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PETITIONER: PUNE CANTONMENT BOARD & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: M.P.J. BUILDERS & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT:       09/08/1996

BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) BENCH: VERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J) VENKATASWAMI K. (J)

CITATION:  JT 1996 (7)   123        1996 SCALE  (5)713

ACT:

HEADNOTE:

JUDGMENT:                       J U D G M E N T      J.S. VERMA, J.      The dispute  relates to  the building sanction of House No.2, Sholapur Bazar Road, Pune, which falls within the area of Pune  Cantonment governed  by the  Cantonments Act,  1924 (hereinafter referred to as ’the act)      The respondent  no.1 was  granted a  building  sanction under Section  181 of  the Act  on 2.7.1981  effective  from 6.7.1981.  The   building  was   intended  to  be  used  for commercial residential  purposes, it was to be an RCC framed structure and  to consist  of ground  and five upper stories (i.e. Stilt  + six  upper stories);  the nature  of soil was ’hard rock’;  the construction  work  was  to  be  commenced within one  year of  the sanction  i.e. before 6.7.1982; and was to  be completed  within 12  months  from  the  date  of commencement of  the work. The building bye-laws existing at the time  of the  sanction did  not contain any restrictions with regard  to the  Floor Area  Ratio (FAR)  or  number  of floors  or  height  of  the  building.  By  a  letter  dated 3.7.1982, barely three days before expiry of the permissible period for  commencement of  the work,  a letter was sent by the  respondent  No.  1  stating  that  the  work  had  been commenced on  that day.  For the  purposes of this case, the appellants did  not dispute  this claim  of  the  respondent no.1. According  to the  conditions of the building sanction imposed  under   the  relevant   statutory  provisions,  the construction of  the building  had to be completed within 12 calendar months  from the  date of  commencement of the work i.e. upto  3.7.1983. Admittedly,  the  construction  of  the building was  neither completed  nor was  extension of  time sought within  that period.  The respondent  No. 1 claims to have made  an application  for extension of time to complete the construction  on 24.9.1983,  after expiry  of  the  time allowed. For the purposes of this case the appellants do not dispute even  this claim.  The contents  of that application alleged to  have been  made by  the respondent  no.1, are as

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under :      "MRJ: 9/86/736           24.9.1983      The Executive Officers,      Cantonment Board,      Pune      Sub: Extension of time.      Ref:  Your   sanction  No.  2/SH/B3      dated 6.7.81,  for our  project  at      No. 2, Sholapur Bazar road.      Sir,      We have  commenced the  above  work      with effect  from 3.7.82  and  your      office  was  intimated  accordingly      vide our  letter  No.  MPJ:MK/7/82,      dated 3.7.1982.      It was not possible to complete the      works within a span of one year due      to the various following reasons:      1.Hard  rock   is  met   with   for      basement foundation  which requires      chiselling.      2.Non-availability   of    building      materials.      3.Due to  change in  the strata now      met  with,   structural   detailing      requires some changes.      4.Due     to      various     other      difficulties.      We,  therefore,   request  you   to      kindly grant  us  an  extension  of      time for  a further  period  of  24      months and oblige.      Yours faithfully,      for MPJ Builders.      Sd/-      (Ramesh Kumar More)      Partner."      On 24.5.1984,  an  engineer  of  the  Cantonment  Board inspected the  site and  submitted a report that no erection work of the building had been commenced till then; the owner had not  made any  application for extension of time and the sanction  had   lapsed.  The   making  of   this  report  is undisputed. Thereafter, on 9.9.1985, an application, said to be the  second application for extension of time was made by the respondent no.1. That application is as under :            "BY REGISTERED A.D      HPJ\RRH\9\85\106     Sept. 9th 1985      Executive Officer,      Pune Cantonment Boards      PUNE 411 OO1      Ref. : (a) Your sanction No.2/SH/B-      3 of  6/7/1981 for  our project  at      No.2 Sholapur Bazar road.      (b)Our letter  No . HPJ/MK/7/82/343      of 3.7.1982 regarding intimation of      commencement.      (c)Our letter No.MPJ/9/83/736 of      Sir,      Due to  various unforeseen  reasons      and  difficulties,  we  could  make      substantial progress  with the work      at our  site at  2  Sholapur  Bazar      Road.      We request  you to grant us further      extension of 18 months and oblige.

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    We assure  you that we will try our      best  to   complete  the   building      within this extended period.      Thanking you,      For MPJ Builders,      (Ramesh Kumar More)      Partner."      On that  application,  a  report  dated  3.10.1985  was submitted by  an Officer  of the  Cantonment Board. Relevant part of that report is as under :      "The  party  has  not  started  the      construction  from   the  date   of      sanction   and    not   taken   any      extension   of   time   limit   for      completion  of   work   from   this      office.      On site  inspection,  it  is  found      that the owner of this property had      started excavation work. Which work      is in progress.      Submitted to your order’s pl.                     Sd/-                     3.10.85"      The Cantonment  Executive Officer, exercising the power of the  Board, granted extension of time for a period of one year from the date of that order dated 2.5.1986 as under:               "02 May 1986      From      The Cantonment  Executive  Officer,      Poona Cantonment Boards Poona.      To      Shri Ramesh  Kumar  More,  Partner,      C/o MPJ  Builders,  Poona  Bottling      Co.Ltd., 4101/1, Bombay Poona Road,      Dapodi, PUNE 411 012.      -----------------------------------      Subject :  Grant  of  Extension  of      time   for   completion   of   work      H.No.2, sholapur Bazar, Pune Cantt.      Reference   :    Your   application      dt.09.9.1985      Dear Sir,      Extension of time for completion of      work for  a period  of one  year is      hereby granted.      Yours faithfully,      Sd/-      CANTT. EXECUTIVE OFFICER."      Prior  to  the  grant  of  extension  of  time  by  the Cantonment  Executive   Officer  on  2.5.1986  or  even  the 8application for  extension of  time dated 9.9.1985, certain changes had  been made  in the  building  bye-laws  imposing additional restrictions.  All subsequent  building sanctions had to  be granted  thereafter subject  to these  additional restrictions  also.  The  first  set  of  restrictions  were imposed on  24.12.1982 under  which the  maximum  number  of stories which  could be  constructed  were  reduced  to  the ground floor  + two  upper stories i.e. in all three stories including the  ground floor.  The  maximum  permissible  FAR commonly known  as FAR  was two  and the maximum permissible built up  area became 1/3rd. These restrictions were imposed under Section  181(2) of  the Act which later became Section 181-A, in  the public  interest  to  regulate  the  building activities in  the cantonment  area. More  restrictions were imposed on  26.3.1984 under  which the  permissible FAR  was

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reduced from  two to  one. It  is to  be remembered that the report dated  24.5.1984 of  the Cantonment  Engineer clearly mentioned the  admitted fact  that no erection work had been commenced by  the respondents  till then.  The  question  of extension of  time to make the construction according to the initially  sanctioned   plan  had  to  be  decided  in  this background taking  into account the fact that no erection of the  building  had  commenced  till  both  sets  of  further restrictions  had   been  imposed;   and  according  to  the additional restrictions,  the kind  of building construction sanctioned on  2.7.1981  could  not  be  permitted,  if  the question of sanction was to be considered afresh.      The  GOC-in-Chief  in  exercise  of  his  powers  under Section 52(1)(b)  of the Act suspended the CEO’s order dated 2.5.1986 by  an order dated 2.1.1987 and issued a show cause notice to  the Cantonment  Board as  well as  the respondent no.1 to  show cause  why the  suspension order  be not  made absolute. After  hearing the  parties, the  GOC-in-Chief, by order  dated  14.2.1987  under  Section  52(2)(c)  made  the suspension order  absolute. It appears that a portion of the building had  been constructed  by then  and  therefore,  on 14.3.1987 the  GOC-in-Chief made the consequential order for its demolition.      A writ  petition was  then filed  on 27.3.1987  in  the Bombay High  Court by the respondents which has been allowed and the  orders made by the GOC-in-Chief dated 14.2.1987 and 14.3.1987 have  been set  aside. The High Court granted some further  time  to  complete  construction  of  the  building according to the initially sanctioned plan. Aggrieved by the High Court’s  order, the  Pune Cantonment Board and the GOC- in-Chief have preferred this appeal by special leave.      It was  common ground  before  us  that  the  stage  of construction till  now is : the basement, a ground floor and the first  floor have  been constructed; the ground floor is of an  extra height so as to accommodate  mezzanine although the mezzanine  floor has  not yet  been cast;  the mezzanine floor sanctioned  does not extend to the entire ground floor area but only to a small portion thereof and the rest of the ground floor  has been  left  with  the  extra  height.  The construction made  so  far  is  already  in  excess  of  the permitted FAR  of one, being approximately 1.59. The learned Solicitor  General,   appearing  for   the  appellants,   on instructions, stated  that the  appellants are  prepared  to permit the  respondent no 1 to retain the existing structure and complete  the finishing  of the  existing structure with the mezzanine  according to  the initially  sanctioned  Plan subject to  the condition  that no  additional slab would be laid anywhere  else.  This  offer  made  on  behalf  of  the appellants at  the hearing  before us  is mentioned since to this extent the appellants consent to grant of relief to the respondents even if the appeal is allowed.      Mention may  also be made of another relevant fact. The High Court  in the impugned judgment invoked the doctrine of estoppel on  the ground that the builders had acted upon the order of  extension and  had  completed  a  portion  of  the building. Shri  F.S.Nariman, learned  senior counsel for the respondents, frankly  conceded that he could not support the High Court’s  order on  that ground. We need not, therefore, consider the applicability of the doctrine of estoppel which is a clearly untenable plea in the present case.      At this  stages before we proceed to consider the rival contentions,  we   may   notice   the   relevant   statutory provisions:      "THE CANTONMENTS ACT, 1924      52 Power  of Officer Commanding-in-

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    Chief, the  Command,  on  reference      under Sec 51 or otherwise - (1) The      Officer  Commanding-in-chief,   the      Command, may at any time-      (a)  xxx       xxx       xxx      (b)direct the  suspension, for such      period as  may  be  stated  in  the      order of  action on any decision of      a  Board,  other  than  a  decision      which  has  been  referred  to  him      under sub-section  (1) of  Sec. 51,      and    thereafter     cancel    the      suspension  or   after  giving  the      Board a  reasonable opportunity  of      showing cause  why  such  direction      should not be made, direct that the      decision shall  not be carried into      effect, or that it shall be carried      into effect with such modifications      as he may specify.      xxx       xxx        xxx      180-A.  Powers   of   Board   under      certain  sections   exercisable  by      Executive  Officer.-   The  powers,      duties and  functions of  the Board      under Sec.  181, sub-section (1) of      Sec. 182,  Sec. 183Sec.  183-A  and      Sec. 185  (excluding the proviso to      sub-section (1)  and the proviso to      sub-section (2) of the saidSec. 185      shall be exercised or discharged in      a  civil   area  by  the  Executive      Officer)      181. Power  refuse -  (1) The Board      may either  refuse to  sanction the      erection  or  re-erection,  as  the      case may  be, of  the building,  or      may sanction  it either  absolutely      or subject to such directions as it      thinks fit  to make  in writing  in      respect  of   all  or  any  of  the      following matters, namely :       xxx        xxx           xxx      and  the  person  erecting  or  re-      erecting the  building  shall  obey      all  such   written  directions  in      every particular.      (2)  The   Board  may   refuse   to      sanction  the   erection   or   re-      erection of  any  building  on  any      grounds sufficient  in the  opinion      of   the    Board   affecting   the      particular building      Provided  that   the  Board   shall      refuse  to   accord  sanction   the      erection  or   re-erection  of  any      building if  such erection  or  re-      erection is  not in conformity with      any general scheme sanctioned under      Sec.181-A.       xxx          xxx         xxx      (5) If the Board decides to refuse-      to sanction  the  erection  or  re-      erection of  the building, it shall      communicate in  writing the reasons

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    for such  refusal to  the person by      whom notice was given.       xxx        xxx               xxx      181-4. Power  to  sanction  general      scheme  for   prevention  of  over-      crowding,  etc.   -   The   Officer      Commanding-in-Chief the Command may      sanction  a   general  scheme   for      erection    or    re-erection    of      buildings within such limits as may      be specified  in the  sanction  for      the prevention  of over crowding or      for purpose  of sanitation,  or  in      the interest  of  persons  residing      within  those  limits  or  for  any      other   purpose,    and   may,   in      pursuance of  such  scheme,  impose      restrictions on the erection or re-      erection of  buildings within those      limits :      Provided that  no such scheme shall      be  sanctioned   by   the   officer      commanding-in-chief,  the  command,      unless  an   opportunity  has  been      given by  a  public  notice  to  be      published locally  by the Executive      Officer requiring  persons affected      or likely  to be  affected  by  the      proposed  scheme,   to  file  their      objections or  suggestions  in  the      manner  specified  in  the  notice,      within a  period of fifteen days of      the publication of such notice, and      after considering  such  objections      and suggestions,  if any,  received      by the Executive Officer within the      said period.      xxx          xxx              xxx      183.  Lapse  of  sanction  -  Every      sanction for  the erection  or  re-      erection of  a  building  given  or      deemed to  have been  given by  the      Board  as   herein-before  provided      shall be  available  for  one  year      from the date on which it is given,      and, if  the building so sanctioned      is not  begun by the person who has      obtained the  sanction or  some one      lawfully claiming  under him within      that   period,    it   shall    not      thereafter  be   begun  unless  the      Board    on     application    made      therefore, has  allowedan extension      of that period.      183-A.  Period  for  completion  of      building -A  Board when sanctioning      the erection  or re-erection,  of a      building as  herein-before provided      shall specify  a reasonable  period      after the work has commenced within      which the  erection or  re-erection      is to  be completed,  and,  if  the      erection  or   re-erection  is  not      completed  within   the  period  so      fixed, it  shall not  be  continued

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    thereafter without  fresh  sanction      obtained  in   the  manner  herein-      before provided,  unless the  Board      on application  made  therefor  has      allowed an extension of that period      :      Provided that  not  more  than  two      such extensions shall be allowed by      the Board in any case."      The learned  Solicitor General  appearing on  behalf of the appellants advanced several arguments. He submitted that no reasons  were given  by the  Cantonment Executive Officer for extension  of time,  on these facts, to justify grant of the extension. The relevant facts for this purpose were that the sanction  had expired  on 3.7.1983  even  prior  to  the making of  the alleged  first application  for extension  of time dated  24.9.1983, assuming  that  the  application  was made, no  construction of  the building  had been  commenced within the  time ailowed  or even  till 3.10.1985 as evident from the  inspection note  of that date and much before that date additional  restrictions had been imposed on 26.12.1982 and 26.3.1984  by amendments  made in  the building bye-laws which did  not Permit  such a construction. It was contended that these  changed circumstances were of great significance but they  were not  considered by  the CEO and no reason was given for  the extension  of time  granted  by  the  CEO  on 2.5.1986. The  learned Solicitor General also submitted that the only  ground mentioned in the application dated 9.9.1985 made by  the  respondent  no.1  did  not  justify  grant  of extension of  time to make any construction in breach of the restrictions imposed  meanwhile in  1982 and  1984  when  no construction of  the building  had been  commenced even till 3.10.1985 and  the sanction  had already lapsed on 3.7.1983. It was  urged that the exercise of power by the GOC-in-Chief under Section  52 to set aside the order made by the CEO was valid  for  the  reasons  given  by  him.  We  have  already mentioned the offer made by the appellants to permit retention of the existing structure even if the appeal succeeds.      In reply,  Shri F.S.Nariman, learned senior counsel for the respondents,  submitted that  the reasons  given in  the order of the GOC-in-Chief setting aside the order of the CEO are  in   applicable   because   the   additional   building restrictions imposed  in 1982  and 1984  did not  apply to a building sanction  granted prior  to the imposition of those additional restrictions.  Shri Nariman  heavily relied  on a foot-note dated 4.4.1984 clarifying this position at the end of the  relevant public  notice quoted  in the  decision  in Usman Gani J.Khatri &. Ors. etc. vs. Cantonment Board & Ors. , 1992 (3) SCC 455 at 464 as under :      "Note  -   It  is   clarified   for      information of  the general  public      that  the   above  orders  will  be      effective from the date the GOC-in-      Chief, HQSC,  has signed  the above      order  i.e.March  26,  1984.  These      restrictions will apply only to the      buildings  whose   plans  will   be      considered/  passed   on  or  after      March  26,   1984.  Building  plans      passed prior  to March 26,1984 will      be governed  by  the  FSI  existing      during that period.      Dated April 4, 1984.      Sd/-  S.P. Nijhawan

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    Cantonment Executive Officer, Pune"      It is  not necsssary  to quote  in extenso  the  public notices imposing  the additional  restrictions on 24.12.1982 and 26.3.1984,  which have  been summarised  earlier and are not disputed.  The other submission of Shri Nariman was that even  though   the  delay  in  making  the  application  for extension of time after expiry of the period of sanction and imposition   of   additional   restrictions   are   relevant circumstances to  be considered  for granting  extension  of time yet  its non-  consideration is  not  a  jurisdictional defect to  denude the CEO of the power to grant extension of time, Shri  Nariman submitted  that  the  initial-  building sanction granted  to the  respondent no.1 being prior to the imposition  of   the  additional   restrictions  which  were prospective in  operation the  further extension  of time to complete the  earlier sanctioned  building would be governed only by  the building bye-laws existing at the time of grant of the initial sanction. Shri Nariman, therefore, argued for dismissal of the appeal for these reasons.      Section  180-A   empowers  the   Executive  Officer  to exercise certain  powers, duties  and functions of the Board which include  the Board’s power to sanction or to refuse to sanction the  erection or  re-erection of the building under Section 181,  and to  allow the  extension of the period for completion of the building. Extension of time granted by the CEO in  the present  case was in exercise of this power. The only question  in the  present case pertains to the validity of the  extension of  the period by the order dated 2.6.1985 made by the CEO in exercise of the power under section 183-A      Section 183  prescribes the period of one year from the date on  which a  building sanction  has been given to begin the building  so  sanctioned,  failing  which  the  sanction lapses unless the Board, on an application made therefor has allowed an  extension of  that period.  In the present case, the compliance  of this  provision is not disputed since the claim of  respondent no. 1 by a letter dated 3.7.1982 is not contested. the significant provision is Section 183-A.      Section 183-A requires the period for completion of the building to be specified when the sanction is granted. It is to be  a resonable  period after  the work has commenced. In the present  case the  period so specified was one year. The fixation of  the period of one year as the reasonable period for completion  of the  building after  commencement of  the work was  not challenged. Thus, the work having commenced on 3.7.1982 as  claimed by  the respondent no.1, the period for its  completion  according  to  Section  183-A,  expired  on 3.7.1983.  Section   183-A  further  provides  that  if  the erection of  the building is not completed within the period so fixed, it shall not be continued thereafter without fresh sanction obtained  in the manner herein-before provided i.e. Section  181,  unless  the  Board  on  an  application  made therefor has  allowed  an  extension  of  that  period.  The proviso then limits the power of the Board to allow not more than two such extensions.      In short,  Section 183-A provides for the specification of the  period for  completion  of  the  building  when  the sanction  is   granted  and   on  expiry   of  that   period construction of  the building  cannot be continued without a fresh sanction,  unless an extension of that period has been allowed on  an application  made  therefor.  It  means  that unless the  Board has  allowed an  extension of  the  period specified for  complotion of  the building on an application made therefor,  the sanction  lapses and the construction of the building  shall not  be continued  thereafter without  a fresh sanction.  Section 183-A speaks of a fresh sanction on

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expiry of the period fixed for completion of the building as well as  extension of  that period  on an  application  made therefor. Meaning  must, therefore,  be given  to  both  the provisions, namely,  fresh sanction  and extension  of  that period; and the two powers must be construed to be available in two  different situations.  This is  necessary to exclude any conflict  and arbitrariness  in exercise  of the  choice between the two powers in similar cases. It appears that the two powers  are meant  to  be  exercised  in  two  different situations and the provision does not leave it to the option of the  authority to deside which of the two powers is to be exercised in  the case.  This  means  that  unless  time  is extended on  an application  made  before  its  expiry,  the sanction lapses  and the  erection of the building cannot be continued thereafter without a fresh sanction.      Effect of  the proviso  in Section  183-A must  also be kept in  mind. Extension  of  time  allowed  has  to  be  in continuity and  it cannot  exceed the period fixed initially for  completion  of  the  building.  The  limit  is  of  two extensions. In  the present  case, the  period fixed was one year and,  therefore, the  permissible two  extensions could not exceed two years because of the proviso. Thus, the total extension of time could not be beyond two year from 3.7.1983 (upto which  date time was allowed for completion). In other words, time extended under Sec.183-A because of the proviso, in the  present case  could not be beyond 3.7.1983 since the extension had  to be  in continuity. In the pesent case that application made  much later  on 9.9.1985 had to be rejected by the  CEO  for  this  reason  alone  and  the  only  power available on  that  date  was  of  a  fresh  sanction.  This obviously could  not be  granted in  view of  the additional restrictions imposed  meanwhile. Thus,  extension of time by the order  dated 2.5.1986  was clearly  without jurisdiction for this reason alone.      Even assuming  the power to allow extension of time was available, the  facts indicate that it could not be granted. As earlier  stated, the  period fixed  for completion of the building under  Section 183-A  was one year which expired on 3.7.1983. Admittedly,  no application  for extension of time was made  by the  respondent no.1  before the expiry of that period and  such an application is alleged to have been made only  on   24.9.1983.  No  extension  was  granted  on  that application since  the Board  does not  admit receiving  the same.  There   was  total  silence  till  almost  two  years thereafter  and   then  on   9.9.1985  the  application  for extension of  time was  made by respondent no. 1. The period fixed for  completion of  the building when the sanction was granted had  expired more than two years earlier. The report of the  officer of  the  Cantonment  Board  dated  3.10.1985 clearly showed that the construction of the building had not commenced till  then  and  the  only  thing  done  was  some excavation work.  In spite  of this  report, the CEO granted extension of  time for  completion of  work  for  a  further period of  one year  without assigning  any reason  a in his order  dated  2.5.1986  made  with  reference  only  to  the application dated 9.9.1985.      It is  obvious that the exercise of the statutory power of grant  of extension  of time  under Section  183-A is not mechanical or automatic and required a decision for be taken on application  of mind with reference to the relevant facts and  circumstances   of  the   case.  The  CEO  should  have considered all  the relevant  facts and circumstances of the present  case.  The  CEO  should  have  considered  all  the relevant facts  and circumstances of the present case before he came  to the conclusion that extension of that period was

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called  for   particularly,  when  no  construction  of  the building  had   been  commenced  till  then  and  additional restrictions had  been imposed  meanwhile according to which such a  building sanction could not be granted if the matter were  to  be  considered  for  grant  of  a  fresh  sanction contemplated under  Section 183-A. Shri Nariman rightly does not dispute that even if the additional restrictions were to apply  prospectively  to  the  grant  of  a  fresh  sanction thereafter,  this   was  a   relevant  circumstance   to  be considered while  deciding to grant extension of that period even in  this  case.  The  total  non-consideration  of  any relevant fact by the CEO while granting extension of time by order dated 2.5.1986 and the absence of any reason for grant of the  sanction is  alone sufficient  to vitiate  the CEO’s order dated  2.5.1986. This conclusion is reached even if it is assumed  that extension  of time  could be  granted on an application made  after expiry  of the  period  allowed  for completion of  the  construction  and  the  embargo  in  the proviso is overlooked.      The validity  of the GOC-in-Chief’s order setting aside the order  of the  CEO granting  extension of time has to be decided on  the above  conclusion reached by us. The GOC-in- Chief’s  order   refers,  inter   alia,  to  the  additional restrictions imposed in the meantime as relevant factors for consideration. It  is rightly  not disputed  that this was a relevant, factor  to consider while deciding the question of extending the  period. In  substance. the  GOC-in-Chief took the view that permitting the construction of such a building which had  not till  then begun would flagrantly violate the building restrictions  which had  come into  force by  then. This reason  cannot be said to be arbitrary since it relates to a  relevant fact  for the  grant of  extension of time. A perusal  of   the  application   dated  9.9.1985   made  the respondent no.1  indicates that  no  fact  had  been  stated therein to  make out  any ground for grant extension of time and to  explain the  inability to  even commence erection of the building  within the  time allowed.  Even a reference to the earlier  application dated  24.9.1983, assuming  it  was filed, shows  that nothing significant was mentioned therein except  some   vague,  general  difficulties  of  which  the respondent no.1  must have been aware even while seeking the initial sanction.  Thus neither  any facts or cogent grounds for extension  of time were mentioned in the application for extension of  time nor was any reason given by the CEO while granting extension  of time by order dated 2.5.1986. This is sufficient to  indicate that  the grant of extension of time by the  CEO was an arbitrary exercise of tower under Section 183-A, even  if the  power was  available. The  GOC-in-Chief was,  therefore,  right  in  setting  aside  that  order  in exercise of his power under Section 52 of the Act.      In the  above view, the High Court was not justified in interfering with  the orders  made by  the  GOC-in-Chief  in exercise of  his power under Section 52 of the Act. Exercise of the  power under  Article 226  of the Constitution by the High Court  in favour of the respondents in such a case was, therefore, clearly  unwarranted. The High Court’s order has, therefore, to be set aside.      Consequently,  the  appeal  is  allowed;  the  impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside. However, in view of the offer  made  on  behalf  of  the  appellants  to  permit retention of  the existing structure in the manner indicated above and  to permit  finishing of the existing structure in the manner  stated, we  permit retention  of the  same.  The orders of  the GOC-in-Chief  would therefore, stand modified to this  extent only.  The respondents  to pay Rs.5,000/- as

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costs to the appellants.