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PETITIONER: PURUSHOTHAMAN NAMBUDIRI

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF KERALA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/12/1961

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. SARKAR, A.K. WANCHOO, K.N. GUPTA, K.C. DAS AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA

CITATION:  1962 AIR  694            1962 SCR  Supl. (1) 753  CITATOR INFO :  F          1962 SC 723  (10)  RF         1972 SC2027  (16,18)  R          1972 SC2301  (56,58)  RF         1990 SC1771  (12)  RF         1992 SC 320  (30,31)

ACT:      Agrarain Relations-Constitutional validity of enactment-Dissolution of  State  Assembly  pending President’s assent-Reconsideration  of Bill by New Assembly-Pandarvaka  Verumapattom   and   Puravaka lands-If amount  to estates-"Estate",  meaning of- Kerala Agrarian  Relations Act,  1960 (Kerala 4 of 1961).-Constitution  of   India  Arts.  31A,  172, 194(3), 196, 200, 201.

HEADNOTE:      The  Kerala   Agrarian  Relations   Bill  was introduced in  the Kerala  Legislative Assembly on December 21, 1957, and was ultimately passed by it on June  10, 1959.  It was  then reserved  by  the Governor of  the  State  for  the  assent  of  the President under  Art. 200  of the  Constitution of India. Meanwhile,  on July 31, 1959, the President issued a  proclamation  under  Art.  356  and  the Assembly was  dissolved. In  February  1960  fresh elections  took   place  in  Kerala  and  on  July 27,1960, the  President for  whose assent the Bill was  pending   sent  it   back  with  his  message requesting the  Legislative Assembly to reconsider the Bill  in the light of the amendments suggested by him.  On October  15, 1960, the Bill as amended in the  light of  the President’s  recommendations was passed  by the  Assembly. It then received the assent of  the President  on January 21, 1961, and became law  as the  Kerala Agrarain Relations Act, 1960. The  petitioner challenged  the validity  of the Act  on the  ground that  the Bill  which  was pending before the President for his assent at the

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time when  the Legislative  Assembly was dissolved lapsed in  consequence of the said dissolution and so it  was not  competent to the President to give his assent  to a  lapsed Bill with the result that the  said   assent  and   all  proceedings   taken subsequent to it were constitutionally invalid. ^      HELD,  that   the   Constitution   of   India radically departs  from the  practice obtaining in the Parliament  of the  United Kingdom under which Bills not  assented to  before the  dissolution of the Houses  are treated  as having  lapsed on that event   occurring.   Under   Act.   196   of   the Constitution a Bill which is pending assent of the Governor or  the President  does not  lapse on the dissolution of  the Legislative  Assembly  of  the State. 754      Held, further,  that the consideration of the remitted Bill  by the new Legislative Assembly did not violate  the provisions  of Art.  201  of  the Constitution.      Per Gajendragadkar,  Sarkar, Wanchoo  and Das Gupta, JJ.-(1)  Clause (5)  of  Art.  196  of  the Constitution of  India deals exhaustively with the circumstances under which Bills would lapse on the dissolution  of  the  Legislative  Assembly  of  a State, and  all cases not falling within its scope are not  subject  to  the  doctrine  of  lapse  of pending  business   on  the   dissolution  of  the Assembly.      (2) Under  Arts. 200 and 201 there is no time limit within  which the  Governor or the President should reach  a decision  on the  Bill referred to him for  his assent  and  those  Articles  do  not require that  the Bill which is sent back with the message of the Governor or the President should be to the  same House  which had considered it in the first instance.      Per  Ayyangar,   J.-(1)  A  Bill  before  the legislative Assembly  of  a  State  ceases  to  be pending under  Art.  196(5)  when  it  has  passed through  all  the  procedure  prescribed  for  its passage through  the House  and has been passed by it, and  is not deemed as pending before the House till the  receipt of the assent of the Governor or the President as the case may be.      (2) Though  under Art.  172 each  Legislative Assembly of  a State  is conceived  of as having a life  of   limited  duration,   in  Art.  201  the expression "The  House of  the Legislature" i used in the  sense of  a House  regarded as a permanent body.      Attorney-General  for   New  South  Wales  v. Pennie, [1896] A.C. 376, relied on.      The Kerala  Agrarian Relations Act. 1960, was enacted with  the  object  of  providing  for  the acquisition of certain types of agricultural lands in the  State beyond  the specific maximum extents laid down  in the  statute. The petitioner who was the owner of certain lands in Trichur of which 900 acres were  classified in  the land records of the State as  Pandaravaka Verumpattom  lands  and  the remaining were  entered as Puravaka lands, claimed that the  lands did  not constitute  estates under

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Art. 31A(2)(a)  and, therefore,  the Act  was  not applicable to  them. His  case  was  (1)  that  as regards  Pandaravaka   Verumpattom  lands  he  was paying  rent   to  the   State  calculated   as  a proportion of  the gross  yield of the properties, that he held the lands under the State as a tenant and that as he was not an intermediary between the State and  the tiller  of the soil, the lands were not an estate under cl. 2 (a) of Art. 31A, and (2) that the  Puravaka lands  were held  under a Jenmi and that as they had within its scope a particular form of land-holding known as kanom 755 tenancy they  were outside  the purview  of cl.  2 (a). It  was not  disputed that  the  proclamation issued by  the Ruler  of Cochin on March 10, 1905, was the  relevant existing  law for the purpose of deciding whether the properties of the petitioner, were an estate under Art. 31A (2)(a). Under cl. 13 of the proclamation the holders of the Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure  acquired full  rights  to  the soil of  the lands  and held  them subject  to the liability to  pay the  assessment  to  the  State. Clause 15  provided that  in the  case of Puravaka Lands  the   Jenmi  was   recognised   as   owning proprietorship in  the land  and entitled to share the produce with the cultivator and the State.      Held, that  the lands  held by the petitioner on Puravaka  tenure satisfied  the test as to what constituted an  estate under Art. 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution and,  therefore, the provision of the Kerala  Agrarian   Relations   Act,   1960,   were applicable to them.      Held,  further  (Ayyangar,  J.,  dissenting), that the  basic concept  of the  word "estate"  as used in Art. 31A(2)(a) of the Constitution is that the person holding the estate should be proprietor of the  soil and  should be in direct relationship with the  State paying  land revenue  to it except where it  is remitted  in whole  or in  part. If a term is  used or  defined in any existing law in a local area which corresponds to this basic concept of estate  that would  be the  local equivalent of the word "estate" in the area. It is not necessary that there  must be  an intermediary  in an estate before it  can be  called  an  estate  within  the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a).      Shri Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay, [1959] Supp.  1 S.C.R.  489, Atma  Ram v. State of Punjab, [1959]  Supp. 1  S.C.R. 748,  Shri Mahadeo Paikaji Kolhe  Yavatmal v. State of Bombay, [1962] 1 S.C.R.  733 and The State of Bihar, v. Rameshwar Pratap Narain  Singh, [1962]  2 S.C.R. 382. relied on.      The  holder  of  lands  held  on  Pandaravaka Verumpattom tenure  was a  proprietor of the lands and held the lands subject to the liability to pay the  assessment   to  the   State  and  therefore, Pandaravaka Verumpattom  could be  regarded  as  a local equivalent  of an  estate under  cl. 2(a) of Art. 31A. 382.      Per Ayyangar, J.-(1) The word "estate" in sub cls.(a) and  (b)  in  Art.  31A(2)  has  the  same meaning   and   signifies   lands   held   by   an intermediary who  stood between  the State and the

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actual tiller  of the  soil and also the interests of those in whose favour there had been alienation of the right to revenue. 756      (2) The  First Amendment  to the Constitution did not  bring within  the definition of an estate in Art.  31A(2)(a) the  holding of  persons  other than intermediaries  or those  who held land under grants on favourable tenures from Government.      (3) Lands held by a ryotwari proprietor other than those  in ’estates’  would not  be an  estate within  sub-cl.   (a)  of  Art.  31A(2),  nor  the interest of  such ryot in his holding an ’interest in an estate’ within sub-cl. (b).      (4) The  word ’includes’  in Art 31A(2)(b) is used in the sense of ’means and includes’.      (5) The  holder  of  Pandaravaka  Verumpattom tenure was in the position of a ryotwari pattadar, and, therefore,  his  lands  were  not  an  estate within the meaning of Art. 31A(2).      (6) The  lands  held  by  the  petitioner  on Puravaka tenure  were within  Art. 31A(2)  because they were  lands  belonging  to  a  Jenmi  and  so covered by  the definition of an estate as amended by  virtue   of  the   Fourth  Amendment   to  the Constitution.

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION:  Petition No.  105  of 1961. Petition  under Art.  32 of the Constitution of  India   for  the  enforcement  of  Fundamental Rights.      A.   V.   Viswanatha   Sastri,   M.   K.   B. Namburdripat  and   M.  R.   K.  Pillai"  for  the petitioner.      M. C.  Setalvad Attorney-General of India, K. K. Mathew,  Advocate  General  for  the  State  of Kerala, Sardar Bahadur, George Pudissary and V. A. Seyid Muhammad, for the respondent.      1961.  December   5.  The  Judgment  of  P.B. Gajendragadkar, A. K. Sarkar, K. N. Wanchoo and K. C.   Das    Gupta,   JJ.,    was   delivered    by Gajendragadkar, J..  N. Rajagopala  Ayyangar,  J., delivered a separate judgment.      GAJENDRAGADKAR,  J.-This  petition  has  been filed under  Art. 32  of the  Constitution and  it seeks to  challenge the  validity  of  the  Kerala Agrarian Relations  Act,  1960  (Act  4  of  1961) (hereafter called  the Act).  The petitioner  owns about 1,  250 acres  of land  in the Kerala State. These lands  were originally  situated within  the erstwhile State  of Cochin which now forms part of the Kerala State. 757 Out of  the lands  owned by  the petitioner nearly 900 acres  are  classified  in  the  land  records maintained by  the State  as Pandaravaka  holdings while  the   remaining  lands  are  classified  as Puravaka holdings.  By his petition the petitioner claims a  declaration that  the Act is ultra vires and unconstitutional  and  prays  for  a  writ  of certiorari or  other appropriate  writ,  order  or direction against  the respondent,  the  State  of

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Kerala,  restraining   it  from  implementing  the provisions  of   the  Act.   It  appears   that  a notification has  been issued by the respondent on February 15, 1961, directing the implementation of ss. 1  to 40,  57,58,60,74 to 79 as well as ss. 81 to  95   of  the   Act  from   the  date   of  the notification. The  petitioner  contends  that  the notification issued  under the  Act is  also ultra vires, unconstitutional and illegal and as such he wants an  appropriate writ  or order  to be issued quashing the  said notification.  That in brief is the  nature   of  the   reliefs  claimed   by  the petitioner.      The Kerala  Agrarian Relations Bill which has ultimately become  the Act  was published  in  the Government Gazette of Kerala on December 18, 1957, and  was  introduced  in  the  Kerala  Legislative Assembly on  December 21,  1957, by  the Communist Government which  was then  in power. The bill was discussed  in  the  Assembly  and  was  ultimately passed by  it  on  June  10,  1959.  It  was  then reserved by  the Governor  of the  State  for  the assent of  the President  under Art.  200  of  the Constitution. Meanwhile,  on  July  31,  1959  the President issued a proclamation under Art. 356 and the Assembly  was dissolved. In February 1960 mid- term general elections took place in Kerala and as a result  a coalition  Government came into power. On July  27,1960, the  President for  whose assent the bill was pending sent it back with his message requesting the  Legislative Assembly to reconsider the bill  in the  light of the specific amendments suggested by  him. On August 2, 1960, the Governor returned the bill 758 remitted by the President with his message and the amendments suggested  by him  to the  new Assembly for consideration.  On  September  26,  1960,  the amendments suggested  by the  President were taken up  for   consideration  by   the   Assembly   and ultimately  on  October  15,  1960,  the  bill  as amended  in   the   light   of   the   President’s recommendations was  passed by  the  Assembly.  It then received  the  assent  of  the  President  on January 21, 1961, and after it thus became law the impugned notification was issued by the respondent on February  15,  1961.  On  March  9,  1961,  the present writ petition was filed.      Broadly  stated   three  points  fall  to  be considered  in   this  petition.   The  petitioner challenges  the   validity  of   the  Act  on  the preliminary ground that the bill which was pending before the  President for  his assent  at the time when the Legislative Assembly was dissolved lapsed in consequence  of the  said dissolution and so it was not  competent to  the President  to give  his assent to  a lapsed  bill with the result that the said assent  and all  proceedings taken subsequent to  it   are  constitutionally  invalid.  If  this preliminary point  is upheld  no further  question would arise  and the  petition  will  have  to  be allowed on  that ground  alone. If  however,  this preliminary challenge  to the validity of the bill does  not   succeed  the   respondent  raises  its preliminary objection  that the  Act is  protected

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under Art.  31 A  (1) (a) and as such its validity cannot be  challenged on  the ground  that  it  is inconsistent with, or takes away, or abridges, any of the  rights conferred  by Arts.  14, 19 and 31. This point  raises the  question as to whether the properties owned  and possessed  by the petitioner are an  "estate" within  the meaning  of Art. 31 A (2) (a).  If this  question  is  answered  in  the affirmative then  the Act would be protected under Art. 31  A  (1)  (a)  and  the  challenge  to  its validity on  the ground  that it  is  inconsistent with Arts. 14,19 and 31 will not 759 survive. If, however, it is held that the whole or any  part   of  the   properties  with  which  the petitioner is  concerned is outside the purview of "estate" as  described by  Art. 31  A (2)  (a) the challenge to the validity of the Act on the merits would  have   to  be  considered.  The  petitioner contends that  the material  provisions of the Act contravenes the  fundamental rights  guaranteed by Arts, 14,  19 (1)  (f) and 31 of the Constitution. That is  how three principal points would call for our decision in the present writ petition.      Let us  first examine  the argument  that the bill which was pending the assent of the President at the  time when  the  legislative  Assembly  was dissolved has lapsed and so no further proceedings could have  been validly  taken in. respect of it. In support  of this  argument  it  is  urged  that wherever  the   English  parliamentary   form   of Government prevails  the words  "prorogation"  and "dissolution" have acquired the status of terms of art and  their significance  and  consequence  are well settled.  The argument is that if there is no provision to  the contrary in our Constitution the English convention  with regard to the consequence of dissolution  should be  held to  follow even in India. There  is no  doubt that,  in  England,  in addition to  bringing a session of Parliament to a close prorogation  puts and  end to  all  business which is pending consideration before either House at the  time of  such prorogation; as a result any proceedings  either   in  the   House  or  in  any Committee of  the house  lapse  with  the  session Dissolution of  Parliament is  invariably preceded by prorogation,  and what is true about the result of prorogation  is, it  is said,  a fortiori  true about the  result of  dissolution (1). Dissolution of Parliament  is sometimes  described as "a civil death of Parliament". Ilbert, in his work on 760 ’Parliament’, has observed that "prorogation means the end  of a  session (not of a Parliament)"; and adds that  "like dissolution,  it kills  all bills which have  not yet  passed".  He  also  describes dissolution as an "end of a Parliament (not merely of a session) by royal proclamation", and observes that "it  wipes the slate clean of all uncompleted bills or  other proceedings". Thus, the petitioner contends   that    the   inevitable   conventional consequence of  dissolution of  Parliament is that there is  a civil  death  of  Parliament  and  all uncompleted  business  pending  before  Parliament lapses.

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    In this  connection it  would be  relevant to see how  Parliament  is  prorogued.  This  is  how prorogation is  described in  May’s "Parliamentary Practice": "If  Her Majesty  attends in  person to prorogue Parliament at the end of the session. the same ceremonies  are observed as at the opening of Parliament: the  attendance of  the Commons in the House of Peers is commanded; and, on their arrival at the  bar, the Speaker addresses Her Majesty, on presenting the  supply bills,  and adverts  to the most important  measures that  have  received  the sanction of  Parliament during  the  session.  The royal assent  is then given to the bills which are awaiting that  sanction, and  Her Majesty’s Speech is read to both Houses of Parliament by herself or by  her   Chancellor;   after   which   the   Lord Chancellor, having  received directions  from  Her Majesty for that purpose, addresses both Houses in this manner: "My Lords and Members of the House of Commons,  it  is  Her  Majesty’s  royal  will  and pleasure that  this Parliament  be prorogued (to a certain day)  to be  then here  holden;  and  this Parliament   is    accordingly   prorogued"   (2). According to  May, the effect of prorogation is at once to  suspend  all  business  until  Parliament shall  be   summoned  again.   Not  only  are  the proceedings  of  Parliament  at  an  end  but  all proceedings pending at the time are quashed except 761 impeachment by  the Commons and appeals before the House of  Lords.  Every  bill  must  therefore  be renewed after  prorogation as if it had never been introduced. To  the same effect are the statements in Halsbury’s  "Laws of  England" (Vide:  Vol. 28, pp. 371, 372, paragraphs 648 to 651). According to Anson,  "prorogation  ends  the  session  of  both Houses simultaneously  and terminates  all pending business. A  bill which  has passed  through  some stages but  which is  not ripe for royal assent at the date of prorogation must begin at the earliest stage when Parliament is summoned again and opened by a speech from the throne" (1). It would thus be seen that  under  English  parliamentary  practice bills which  have passed  by both  Houses and  are awaiting assent  of the  Crown receive  the  royal assent  before   the  Houses   of  Parliament  are prorogued. In  other words,  the  procedure  which appears to  be invariably  followed in  proroguing and dissolving  the  Houses  shows  that  no  bill pending royal  assent is  left outstanding  at the time of  prorogation or  dissolution. That  is why the question as to whether a bill which is pending assent  lapses  as  a  result  of  prorogation  or dissolution does  not normally  arise in  England. Thus, there  can be  no doubt  that in England the dissolution of  the Houses of Parliament kills all business pending  before either  House at the time of dissolution. According to the petitioner, under our Constitution  the result of dissolution should be held  to be  the same;  and since  the bill  in question  did   not  receive  the  assent  of  the President before  the Assembly  was  dissolved  it should be held that the said bill lapsed.      This argument  has taken  another  form.  The duration of the Legislative Assembly is prescribed

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by Art.  172(1), and  normally at  the end of five years the  life of  the Assembly  would come to an end. Its life could come to an end even before the expiration of the said period 762 of five  years if  during the  said five years the President acts  under Art.  356. In any case there is  no   continuity  in  the  personality  of  the Assembly where  the life  of one Assembly comes to an end  and another  Assembly  is  in  due  course elected. If  that be  so, a  bill  passed  by  one Assembly cannot,  on well recognised principles of democratic government.  be  brought  back  to  the successor Assembly  as  though  a  change  in  the personality of  the Assembly  had not taken place. The scheme  of the  Constitution in  regard to the duration  of   the  life   of  State   Legislative Assembly, it  is urged, supports the argument that with the  dissolution of the Assembly all business pending  before   the  Assembly  at  the  date  of dissolution must  lapse. This  position  would  be consonant with  the well  recognised principles of democratic  rule.   The   Assembly   derives   its sovereign power  to legislate  essentially because it represents  the will  of the  citizens  of  the State, and  when one  Assembly has  been dissolved and another  has been  elected in  its place,  the successor Assembly  cannot be required to carry on with the  business pending before its predecessor, because   that    would   assume   continuity   of personality which  in the eyes of the Constitution does not  exist. Therefore,  sending the bill back to the  successor Assembly with the message of the President would  be inconsistent  with this  basic principle of democracy.      It is  also urged  that in  dealing with  the effect  of   the  relevant   provisions   of   the legislative procedure  prescribed by  Art. 196  it would be necessary to bear in mind that the powers of the legislature which are recognised in England will also  be available  to the  State Legislature under Art.  194 (3).  The argument is that whether or not  a successor Legislative Assembly can carry on  with   the   business   pending   before   its predecessor at  the time  of  its  dissolution  is really 763 a matter  of the  power of  the Legislature and as such the  powers of the Legislative Assembly shall be "such  as may  from time to time be defined, by the Legislature  by law,  and, until  so  defined, shall  be   those  of  the  House  of  Commons  of Parliament of  the  United  Kingdom,  and  of  its Members and  Committees, at  the  commencement  of this Constitution".  In other words, this argument assumes that the conventional position with regard to the  effect of  dissolution of Parliament which prevails in England is expressly saved in India by virtue of  Art. 194(3)  until a  definite  law  is passed by  the State Legislature in that behalf to the  contrary.  It  would  be  noticed  that  this argument purports to supply a constitutional basis for the  contention which  we have already set out that the  word "dissolution"  is a term of art and its effect should be the same in India as it is in

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England. It  may incidentally  be pointed out that the corresponding  provisions for  our  Parliament are contained in Art. 104(3).      As we  have already  mentioned  there  is  no doubt that  dissolution of the House of Parliament in England  brings to  a close  and in  that sense kills all  business pending before either House at the time of dissolution; but, before accepting the broad argument  that this  must inevitably  be the consequence in every country which has adopted the English Parliamentary  form of Government it would be necessary  to enquire  whether  there  are  any provisions made  by our  Constitution  which  deal with the matter; and if the relevant provisions of our Constitution  provide for  the solution of the problem it  is that  solution which obviously must be  adopted.   This  position   is  not  disputed. Therefore, in  determining  the  validity  of  the contentions raised  by the  petitioner it would be necessary to  interpret the provisions of Art. 196 and  determine  their  effect.  The  corresponding provisions in regard to the 764 legislative procedure  of Parliament are contained in Art. 107.      The argument  based on the provisions of Art. 194(3) is,  in our opinion, entirely misconceived. The powers,  privileges and  immunities  of  State Legislatures and their members with which the said Article deals  have no  reference or  relevance to the legislative  procedure which  is  the  subject matter of  the provisions  of  Art.  196.  In  the context, the  word ’powers’  used in  Art.  194(3) must  be   considered   along   with   the   words "privileges and  immunities"  to  which  the  said clause refers,  and there can be no doubt that the said word  can have  no reference to the effect of dissolution  with  which  we  are  concerned.  The powers of  the House of the Legislature of a State to which reference is made in Art. 194(3) may, for instance, refer  to the  powers of  the  House  to punish contempt  of the  House. The two topics are entirely different and distinct and the provisions in respect  of one  cannot be invoked in regard to the other.  Therefore, there  is no constitutional basis for the argument that unless the Legislature by law  has made  a contrary provision the English convention  with   regard   to   the   effect   of dissolution shall prevail in this country.      What then  is the result of the provisions of Art.  196   which  deals   with  the   legislative procedure and  makes provisions  in regard  to the introduction and  passing of bills? Before dealing with this  question it  may be  useful to refer to some relevant  provisions in  regard to  the State Legislature under  the constitution.  Article  168 provides that  for every  State there  shall be  a Legislature which  shall consist  of the  Governor and (a)  in the  States of  Bihar, Bombay,  Madhya Pradesh, Madras, Mysore, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal,  two Houses, and (b) in other States, one  House.   In  the   present  petition  we  are concerned with  the State of Kerala which has only one House 765

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Article 168  (2) provides that where there are two House of  the Legislature of a State. one shall be known as  the Legislative Council and the other as the Legislative  Assembly, and where there is only one House,  it shall  be known  as the Legislative Assembly. Article  170 deals  with the composition of the  Legislative Assembly.  and Art.  171  with that of  the  Legislative  Council.  Article,  172 provides   for   the   duration   of   the   State Legislatures. Under  Art. 172(1) the normal period for the  life of the Assembly is five years unless it is  sooner dissolved.  Article 172(2)  provides that the  Legislative Council of a State shall not be subjected  to dissolution,  but  as  nearly  as possible one-third  of the  members thereof  shall retire as  soon as  may be  on the  expiration  of every  second   year  in   accordance   with   the provisions made  in that  behalf by  Parliament by law.  It   would  thus  be  seen  that  under  the Constitution  where   the  State   Legislature  is bicameral the  Legislative Council  is not subject to  dissolution   and  this  is  a  feature  which distinguishes  the  State  Legislatures  from  the England Houses  of Parliament. When the Parliament is dissolved  both  the  Houses  stand  dissolved, whereas the position is different in India. In the States  with   bicameral  Legislature   only   the Legislative Assembly  can be dissolved but not the Legislative Council.  The  same  is  the  position under Art. 83 in regard to the House of the People and  the   Council  of   States.   This   material distinction has  to be borne in mind in construing the provisions  of Art. 196 and appreciating their effect.      Article 196 reads thus:           "196. (1)  Subject to  the provisions of      Articles 198  and 207  with respect  to Money      Bills and  other financial  Bills, a Bill may      originate in  either House of the Legislature      of a State which has a Legislative Council. 766           (2) Subject to the provision of articles      197 and  198, a  Bill shall  not be deemed to      have  been   passed  by  the  Houses  of  the      Legislature of  a State  having a Legislative      Council unless  it has been agreed to by both      Houses either  without amendment or with such      amendments only  as are  agreed  to  by  both      Houses.           (3) A Bill pending in the Legislature of      a State  shall not  lapse by  reason  of  the      prorogation of the House or Houses thereof.           (4) A  Bill pending  in the  Legislative      Council of  a State which has not been passed      by the  Legislative Assembly  shall not lapse      on a dissolution of the Assembly.           (5)  A   Bill  which   is  pending   the      Legislative Assembly  of a  State,  or  which      having  been   passed  by   the   Legislative      Assembly  is   pending  in   the  Legislative      Council, shall  lapse on a dissolution of the      Assembly". With the  first two clauses of this Article we are not directly concerned in the present petition. It is the  last  three  clauses  that  call  for  our

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examination Under  cl. (3)  a Bill  pending in the Legislature of a State will not lapse by reason of the prorogation  of the  House or  Houses thereof. Thus, this  clause marks a complete departure from the English convention inasmuch as the prorogation of  the  House  or  Houses  does  not  affect  the business pending  before the  Legislature  at  the time of  prorogation. In considering the effect of dissolution on  pending business  it is  therefore necessary  to   bear  in   mind  this  significant departure made  by the  Constitution in  regard to the effect  of prorogation.  Under this clause the pending business  may be  pending  either  in  the Legislative Assembly or in the Legislative Council or may  be pending  the assent of the Governor. At whichever stage the 767 pending business  may stand,  so  long  as  it  is pending before the Legislature of a state it shall not lapse  by the  prorogation  of  the  Assembly. Thus, there can be no doubt that unlike in England prorogation  does   not  wipe   out  the   pending business.      Clause (4)  deals with a case where a Bill is pending in  the Legislative Council of a State and the same  has not  been passed  by the Legislative Assembly; and it provides that such a bill pending before the  Legislative Council  of a  State shall not lapse  on the  dissolution of  the Legislative Assembly. It  would be  noticed that  this  clause deals with the case of a Bill which has originated in the  Legislature Council  and has  yet to reach the Legislative  Assembly; and so the Constitution provides that  in regard  to such a Bill which has yet  to   reach,  and   be  dealt   with  by,  the Legislative  Assembly   the  dissolution   of  the Legislative Assembly  will not  affect its further progress  and  it  will  not  lapse  despite  such dissolution.      That takes  us to  cl. (5). This clause deals with two categories of cases. The first part deals with  Bills   which   are   pending   before   the Legislative Assembly  of a  State, and  the second with  Bills   which  having  been  passed  by  the Legislative  Assembly   are  pending   before  the Legislative Council.  The Bills falling under both the  clause   lapse  on  the  dissolution  of  the Assembly. The  latter part  of cl.  (5) deals with cases of Bills which are supplemental to the cases covered by  cl. (4).  Whereas  cl.(4)  dealt  with Bills which  had  originated  in  the  Legislative Council the latter part of cl.(5) deals with Bills which,  having   originated  in   the  Legislative Assembly, have  been passed  by it and are pending before the  Legislative Council. Since cl. (4) had provided that  Bills falling  under it  shall  not lapse  on  dissolution  of  the  Assembly  it  was thought  necessary  to  provide  as  a  matter  of precaution that  Bills falling  under  the  latter part of  cl. (5) shall lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly. 768 That leaves  part 1  of cl.  (5) to be considered. This part may cover three classes of cases. It may include  a   Bill  which  is  pending  before  the

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Legislative  Assembly   of  a   State   which   is unicameral and  that is the case with which we are concerned in  the present proceedings. It may also include a  case of  a Bill which is pending before the Legislative  Assembly  of  a  state  which  is bicameral; or  it may  include a  case of  a  Bill which has  been passed  by the Legislative Council in a  bicameral State  and is  pending before  the Legislative  Assembly.  In  all  these  cases  the dissolution  of   the  Assembly   leads   to   the consequence  that   the   Bills   lapse.   It   is significant that  whereas cl.  (3) deals  with the case of  a Bill  pending in  the Legislature  of a State, cl.  (5) deals  with a  Bill pending in the Legislative Assembly  of a State or pending in the Legislative Council; and that clearly means that a Bill  pending   assent  of  the  Governor  or  the President is  outside cl. (5). If the Constitution makers had  intended that  a Bill  pending  assent should  also  lapse  on  the  dissolution  of  the Assembly a specific provision to that effect would undoubtedly have  been  made.  Similarly,  if  the Constitution  makers   had   intended   that   the dissolution of  the Assembly  should lead  to  the lapse of  all pending  business it would have been unnecessary to  make the  provisions of cl. (5) at all. The  cases of  Bills contemplated  by cl. (5) would have been governed by the English convention in that  matter and  would have  lapsed without  a specific provision  in that  behalf. Therefore, it seems to  us that  the effect  of cl.  (5)  is  to provide for all cases where the principle of lapse on dissolution should apply. If that be so, a Bill pending assent  of the  Governor or  President  is outside cl. (5) and cannot be said to lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly.      It is  however, contended  by the  petitioner that if  cl. (5)  was intended  to deal  with  all cases 769 where  pending   business  would   lapse  on   the dissolution  of   the  Assembly   it  was   hardly necessary to  make any provision by cl. (4). There is no  doubt in  force in  the contention; but, on the other  hand it may have been thought necessary to make  a  provision  for  Bill  pending  in  the Legislative  Council   of  a   State  because  the Legislative  Council  of  a  continuing  body  not subject to dissolution and the Constitution wanted to  make   a  specific  provision  based  on  that distinctive character  of the Legislative Council. Having made a provision for a Bill originating and pending in  the Legislative  Council by cl. (4) it was thought  necessary to  deal with  a  different category of  cases where Bills have been passed by the Legislative  Assembly and  are pending  in the Legislative Council; and so the latter part of cl. (5) was included in cl. (5). On the other hand, if the petitioner’s  contention is right cls. (3) and (4) of  Art. 196  having provided  for cases  were business did  not lapse it was hardly necessary to have made any provisions by cl. (5) at all. In the absence of cl. (5) it would have followed that all pending business,  on the  analogy of  the English convention, would  laps on  the dissolution of the

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Legislative Assembly. It is true that the question raised before  us by  the present  petition  under Art. 196  is not  free from difficulty but, on the whole, we  are inclined  to take the view that the effect of  cl. (5)  is that  all cases not falling within its  scope are  not subject to the doctrine of lapse of pending business on the dissolution of the Legislative  Assembly. In  that sense  we read cl. (5)  as dealing  exhaustively with Bills which would lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly. If that be  the true  position then the argument that the Bill which was pending assent of the President lapsed  on  the  dissolution  of  the  Legislative Assembly cannot be upheld.      In  this   connection  it   is  necessary  to consider Arts.  200 and  201 which deal with Bills reserved for  the assent  of the  Governor or  the President. 770 Article 200 provides, inter alia, that when a Bill has been  passed by  the Legislative Assembly of a State it  shall be  presented to the Governor, and the Governor  shall declare either that he assents to the  Bill or that he withholds assent therefrom or that he reserves the Bill for the consideration of the  President. The  proviso  to  this  Article requires  that   the  Governor  may,  as  soon  as possible after the presentation to him of the Bill for assent,  return the  Bill if it is not a Money Bill together  with a  message requesting that the House or  Houses will  reconsider the  Bill or any specified provisions  thereof and,  in particular, will consider  the desirability of introducing any such amendments as he may recommend in his message and, when  a Bill  is so  returned  the  House  or Houses shall  reconsider the Bill accordingly, and if the Bill is passed again by the House or Houses with or  without amendment  and presented  to  the Governor  for   assent  the   Governor  shall  not withhold  assent  therefrom.  The  Second  proviso deals with  cases where  the  Governor  shall  not assent to  but shall reserve for the consideration of the  President any Bill which in the opinion of the Governor  would, if it became law, so derogate from the  powers of  the High Court as to endanger the  position   which  that   Court  is   by  this Constitution designed  to fill.  Article 201  then deals with  the procedure  which has to be adopted when a  Bill is  be assented  to by the President. Under the said Article the President shall declare either that  he assents  to the  Bill or  that  he withholds assent therefrom. The proviso lays down, inter alia,  that the  President  may  direct  the Governor to return the Bill to the House together, with such  message as  is mentioned  in the  first proviso to  Art.  200,  and  when  a  Bill  is  so returned the House shall reconsider it accordingly within a  period of  six months  from the  date of receipt of such message, and if it is again passed by the House with or without amendment it shall be presented  again   to  the   President   for   his consideration. The provisions of 771 these two  Articles incidentally have a bearing on the decision  of the  question as to the effect of

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Art.  196.   The   corresponding   provision   for Parliamentary Bill is contained in Art. 111.      It is clear that if a Bill pending the assent of the  Governor or the President is hold to lapse on the dissolution of the Assembly unlikely that a fair number of Bills which may have been passed by the Assembly,  say during  the last  six months of its existence, may be exposed to the risk of lapse consequent on  the dissolution  of  the  Assembly, unless assent is either withheld or granted before the date  of the  dissolution. If  we look  at the relevant provisions of Arts. 200 and 201 from this point of view it would be significant that neither Article provides for a time limit within which the Governor  or   the  President  should  come  to  a decision on  the Bill  referred  to  him  for  his assent. Where  it appeared necessary and expedient to prescribe  a time  limit the  Constitution  has made appropriate provisions in that behalf (vide : Art. 197  (1)(b) and  (2)(b)). In fact the proviso to Art.  201 requires  that the House to which the Bill is remitted with a message from the President shall reconsider it accordingly within a period of six months  from the  date of-the  receipt of such message.  Therefore,   the  failure  to  make  any provision as to the time within which the Governor or the  President  should  reach  a  decision  may suggest that  the Constitution  makers knew that a Bill which  was pending the assent of the Governor or the President did not stand the risk of laps on the dissolution  of the  Assembly. That  is why no time limit  was prescribed  by Arts.  200 and 201. Therefore, in our opinion, the scheme of Arts. 200 and  201  supports  the  conclusion  that  a  Bill pending  the   assent  of   the  Governor  or  the President does  not  lapse  as  a  result  of  the dissolution of  the Assembly and that incidentally shows that  the  provisions  of  Art.  196(5)  are exhaustive. 772      At this  stage it  is  necessary  to  examine another argument  which has been urged against the validity  of  the  Act  on  the  strength  of  the provisions of  Arts. 200 and 201. It is urged that even if  it be  held that the Bill does not lapse, the Act  is invalid  because it has been passed in contravention of  Arts. 200  and 201. The argument is that  the  scheme  of  the  said  two  Articles postulates that  the Bill  which is sent back with the message of the President ought to be sent back to the same house that originally passed it. It is pointed out  that when  the message is sent by the President the  House the  requested to  reconsider the Bill  and it  is provided  that if the Bill is again passed  by the  House the Governor shall not withhold assent  therefrom. This argument proceeds on the  basis that  the concept of reconsideration must involve  the identity  of the  House, because unless the  House had  considered it  in the first instance it  would be illogical to suggest that it should  reconsider   it.   Reconsideration   means consideration of  the Bill again and that could be appropriately done  only if  it is  the same House that should  consider it  at the second stage. The same comment  is made on the use of the expression

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"if the  Bill is  passed against. It is also urged that it  would be  basically unsound  to  ask  the successor House  to take the Bill as it stands and not give  it an opportunity to consider the merits of all  the provisions  of the  Bill. We  are  not impressed by these pleas. When the successor House is considering the Bill it would be correct to say that the  Bill is  being reconsidered  because  in fact it  had been considered once. Similarly, when it is  said that  if the  Bill is passed again the Governor shall  not withhold  assent therefrom  it does not postulate the existence of the same House because even  if it  is the  successor House which passes it  is true  to say  that the Bill has been passed again because in fact it had been passed on an early  occasion. Besides, if the effect of Art. 196 is that the Bills 773 pending assent  do not lapse on the dissolution of the House  then relevant  provisions of  Art.  200 must be  read in  the light of that conclusion. In our opinion,  there is  nothing in  the proviso to Art. 201  which is  inconsistent  with  the  basic concept  of  democratic  Government  in  asking  a successor House  to reconsider  the Bill  with the amendments suggested  by the President because the proviso makes  it, perfectly clear that it is open to the  successor House  to  throw  out  the  Bill altogether. It  is only  if the Bill passed by the successor House  that  the  stage  is  reached  to present it  to the  Governor or  President for his assent, not  otherwise.  Therefore,  there  is  no substance in  the argument that even if the effect of Art.  196 is  held to  be against the theory of lapse propounded  by the  petitioner the  Bill  is invalid   because    it   has   been   passed   in contravention of  the provisions  of Arts. 200 and 201. This argument proceeds on the assumption that the House  to which  the Bill  is sent must be the same House  and that  assumption, we  think is not well-founded. We  would accordingly  hold that the preliminary contention raised against the validity of the Bill cannot be sustained.      That takes  us to  the point  raised  by  the respondent that the Act attracts the protection of Art.  31A   (1)(a)  and  so  is  immune  from  any challenge under  Arts. 14,  19 and 31. There is no doubt that  if the  Act falls under Art. 31A(1)(a) its validity cannot be impugned on the ground that it contravenes  Arts.  14,  19  and  31;  but  the question still  remains: Does  the Act  fall under Art. 31A  (1)  (a)  ?;  and  the  answer  to  this question depends  on whether or not the properties of the  petitioner  fall  within  Art.  31A(2)(a). Before dealing  with this point it is necessary to set out  the relevant  provisions of  Art. 31A (2) Article 31A(2) reads thus:           "31A (2). In this article-           (a) the  expression ’estate  ’ shall, in      relation to  any local  area, have  the  same      meaning 774      as that  expression or  its local  equivalent      has in  the existing  law  relating  to  land      tenures in force in that area, and shall also

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    include any  jagir, inam  or muafi  or  other      similar grant,  and in  the States  of Madras      and Kerala any janmam right;           (b) the expression ’rights’, in relation      to  an   estate,  shall  include  any  rights      vesting  in   a  proprietor,  sub-proprietor,      under-proprietor    tenure-holder,    raiyat,      under-raiyat or  other intermediary  and  any      rights  or  privileges  in  respect  of  land      revenue." Article 31A  was added  by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act,  1951, with  retrospective effect. Similarly, the portion in italics was added by the Constitution (Forth  Amendment)  Act,  1955,  with retrospective effect.      It is  well-known that the Constitution First Amendment of  1951 was  made in  order to validate the  acquisition  of  zamindari  estates  and  the abolition of  permanent settlement. In other words the effect  of the  First Amendment was to provide that any  law which  affected  the  right  of  any proprietor or  intermediate holder  in any  estate shall  not   be  void   on  the  ground  that  its provisions  were  inconsistent  with  any  of  the fundamental rights  guaranteed by  part III of the Constitution. The  acquisition of zamindnri rights and  the   abolition  of   permanent   settlement, however, was  only the first step in the matter of agrarian reform  which the Constitution-makers had in mind.  When the  first zamindari abolition laws were passed  in  pursuance  of  the  programme  of social  welfare  legislation  their  validity  was impugned on  the ground  that they contravened the provisions of  Arts. 14,  19 and  31. In  order to save  the   impugned  legislation  from  any  such challenge Arts. 31A and 31B and the Ninth Schedule were enacted  by the  Constitution First Amendment Act; and  it is  in that context that Art. 31A (2) (a) 775 and (b)  were also  enacted. After  the  zamindari abolition   legislation   was   thus   saved   the Constitution-makers thought  of enabling the State Legislatures to  take the  next step in the matter of  agrarian  reform.  As  subsequent  legislation passed by several States shows the next step which was intended to be taken in the matter of agrarian reform was  to put  a ceiling  on  the  extent  of individual  holding   of  agricultural  land.  The inevitable consequence  of putting  a  ceiling  on individual  occupation   or  ownership   of   such agricultural  land   was  to   provide   for   the acquisition of  the land  held in  excess  of  the prescribed maximum  for distribution  amongst  the tillers of  the soil.  It is  in the light of this background that  we have to determine the question as  to   whether  the   property  with  which  the petitioner is  concerned constitutes  an estate or rights in  relation to  an estate under cl. (2)(a) or (b).      The petitioner  contends that in interpreting the expression "estate" we must have regard to the fact that originally it was intended to cover case of zamindars  and other  intermediaries who  stood between the  State and the cultivator and who were

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generally alienees  of land  revenue; and so it is urged  that   it  is  only  what  may  be  broadly described as  landlord tenures  which fall  within the scope  of the  expression  "estate  ".  It  is conceded that  the expression  "rights in relation to an  estate " as it now stands is very broad and it includes  the interest  of a raiyat and also an under-raiyat; but  it is pointed out that the said rights, however  comprehensive and  broad they may be, must  be rights  in relation to an estate, and unless the property satisfies the test which would have been  reasonably applied  in determining  the scope of  "estate" in  1950 the  amendment made in cl. (2)(b)  will not  make the  denotation of  the word "estate"  any broader.  In other  words,  the argument  is   that  the   denotation  which   the expression "estate  " had  in 1950 continues to be the same even after the 776 amendments of  1965 because  no suitable amendment has been made in cl. (2) (a). But the infirmity in this argument  is that  the limitation  which  the petitioner seeks to place on the denotation of the expression "estate"  is not justified by any words used in  cl. (2)(a)  at all;  it is  introduced by reading cls.  (2)(a) and  (b) together,  and  that would not be reasonable or legitimate. In deciding what an  "estate" means  in cl. (a) we must in the first instance construe cl. (a) by itself.      In dealing with the effect of cl. (2) (a) two features of  the clause  are  significant.  First, that the  definition has  been  deliberately  made inclusive, and  second, that  its scope  has  been left to be determined not only in the light of the content of  the expression  "estate "  but also in the  light   of  the   local  equivalent   of  the expression  "estate"   as  may  be  found  in  the existing law  relating to  land tenure in force in that  area.  The  Constitution-makers  were  fully conscious of  the fact  that the  content  of  the expression "estate"  may not  be identical  in all the areas  in  this  country  and  that  the  said concept may  not be  described by the same word by the relevant  existing law; and so the decision of the question  as to  what an  estate is  has  been deliberately left rather elastic. In each case the question to  decide would  be whether the property in question  is described  as  an  estate  in  the terminology adopted  by the  relevant law.  If the said law uses the word "estate" and defines it the there is  no difficulty  in holding  the  property described by  the local  law as  an estate  is  an estate  for   the  purpose  of  this  clause.  The difficulty arises  only where  the relevant  local law does  not describe  any agricultural  property expressly as an estate. It is conceded that though no  agricultural   property   may   be   expressly described as  an estate  by the local law, even so there may be some properties in the area which may constitute an 777 estate under cl. (2) (a); and so in deciding which property  constitutes   an  estate   it  would  be necessary to  examine its attributes and essential features and enquire whether it satisfies the test

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implied by the expression "estate " as used in cl. (2) (a)      In  this   connection  it   is  pertinent  to remember that  the Constitution-makers  were aware that in  several local  areas in the country where the  zamindari   tenure  did   not   prevail   the expression "estate" as defined by the relevant law included  estates   which  did   not  satisfy  the requirement of the presence of intermediaries, and yet cl.  (2)(s) expressly includes estates in such areas within  its purview  and  that  incidentally shows  that   the  concept   of  "   estate  "  as contemplated by  cl.  (2)(a)  is  not  necessarily conditioned   by    the   rigid   and   inflexible requirement that it must be landlord-tenure of the character  of   zamindari  estate.  That  is  why, treating  the   expression  "estate"  as  of  wide denotation in  every case  we will have to enquire whether there  is a  local definition  of "estate" prevailing in  the relevant existing law; if there is one  that would  determine the  nature  of  the property.  If   there  is  no  definition  in  the relevant existing  law defining  the word "estate" as such we will have to enquire whether there is a local equivalent,  and in that connection it would be necessary  to consider  the  character  of  the given agricultural property and its attributes and then decide  whether it  can constitute  an estate under cl.  (2)(a). If  the expression  "estate" is construed  in   the  narrow  sense  in  which  the petitioner wants  it to  be construed  then it may not  be   easy  to   reconcile  the   said  narrow denotation  with  the  wide  extent  of  the  word "estate" as  is defined  in some local definitions of the  word "estate ". Therefore, in deciding the question as  to  whether  the  properties  of  the petitioner are  an "estate"  within the meaning of Art. 31A(2)(a) we are not prepared to adopt 778 the  narrow  construction  that  the  estate  must always and in every case represent the estate held by zamindars  or other  similar intermediaries who are the alienees of land revenue.      This question  can also  be  considered  from another point  of view. As we will presently point out,  decisions  of  this  Court  in  relation  to agricultural estates  existing in  areas where the zamindari tenure  does not  prevail  clearly  show that the definitions in the relevant existing laws in  those  areas  include  properties  within  the expression "estate"  despite  the  fact  that  the condition of  the existence of the intermediary is not satisfied  by them,  and so  there can  be  no doubt that  even in such ares if the definition of the word  "estate" includes specified agricultural properties they  would be treated as estates under cl. (2)(a).  Now just  consider what  would be the position in  areas where the zamindari tenure does not prevail  and where  the relevant  existing law dose not  contain a  definition of  an "estate" as such. According to the petitioner’s argument where in such a case it is necessary to find out a local equivalent of  an estate  the search  for  such  a local equivalent  would be  futile, because in the area in  question the  condition or  test  of  the

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presence of  intermediaries may  not be  satisfied and that  would mean  that the  main  object  with which the  Constitution First and Fourth Amendment Acts of  1951 and  1955 were passed would be of no assistance to the State Legislatures in such local areas. If  the State  Legislatures in  such  local areas want to enact a law for agrarian reform they would not  be able to claim the benefit of Art. 31 A (1)(a).  Indeed, the petitioner concedes that on his construction  of  cl.  (2)  (a)  the  intended object of the amendments may not be carried out in certain areas where the existing relevant law does not define  an estate as such; but his argument is that the Constitution-makers failed to give effect to their intention 779 because  they  omitted  to  introduce  a  suitable amendment in cl. (2)(a). On a fair construction of cl. (2)  (a) we do not think that we are driven to such a  conclusion. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept  the petitioner’s  narrow interpretation of the word "estate" in cl. (2) (a).      It is  necessary therefore to have some basic idea of  the meaning  of the word "estate" as used in Art. 31A(2) (a). As we have said already, where the word  "estate" as such is used in the existing law  relating  to  land  tenures  in  force  in  a particular area,  there is  no difficulty  and the word  "estate" as defined in the exiting law would have that meaning for that area and there would be no necessity  for looking  for a local equivalent. But where the word "estate" as such is not defined in an  existing law it will be necessary to see if some other term is defined or used in the existing law in a particular area which in that area is the local equivalent  of the  word "estate".  In  that case the  word "estate"  would  have  the  meaning assigned to  that term in the existing law in that area. To  determine therefore whether a particular term defined  or used  in a particular area is the local equivalent  of the  word "estate" as used in Art. 31  A (2)  (a) it  is necessary  to have some basic concept  of the meaning of the word "estate" as  used   in  the   relevant   Article   of   the Constitution.  It  seems  to  us  that  the  basic concept of  the word  "estate" is  that the person holding the  estate should  be proprietor  of  the soil and should be in direct relationship with the State paying land revenue to it except where it is remitted in  whole or in part. If therefore a term is used  or defined in any existing law in a local area which  corresponds to  this basic  concept of "estate" that  would be  the local  equivalent  of word "estate"  in that  area. It is not necessary. that there  must be  an intermediary  in an estate before it  can be  called  an  estate  within  the meaning of Art. 31 A (2)(a); it is true that in 780 many cases  of estate  such intermediaries  exist, but there  are many  holders of  small estates who cultivate their  lands  without  any  intermediary whatever.  It   is  not   the  presence   of   the intermediary that  determines whether a particular landed  property   is  an   estate  or  not;  what determines the character of such property to be an

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estate is  whether it  comes within the definition of the  word "estate"  in the  existing law  in  a particular area or is for the purpose of that area the  local   equivalent  of   the  word   "estate" irrespective of  whether there  are intermediaries in existence  or not. This in our opinion, is also borne  out   by  consideration   of  the  relevant decisions of this Court to which we will now turn.      The  decisions   of  this  Court  where  this question has  been considered  lend support to the construction of  the word  "estate" for  which the respondent contends.  In Sri  Ram Ram Narain Medhi v. The  State of  Bombay  (1)  the  constitutional validity of  the Bombay  Tenancy and  Agricultural Lands (Amendment)  Act 1956  (Bombay Act  XIII  of 1956) amending the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act,  1948 (Bombay  Act LXVII  of 1948), was considered by  this Court.  Section  2(5)  of  the Bombay Land  Revenue Code,  1879, had  defined the word "estate"  as meaning  any interest  lands and the aggregate  of  such  interested  vested  in  a person or  aggregate of persons capable of holding the same.  This Court  held that  the Bombay  Land Revenue Code was the existing law relating to land tenures in  force in  the State of Bombay and that the definition  of the word "estate" as prescribed by s.2(5)  had the meaning of any interest in land and it  was not confined merely to the holdings of landholders of  alienated  lands.  The  expression applied not  only to  such estate-holders but also to  land  holders  and  occupants  of  unalienated lands". It  would be noticed that s. 2(5) referred to "any 781 interest in  lands" and the expression "lands" was undoubtedly capable of comprising within its ambit alienated  and  unalienated  lands.  The  argument urged by  the petitioner in that case in attacking the validity  of the impugned Act in substance was that having regard to the narrow denotation of the "estate"  used   in  Art.  31A(2)(a)  the  broader construction of s. 2(5) of the Bombay Land Revenue Code should not be adopted, and in construing what is the local equivalent of the expression "estate" in Bombay  the  narrow  construction  of  s.  2(5) should be  adopted and  its  operation  should  be confined to alienated lands alone. This contention was rejected  and it  was held  that the estate as defined was not confined merely to the holdings of landholders of  alienated lands.  It is  true that the  decision   proceeded  substantially   on  the interpretation of  s. 2(5)  of the local Act ; but it may  be observed  that if the denotation of the word "estate"  occurring in  Art. 31A(2)(a) was as narrow as is suggested to by the petitioner before us  this  Court  would  have  treated  that  as  a relevant and  material  fact  in  considering  the contention of  the petitioner  before it  that the narrow construction  of s. 2(5) should be adopted. There is no doubt that the property which was held to be  an estate  in Medhi’s case (1) would not be an estate within the narrow meaning of the word as suggested by the petitioner.      In Atma  Ram v. The State of Punjab (2), this Court had  occasion to consider the meaning of the

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expression "estate"  in the  light of  the  Punjab Land Revenue  Act, 1887.  Section 3(1) of the said Act had  provided that an "estate" means any area- (a) for which a separate record of rights has been made, or (b) which has separately assessed to land revenue, or  would have  been so  assessed if  the land revenue had not been released, compounded for or redeemed,  or(c) which the State Government may by general rule or special order, declare to be an estate.  Section   3(3)  which  is  also  relevant provided 782 that "holding"  means a  share or  portion  of  an estate held  by one landowner or jointly by two or more landowners. One of the arguments urged by the petitioner before the Court was that a part of the holding was not an estate within the meaning of s. 3(1) of the local Act. This argument was rejected. In dealing  with the  question as  to whether  the property held  by the  petitioner  was  an  estate under the  Art. 31A(2)(a)  it became necessary for the  Court   to  consider  the  amplitude  of  the expression "any  estate or  of any rights therein" in Art. 31A (1) (a). Sinha J., as he then was, who spoke for  the Court, has elaborately examined the different kinds  of  land  tenures  prevailing  in different parts  of India,  and has  described the process of sub-infeudation which was noticeable in most of  the areas in course of time. An "estate", it was observed, "is an area of land which is unit of revenue  assessment  and  which  is  separately entered in  the Land  Revenue Collector’s register or  revenue   paying  or   revenue-free  estates". "Speaking generally",  observed Sinha, J., "It may be said that at the apex of the pyramid stands the State. Under  the State, a large number of persons variously    called     proprietors,    zamindars, malguzars,  inamdars  and  jagirdars,  etc.,  hold parcels of  land, subject  to the  payment of land revenue  designated   as  peshkash,   quitrent  or malguzari,  etc.,   representing  the   Government demands by  way of land tax out of the usufruct of the land  constituting an  state, except where the Government demands had been excused in whole or in part by  way of reward for service rendered to the State in  the past,  or  to  be  rendered  in  the future"  (p.   759).  "Tenure-holders",   it   was observed, "were  persons  who  took  lands  of  an estate not  necessarily for  the purpose  of self- cultivation, but  also for settling tenants on the land and  realising rents  from them......Thus, in each grade  of holders  of land, in the process of sub-infeudation the  holder is  a tenant under his superior holder 783 the landlord,  and also the landlord of the holder directly holding under him" (pp. 760, 761).      Having thus  considered the background of the land tenures  in Punjab  and elsewhere  this Court proceeded to consider the amplitude of the crucial words "any  estate or  of any  rights therein"  in Art. 31A(1)(a). "According to this decision as the connotation of  the term "estate" was different in different parts  of the  country,  the  expression "estate" described  in cl.  (2) of  Art. 31A,  has

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been so broadly defined as to cover all estates in the country,  and to  cover all  possible kinds of rights in  estates, as shown by sub-cl. (b) of cl. (2) of  Art.  31  A"  (p.  762).  "The  expression ‘rights’ in  relation to  an estate has been given an all-inclusive  meaning comprising  both what we have  called,   for  the   sake  of  brevity,  the horizontal and  vertical divisions  of an  estate. The Provisions  aforesaid of Art. 31 A, bearing on the construction  of the  expression  ‘estate’  or ‘rights’ in an estate, have been deliberately made as wide  as they  could be in order to take in all kinds of rights-quantitative and qualitative-in an area coextensive  with an estate or only a portion thereof" (p.  763). Further  observations made  in the judgment  in  regard  to  the  effect  of  the addition of words "raiyats" and "under-raiyats" in cl.  (b)  may  also  be  usefully  quoted  :  "The expression ‘rights’ in relation to an estate again has been  used in  a very  comprehensive sense  of including not only the interests of proprietors or Sub-proprietors but  also of  lower grade tenants, like  raiyats  or  under-raiyats,  and  then  they added,  by   way  of   further  emphasising  their intention, the  expression  ‘other  intermediary’, thus  clearly  showing  that  the  enumeration  of intermediaries  was   only  illustrative  and  not exhaustive" (p.  765). Thus,  this decision  shows that the amendments made by the constitution First and Fourth  Amendment Acts  of 1951  and 1955 were intended  to  enable  the  State  Legislatures  to undertake the  task of  agrarian reform  with  the object of abolishing intermediaries 784 and establishing  direct relationship  between the State and  tillers of  the soil; and it is in that context that  the would  "estate" occurring in cl. (2) of Art. 31 A was construed by this Court. What we have  said about  the decision  in Medhi’s case (1) is equally true about the decision in the case of Atma Ram (2). The property which was held to be an estate  was not  an estate  in the narrow sense for which the petitioner contends.      In Shri Mahadeo Paikaji Kolhe Yavatmal v. The State of  Bombay and  Shri Namadeorao Baliramji v. The State of Bombay (3) this Court had to consider the case  of the  petitioners in Vidarbha who held lands under  the State  and paid  land revenue for the said  lands thus  held by  them. The  relevant provisions of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  Land  Revenue Code. 1954  (II of  1955) were examined and it was held that  though the  word "estate"  as. such had not been  employed by the said Code the equivalent of the estate had to he determined under Art. 31 A (2) (a),  and as a result of provisions of ss. 145 and 146  of the  said Code  it was  held that  the estates held by the petitioners satisfied the test of   the   local   equivalent   of   "estate"   as contemplated by  Art. 31A (2) (a). In The State of Bihar v.  Rameshwar Pratap  Narain Singh(4),  this Court had  occasion  to  consider  the  scope  and effect of the expression "rights in relation to an estate" used  in cl. (2) (b), and it held that "in the circumstances and in the particular setting in which the  words ‘raiyat’  and ‘under-raiyat’ were

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introduced into  the definition  it must  be  held that the  words "or  other intermediary" occurring at the end do not qualify or colour the meaning to be attached  to the tenures newly added". It is in the light  of these  decisions that  we  must  now proceed to examine the character of the properties with which the petitioner is concerned.      As we  have already  seen the petitioner owns about 900 acres of land which are classified 785 as Pandaravaka  holdings and about 350 acres which are described as Puravaka holdings. In meeting the respondent’s contention  that these  lands are  an estate  under   cl.  (2)   (a)  of  Art.  31A  the petitioner has alleged that the Pandaravaka tenure represents lands  of which  the State  was in  the position of the landlord and whatever rights other persons possessed  were directly  derived from the State.  Of  the  several  classes  of  Pandaravaka tenure the most common is the verumpattom and most of  the   petitioner’s  lands  falling  under  the Pandaravaka  tenure  belong  to  this  class.  The petitioner’s case  is that his liability is to pay rent to  the State  calculated as  a proportion of the gross  yield of  the properties  ; and  so the lands held  by the  petitioner as tenant under the State cannot be said to be an estate under cl. (2) (a). He  is not  an intermediary between the State and the  tiller of  soil and  so  is  outside  the purview of  cl. (2)  (a). It has also been alleged by the  petitioner that  his properties  cannot be said to  be an estate even in the sense of a local equivalent of  the term  "estate" because there is no unified  record of  rights  over  the  area  in question; "each  survey number  is  often  divided into several sub-numbers and representing holdings that do  not often  take in  more than a few cents has  his   own  record   of  rights  and  separate assessment register". It is for these reasons that the petitioner  resists the application of cl. (2) (a) to his Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands.      No clear and specific plea has been expressly made by  the  petitioner  in  regard  to  Puravaka lands. In  that  connection  the  petitioner  has, however,  alleged   that  the  Janmam  is  another peculiar feature  of the  land  system  in  Kerala which it  is not  easy to define since a good deal of ambiguity  attaches to  the  term.  However  he contends  that   the  Janmam   right  has   to  be understood in  its limited  and technical sense as taking within its scope a particular form of land- holding known as the known tenancy. 786 According  to  the  petitioner  the  Janmam  right included in  cl. (2)  (a) can  take  in  only  the rights and  liabilities controlled  and created by the two  Tenancy Acts  to which  he has  referred. That is  how  the  petitioner  contends  that  the Puravaka lands are also outside the purview of cl. (2) (a).      It is  common-ground  that  the  proclamation issued by  his Highness  Sir Rama  Varma  Raja  of Cochin on March 10, 1905, is the relevant existing law  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  whether  the agricultural   properties    of   the   petitioner

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constitute an  estate  under  cl.  (2)(a).  It  is therefore, necessary to examine the scheme of this proclamation and  decide whether  in view  of  the characteristics and  attributes of  the properties held  by  the  petitioner  they  can  be  said  to constitute a  local equivalent  of an estate under cl.(2)(a). This  proclamation consists  of twenty- eight clauses  which deal  broadly  with  all  the aspects of  land tenure prevailing in the State of Cochin. The  preamble to  the proclamation recites that the  Raja had already ordered that a complete survey embracing  demarcation and  mapping and the preparation of  an accurate  record of  titles  in respect of  all descriptions  of properties within his entire State shall be carried out, and it adds that directions  had been  issued that  a  revenue settlement or  revision of  the State demand shall be conducted  in accordance  with  the  principles laid down by the proclamation. Clause 6 enumerates the tenures  of lands  prevailing  in  the  State. Under this  clause there are two major tenures (1) Pandaravaka and  (2) Puravaka. The former are held on one  or the  other of six varieties of tenures; of these  we are  concerned with  the  verumpattom sub-tenure.  This   clause   provides   that   the Pandaravaka verumpattom  tenure shall be deemed as the normal  tenure for  settling  the  full  State demand and that the other tenures shall be treated as favourable  tenures and  settled on  the  lines indicated in cls. 14 to 17. Clause 7 says that the present rate of assessment 787 on Pandaravaka  verumpattom nilas  varies from one eighth para  to twelve  paras of  paddy for  every para of  land;  and  it  adds  that  such  a  vast disparity  of   rates  is  indicative  of  unequal incidence under  the existing revenue system. That is why  the clause  proceeds to  lay down that the State demand should bear a fixed proportion to the produce a  land is  capable of  yielding and so it prescribes that  under the Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure the  holder should  pay  half  of  the  net produce to  the State. The clause then proceeds to provide for  the method  in which this half of the net produce  should be  determined. Clauses 11 and 12 deal with the assessment on tree.      Clause 13  is important.  It says "at present holders of  Pandaravaka verumpattom  lands do  not possess any  property  in  the  soil.  As  we  are convinced that  proprietorship in  the  soil  will induce the  cultivator to  improve  his  land  and thereby add  to the  prosperity of  the  land,  we hereby declare  that the  verumpattom  holders  of lands shall,  after the  new settlement  has  been introduced, acquire full rights to the soil of the lands they hold and that their rights shall remain undisturbed so  long as  they  regularly  pay  the State revenue  provided that the rights to metals, minerals possessed by the State in all lands under whatever tenure  they are held are reserved to the State".      Under cl.18  it is provided, inter alia, that in the  case of  Pandaravaka  lands  held  on  the erumpattom tenure  the settlement  shall  be  made with the  present holder of the land and in regard

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to  Puravaka  land  with  the  Janmam.  Clause  22 prescribes the  procedure and  the  time  for  the introduction  of   settlement.  It  requires  that before  the  introduction  of  the  new  rates  of assessment a  rough patta  shall be issued to each of the  landholders showing the relevant detail of his holdings  and the assessment to be paid by him hereafter. The object of preparing such a patta is to 788 give an opportunity to the landholders to bring to the notice  of the authorities their objections if any. The  objections are then required to be heard before the  final  entries  are  made.  Clause  26 declares that  the new settlement shall be current for a  term of  thirty years.  This has  been done with a view to secure the utmost freedom of action to the  landholders in  improving their properties and turning  them to  the best advantage according to their  means and  inclination. Clause  27 deals with escheats; and cl. 28 makes general provisions as to the formation of a new land record including reassessment  of  land  and  the  registration  of titles "a  work calculated  to promote  the  well- being of a State".      It would  thus be  seen that under cl. 13 the person   holding    lands   on   the   Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure  is not  a tenant.  He is given the proprietary  right in the soil itself, subject of course  to the rights as to metals and minerals reserved in favour of the State. Indeed, the whole scheme of  the new  proclamation appears  to be to change the  character of  the  possession  of  the Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure-holder from that of a tenant  into that  of a proprietor-holder. It is true that he is made liable to pay half of the net produce and  that may  appear to  be a  little too high, but the measure of the levy will not convert what is  intended to  be a  recovery of assessment into a  recovery of  rent. The  proprietor of  the land held  on Pandaravaka  verumpattom  tenure  is nevertheless a proprietor of the land and he holds the land  subject to  his  liability  to  pay  the assessment to  the State.  It is  not difficult to imagine that  in a  fairly large  number of  lands held by Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure-holders the holders in  turn would  let out  the lands  to the cultivators and  thus would  come into existence a local equivalent  of the  class of intermediaries. Land revenue  record is required to be prepared by the proclamation  and relevant entries showing the extent of the properties belonging to 789 the respective holders and the details about their liability to pay the assessment are intended to be shown in the said record. In our opinion, it would not be  reasonable to  hold that the lands held by the petitioner  under the  Pandaravaka verumpattom tenure do  not confer on him the proprietary right at all  but make him a tenant of the State. In the proclamation  there   does  not  appear  to  be  a provision for  forfeiture  or  surrender  and  the scheme adopted  by the  proclamation suggests that the amount  due from  the tenure-holder  by was of assessment  would   presumably  be   recovered  as

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arrears  of   land  revenue   and  not   as  rent. Therefore,  we  are  inclined  to  hold  that  the Pandaravaka Verumpattom can be regarded as a local equivalent of  an estate under cl. (2) (a) of Art. 31A.      The position with regard to Puravaka lands is still more  clear. Clause  14 of  the proclamation enumerates four  kinds of more favourable tenures. The first of these is the class of Puravaka lands. Clause 15  provides that  in the  case of Puravaka lands a  third party called Janmi is recognised as owning proprietorship  in the  land and  therefore entitled to  share the produce with the cultivator and the sirkar. Then the clause describes the mode in which share of the State or its demand on these Puravaka lands is calculated, under the previously existing land system; and it provides new rates of assessment payable  in  respect  of  the  Puravaka tenure. The  Puravaka tenure  in  the  State,  the clause adds,  corresponds to the normal conditions of land  tenure in  the District of Malabar where, in the  recently introduced  settlements, the  net produce was  distributed among the cultivator, the Janmi and the State in the following proportion : 790 __________________________________________________ __________                        In Wet Lands             In Garden Lands or Vrikshapattom                                           Parambas __________________________________________________ __________      Cultivator        5 out of 15               5 out of 15      Jenmi             4 out of 15               5 out of 15      State             6 out of 15               5 out of 15 __________________________________________________ __________ Since it  was thought  that  the  said  method  of apportionment was  fair and  equitable the  clause adopted the  same in the State of Cochin. It would thus  be   clear  that   the  lands  held  by  the petitioner under  the Puravaka  tenure satisfy the test of even the narrow construction placed by the petitioner on  the term  "estate" in  cl.  (2)(a). Therefore, there  can be  no doubt  that about 350 acres of  land  held  by  the  petitioner  on  the Puravaka tenure  constitute an  estate  under  cl. (2)(a).      The result  is that  the lands  held  by  the petitioner are  an estate under cl. (2)(a), and so the Act  in so  far as  it  operates  against  the holdings of the petitioner is protected under Art. 31A(1)(a) and  so it is not open to the petitioner to challenge  its validity  on the ground that its material provisions  offend against  Arts. 14,  19 and 31  of the  Constitution.  The  writ  petition accordingly fails  and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.      AYYANGAR, J.-I  regret I  am unable  to agree that Art. 31A of the Constitution saves the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960, from challenge under

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Arts. 14,  19 and 31 of the Constitution in so far as the  said Act  relates to the Pandaravaka lands of the petitioner.      Before however  dealing  with  this  point  I consider it  proper to  add that  I entirely agree that the  Act was  properly enacted  by the  State Legislature and  that  the  consideration  of  the remitted bill  by the new Legislative Assembly did not violate  the provisions  of  Art.  20  of  the Constitution. In my judgment the terms of Art. 196 of the  Constitution proceed on the basis that the Constitution-maker 791 in line  with the  framers of  the  Government  of India  Act,  1935,  radically  departed  from  the theory of  the British  Constitutional Law and the practice obtaining in the Parliament of the United Kingdom as  regards the  effect of  dissolution of the Houses  of the  Legislature on bills passed by the House  or Houses and pending the assent of the head of the State. Article 196 by its third clause having  negatived  the  English  rule  that  bills pending in  the legislature  lapse  by  reason  of prorogation, goes  on to  enact cls.  (4) and  (5) making special provision for Lapse in the event of not  prorogation   but  dissolution.   Clause  (5) enacts:           "A  bill   which  is   pending  in   the      Legislative Assembly  of  a  State  or  which      having  been   passed  by   the   Legislative      Assembly  is   pending  in   the  legislative      Council shall  lapse on  a dissolution of the      Assembly." This clause  on its  terms applies  both to States which have  and which  do  not  have  a  bicameral legislature. In its application to a State without a Legislative  Council the  relevant words  of the clause would  read: "A  bill which is pending in a Legislative Assembly  of  a  State...........shall lapse  on   dissolution  of   the  Assembly".  The question that  arises on  the terms of this clause may be  stated thus:  Can a  bill be  said  to  be pending before  the Legislative  Assembly when  it has gone  through all  the stages of the procedure prescribed for  its passage  through the house and has been  passed by  the Assembly  ? Expressed  in other words,  does the  pendency of  a bill before the Assembly  cease when it has passed through all the stages  through which  bills pass  before  the House or  is it to be deemed as pending before the House until  the bill  receives the  assent of the Governor or  the President, as the case may be the latter event  arising when  bills are  reserved by the Governor  for the  President’s assent ? Unless it could be contended that a bill 792 is  pending  in  the  Legislative  Assembly  until assent, there  could be  no scope for the argument based on  Art. 196(5)  in support  of the position that an  unassented bill  is still  pending in the Assembly. In  this context  the difference  in the terminology employed  in Art.  196(3)  and  196(5) requires to be noticed. Whereas Art. 196(3) speaks of the  pendency of a bill in the Legislature of a State  which   would,   having   regard   to   the

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description of  ’Legislature’ in Art. 168, include the  Governor,   Art.  196(5)   uses   the   words ’Legislative Assembly’  as if  to indicate that it is only  in the  event of  the bill  being pending before that body that it lapses on dissolution. In the face  of the provision in Art. 196(5) there is no  justification   for  invoking   the   Biritish practice under  which bills not assented to before the dissolution  of  the  Houses  are  treated  as having lapsed on that event occurring.      If the  Governor  can  assent  or  refuse  to assent to a bill, which has passed through all the stages of  consideration by a Legislative Assembly even though  that Assembly  is dissolved under the terms of Art. 200, because the bill is a live bill within the  terms of that Article, it would follow that he can exercise the other alternative open to him under  that Article, viz., to reserve the bill for the  President’s assent.  If by  reason of the language employed in Art. 196(5) the bill is alive so far, and the President could assent to the bill it would  follow that subject to an argument based on the  terms of  Art. 201  he can  also remit the bill   for   reconsideration   by   the   Assembly notwithstanding the dissolution.      The  next   question  for   consideration  is whether there is anything in the terms of Art. 201 which precludes  effect being  given to  the above principle. The Article runs: 793           "201. When  a  Bill  is  reserved  by  a      Governor  for   the  consideration   of   the      President, the President shall declare either      that he  assents  to  the  Bill  or  that  he      withholds assent therefrom:           Provided that,  where the  Bill is not a      Money Bill,  the  President  may  direct  the      Governor to  return the Bill to the House or,      as  the  case  may  be,  the  Houses  of  the      Legislature of the State together with such a      message as  is mentioned in the first proviso      to  article  200  and,  when  a  Bill  is  so      returned,   the   House   or   Houses   shall      reconsider it  accordingly within a period of      six months  from the  date of receipt of such      message and  if it  is again  passed  by  the      House or Houses with or without amendment, it      shall be presented again to the President for      his consideration." Considerable  stress   was  laid  by  the  Learned Counsel on  the use of the two expressions ’return the bill  to  the  House’  and  ’the  House  shall reconsider it  accordingly’ as indicating that the words underlined*  unmistakably implied  that  the consideration of  the bill must be by the Assembly which  originally   passed  it.  It  was  in  this connection that  reliance was  placed on the terms of Art. 172(1) reading (omitting the proviso which is immaterial for the present purpose):           "172. (1)  Every Legislative Assembly of      every State,  unless sooner  dissolved, shall      continue  for   five  years   from  the  date      appointed for its first meeting and no longer      and the expiration of the said period of five      years shall  operate as  a dissolution of the

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    Assembly: " The argument  was that  the Constitution  did  not envisage the  Assemblies having  a continuous life but 794 that on  the other  hand it  clearly  contemplated different Legislative Assemblies each one having a definite life  which ended either automatically at the end  of five  years or at an earlier period by dissolution  and  that  in  the  context  of  this provision, to  the words ’return’ and ’reconsider’ employed in Art. 201 their literal meaning must be attached.      It   is   not   possible   to   accept   this construction as  to the  effect of Art. 172 on the rest of the provisions in this Part. No doubt, for particular purposes  each Assembly is conceived of as having  a life  of limited duration but it does not follow that the Constitution does not envisage the  Legislature   as  an   institution.  In  this connection I  consider it  useful to  refer to the decision of  the Privy Council in Attorney-General for New  South Wales  v. Rennie  (1). The question before  the   Board  was   as  ragards   the  true construction of  a New  South  Wales  statute-"The Parliamentary  Representatives’   Allowance  Act"- which by  its s.  2 made an annual grant to "every member of  the Legislative Assembly now serving or hereafter to  serve therein".  Section  2  of  the Imperial Act which enacted the Constitution Act of the  Colony   provided  that   "every  Legislative Assembly was  to continue  for five years from the day of  the return  of writs for choosing the same and no  longer, subject  to be sooner prorogued or dissolved by  the Governor  of the  Colony", which term was  by a  later enactment  reduced to  three years. The  Attorney-General for  New South  Wales raised an  information seeking  a declaration that there  were   no  moneys   legally  available   or applicable to  the payment  of members  of  future Assemblies with  a prayer that the Auditor-General might  be   restrained  from   countersigning  the authorisation of  such payments. The Supreme Court of the  Colony dismissed the information whereupon the Attorney-General  brought the matter in appeal to the Privy 795 Council. The question turned on the meaning of the words ’the  Legislative Assembly’  in s.  2 of the Act and  reliance was  placed  on  behalf  of  the appellant  on   the  provision   for   dissolution contained in  the Imperial  Act. It  was contended that the  Assembly was  a body of limited duration called into  existence from time to time and not a permanent   and    continuous   body    and   that consequently the Act granting the allowance should be construed  as applying  to the  members of  the particular Assembly  in existence  on the  date of the Act.  Rejecting this  argument,  Sir,  Richard Couch stated:           "They  think   that  according   to  the      ordinary  use   of  the   term   ’legislative      assembly it means the assembly created by the      Constitution Act  which, though  liable to be      dissolved or  to expire by effluxion of time,

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    is an  essential part  of the constitution of      the  colony   and  must   be  regarded  as  a      permanent body." I  consider   these  words  apt  to  describe  the reference to the "House of the Legislature" in the proviso to  Art.  201.  I  therefore  respectfully concur in  the view  that  the  bill  was  validly passed  and   that  the   objection  based  on  an infringement or  contravention of Art. 201 must be repelled.      I shall  now take  up for  consideration  the merits of  the petition.  The  petitioner  is  the owner of  about 1,250  acres of land in Trichur in the erstwhile  princely State  of Cochin.  Out  of this extent,  900 acres are classified in the land records of  the State  as Pandaravaka  Verumpattom lands and  the remaining  are entered  as Puravaka lands.      While so  the Kerala  Legislature enacted the Kerala Agrarian Relations Act, 1960 (Kerala Act IV of 1961), providing for the acquisition of certain types of  agricultural lands  in the  State beyond the specified  maximum extents  laid down  in  the statute and 796 on payment  of compensation  as determined  by it. The details  of this  legislation are  set out and their impact  on the  owners of landed property in the State  are dealt  with in full in the judgment in Writ  Petitions 114  and  115  which  is  being pronounced today.  In the  circumstances it is not necessary to  say more  about the  enactment  than point out  that it  seriously interferes  with the rights of landowners in a manner which, as held in the judgment  in the other petitions, is violative of the  rights guaranteed  to citizens by Part III of the  constitution. For  the respondent  however the main defence on this petition is based on Art. 31A, the  submission being  that the  lands of the petitioner by  reason of  the tenure  by which  he holds them,  constitute  an  "estate"  within  the definition of  that term in Art. 31A(2)(a). As the tenures which  are  involved  in  the  case  cover considerable areas  of the former State of Cochin, and as  the implications arising from any decision as regards these tenures might affect other areas, particularly in  South India  the  effect  of  the acceptance of  the submission  by  the  respondent would be far-reaching. I have therefore considered it proper  to deal  with matter from a wider angle than would  be necessary  if  the  effect  of  our decision  would   be  confined   to   tenures   of infrequent occurrence.      The two  tenures into which the lands held by the  petitioner   fall  are,  as  stated  earlier, Pandaravaka  Verumpattom  and  the  Puravaka,  but before considering  their characteristics  it will be useful  to attempt  a picture  of  the  general system of  landholding  in  Malabar.  As  is  well known, Malabar-comprising  the territories  of the former princely  State of  Travancore & Cochin and the contiguous  district of  Malabar in the former Presidency of  Madras, was  among the few areas in India  in  which  freehold  rights  in  land  were recognised. This  exclusive right  and  hereditary

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possession and usufruct of the soil was denoted by the term "Jenm" 797 and the  holder was  designated the  Jenmi or  the Jenmikaran.  The  Jenmis  had  full  and  obsolute property in  the soil.  All land which was not the property of  Jenmis or ceased to be theirs-such as by forfeiture, were held by the State. These lands were let  for rent  to  cultivators  on  terms  of paying rent.  The assertion  by the  State to  the proprietorship of the soil which carried with it a denial of the right of alienation by the tenant of the leased lands and so of the right to hereditary enjoyment  was   besides  being  contrary  to  the accepted theory  of the Hindu law givers, was also productive of  grave economic  ills. According  to the Hindu  Law givers starting from Manu, property in  the   soil  arose   out  of   occupation   and cultivation. The texts which expound this position are set  out and  discussed by Westropp, C. J., in Vykunta Bapuji  v. Government  of  Bombay(1)  (See also Sundaraja  Iyengar Land Tenures in the Madras Presidency, pp.  5 to21). According to this theory the King  was not the owner of cultivated land but the proprietary  interest  in  it  vested  in  the cultivator, the  right of the King being merely to the  Raja   bhagam   which   represented   various proportions of  the produce,  sometimes thought of as being  a sixth  and at  other times  at  higher proportions ranging  up to  a half. As observed by Subramania  Iyer,  J.,  in  Venkata  Narasimha  v. Kotayya (2).           "For, in  the first  place,  sovereigns,      ancient or  modern, did here set up more than      a right  to a  share of the produce raised by      raiyats in  lands cultivated by them, however      much that  share varied  at different  times.      And,in the  language of  the Board of Revenue      which long  after  the  Permanent  Settlement      Regulations  were  passed,  investigated  and      reported upon  the nature  of the  rights  of      ryots in the various parts of the Presidency,      ’whether rendered  in service, in money or in      kind and  whether paid  to rajas,  jagirdars,      zemindars, poligars, mutadars 798      shro-triemdars,  inamdars  or  to  Government      officers, such as tahsildars, amildars, amins      or thannadars, the payments which have always      been made  are universally  deemed the due of      Government.’  (See  the  Proceedings  of  the      Board of  Revenue, dated  5th January,  1818,      quoted in  the note  at  page  223  of  Dewan      Bahadur    Srinivasa    Raghava    Ayyangar’s      ’Progress in the Madras Presidency’)." This proprietary interest of the cultivator was in its true  sense a  property right-being capable of alienation and  of hereditary  enjoyment.  At  the time of  Permanent Settlement Regulation in Bengal (1793),   and   subsequently   when   its   Madras counterpart was  enacted (Regulation XXV of 1802), there was  a  great  deal  of  controversy  as  to whether the East India Company as the Ruler was or was not  entitled to the proprietary rights to the soil in  the country. In the words of Westropp, C.

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J., in  Vykunta Bapuji v. Government of Bombay (1) involved in this           "was the question as to the character in      which native  governments claimed,  from  the      occupants of  the land,  payments  either  in      money or  in produce  in respect of the land.      Were these  payments rent  or revenue  ? Some      maintained that those payments were rent, not      revenue; because, it was said, the land could      only  be   occupied  and  cultivated  by  the      permission of  the sovereign,  and that  such      produce, as  there may  be in  excess of what      sufficed for  the  bare  subsistence  of  the      cultivators   and   for   the   expenses   of      cultivation,   is   the   property   of   the      sovereign.   Others   maintained   that   the      sovereign  was   only  entitled  to  a  fixed      portion of  the produce, and that the surplus      beyond that  portion, plus the subsistence of      the rayuts (cultivators) 799      and the  cost of  cultivation, belonged  to a      class  of   great   landlords   between   the      sovereign and  the rayuts, which intermediate      class consisted  of zamindars,  talukdars  or      similar  personages;   while   others   again      strongly contended  that, subject  to a land-      tax payable to the sovereign, the property in      the  soil   was  vested  in  the  cultivator,      sometimes in  the form of village communities      holding   corporately,    at   other    times      individuals holding  in severalty, or jointly      as members  of an  undivided family. In 1793,      (either upon  the ground  that the  soil  was      vested in  the sovereign  power, and  that it      was expedient  that, by  that power, a landed      aristocracy should  be created,  or upon  the      ground, that the land, subject to the revenue      assessment i.e., the king’s (or State’s share      of  the   produce,  ought   to  be   publicly      recognized  as   vested  in   the  class   of      zamindars, &  c., as landlords) the permanent      settlement in  Bengal, Bihar  and Orissa  was      made by the Government of Lord Cornwallis, by      recognizing  the  zamindars,  &  c.,  as  the      proprietors of  the  soil,  and  entitled  to      transfer it, and by fixing, once for all, the      land-tax payable  by them  to the State at an      immutable annual rate." In 1796 the Government of Madras declared that "it is the  first feature  in all  the Governments  of India,  that   the  Sovereign,  whether  he  be  a Mussulman or Hindoo is lord of the soil; and hence it  is  that  no  alienation  of  lands  from  the property of the circar, or rather no possession of land  whatever   is  valid   without   a   written instrument  from   the  superior  lord;  and  this distinction has  invariably followed the conquests of all  nations who have established themselves in India". This  statement was  directly contrary  to accepted practice  and the  consciousness  of  the cultivator in Madras. It is not therefore a matter for surprise 800 that  in   answer  to   this  declaration  of  the

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Government, the  Board of  Revenue at once pointed out that  "there were  hereditary  cultivators  on lands with  the right of making any disposition of them by  sale, mortgage  or otherwise  as long  as they paid  the Government  revenue, and  that they only could  not make any alienation of them to the exclusion of the royal share of the revenue."      Acting on  the view  that the  Crown was  the proprietor of  the soil,  the  Birtish  Government purported to confer proprietary rights in the soil on the  zamindars under  the Permanent  Settlement the preamble  to which referred to the reservation by the  ruling power  of the  "implied  right  and actual  exercise   of  the  proprietary  right  to possession of  all lands  whatever" and  by  s.  2 purported to vest in the zamindars the proprietary right to  the soil. It was however found that this interfered  with   the   established   rights   of cultivators and  Madras Regulation  IV of 1822 was passed  to   declare  that   the   provisions   of Regulation XXV of 1802 were not intended to affect the actual ryots in cultivation of lands. It might be added that the Privy Council ruled in Collector of Trichinapally  v. Lekkamoni (1) that the theory underlying these  words in the Regulation were not sustainable and that there were proprietary rights in land  not traceable  to  or  derived  from  the sovereign.      The introduction  of the Permanent Settlement with the  creation of  a class  of zamindars as in Bengal was  not  considered  to  be  a  beneficial system by  the Government  of Madras  and so after the grant  of some  sanads under Madras Regulation XXV  of  1802-mostly  in  recognition  of  ancient titles-the creation  of  new  permanently  settled estates was  stopped and  in its place, the system of revenue administration associated with the name of Sir  Thomas Munro  known as the ryotwari system was adopted. According to Munro there was 801 no need  for the  interposition of an intermediary between  the  State  and  the  actual  cultivator, particularly as it was clear that the system meant that the  zamindars enjoyed  what  the  cultivator parted with  to the  State; in  other  words,  the difference between  the rent  paid by  the  actual cultivator, viz.,  the melwaram  and the peishcush or the  Jama fixed  by the  zamindar or proprietor was so much profit for the middleman and therefore pro tanto  a diminution  of the amount which would have  accrued   to  the   State.  Besides,   Munro considered that  on economic  grounds and  with  a view to  increase agricultural  production it  was necessary for  the State  being in  touch with the actual cultivator. For these reasons he formulated the "ryotwari system" and introduced it in several areas of  the  Madras  Presidency  and  Coimbatore district  adjoining  the  State  of  Cochin  being almost the  first among  the districts  where  the system was  introduced. The  basic  and  essential feature of the system was that the fixation of the revenue assessment  payable by  the cultivator had to be  proceeded by  a survey  of the a land which included the  ascertainment of the productivity of the soil  and that  the assessment should be based

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on  what   was  known  as  ’tharam’  (or  quality) classification. The  assessment thus  began to  be based on scientific data and principles-and was so designed as  to leave  a sufficient  margin to the cultivator to induce him to remain on the land and be assured of a good share in increased production resulting from  the employment  of his  labour and capital. The terms on which the ryot held the land was contained in the patta issued to him on behalf of the Government and this specified the extent of land held  by him  as well  as the  amount of  the assessment and  the time  when the instalments had to be  paid. This was not however considered to be any document  of title,  because the  ryot had the property in him and his interest was a proprietary interest in the soil and so capable 802 of being alienated and of being transmitted to his heirs. This  however was  not anything  new and it was not  as if  the interest of the cultivator was not  alienable  before  the  ryotwari  system  was introduced.  Before   that   date   however,   the assessment of  the land  was both  heavy  in  most parts  and   unequal-not  being   based   on   the productive capacity  of  the  soil,  as  to  leave little or no margin to the cultivator. Besides the predations of  revenue and the severity of the tax was dependent  on the  exigencies and necessities, if not  the whims  of the  ruler  and  in  such  a situation, even though technically cultivated land was capable  of alienation  there being  no ban on alienation, still  having  regard  to  the  meagre margin left to the owner and the fear of increased taxation based on no principle, no purchaser could be found;  though owing  to the  impossibility  of finding a  more profitable  use for  manual labour apart from the sentimental attachment to land, the actual cultivator  clung to  his holding. But when with the advent of a system of assessment based on fixed  and  scientific  principles  which  left  a sufficient margin  for the  cultivator, and  there was no  fear of  sudden increases  of  assessment, land became  a marketable  commodity investment in which was rendered worthwhile.      Notwithstanding  that   in  Malabar  absolute ownership of  the soil by the Jenmi where the land was the  property of  individuals and of the State where it  was the  owner, was  a characteristic of the landholding,  still from  a fairly  early date after the  British conquest  of  the  neighbouring areas the  concept of the cultivator with whom the State entered into direct relations being conceded the proprietorship of the soil slowly permeated.      In this  connection I might usefully refer to a proclamation  of the ruler of Travancore of 1865 (1040 M.  E.) regarding  Sarkar-pattom lands, with the observation that subject to variations 803 dependent on  local usages,  the  system  of  land tenure and  the concepts  as regards the rights of property in  land were  substantially  similar  in Travancore and  Cochin. Sarkar-pattom  lands  were what might  be termed  ’Crown lands’  of which the ruler was  deemed to be the Jenmi or the landlord. Previous  to   the  proclamation  the  lands  were

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legally capable  of being  resumed by  the  ruler, though this  was seldom  done and  the cultivators were not legally entitled to transfer their rights and where  this was  done the  Government had  the right to ignore the transaction. The fact that the cultivator  was   conceived  of   as   having   no proprietary  interest   on  the   land  also  bore adversely  on   the  State  since  the  State  was deprived of  the means of realising any arrears of revenue by bringing the holding to sale. It was to remedy this  situation that  the proclamation  was issued and  the preamble  and its  terms carry the impress of  the impact  of the  ryotwari system of Madras. The proclamation reads:           "Whereas we  earnestly desire  that  the      possession  of   landed  as   well  as  other      property in Our Territory should be as secure      as possible;  and whereas  We are  of opinion      that, with  this view Sirkar Pattom lands can      be placed  on a  much better  footing than at      present so  as to enhance their value; we are      pleased to notify to our Ryots-           1st. That the Sirkar hereby and for ever      surrenders, for  the benefit  of the  people,      all optional power over the following classes      of lands,  whether wet,  garden or  dry,  and      whether included  in the  Ayacut accounts  or      registered since:           Ven Pattom,           Vettolivoo Pattom,           Maraya Pattom,           Olavoo Pattom,           Mara Pattom, 804 and all  such Durkast  Pattom, the tax of which is understood to  be fixed  till the  next Survey and assessment.           2ndly.  That  the  Ryots  holding  these      lands  may  regard  them  fully  as  private,      heritable,    saleable,     and     otherwise      transferable, property.           3rdly.    Accordingly,     the    sales,      mortgages,  &   c.,  of   these  lands   will      henceforward be  valid, may  be  effected  on      stamped cadjans, and will be duly registered.      The lands  may be sold for arrears of tax, in      execution of decrees of Courts and such other      legitimate purposes, and may also be accepted      as security  by the  Sirkar  as  well  as  by      private individuals.           4thly. That  the holders of the lands in      question may rest assured that they may enjoy      them undisturbed  so long  as  the  appointed      assessment is paid.           5thly.  That   the  said   holders   are      henceforth at  full liberty to lay out labour      and capital  on their  lands of the aforesaid      description to  any extent they please, being      sure     of      continued     and     secure      possession...................."      The language  employed in the proclamation is of significance.  It speaks  of the relinquishment or withdrawal of the right of the State and not of the conferment  of a  right on  the ryot  so as to render the  ryot a grantee from the State, just in

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line  with   the   Hindu   Law   theory   of   the proprietorship  of   the  soil   vesting  in   the occupant-cultivator.      With this  background,  I  shall  proceed  to consider the nature of the tenures-Pandaravaka and Puravaka-with which  this petition  is  concerned. The two  tenures  are  quite  different  in  their origin and  essential characteristics  and so have to be separately dealt with. Pandaravaka lands are those in  which the State held proprietary rights- the 805 name being  derived from  Bandara or the treasury, while in  regard to  the Puravaka, they were lands in which  the proprietorship  vested in the Jenmi, but which were under the cultivation of tenants on whom the State imposed land revenue. Putting aside for the moment the Puravaka lands, the Pandaravaka lands might  be approximated  to the  Crown  lands dealt with  by the Travancore Proclamation of 1865 already  referred  to.  The  terms  on  which  the tenants held  the right  of the  Crown were almost the same as in the other case. The evils which the system gave  rise to,  the economic  insecurity of the tenant and the consequent lack of incentive on his part  to put his best exertion on the land and the resultant  loss to  the state  in the shape of revenue  as  well  as  the  rise  of  a  contented peasantry were  exactly parallel  to the situation which faced the ruler of Travancore leading to the proclamation   of    1865.   It   was   in   these circumstances that  the ruler  of Cochin  issued a proclamation on March 10, 1905, which defined with precision the  rights of  the  State  and  of  the cultivator in  regard to these lands and it is the submission of  the learned  Attorney-General  that the effect  of this  proclamation is to render the Pandaravaka  and   Puravaka  lands   held  by  the petitioner "estates"  within the  meaning of  Art. 31A(2) of the constitution as it now stands. It is therefore necessary  to set out in some detail the terms of this proclamation.      The preamble  to the proclamation recites the fact that  the State  demand had  not  been  fixed either with  reference to  the actual measurements of the  land or on any fixed or uniform principles and that a revision of the State demand based upon a  correct   measurement  of  lands  and  definite principles, fair  alike to  the  State  and  "our" agricultural  population,   is  desirable  in  the interest of  a sound  revenue  administration.  It then proceeds to state 806 that a  survey  which  included  the  demarcation, mapping and  the preparation of an accurate record of  titles  in  respect  of  all  descriptions  of properties was  to  be  carried  out  and  that  a Settlement or  revision of  the State demand would be conducted  in accordance  with  the  principles laid down  by the  proclamation. In passing it may be mentioned  that  this  is  reminiscent  of  the despatches of  Thomas Munro in which he expatiates upon the  need of  a proper  survey and  a correct definition  of  the  principles  upon  which  land revenue shall  be assessed and that the quantum of

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revenue should  be such  as while  providing for a fair share  to the  State, should leave enough for the  cultivator   to  live   upon  and   offer  an inducement to  him to  increase the  output of his fields in which event the surplus available to him would be  more. In  particular I  might refer to a passage  in  a  despatch  which  is  extracted  by Westropp, C.J., in Vykunta Bapuji v. Government of Bombay (1) reading:      "When the  land revenue  is fixed  and light, the farmer  sees that  he will  reap the reward of his  own   industry:  the   cheerful  prospect  of improving his  situation animates his labours, and enables him  to replace in a short time the losses he  may   sustain  from   adverse   seasons,   the devastations of war, and other accidents."      Paragraph 5  of the proclamation directs that lands, whether  wet or  dry, were to be classified with reference  to the  nature of  their soils  in accordance  with   the  table   of  classification prescribed in  the Madras  Settlement Manual which is   sufficiently    indicative   of   the   close correspondence between  the  ryotwari  system  and mode  of   fixation  of   land  revenue   and  the principles  underlying  it  as  prevailed  in  the neighbouring Presidency  of  Madras.  Paragraph  6 reads:           "Under the  present land  revenue system      of the State, lands are held under two main 807      tenures,      viz.,      Pandaravaka      and Puravaka............" At this stage it is necessary only to add that the proclamation does  not deal  with  the  rights  as between the  State and Jenmis, i.e., that class of land  owners  who  were  entitled  to  a  freehold interest in the land as explained earlier. I shall deal later with special legislation with reference to Jenmis  in the  other princely State which is a constituent of  present State  of  Kerala  in  its proper place.  Paragraph 6  proceeds to  enumerate the  six   subsidiary   classifications   of   the Pandaravaka tenure  and enumerates the Verumpattom type as  the first  among them  and this  type  is taken as  the standard for fixing the land revenue of  the   other  categories  which,  it  might  be mentioned,  are   favourable  tenants,  the  State demand  being   reduced.  To  these  others  which partake of  the nature  of grants  of land revenue very different  considerations  would  apply.  The lands  of   the  petitioner  held  on  Pandaravaka tenure, it  should be  added fall  within the sub- category of  Verumpattom lands.  The  proclamation then proceeds to state:           "The revenue  paid to  the State  varies      according to  the nature of the tenure, i.e.,      the six  sub-classes. It  is however only the      Pandaravaka Verumpattom  lands which  pay the      full pattom  or share  due to  the State.  We      have accordingly decided that the Pandaravaka      Verumpattom shall  be deemed  as  the  normal      tenure for settling the full State demand and      that the  other tenures  shall be  treated as      favourable tenures  and settled  on the lines      hereinafter indicated..........."

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Paragraph 7,  after reciting  that  the  rates  of assessment on  Pandaravaka Verumpattom  wet  lands vary from  place to  place, points  out that  such disparity is  indicative of  unequal incidence and stating that  it  was  essential  that  the  State demand should 808 bear a  fixed proportion  to the produce a land is capable of  yielding announces  the decision  that the same  shall  be  half  the  net  produce.  The deductions to  be made  for ascertaining  the  net produce are indicated. The next clause which is of relevance and importance in the present context is cl. 13 which runs:           "13. At  present holders  of Pandaravaka      Verumpattom lands do not possess any property      in  the   soil.  As  we  are  convinced  that      proprietorship  in   soil   will   induce   a      cultivator to  improve his  land and  thereby      add to  the agricultural  prosperity  of  the      country,   we   hereby   declare   that   our      Verumpattom holders of lands shall, after the      new Settlement  has been  introduced, acquire      full rights  to the  soil of  the lands  they      hold  and  that  their  rights  shall  remain      undisturbed so long as they regularly pay the      State revenue,  provided that  the rights  to      metals and  minerals, possessed  by the State      in all  lands under whatever tenures they are      held, are reserved to the State." Paragraph 14  onwards deal with favourable tenures and of  these we  are concerned only with Puravaka lands and  it is  pointed out in Paragraph 15 that in  the  case  of  Puravaka  lands  the  Jenmi  is recognised as  owning the  proprietorship  in  the land and  is consequently  entitled to  share  the produce with  the cultivator  and the  Sirkar, and proceeds to define the State demand in such lands. There  are   other  clauses   dealing  with  other incidents in regard to these tenures and in regard to other interests in the land such as house-sites etc. but  we are  not  concerned  with  them.  The proclamation also makes provision for the grant of rough or  draft pattas  to cultivators and of fair pattas detailing  the assessment  payable on  such lands-provisions exactly  parallel to the practice and procedure  prevailing in the adjoining area of the Madras Presidency. Besides, it also makes 809 provision against  any revision  of the assessment once fixed  before the expiry of 30 years, also in line with the then practice in Madras. I have made this   analysis   of   the   provisions   of   the proclamation for  the purpose  of emphasizing that what the  proclamation intended to achieve was the introduction of  ryotwari system  of settlement in the place  of exactions  by the  State based on no principles and  unrelated to  the productivity  of the soil  and  having  an  unequal  incidence  for different areas and different lands. The holder of Pandaravaka  Verumpattom   patta   was   therefore nothing more  or nothing less than the holder of a ryotwari patta  in the adjoining Madras State. The only point  of difference  that could be suggested is  this.   Under   the   ryotwari   system,   the

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proprietorship of  the ryot  to the soil is not in theory derived  from the  State, whereas under the proclamation of  1905, it  appears to  rest  on  a grant. In  my opinion  this makes  no  difference, because the  essential features  of the system are the  same   as  those  of  ryotwari-(1)  a  direct relationship between the State and the cultivator, and  with  the  absence  of  any  intermediary  to intercept the  raja bhagam  or land  revenue,  (2) there is  no grant  or alienation  of the  States’ right to revenue in favour of the grantee.      The Puravaka  tenure  was  wholly  different. They were  lands held  by Jenmis.  As I shall show later, Jenmam  lands  were  not  exempt  from  the payment of  land revenue  but the  Puravaka tenant had the  benefit of  a favourable  assessment.  In other words, in respect of those lands the produce of the  land was the subject of sharing as between the actual  cultivator, the  Jenmi and  the State, though the  Jenmi had  a freehold  interest in the land itself      The question for consideration now is whether the lands  held under  a patta  by  a  Pandaravaka Verumpattom and of Jenmam lands by a Puravaka 810 tenant are "estates" within the meaning of Art. 31 A (2).      Before examining  the terms  of Art. 31 A (2) as they now stand, it is necessary to refer to the antecedent history  which led to the First and the Fourth Constitutional  Amendments. Preliminary  to this it  might not  be out  of  place  to  briefly explain the  circumstances which  necessitated the First amendment  as pointing to the mischief which that amendment  was designed  to remedy. Very soon after independence  several States  initiated land reforms whose  object was  the elimination  of the intermediaries. The Madras Legislature enacted the Madras Abolition  of Estates  and Conversion  into Ryotwari Act, 1948, by which intermediaries in the shape   of   zemindars,   Palayagars,   Jagirdars, Inamdars   and   other   such   proprietors   were eliminated and  persons in  actual cultivation  of the lands  under the  zemindars were  brought into direct relationship  with the  government by being granted ryotwari pattas in respect of their former holdings. There  was similar legislation in Bihar- Bihar Act  1 of 1950, as also in some of the other States of  the Indian  Union. The  validity of the several pieces  of legislation  was challenged  in the respective  High  Courts  principally  on  the ground that  the deprivation  of the rights of the zamindars etc.  effected by  these enactments  and the principles upon which the compensation payable for the  deprivation was determined violated Arts. 14, 19  and 31 of the Constitution. The first case in which  a decision  was rendered by a High Court in respect  of the  contentions urged  was by  the Patna High  Court in  Kameshwar Singh  v. State of Bihar (1)  in which  the  petition  succeeded  and Bihar Abolition  of Estates  Act  1  of  1950  was declared unconstitutional. An appeal was preferred by the  State against  the judgment  to this Court and it was during 811

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the pendency  of this  appeal and  with a  view to validate the legislation which had been enacted in the several  States and  which was  the subject of attack in  several Courts,  including this  Court, that First  Constitutional Amendment by which Art. 31A was  introduced  into  the  Constitution,  was enacted. The  Constitution (First  Amendment) Act, 1951, received the assent of the President on June 18, 1951,  but Art. 31A which was introduced by s. 4 of  this Act  was expressly  made  retrospective from the commencement of the Constitution. As then enacted Art. 31A ran:           "31A.  Saving   of  laws  providing  for      acquisition     of      estates:     etc.-(1)      Notwithstanding  anything  in  the  foregoing      provisions of this Part, no law providing for      the acquisition by the State of any estate or      of   any    rights   therein   or   for   the      extinguishment or  modification of  any  such      rights shall  be deemed  to be  void  on  the      ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes      away or  abridges any of the rights conferred      by, any provisions of this Part:           Provided that  where such  law is  a law      made by  the  Legislature  of  a  State,  the      provisions of  this article  shall not  apply      thereto unless such law, having been reserved      for the  consideration of  the President, has      received his assent.           (2) In this article,-           (a) the  expression  ’estate’  shall  in      relation to  any local  area, have  the  same      meaning  as  that  expression  or  its  local      equivalent has  in the  existing law relating      to land  tenures in  force in  that area, and      shall also  include any  jagir, inam or muafi      or other similar grant;           (b) the  expression ’rights’ in relation      to an estate shall include any rights vesting      in  a   proprietor,  sub-proprietor,   under-      proprietor     tenure-holder     or     other      intermediary and  any rights  or privilege in      respect of revenue." 812 In addition  the First  Constitution Amendment Act also enacted  by its s. 5 a further provision-Art. 31B expressly validating the several enactments of the various States which were then under challenge and which  were all  set out  in  Sch.  9  of  the Constitution. From  this collocation  it would  be seen that  whereas Art.  31B immunised from attack all the  pieces  of  legislation  which  had  been enacted by  June 1951,  Art. 31A  was intended  to render the  same types  of legislation  enacted in future  immune  from  attack,  provided  that  the enactments  were   reserved  for  the  President’s assent and  were assented  to by  him. It  is with this background  that  one  has  to  approach  the construction of Art. 31A.      Clause (1)  of Art.  31A does not present any difficulty in  construction with  reference to the point now  under discussion, because its terms are clear  and   apply  to  laws  providing  for  "the acquisition by  the State  of any estate or rights therein" or "the extinguishment or modification of

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any such  rights". The crucial words here are that the rights  which are  acquired,  extinguished  or modified  are  rights  in  or  in  respect  of  an "estate". If  there had  been no definition of the expression ’estate’, one might have had to look to the grammatical  of literal  meaning of  the word, and the  word might  conceivably be  understood as including person’s  interest  in  landed  property whatever may  be  the  nature  or  extent  of  the interest, though  the width  of this meaning might be controlled by the history of the provision, the antecedent state of circumstances and the mischief which  it   was  designed  to  overcome.  But  the enactment   has   not   left   this   matter   for investigation in  that manner.  Sub-clause  (2)(a) contains the definition of expression ’estate’ and sub-cl. (b)  of "rights in relation to an estate". It is  obvious that  the word ’estate’ in sub-cls. (a) and  (b) mean  the same  and  is  employed  to designate identical  types of land holding. If the expression "rights  in relation  to an  estate" in sub-cl. (b) 813 indicates that  it is the "estate" or the right of the intermediary  that is  comprehended by the use of the  words ’proprietor,  sub-proprietor, under- proprietor, tenure-holder  or other intermediary", clearly the expression ’estate’ in sub-cl.(a) must be  understood  as  referring  to  such  types  of landholder. It is also worth noting that the words "shall also  include any  jagir, inam  or muafi or other similar  grant" in  sub  cl.(a)  have  their parallel in  sub-cl. (b)  by the words "any rights or privileges in respect of land revenue." The net result  therefore   was  that  the  term  ’estate’ signified the  land held  by an  intermediary  who stood between  the State  and the actual tiller of the soil, and also the interests of those in whose favour there  had been  alienation of the right to revenue, i.e.,  lands held  on revenue  free or on favourable tenures. The two sub-clauses may now be further examined  to determine  their content  and significance.  Taking  first  sub-cl.  (a)  it  is necessary  to  advert  to  two  matters:  (1)  the reference to  the "local  equivalent" of  the term ’estate’ in  the law  existing in  any local area, and (2)  the denotation of the words ’the existing law in  relation to  land tenures in force in that area’. In  regard to the ’local equivalent’ of the term ’estate’ there is one observation I desire to make.  These   words  were  not  in  the  Bill  as originally  presented   to  Parliament   and  were brought in  as a  result of  the suggestion of the Joint Select  Committee  to  which  the  BIII  was referred. In  their report  the  Select  Committee stated:           "We have  amended the  definition of  an      ’estate’ to  cover cases  where the  existing      law relating  to land-tenure is in a regional      language for  example in  Hindi or  Urdu  and      uses the local equivalent of ’estate’." I am  far from  saying that  if the meaning of the expression were  clear the  purpose for  which the words were used would determine their construction 814

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but I  am drawing  attention to  this passage from the report  of  the  Joint  Select  Committee  for pointing out  that by  the use  of the  expression ’local  equivalent’  the  central  concept  of  an ’estate’, as would be clear from the terms of sub- cl. (b),  which in  effect is a further definition of the  term  ’estate’  was  not  intended  to  be departed from.      Next as  to the  meaning of  "in the existing law in  relation  to  land-tenures".  These  words raise for  consideration the  question as  to what constitutes "a  land-tenure". If  one  had  to  go merely  by   the  grammatical  meaning  merely  of ’tenure’ derived  from the Latin ’tenere’ to hold, any kind  of right  or title  by which property is held would be included, the only requirement would be that the property should be held of another. In that wide  sense it would include the case of land held under  an ordinary  tenancy under  a landlord under the Transfer of Property Act. Obviously that is not  the sense in which the word is employed in the clause.  It has  therefore to be understood as comprehending that  type of  "holding"  where  the holder is  an intermediary  between the  State and the tiller,  or is  otherwise the  grantee of land revenue  holding   the  land  under  a  favourable tenure. If  this is  the essential  feature of the concept  of   an  ’estate’   under  cl.  (2),  the expression ’land-tenure’  must in the context mean the ’tenure’ under which an ’estate’ as defined is held. To  read it  otherwise and understand ’land- tenure’ as  designating any system of landholding, whether or not such system conforms to the central and essential  concept of  estate,  would  not  be correct. Such  an interpretation  would result  in anomaly that  in an  existing law  in force  in  a local  area  which  uses  the  word  ’estate’  and includes   within   that   definition   particular tenures, only they and none also are included, but if such  law does  not refer  to a  tenure  as  an ’estate’ then it comprehends any 815 holding of  land under  Government whatever be the nature of  the tenure.  That  would  constitute  a radical departure  from the  purpose of  the First Amendment  and   a  construction   which  is   not compelled by  the words,  but on  the  other  hand contradicted by  the context  and setting in which they occur.      This leads  me to the case where an "existing law in  relation to  land-tenures" uses  the  term ’estate’ and defines it in a particular manner and that   definition    includes   not   merely   the proprietary rights  of  intermediaries  or  others holding land on favourable tenures as described in sub-cl. (b) but also others who hold properties in their own  right and describes the land-holding of these others also as ’estates’. The question would then arise  whether literal  effect has or has not to be  given to  the words  ’defined as  an estate under the  law relating to land-tenures’ occurring in sub-cl. (a). One possible view to take would be that having  regard to  the central  concept of an ’estate’ as  signifying the  rights in  land of an intermediary etc.,  those whose rights in land did

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not involve  any assignment of the Raja bhagam but were in  direct relationship  with the  State  and subject to  the payment  of the full assessment of the revenue lawfully imposed upon it, could not be termed to have an interest in an ’estate’, nor the land held by them to fall within the concept of an ’estate’ as comprehended in sub-cl. (a).      The other view would be that if the operative terms of Art. 31A and in particular the definition of   "an   estate"   contained   in   cl.   (2)(a) unambiguously covered  cases of non intermediaries also, effect  would have  to be given to the terms used for  it is  a cardinal rule of interpretation that the  operative words  of an enactment, and in this  must   be  included   the   terms   of   the Constitution, cannot be controlled by reference to the object  for which the provision was introduced where the words are unambiguous. If a law in force in any local area 816 at the  commencement of the Constitution which was "a law  in relation to land-tenures" contained the definition of  an ’estate’  then every  species of land-holding which  fell within the definition and was comprehended  by such  law relating  to  land- tenure would,  for the purpose of the Constitution be comprehended  within the  ambit of  an ’estate’ and it  might  be  no  answer  in  regard  to  any particular species  of land-tenure that its holder was not  an intermediary. I shall have occasion to refer to  the decisions  which turn on this aspect of the  matter a  little  later.  Apart  from  the exceptional cases  just now mentioned where one is faced with  a definition  of  ’an  estate’  in  an existing law,  I consider that the First Amendment to the  Constitution  did  not  bring  within  the definition of  ’an estate’ the holdings of persons other than  intermediaries or  those who held land under   grants    on   favourable   tenures   from Government-Jagirdar, Inamdar,  Muafidar,  etc.  As pointed out by Venkatarama Ayyar, J., speaking for this Court  in Thakur  Amar Singhji  v.  State  of Rajasthan (1):           The object  of  Art.  31A  was  to  save      legislation  which   was  directed   to   the      abolition  of   intermediaries   so   as   to      establish  direct  relationship  between  the      State and the tillers of the soil........"      I shall  now turn  to sub-cl.  (b) and to the terminology employed  in it  to define  ’rights in relation to  an estate’  and examine  how far this definition affects the content of cl. (a) as above explained. In  the first place as already noticed, the use  of the word ’estate’ in the clause serves to bring  into it  the concept  of an  ’estate’ as defined  in   cl.  (a)   pointing  to  the  inter- dependence of  the two clauses necessitating their having to  be  read  together.  The  second  point requiring advertance  is as regards the definition purporting to be inclusive and not exhaustive. The question arising therefrom may be 817 posed thus:  Does the definition include any other type  of   interest  besides   those   enumerated, particularly   of    a   different    nature    or

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characteristic which  could  not  be  comprehended within the  extension brought  in by the words ’or other intermediary’.  I am  clearly of the opinion that it  does not  and that  the word includes’ is here used in the sense of ’means and includes’. In this connection  I would  usefully  refer  to  the observations  of   Lord  Watson   delivering   the judgment of  the  Privy  Council  in  Dilworth  v. Commissioner for Land and Income-Tax (1):           "The word  ’include’ is  very  generally      used in  interpretation clauses  in order  to      enlarge  the  meaning  of  words  or  phrases      occurring in  the body  of the  statute;  and      when it  is so  used these  words or  phrases      must be  construed as  comprehending not only      such things  as  they  signify  according  to      their natural  import, but  also those things      which the interpretation clause declares that      they shall include. But the word ’include’ is      susceptible of  another  construction,  which      may become  imperative, if the context of the      Act is  sufficient to  shew that  it was  not      merely employed  for the purpose of adding to      the natural  significance  of  the  words  or      expressions defined.  It may be equivalent to      ’mean and  include’, and  in that case it may      afford  an   exhaustive  explanation  of  the      meaning which  for the  purposes of  the Act,      must invariably be attached to these words or      expressions."      If therefore the constitutional validity of a legislation extinguishing  or modifying the rights either of the Pandaravaka Verumpattomdars who were in the  position of  a ryotwari pattadar or of the Puravaka holders  who held under a Jenmi of Jenmam land had to be tested with reference to 818 Art. 31A as it stood when it was introduced by the First  Amendment,   these  interests   under   the proclamation of  1905 would  not be  held to be an ’estate’ and  therefore outside  the scope  of the protection  against   the  guaranteed  fundamental rights.      Before examining  the effect  of  the  change introduced by  the Fourth Amendment to Art. 31A it might be  useful to detail the circumstances which put these tenures outside Art. 31A under the First Constitution Amendment. Taking the Puravaka tenure first, it  ought to  be mentioned that as would be seen from  the terms  of the  proclamation of 1905 extracted earlier,  Puravaka lands  were those  in the ownership of the Jenmi but in respect of which he was  not directly in cultivation. The Jenmi was considered an  absolute proprietor  not merely  of lands  which   were  cultivated   but  unlike  the ryotwari pattadar  also those which were not under his cultivation  such  as  waste  lands,  forests, etc., and he did not hold land under the State. In other words,  his proprietorship to or rights over the land  of which  he claimed  ownership was  not traceable to any title derived from the State. But notwithstanding  this   freehold  right   that  he claimed and  enjoyed the  State was  entitled from the earliest  times to  assess his  lands to land- revenue.  Exemption  from  taxation  was  not  any

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essential condition of Jenmam tenure and the Jenmi was under  an obligation  to pay  what was  termed ’Raja bhagam’  which was  the  equivalent  of  the expression’land-revenue’. This incidence of Jenmam land did  not therefore detract from its character of its  being the private and absolute property of the Jenmi.  There was legislation in Travancore as regards the  liability of  the Jenmi  to  pay  the land-tax or  the Raja bhagam except, of course, in those cases where anr particular land was rendered tax-free as a mattey of grace or concession by the ruler.  The   legislation  started  with  a  royal proclamation 1869  (1042 M.E.)  dealing  with  the lands of Jenmis and their relation 819 with their tenants. This proclamation was replaced by Regulation  5 of  1071  (July  3,  1896)  which continued in  force with  various amendments right up to  the date  of the  Act whose validity is now impugned and is referred to in it. By these pieces of legislation  the rights  of the Jenmi quoad his tenants were  regulated, the  grounds  upon  which eviction would  take place  were laid down and the customary rights enjoyed by either party were, so, to speak, codified. I am pointing this out because the existence  of a  law regulating  the rights of property-owners  and   defining  their  rights  or obligations either quoad the Government in respect of land-revenue or as regards persons holding land under them  did not  by itself render such law one "relating to  land-tenure" within  the meaning  of Art. 31A(2)(a).  In order  to be  such  a  law  it should regulate  the  rights  of  persons  holding under grants  from  the  government  of  the  Raja bhagom. A  law defining  or regulating the levy of assessment or revenue on lands held not under such grants from  the State would not be such a law. It was for  this reason  that the  interest of Jenmis and the  lands owned  in Jenmam right did not fall within Art.  31A  as  it  stood  under  the  First Amendment   to    the   Constitution   and   which necessitated the Fourth Amendment to which I shall refer later. The position of persons holding lands on Puravaka  tenure would  not be  different  from that of  the Jenmis.  As the  Puravaka lands  were held not  under the State or under a grant from it but under  the Jenmis,  though liable  to pay Raja bhagam, they would not be ’estates’.      The case  of the  Pandaravaka Verumpattomdars would be  similar and the lands held by them would also not  fall within  the category  of  ’estate.’ This  would  be  so  because  they  like  ryotwari pattadars held  the lands for cultivation directly from the  State, and  were niether  intermediaries nor persons 820 who held  their lands  on a  favourable tenure  as regards the  payment  of  land  revenue  in  other words, they  were not  alienees of the Raja bhagam to any  extent, and were therefore not intended to be affected  by  the  First  Amendment.  For  this purpose it  would make  no difference  whether the origin of  the ryot’s  proprietary interest in the land be  traceable to  the Hindu  law  concept  of title based  on occupation  and cultivation  or to

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the  relinquishment   by  the   State  under   the Travancore Proclamation  of 1865  or even  to  the conferment of  proprietary rights  by  the  Cochin Proclamation of  1905. It is only necessary to add that,  their  being  outside  the  ambit  of  Art. 31A(2),  and  this  would  equally  apply  to  the interest of the Jenmi, was not due to their tenure not being  regulated by  enacted law,  as distinct from regulation  either by  the common  law of  by departmental instructions  in  the  shape  of  the Standing Orders  of the  Board of Revenue or other similar bodies.      The point  next to be considered is regarding the effect  of the  change brought  about  by  the Fourth Amendment  in 1955  which on  its terms was also  to   have  retrospective   effect  from  the commencement of  the Constitution. Clause 3 of the Act which  was substituted  for the original cl. 1 of  Art.   31A,  provides  for  various  types  of legislation interfering  with property rights, but in respect of the matter now in question the words in  the   original  cl.  1  referring  to  "a  law providing for  the acquisition  by the State of an estate  of   an  any   rights   therein   or   the extinguishment or modification of any such rights" were left  untouched. In  regard to the definition of an  "estate" contained in cl. 2 the only change effected in  sub-cl. (a)  was the  addition of the words "in  the States  of Madras  and Travancore & cochin any Janmam right" after the word "grant" in the clause  as it  stood and  in sub  cl. (b)  the addition of the words "ryot and under-ryot" 821 after the  word "tenure-holder"  in  the  original clause. After the amendment, the relevant words in Art. 31A read as follow:           "(I) Notwithstanding  anything contained      in article 13, no law providing for-           (a) the  acquisition by the State of any      estate  or  of  any  rights  therein  or  the      extinguishment or  modification of  any  such      rights ............  shall be  deemed  to  be      void on  the ground  that it  is inconsistent      with, or  takes away  or abridges  any of the      rights conferred by article 14, article 19 or      article 31:           Provided that  where such  law is  a law      made by  the  Legislature  of  a  State,  the      provisions of  this article  shall not  apply      thereto unless such law, having been reserved      for the  consideration of  the President, has      received his assent.           (2) In this article,-           (a) the  expression ’estate’  shall,  in      relation to  any local  area, have  the  same      meaning  as  that  expression  or  its  local      equivalent has  in the  existing law relating      to land  tenures in  force in  that area, and      shall also  include any  Jagir, inam or muafi      or other  similar grant  and in  the Sates of      Madras and Kerala, any Janman right;           (b) the  expression ’rights’ in relation      to  an   estate,  shall  include  any  rights      vesting  in   a  proprietor,  sub-proprietor,      under-proprietor,   tenure-holder,    raiyat,

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    under-raiyat or  other intermediary  and  any      rights  or  privileges  in  respect  of  land      revenue." It is not open to dispute that if the words of the statute are  clear their  import or content cannot be modified  or varied  either by way of extension or of 822 diminution by  reference to the presumed intention gatherable  from  the  statement  of  objects  and reasons to  which I  shall refer presently, for it is the enacted words that constitute the record of the intention of the legislature and where this is clear any  extrinsic aid  is forbidden. Now let us look at  the definition  of an  "estate"  in  sub- cl.(a) where  in express terms the lands held by a Jenmi are  deemed to  be a  part of an estate. The words that  precede  the  newly  introduced  words still retain  their original form, with the result that they  continue to  connot the  same idea  and their content  remains unaltered.  The  result  of this would  be that  to the  class of the lands of proprietors who  were intermediaries and of others holding on favourable tenures which was designated as an  "estate"  under  the  First  Constitutional Amendment, Jenmi  lands were  by specific  ad  hoc addition included.  If therefore  the holding of a ryotwari proprietor  was not  comprehended  within the definition  of an  estate, the  same cannot be included by  reason of  Jenmi lands  being brought in. The  argument that  a raiyatwari  holding  has merely by  the inclusion  of the  Jenmi become  an "estate" would  require the  entire clause  to  be rewritten so  as to  make it read as embracing all lands which are subject to payment of land revenue to  government.  I  consider  this  contention  so unreasonable and unrelated to the language used in the   clause    as   not    to   deserve   serious consideration.      Proceeding next  to sub-cl. (b), I must point out that it was on the introduction into it of the words ’raiyat  and under-raiyat’  that almost  the entire argument  on behalf  of the  respondent was rested. It  is therefore  necessary to  scrutinize carefully the  effect of  these words. There is no doubt that  if the words ’raiyat and under-raiyat’ had  been   introduced   in   sub-cl.(b)   as   an independent category  of persons  whose  interests were intended  to be  covered by  the  definition, just as the lands held by Jenmis were brought into sub-cl. (a) then the words 823 of the  definition would  have to  be  given  full effect  and  the  expression  ’raiyat  and  under- raiyat’ receive  the construction  urged before us by the  respondent. But  they  are,  however,  not introduced as  an independent category as has been done in  the case  of the  Jenmam right,  but  are wedged in  the midst  of the  enumeration  of  the several types  of tenures in estates such as those of proprietor, sub-proprietor under-proprietor and tenure-holder-persons deriving  their title to the interest held  by them  either under  grants by  a sovereign or  under a  title derived from grantees from government, the clause continuing to be wound

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up by  a reference  to "other  intermediaries". As regards this a few observations may pertinently be made. The  first is  that even  after  the  Fourth Amendment, "the  rights vesting  in a  proprietor" etc. still  continue to be a definition of "rights in relation to an estate" and if the word ’estate’ in cl.  (b) has  to be  read in  the light  of the definition of  that word  in  cl.(a)  no  interest other than one in the estate of an intermediary or of a grantee on a favourable tenure and other than one in  the estate  of a Jenmi would be covered by sub-cl.(b). (2)  I have  already had  occasion  to point out that raiyats in proprietary estates like those of  zamindars etc.  did not  claim title  to hold their lands from the proprietor but according to law,  as understood  their rights even preceded that of the proprietor, i.e., the rights vested in them even before their proprietor. The interest of such  raiyats  cannot  therefore  be  comprehended within the  expression ’rights  in relation  to an estate’ which  as ordinarily understood would mean ’rights created  in an  estate or  held under  the proprietor’. Undoubtedly,  the words  ’raiyat  and under-raiyat’ introduced  by the  Fourth Amendment would comprehend  this class  of  raiyats  because they were  raiyats in an estate as defined in sub- cl.(a). I  am pointing this out for the purpose of showing that it is not as if the words ’raiyat and under-raiyat’ would be without any 824 meaning if  they were  not taken  to extend to the interest of  every raiyatwari  proprietor  having, direct  relationship   with  the  State.  In  this connection the decision in this Court in The State of Bihar  v. Rameshwar  Pratap Narain Singh (1) is very relevant. The point in controversy before the Court was  this. Under  the Bihar Land Reforms Act (1 of  1950), the ex-intermediaries were conferred a  ryoti   interest  in   certain  types  of  land previously held  by them as proprietors. As owners of these lands they had been holding melas in some places  on   these   lands   and   were   deriving considerable income  therefrom. By  the Bihar Land Reforms Amendment Act of 1959, their right to hold melas was  taken away  and it  was the validity of this enactment that was challenged in the case. It was urged  on their  behalf that  when  the  land- holders were  converted into  raiyats,  they  were entitled to  hold melas  as an  incident of  their rights as  raiyats and  that  this  could  not  be adversely affected  by State  legislation  without the same standing the test of scrutiny under Arts. 19, 31  etc. of  the Constitution.  The  State  of Bihar  which   was  the  respondent  in  the  Writ Petition sought  the protection of Art. 31A of the Constitution as  amended by  the Fourth Amendment. Dealing with  the meaning of the words the ’raiyat and under-raiyat’  in Art.  31A(2)(b)  this  Court said:           "It is reasonable to think that the word      ’raiyat’  was  used  in  its  ordinary  well-      accepted sense,  of the  person who holds the      land under  the proprietor or a tenure-holder      for the  purpose of cultivation, and the word      ’under-raiyat’  used  in  the  equally  well-

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    accepted and  oridinary sense of a person who      holds land  under a raiyat for the purpose of      cultivation". and  speaking   of  the   purpose  of  the  Fourth Amendment it was observed: 825           "At that  time  laws  had  already  been      passed  in   most  of   the  States  for  the      acquisition of  the rights  of intermediaries      in the  estates; rights  of raiyats  or under      raiyats  who  might  answer  the  description      ’intermediary’   were    also   within    the      definition because of the use of the word ’or      other  intermediary’.  The  only  reason  for      specifically   including    the   rights   of      ’raiyats’   and    ’under-raiyats’   in   the      definition could  therefore be  to extend the      protection of  Art. 31A to laws providing for      acquisition  by   the  State  Governments  of      rights of these ’raiyats’ or ’under-raiyats’.      In the  circumstances and  in the  particular      setting in which the words ’raiyat’ or ’under      raiyat’ were  introduced into the definition,      in must  be held  that the  words  ’or  other      intermediary’occurring at  the  end,  do  not      qualify or  colour the meaning to be attached      to the tenures newly added". In other  words, the  decision was that the object achieved  by   the   Fourth   Amendment   by   the introduction of these two words in sub-cl. (b) was to rope  in the  interests of ’raiyats’ and ’under raiyats’ in  ’estates’, notwithstanding  that  the ryot might not derive his interest, in his holding from the  proprietor. The lands held by a ryotwari proprietor other  than those in ’estates’would not be an ’estate’ within sub-cl. (a) nor the interest of such  ryot in  his holding  an ’interest  in an estate’ within  sub-cl. (b)  having regard  to the collocation of the words which I have attempted to explain earlier.      In  support  of  the  construction  that  the holdings of  ryots were  comprehended  within  the definition  of   ’estates’  in   Art.  31A(2),  to submissions were  made. The first was based on the object  sought   to  be  achieved  by  the  Fourth Constitutional Amendment  Act as  set out  in  the statement of  objects and reasons of the Bill. The passage relied on reads: 826           "While the  abolition of  zamindaris and      the numerous intermediaries between the State      and the  tiller of the soil has been achieved      for the most part our next objectives in land      reform are the fixing of limits to the extent      of agricultural  lands that  could be held or      kept by  any person, the disposal of any land      held in  excess of the prescribed maximum and      the further  modification of  the  rights  of      landowners’    tenants    and    agricultural      holders". I am  unable to  accept  the  argument  that  this passage  can   be  of   any  assistance   in   the construction of cl. (a) or (b) of Art. 31A (2). As already  pointed   out,  any   extrinsic  aid   to construction can sought only when the words of the

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statute reasonably and properly interpreted are of ambiguous import,  and  the  construction  of  the clauses  now   under  consideration  leads  to  no ambiguity. In  the circumstances,  to  accept  the construction contended  for by respondent would be not to  interpret the enacted words but to rewrite the clauses  altogether. Besides,  Art. 31A  makes provision for  special cases  where on  account of overwhelming social needs, the protection normally afforded  to  the  citizen  by  the  guarantee  of fundamental  rights  is  withdrawn.  It  would,  I consider, be  a proper  rule  of  construction  to interpret the  terms  of  such  a  provision  with strictness which  would serve to preserve the area of  the   guaranteed  freedoms  from  encroachment except as  specially provided.  In other words, if the construction  of Art.  31A were ambiguous, the ambiguity should  be resolved  in  favour  of  the citizen, so as to preserve to him the guarantee of the fundamental  rights guaranteed by Arts. 14, 19 and 31  except where  the same  has been denied to him by the clear words of the Constitution.      Secondly reliance was placed on three 827 decisions of  this Court:  Shri  Ram  Ram  Narayan Medhi v.  The State of Bombay (1), Atma Ram v. The State of  Punjab (2)  and  Yavtamal  v.  State  of Bombay (3).  In the  two  reported  decisions,  no doubt this  Court held  that interests  of persons similar to  those of  raiyatwari proprietors  were comprehended within  the definition of an ’estate’ within sub-cl.  (a) but  the reasoning  upon which this  was   rested  in   wholly  inapplicable  for resolving the  controversy now  before us.  In the first case  Sri Ram  Narain Medhi  v. The State of Bombay (1),-the  Bombay  Land  Revenue  Code  1879 contained  a   definition  of  an  ’estate’  which included not  merely the estates of intermediaries such as zamindars, taluqdars and other proprietors but also  an occupant,  i.e., a  person  who  held directly under  the government  and whose property was assessed to land revenue in full. The question however was whether the provision in Art. 31 A (2) (a) that  the expression ’estates’ "shall have the same  meaning   as  that  expression  has  in  the existing law  relating to  land tenures enforce in the  area"   could  be   read  as  permitting  the exclusion from  the definition  of interests which were defined  in such  a law  as ’estates’  on the ground that  such interests  were not  those of an intermediary. This Court held that full effect had to be given to these words and that the definition of an  ’estate’ in a pre-Constitution law relating to land-tenures must determine the content of that expression. It would be seen that the result would have been  the same  whether the case arose before or after  the Fourth  Amendment. The  decision  in Atma Ram v. The State of Punjab (2) proceeds on an identical basis and turned on the definition of an ’estate’ in  the Punjab Revenue Act 17 of 1887. In this, as  in the  earlier case  in relation to the Bombay  Land  Revenue  Code,  there  could  be  no dispute that  the enactment  was a law in relation to land-tenure. The only question therefore was 828

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whether full  effect could or ought to be given to the words of the definition, and this was answered in the  affirmative. In  my opinion,  the  learned Attorney-General cannot derive any assistance from either  of  these  decisions.  In  the  unreported decision in  Yavatmal v.  The State  of Bombay (1) the challenge  was to  the validity  of  a  Bombay enactment  of   1958  which  extended  the  Bombay Tenancy &  Agricultural  Lands  Act  1956  to  the Vidarbha region, an enactment whose constitutional validity had  been upheld by this Court in Medhi’s case. The  argument before  the Court was that the lands of  the petitioners were not an ’estate’ and this,  for   the  most  part,  was  sought  to  be supported by  the absence of any definition of the word ’estate’  in the  Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code of  1954 which  was taken to be "the existing law  relating  to  landtenures"  in  the  Vidarbha region. This  Court  accepted  the  submission  of Counsel for  the respondent  that Art. 31A applied to and  saved the  legislation from being impugned under Arts.  14, 19 and 31 for the reason that the interest of the petitioners in that case (who were bhoomiswamis)  was  the  local  equivalent  of  an ’estate’. The decision, therefore, is no authority for the  point now  under consideration  as to the proper meaning to be attached to the word ’raiyat’ and ’under-raiyat’  in sub-cl.  (2)(b) of Art. 31A or as  regards the  effect of the Fourth Amendment to the  Constitution in  regard to  the point  now under controversy.      From the  foregoing it would be seen that the interests of  the petitioner  in the lands held by him on Puravaka tenure are within Art. 31A because they are lands belonging to a Jenmi and so covered by the  definition of  an ’estate’  as amended  by virtue   of    the   Fourth   Amendment   to   the Constitution.  With   regard,  however,   to   the Pandaravaka Verumpattom  lands I am clearly of the opinion that they are not an ’estate’ and that the interests of the 829 petitioner in  them do  not amount to "an interest in an estate" within sub-cl. (b) of Art. 31A(2).      It would  follow that  the  validity  of  the impugned Act  in  relation  to  Pandaravaka  lands would have  to be  considered  with  reference  to Arts. 14, 19 and 31. For the reasons stated in the judgment of  this Court  in Writ Petitions 114 and 115 which  need not  be repeated,  I hold that the impugned Act  is  constitutionally  in  valid  and cannot be  applied to  the Pandaravaka Verumpattom lands of  the petitioner  but that  the petitioner would not be entitled to any relief as regards his other properties.      BY COURT:  In accordance  with the opinion of the majority,  the petition  is  dismissed.  There will be no order as to costs.                                Petition dismissed.