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PETITIONER: PUNJAB WATER SUPPLY & SEWAGE BOARD

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M/S. UDAIPUR CEMENT WORKS AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT13/11/1995

BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) BENCH: KULDIP SINGH (J) AHMAD SAGHIR S. (J)

CITATION:  1996 AIR  537            1995 SCC  Supl.  (4) 117  1995 SCALE  (6)327

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                          O R D E R      Punjab Water  Supply and  Sewage Board, Chandigarh (the Board)  filed  a  complaint  before  the  Consumer  Disputes Redressal Commission,  U.T. Chandigarh  (Commission) against M/s. Udaipur  Cement Works,  Udaipur, Rajasthan  (the cement works), alleging,  inter alia,  deficiency in service in the supply of  cement for  which confirmed orders were placed by the Board.  The Commission allowed the complaint and awarded 12% interest  to the  Board for  the period during which the amount of  deposit  remained  with  the  cement  works.  The National  Consumer   Disputes  Redressal   Commission   (the National Commission)  by the  order dated September 27, 1994 reversed the  order of  the  Commission  and  dismissed  the complaint of  the Board. This appeal by way of special leave is against the order of the National Commission.      The  Commission   noticed  the  admitted  facts,  which emerged from  the pleadings of the parties, in the following words:      "Certain undisputed facts emerge in this      case. The salient ones are that the      complainant placed an order for the      supply of cement with the respondent      firm and  for this purpose, an amount of      Rs.23,62,900/- was remitted to the      respondent firm and by means of three o      Bank Drafts. According to the order as      confirmed, 2500 M.T. Cement had to be      supplied on or before 7.3.1988. There is      also no  controversy about the fact that      the goods  in question were delivered to      the complainant in November, 1990 and      that too at the higher rate and not at      the original rate as agreed to at the      time of   placing the order. In the wake      of these undisputed facts, the points

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    raised in defence on behalf of the      respondent firm may be considered."      The National  Commission  allowed  the  appeal  of  the cement works  and set aside the order of the Commission by a short order which is reproduced hereunder:      "In our opinion the counsel appearing      for the Appellant is well founded in his      submission that  there was no arrangment      of hiring  of service at all between the      parties in this case since the      transaction is  one of sale and purchase      simplicitor namely the sale and purchase      of a  specified quantity of cement which      was to be supplied by the Appellant      herein to the Respondent. In these      cumstances no  question of deficiency in      ervice can arise so as to entitle the      complainant to invoke the jurisdiction      of the  Consumer Forum when there was no      case at all of any defect in the goods      supplied. Unfortunately,  this important      aspect of  the case was lost sight of by      the State Commission and it proceeded to      grant relief to the Complainant on the      ground that delay in the supply of      cement constituted deficiency in      service. We  hold that the said Order of      the State  Commission is clearly illegal      and without jurisdiction and is hereby      set aside. The Complainant will be at      liberty to pursue whatever other      remedies are open to him in law."      We do  not appreciate  the blanket  observation of  the National Commission to the effect that where the transaction is one  of sale  and purchase  simplicitor "no  question  of deficiency in  service  can  arise  so  as  to  entitle  the complainant to invoke the jurisdiction of the Consumer Forum when there  was no  case at  all of  any defect in the goods supplied". The  impugned order of the National Commission is rather mechanical.  Learned counsel  for  the  parties  have invited our  attention to  Section 2 (c), (d), (f), (g), (o) and various other provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (the Act). The National Commission, in our view, should have appreciated  the pleadings  of the parties in the light of various provisions of the Act.      We allow  the appeal,  set aside  the impugned order of the National  Commission and remand the case to the National Commission to  hear the  appeal against  the  order  of  the Commission  afresh   after  affording   opportunity  to  the parties. It  will be  open to  the parties to raise relevant questions of law and fact before the National Commission. No costs.