether  there  should  be  joint   or   separate electorates  was first considered by the Advisory  Committee constituted  by  the Constituent Assembly to  determine  the fundamental rights of citizen, minorities etc.  The advisory Committee in its report dated August 8, 1947 has stated :               "The  first  question we tackled was  that  of               separate  electorates; we considered  this  as               being of crucial importance               1121               both to the minorities them selves and to  the               political life of the country as a whole.   By               an  overwhelming  majority,  we  came  to  the               conclusion   that  the  system   of   separate               electorates  must  be  abolished  in  the  new               Constitution.   In our judgment,  this  system               has in the past sharpened communal differences               to  a dangerous extent and has proved  one  of               the  main stumbling blocks to the  development               of   a  healthy  national  life.    It   seems               specially necessary to avoid these dangers  in               the   new  political  conditions   that   have               developed  in the country and from this  point               of   view  the  arguments   against   separate               electorates seem to us absolutely decisive.               We recommend accordingly that all elections to               the Central and Provincial Legislatures should               be held on the basis of joint electorates." [Shiva   Rao,  Framing  of  India’s   Constitution,   Select Documents, Vol.II, p.412] When  the  report  of the Advisory  Committee  came  up  for consideration   before   the  Constituent   Assembly,   Shri Muniswami  Pillai,  expressing  his  satisfaction  with  the report, said :               "One  great point, Sir, which I would like  to               tell  this  house is that we got  rid  of  the               harmful   mode   of   election   by   separate               electorates.  It has been buried seven  fathom               deep, never more to rise in our country." [Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol.  V p. 2021 An  amendment  was  moved by Shri B.  Pocker  Sahib  Bahadur belonging  to  Muslim  League to the  effect  that  all  the elections to the Central and Provincial Legislatures should, as  far  as Muslims are concerned, be held on the  basis  of separate  electorates.   The said amendment was  opposed  by most  of the members.  Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant,  speaking on the said occasion, stated

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             "...  So,  separate electorates are  not  only               dangerous to the               State and to society as a whole, but they  are               particularly               1022               harmful  to the minorities.  We all  have  had               enough of this experience, and it is  somewhat               tragic to find that all that experience should               be  lost  and  still  people  should  hug  the               exploded shibboleths and slogans."               [Constituent Assembly Debates; Vol.  V, p.224]               Sardar  Patel in his reply to the  debate  was               more emphatic.  He said:-               "I  had not the occasion to hear the  speeches               which  were  made in the initial  stages  when               this  question  of  communal  electorates  was               introduced in the Congress; but there are many               eminent Muslims who have recorded their  views               that  the greatest evil in this country  which               has  been  brought  to pass  is  the  communal               electorate.  The introduction of the system of               communal  electorates  is a poison  which  has               entered into the body politic of our  country.               Many Englishmen who were responsible for  this               also admitted that.  But today, after agreeing               to  the separation of the country as a  result               of  this communal electorate, I never  thought               that   proposition  was  going  to  be   moved               seriously, and even if it was moved seriously,               that it would be taken seriously." [Constituent Assembly Debates; Vol.  V, p. 255] The Constituent Assembly rejected the move and approved  the recommendation  of  the  Advisory  Committee.   But  in  the original  Draft Constitution there was no express  provision to  the effect that elections to the Parliament and  to  the State  Legislatures  shall  be on the  basis  of  the  joint electorates  for the reason that electoral details had  been left to auxiliary legislation under Articles 290 and 291  of the  Draft  Constitution.   Subsequently it  was  felt  that provision regarding joint electorates is of such fundamental importance  that it ought to be mentioned expressly  in  the Constitution itself.  Article 289-A was, therefore, inserted to provide that all elections to either House of  Parliament or the Legislature of any State shall be on the basis of the joint   electorates.  [Shiva  Rao  :  Framing   of   India’s Constitution,  Select Documents, Vol.  IV p. 141].   Article 289-A,   as   proposed  by  the  Drafting   Committee,   was substituted  during the course of debate in the  Constituent Assembly and the said provision, as finally 1023 adopted by the Constituent Assembly was numbered as  Article 325. This   would   show  that.   Article  325  is   of   crucial significance  for maintaining the secular character  of  the Constitution.   Any  contravention  of  the  said  provision cannot  but have an adverse impact on the secular  character of  the Republic which is one of the basic features  of  the Constitution.    The  same  is  true  with  regard  to   the provisions  of  clause  (1) of Article  15  which  prohibits reservation of seats in the legislatures on the ground  only of religion. It is no doubt true that the impugned provisions, relate  to only one seat out of 32 seats in the Legislative Assembly of Sikkim.   But the potentialities of mischief resulting  from such provisions cannot be minimised.  The existence of  such

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provisions  is  bound  to give rise to  similar  demands  by followers  of other religions and revival of the demand  for reservation  of seats on religious grounds and for  separate electorates   which   was  emphatically  rejected   by   the Constituent  Assembly.   It  is  a  poison  which,  if   not eradicated from the system at the earliest, is bound to  eat into the vitals of the nation.  It is, therefore, imperative that  such  provision should not find place in  the  statute book  so that further mischief is prevented and the  secular character of the Republic is protected and preserved.  While dealing  with fundamental liberties, Bose J., in Kedar  Nath Bajoria  v. The State of West Bengal, [1954] 5 SCR  30,  has struck a note of caution :               "If   we  wish  of  retain   the   fundamental               liberties   which   we  have   so   eloquently               proclaimed  in our Constitution and  remain  a               free  and independment people walking  in  the               democratic  way of life, we must be  swift  to               scotch  at  the outset  tendencies  which  may               easily   widen,  as  precedent  is  added   to               precedent, into that which in the end will  be               the negation of freedom and equality". (p.52) Similar  caution  is  called for  to  preserve  the  secular character of the Republic. Having  found  that the impugned provision providing  for  a separate electoral roll for Sangha Constituency contraveness Article  325  and  reservation  of  one  seat  for   Sanghas contravenes Article 15(1) and Articles 325 and 15(1) are  of crucial importance to the concept of Secularism envisaged 1024 in the Constitution it becomes necessary to examine  whether Article  371-F  permits  a  departure  from  the   principle contained  in  Articles  325 and 15(1)  while  applying  the Constitution  to the newly admitted State of Sikkim.   I  am unable  to  construe  the provisions of Cl  (f)  of  Article 371-F-as conferring such a power clause (f) of Article 371-F which empowers Parliament to make provision for  reservation of   seats  in  the  Legislative  Assembly  of  Sikkim   for protecting the rights and interest of the different sections of  the  population  of Sikkim, must be  considered  in  the context of clause (5) of the tripartite agreement of May  8, 1973.   The ’different sections’ contemplated in clause  (f) of  Article 371-F are Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha  origin  on the one hand and Sikkimese of Nepali origin on the other and the said provision is intended to protect and safeguard the. rights  and  interests  of these sections.   Clause  (f)  of Article  371-F,  in my view, cannot be construed  to  permit reservation of a seat for Sanghas and election to that  seat on  the  basis  of a separate  electoral  roll  composed  of Sanghas only. It  must, therefore, be held that clause (c) of  sub-s.(1-A) of s.7 and Section 25-A of the 1950 Act and the words "other than  constituency  reserved for Sanghas" in clause  (a)  of sub-s.(2)  of s.5-A and clause (c) of sub-s.(2) of s.5-A  of the  1951  Act are violative of the provisions  of  Articles 15(1)  and  325  of the Constitution and are  not  saved  by Article 371-F of the Constitution.  The said provisions,  in my  view, are however, severable from the  other  provisions which have been inserted in the 1950 Act and the 1951 Act by the  1976 Act and the 1980 Act and the striking down of  the impugned  provisions  does not stand in the  way  of  giving effect to the other provisions. I would, therefore, strike down s.25-A inserted in the  1950 Act  by the Act 10 of 1976 and the provisions  contained  in clause (c) of sub-s.(1-A) which has been inserted in Section

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7  of the 1950 Act by Act 8 of 1.980, the words "other  than the constituency reserved for the Sanghas" in clause (a)  of sub-s.(2)  as  well as clause (c) of sub-s.(2)  inserted  in Section  5-A  of  the 1951 Act by Act 8  of  1980  as  being unconstitutional. In Transferred Cases Nos. 93 and 94 of 1991, Shri K.N. Bhatt and Shri K.M.K. Nair, the learned counsel appearing for  the petitioners  therein have not assailed the validity  of  the provisions with regard to reservation of seats for Sikkimese of Bhutia and Lepcha origin.  They have. however, 1025 urged that Clause (f) of Article 371-F imposes an obligation on Parliament to make provision for protection of the rights and  interests of Sikkimese of Nepali origin also  and  that while  making  reservation  for  protection  of  rights  and interest  of Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha  origin,  Parliament was  also  required to provide for  similar  reservation  of seats  for Sikkimese of Nepali origin to protect the  rights and  interests  of  Sikkimese of Napalis  origin.   In  this regard, it has been submitted that reservation for seats  in the  Sikkim Council and subsequently in Sikkim Assembly  for Sikkimese of Nepali origin had been there since the elective element  was  introduced in 1952.  It was  also  urged  that after  Sikkim  was admitted in the Indian Union,  there  has been  large  influx of outsiders in Sikkim as  a  result  of which  the original residents of Sikkim including  Sikkimese of  Nepali origin have been vastly out numbered by  settlers coming  to  Sikkim from other parts of the country.   In  my view, there is no substance in these contentions.  According to  the  figures of 1971 census Sikkimese of  Nepali  origin were 1,40,000 whereas Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin were 51,600  and  as  per  per the figures  of  1981  census  the corresponding figures were 2,24,481 and 73,623 respectively. This shows that the ratio of Sikkimese of Nepali origin  and Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin is about 3:1.  In view  of the vast difference in their numbers the Sikkimese of Nepali origin  can  have  no apprehension about  their  rights  and interests  being  jeopardised on account of  reservation  of twelve  seats for Sikkimese of Bhutia-Lepcha origin  in  the Legislative  Assembly  composed  of  thirty-two  seats.   As regards the apprehension that the Sikkimese of Nepali origin would  be out-numbered by the settlors from other  parts  of the  country I find that no material has been placed by  the petitioners  to show that the number of settlors from  other parts of the country into Sikkim is so large that  Sikkimese of Nepali origin are being out-numbered.  The figures of the 1971  and  1981 census, on the other hand, indicate  to  the contrary.   According  to  the 1.971  census  in  the  total population  of 2,09,843 the Sikkimese of Nepali origin  were about 1,40,000, i.e., about 67%, and according to the  1981. census  in  the total population of  3.16,385  Sikkimese  of Nepali  origin  were 2,24,481, i.e., about  70%.   In  these circumstances,  it cannot be said that reservation  of  seat for  Sikkimese  of Nepali origin was required  in  order  to protect  their- rights and interests and in not  making  any provision  for reservation of seats for Sikkimese of  Nepali origin   Parliament  has  failed  to  give  effect  to   the provisions of clause Article 371-F of the Constitution. 1026 For  the  reasons above mentioned, these cases  have  to  be partly  allowed  and  it  is  declared  that  Section   25-A introduced in the 1950 Act by Act no. 10 of 1976, Clause (c) of sub-s.(1A) introduced in Section 7 of the 1950 Act by Act no.  8 of 1980, the words "other than constituency  reserved for  the  Sanghas"in clause (a) of sub-s.(2)  introduced  in

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Section  5-A of the 1951 Act by Act no.8 of 1980 and  clause (c) of sub-s.(2) introduced in s.5-A of the 1951 Act by  Act no.8 of 1980 are unconstitutional nd avoid. T.N.A. Petitions dismissed. 1027