http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.)  945 of 2004

PETITIONER: Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy

RESPONDENT: State of A.P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/08/2006

BENCH: G. P. Mathur & R. V. Raveendran

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T

RAVEENDRAN, J.

       This appeal by special leave is against the judgment dated  28.8.2003 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal  No.1211 of 2001 reversing the judgment of acquittal dated 7.2.2000   passed by the First Addl. Sessions Judge, Chittoor in S.C. No.361 of  1999.  

2.      The prosecution case, in brief, is as under :  

2.1)    P. Narasimha Reddy (PW-2) and P. Govinda Reddy (Accused  No.1) are brothers. P. Dilli Babu Reddy (PW-1) and Purushotham  Reddy (deceased) are the sons of Narasimha Reddy. Ranamma  (Accused No.2) is the wife of Govinda Reddy. Nagaraja Reddy  (Accused No.3), Balakrishna Reddy @ ’Balu’ and Chandrababu Reddy  @ ’Babu’ are the sons of Govinda Reddy and Ranamma. (Balu and  Babu were juveniles at the relevant time). Both families were residents  of Bangareddipalli Diguva Indlu, a hamlet falling under the  Gangadhara Nellore Panchayat in Chittoor District. The house of  Narasimha Reddy and house of Govinda Reddy were separated by the  land of Chinnakka.

2.2)    Narasimha Reddy, after his marriage, having differences with his  parents had shifted to his father-in-law’s place and then to Madras.  Ultimately, he came back to his native village. In the meanwhile,  Govinda Reddy and two other brothers namely Krishna Reddy and  Venkateswarulu Reddy had continued to live with their father Bakki  Reddy. Bakki Reddy and Venkateswarulu Reddy had died and Krishna  Reddy was residing in a different town. Govinda Reddy was in  possession and enjoyment of the family properties. There were  disputes between the families of Narasimha Reddy and Govinda Reddy  in regard to property.   

2.3)    On 24.4.1999, Narasimha Reddy (PW-2) brought some plastic  pipes to his house in a hired tractor. Accused 1, 2 and 3 (Govinda  Reddy, his wife and son Nagaraja Reddy) came to the house of  Narasimha Reddy and raised a quarrel stating that the tractor  unauthorizedly passed through their land and threatened Narasimha  Reddy with dire consequences. This was the first incident.  

2.4)    On 25.4.1999 at about 6 p.m., Govinda Reddy with his wife (A2)  and sons (A3 and two juveniles) removed a part of the fence  surrounding Narasimha Reddy’s property. When Narasimha Reddy and  his son Dilli Babu Reddy rushed to the place and questioned why they   were removing the fence, Accused 1, 2 and 3 started abusing them.  Govinda Reddy (A1) exhorted his wife and sons to kill Narasimha  Reddy and Dilli Babu Reddy. Nagaraja Reddy (A-3) dealt a blow on the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

right side of Dilli Babu Reddy’s head with the upper side of a ’Barisa’ (a  long dagger with a long handle). Then, Govinda Reddy (A1) dealt a  blow on the right middle finger of Narasimha Reddy with a sickle. Both  Narasimha and Dilli Babu Reddy sustained bleeding injuries. The  neighbouring land owners and others working in the adjoining fields  rushed and separated the two groups.  This was the second incident.  

2.5)    Within about half an hour of the second incident, Purushotham  Reddy (first son of Narasimha Reddy) returned home. Narasimha  Reddy and Dilli Babu Reddy narrated to him what had happened.  Immediately, Purushotham Reddy, followed by his father (PW-2) and  brother (PW-1), went towards the house of Govinda Reddy to question  them about their high-handed acts. When Purushotham Reddy entered  the land Chinnaka which was situated between the lands (houses) of  the two brothers, accused 1, 2, & 3 (Govinda Reddy, Ranamma and  Nagaraja Reddy)  along with two juvenile sons of Accused No.1 (Balu  and Babu) came from their house. Govinda Reddy was armed with a  stick with nails, Ranamma was armed with stout stick, Nagaraja was  armed with a Barisa. Govinda Reddy exhorted his wife and sons to kill  Purushotham Reddy. Balu and Babu threw mud balls at Narasimha  Reddy and Dilli Babu Reddy, who were following Purushotham Reddy.  Govinda Reddy and Ranamma caught hold of Purushotham Reddy and  Nagaraja (A-3) stabbed Purushotham Reddy near his throat with the  Barisa. Purushotham Reddy collapsed. Govinda Reddy and his wife and  children ran away. This was the third incident. It occurred around 7.30  P.M. This incident was witnessed by Gurava Reddy (PW-3), Gungulu  Reddy (PW-4), Perumal’s son Dilli Babu (PW-5) and P. Ravi (PW-6)  and Sarojamma. But they did not interfere.  

2.6)    Thereafter, Dilli Babu Reddy (PW-1) got a complaint (Ex.P-1)  written and presented it at the Gangadhara Nellore Police Station  (which was at a distance of about 4 km. from the place of incident)  around 9.00 P.M. The police sent Narasimha Reddy and Dilli Babu  Reddy for treatment to Primary Health Centre for examination and  treatment.  

3.      T. Sundaramurthy, Sub-Inspector of Gangadhara Nellore Police  Station (PW-15), received the complaint and registered the case in  Crime No.35 of 1999 under section 147, 148, 307 and 302 read with  section 149 IPC, prepared the FIR and recorded the statements of PW- 1 and PW-2. He also seized the blood-stained clothes of PW-1 from  him under a Mahazarnama. The next day, K. Srinivasa Gopal,  Inspector of Police, Chittoor Rural Circle (PW-16), took up the  investigation and recorded the statements of some other witnesses.  On 26.4.1999, at about 9.00 A.M., inquest was conducted over the  dead-body and it was sent for autopsy. He arrested accused 1 & 2 as  also their juvenile sons \026 Balu and Babu on 28.4.1999 at about 3 p.m.  in the presence of PW-9 (Pancha) and recorded their  confession  statements and on the same day at 6.00 P.M. in pursuance of the  information, disclosed in the confession statement of Govinda Reddy,  recovered the Barisa (MO.1) from a sugarcane garden shown by  Govinda Reddy. PW-16 also arrested Nagaraja Reddy (A-3) on  1.5.1999 around 9 A.M. in the presence of Panchas (PW-10 and  another). Nagaraja Reddy made a confession statement (Ex. P-25) and  took them to the house of one Subha Reddy and produced a blood- stained shirt (MO-8).  

4.      The IV Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, took the case  on file and committed accused 1, 2, & 3 to the Court of Sessions,  Chittoor. Balu and Babu, the juvenile sons of accused No.1 were  subjected to a separate proceeding before the Juvenile Court. In the  Sessions trial, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses. Dilli Babu  Reddy and his father Narasimha Reddy (PW-1 & PW-2) were the  injured eye-witnesses. PW-3 to PW-6 who were examined as eye- witnesses turned hostile and stated that they did not know anything

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

about the incident. PW-11 (Dr. S.Narasimhulu) examined Dilli Babu  Reddy (PW-1) and Narasimha Reddy (PW-2) at the Primary Health  Centre and issued certificates in regard to their injuries as per Ex.P-13  and P-14. Dr. P.Venkataswamy (PW-12), Civil Assistant Surgeon,  Government Head-Quarters Hospital, Chittoor, conducted the post- mortem over the dead-body of Purushotham Reddy and issued a post- mortem certificate as per Ex.P-15. PW-15 and PW-16 were the Police  Officers. PW-7 to PW-10, PW-13 and PW-14 were the witnesses to the  inquest, and the Mahazars relating to arrest and seizure. PWs.7, 9, 13  and 14  turned hostile.

5.      On considering the evidence, the trial court by judgment dated  7.2.2000 acquitted all the accused by extending them the benefit of  doubt. It held that the evidence was not trustworthy for the following  reasons :  

a)      All the four independent eye-witnesses (PW-3, 4, 5 & 6)   turned hostile and denied knowledge of the incident.  b)      Four out of the six Mahazar  witnesses (PWs. 7, 9, 13, and  14) also turned hostile and did not support the case of the  prosecution.  c)      The evidence of the two eye-witnesses (PW-1 and PW-2)  could not be relied on as they were close relatives of the  deceased, having previous enmity and grudge against the  accused and who were interested in falsely implicating the  accused. Their evidence was also inconsistent with the  allegations in the complaint (Ex. P1) lodged by PW-1.      

6.      The said judgment was challenged by the State. The State’s  appeal was allowed by the High Court. It held that the rejection of the  evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 by the trial court was unjustified and  perverse, for the following reasons :  

a)      The evidence of PWs. 1 and 2, who were eye-witnesses,  could not be rejected merely on the ground that they were  interested or partisan, as their evidence was otherwise  found to be credible.      b)      The second incident which occurred at about 6.00 to 7.00  P.M. wherein PW-1 and PW-2 were attacked and injured  and the third incident within about half an hour thereof  when Purushotham Reddy was killed should be considered  as having occurred during the course of the same  transaction in the sense that the latter incident was a  continuation and consequence of the earlier incident.  Therefore, PW1 and PW2 were in the position of injured  eye-witnesses and not chance witnesses. Their presence at  the time and place of the incident was natural and properly  explained.  c)      Nothing was elicited in the cross-examination of PW-1 and  PW-2 to disbelieve their evidence about the incidents, in  particular the manner in which they were attacked and  injured by accused 1 and 3 and the manner in which  Purushottam Reddy was killed by Nagaraja Reddy (A-3). d)      Though the incident took place at 7.30 P.M. and there  were no light, the evidence of PWs.1 and 2 that could see  the accused clearly in the moonlight ought to be accepted.  Being close relatives, they had no difficulty in identifying  the accused particularly as the accused had chased them  to some distance after killing the deceased.  e)      There was no inconsistency between the testimony of  PWs.1 and 2 and the allegations in the complaint. (Ex. P1). f)      The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 established that A-1 to A- 3 caught the deceased and A-3 stabbed him near the  throat with MO1 - Barisa (long dagger). The  medical  evidence corroborated that the injury was caused of a

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

weapon like MO1. The blood-stained shirt of A-3 (MO8)  was found and seized in pursuance of the confession  statement made by A-3 on his arrest before the  Investigating Officer  which was corroborated by the  evidence of PW-10.  

7.      The High Court held that the evidence of PW-2 showed that A-1  and A-2 were not armed with any weapons when the deceased was  attacked and that they (A-1 and A-2) did not cause or attempt to  cause any injury to the deceased. It concluded that the killing of  Purushotham Reddy was not on account of any pre-planned attack by  accused 1 to 3 and that it appeared that A-3 had attacked the  deceased thinking that the deceased was coming to attack him. The  High Court also observed  that if A-1 and A-2 had wanted to kill the  deceased, they would have also attacked the deceased, but they did  not do so, and that therefore, A-1 and A-2 did not share any common  intention with A-3. As a consequence, the High Court held that the  charge under section 302 was proved against A-3 and that the charge  under section 302 read with section 34 IPC was not proved against A1  and A2. The High Court also did not accept that A-1 and his family  members constituted an unlawful assembly and therefore, charge  under section 148 IPC was also not established. In regard to the  injuries caused to PW-1 and PW-2, the High Court held that the  prosecution had failed to prove the case against A-2 (Ranamma) but  had proved its case against A-1 and A-3 under section 324 IPC. Having  regard to the overall circumstances and the simple nature of injuries,  the High Court was of the view that the imposition of a fine in that  behalf would meet the ends of justice.

8.      Accordingly, the High Court convicted A-3 under section 302 IPC  and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and pay a fine of  Rs.1,000/-. It convicted A-1 and A-3 under section 324 IPC for causing  injuries to PW-1 and PW-2 and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of  Rs.5,000/- and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment of six  months.   

9.      The said judgment of the High Court reversing  the acquittal by  the trial court is challenged by A-3 in this appeal by special leave. The  learned counsel for the appellant urged  the following contentions  before us :  

(a)     The High Court should not have interfered with the  judgment of acquittal by the Sessions Court merely  because another view was possible on re-appreciation  of the evidence. High Court wrongly relied on the  evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 who were partisan  witnesses interested in falsely implicating the accused.   

(b)     The evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 were inconsistent with  the allegations in the FIR based on the complaint (Ex.  P1) given by PW-1 within one and half hours of the  incident. In Ex.P-1, it was stated that five members,  that is Govinda Reddy, Ranamma, Nagaraja Reddy,  Balu and Babu attacked Purushotham Reddy with  sticks, knives and daggers, and Nagaraja Reddy  murdered Purushotham Reddy by stabbing him with a  dagger on his throat. If the five of them had really  attacked Purushotham Reddy with sticks, knives and  daggers, there should be corresponding injuries on the  body of the deceased. But the post-mortem report and  the evidence of Dr. Venkataswamy (PW-12) show that  the deceased had sustained only one incised injury  over the right clavicle. The Doctor (PW-12) clearly  stated that except the said injury, he did not find any

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

injury on any other part of the body of the deceased.  When  there was only one injury which corresponded  to the dagger attack by Nagaraja Reddy, the allegation  in the complaint that Govinda Reddy, Ranamma,  Nagaraja Reddy, Balu and Babu together attacked the  deceased with sticks, knives and daggers is obviously  false. This demonstrated that PW-1 had tried to falsely  implicate the entire family of Govinda Reddy (five  members) on account of the previous enmity between  the two families. The case of the prosecution based on  the said complaint was therefore liable to be rejected.

(c)     At all events, as the High Court having recorded a  finding that "It is not a case of pre-planned attack by  the accused. It appears that the thinking that the  deceased was coming to attack in, A-3 attacked him",  ought to have held that the act was a culpable  homicide not amounting to murder punishable under  section 304 Part II IPC.   

Re : Contention (i) :

10.     It is now well settled that the power of the High Court in an  appeal from acquittal is no different from its power in an appeal from  conviction. It can review and consider the entire evidence and come to  its own conclusions by either accepting the evidence rejected by the  trial court or rejecting the evidence accepted by the trial court.  However, if the High Court decided to depart from the conclusions  reached by the trial court, it should pay due attention to the grounds  on which acquittal was based and state the reasons as to why it finds  the conclusions leading to the acquittal, unacceptable. It should also  bear in mind that (i) the presumption of innocence in favour of the  accused is fortified by the findings of the trial court; (ii) the accused is  entitled to benefit of any doubt; and (iii) the trial court had the  advantage of examining the demeanour of the witnesses. The crux of  the matter, however, is whether the High Court is able to give clear  reasons to dispel the doubt raised, and reject the reasons given by the  trial court [See : Sher Singh vs. State of U.P. \026 AIR 1967 SC 1412;  Dargahs vs. State of U.P. \026 AIR 1973 SC 2695; Ravinder Singh vs.  State of Haryana \026 AIR 1975 SC 856; and Labh Singh vs. State of  Punjab \026 AIR 1976 SC 83].  

11.     In this case, we find that the trial court had rejected the  evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 merely because they were interested  witnesses being the brother and father of the deceased. But it is well  settled that evidence of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the  ground that he is either partisan or interested or closely related to the  deceased, if it is otherwise found to be trustworthy and credible. It  only requires scrutiny with more care and caution, so that neither the  guilty escape nor the innocent wrongly convicted. If on such careful  scrutiny, the evidence is found to be reliable and probable, it can be  acted upon. If it is found to be improbable or suspicious, it ought to be  rejected. Where the witness has a motive to falsely implicate the  accused, his testimony should have corroboration in regard to material  particulars before it is accepted. [vide Hari Obula Reddi v. State of  Andhra Pradesh \026 1981 (3) SCC 675, Ashok Kumar Pandey vs. State of  Delhi \026 2002 (4) SCC 76 and Bijoy Singh vs. State of Bihar \026 2002 (9)  SCC 147]. Nothing had been elicited in the cross-examination of PW-1  and PW-2 to discredit their evidence. Their evidence finds  corroboration in Ex.P-1 and the evidence of the Doctors (PW-11 and  PW-12) and the MOs seized on the disclosures made by A-1 and A-3.  Therefore, the High Court rightly held that the evidence of PW-1 and 2  could not be rejected, even though they were closely related to the  deceased and inimically disposed towards the accused. There is no  infirmity in the decision of the High Court by re-appreciating the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

evidence and reaching independent conclusions.  

Re : Contention (ii) :  

12.     This contention is based on the assumption that in his complaint  (Ex.P-1), PW-1 had stated that accused No. 1 and his four family  members attacked the deceased with sticks, knives and daggers. The  learned counsel for the State submitted that the words ’attacked with  sticks, knives and daggers’ in the English translation of Ex.P1 is  incorrect and that the complaint (Ex.P1) in Telugu uses the word  ’dourjanyam’ which is wrongly translated as ’attacked’. The use of the  word ’dourjanyam’ in the complaint does not refer to physical assault  but action which is intended to intimidate, threaten and frighten  anyone. We are, therefore, satisfied that the complaint does not allege  that Govinda Reddy, his wife and three children physically assaulted  the deceased with sticks, knives and daggers, but only alleges that  accused and his family members approached the deceased   Purushotham Reddy with sticks, knives and daggers in an intimidating  and threatening manner. Therefore, the absence of any other injury  except the dagger injury caused by Nagaraja Reddy (A-3) is consistent  with allegations in  Ex. P-1.  

Re : Contention No.(iii)

13.     The third contention relates to the question whether the offence  is a murder punishable under Section 302, or culpable homicide not  amounting to murder, punishable under Section 304 Part II. The  evidence shows that there was a long standing enmity between the  families of the two brothers (A-1 and PW-2). There was a quarrel on  24.4.1999 in respect of PW-2 taking a tractor through the land of A-1.  There was another quarrel when A-1 allegedly removed the fence and  PW-1 and PW-1 questioned A-1 as to why he removed fencing, which  led to an altercation between A-1 and A-3 on the one hand and PW-1  and PW-2 on the other about half an hour before the stabbing of the  deceased, which resulted in injuries to PW-1 and PW-2.   After the second incident, Purushotham Reddy followed by PW-1 and  PW-2  was going towards A-1’s house to protest against A-1 and the  appellant causing injuries to PW-1 and PW-2. Neither Purushottam  Reddy nor PW-1 and PW-2 were armed with any weapon.  There was  no indication that they intended to cause any physical harm to the  accused, or that they intended to retaliate for the earlier incident. The  nature and size of the weapon used by the appellant (barisa, which is  a big size dagger), the force with which the weapon was used, the part  of the body where the injury was caused \026 just below the neck, a vital  part of the body, the nature of the injury \026 stab wound measuring 3  cm x 5 cm x 12 cm, resulting in instantaneous collapse leading to  death, leave no room to doubt that the intention of the appellant was  to cause the death or, at all events, cause bodily injury, which is  sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.  

14.         It is true that the High Court disbelieved the prosecution case  that A2 (mother of appellant) or the two juvenile brothers of the  appellant had participated in either of the incidents, though their  presence was not ruled out. But that will not assist the appellant to  contend that he was not guilty. Considerable reliance was placed by  the learned counsel for the appellant on the observation of the High  Court that the deceased was stabbed by the appellant, not in  pursuance of any pre-planned attack, but being under the impression  that the deceased was coming to attack him. But this observation was  made in the context of recording a finding that A-1 and A-2 did not  share any common intention with the appellant.  The said observation  cannot be read out of context to make out a case that the appellant  acted in self defence. Such a plea is neither put forth in the statement  under Section 313 nor  brought out in the cross examination of any of

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

the prosecution witnesses.  

15.     Learned counsel for the appellant referred to the circumstance  that there was only one stab injury on the deceased, to contend that  there was no pre-meditation and the attack was ’in a sudden fight in  the heat of passion’, and that the appellant had not acted in a cruel or  unusual manner or taken undue advantage of the situation. He   submitted that the High Court ought to have given benefit of Exception  4 to Section 300 to appellant and held him guilty under Section 304  Part II. He relied on the decisions of this Court in Laxman Kalu Nikalje  v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 1968 SC 1390), Randhir Singh v. State of  Punjab (AIR 1982 SC 55), Tholan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1984  SC 759), Bagdiram Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh [2004 (12) SCC 302]  in support of his contention.

16.     We cannot accept the contention  that whenever the death is on  account of a single blow, the offence is one under Section 304 and not  Section 302. We will briefly refer to the cases relied on by the  appellant.  

16.1)   In Laxman Kalu Nikalje (supra), the accused had gone to his  father-in-law’s house to take his wife back to his house. His father-in- law delayed the departure of his wife by a day. The delay upset the  accused and he was in a foul mood. When his brother-in-law made  some remark, he responded by whipping out his knife and giving a  blow on the chest of his brother-in-law. His brother-in-law died a few  hours later.  This Court held that the case fell under the second part of  Section 304 as the accused gave only one blow and it was not on a  vital part of the chest and but for the fact that injury caused severed  an artery, death would not have ensued.

16.2)   In Randhir Singh (supra), that there was an altercation between  the deceased and father of the accused. At that time, on the  exhortation of his father, the accused, a young college student, gave a  blow on the head of the deceased with a Kassi. The solitary injury  caused by the accused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature  to cause death and the deceased died after six days. Taking note of  the circumstances, that the accused was not carrying the weapon in  advance, there was no pre-meditation, that he was a young college  boy, that there was some altercation between father of the accused  and deceased, and that the death occurred after six days, the  conviction was altered from  Section 302 to 304 Part II.

16.3)    In Tholan (supra), the accused  stood in front of the house of  the deceased and used filthy language against some persons (who  were unconnected with the deceased).  The deceased came out of his  house and told the accused that he should not use vulgar and filthy  language in front of ladies and asked him to go away.  The accused  questioned the authority of the deceased to ask him to leave the  place. In the ensuing altercation, the accused gave one blow with a  knife which landed on the (right) chest of the deceased which proved  to be fatal. This Court came to the conclusion that the accused could  not be convicted under Section 302, but was guilty under Section 304  Part II. The circumstances which weighed with this Court were : (i)  there was no connection between the accused and the deceased and  the presence of the deceased at the time of the incident, was wholly  accidental; (ii) altercation with the deceased was on the spur of the  moment and the accused gave a single blow being enraged by the  deceased asking him to leave the place;(iii)  requisite intention could  not be attributed to the accused as there was nothing to show that the  accused intended the blow to land on the right side of the chest which  proved to be fatal.   

16.4)   In Bagdiram (supra), there was an altercation between two  groups and brick-batting from both sides. When tempers were running

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

high, in the heat of passion, upon sudden quarrel without any pre- meditation, the accused assaulted the unarmed deceased.  The  accused-appellant was not carrying any weapon, but he picked up a  pick axe lying at the place of  incident and he landed only one blow  and did not repeat the blow.  In these circumstances, it was held that  he did not intend to cause the death of the deceased and that the   appellant was guilty under Section 304 Part I IPC.   

17.     It would thus be seen that in all these cases, the accused   landing a single blow was only one of the several circumstances which  persuaded this Court to hold that the offence did not fall under Section  302 but fell under Section 304 Part I or Part II. The fact that the  accused gave only one blow, by itself, would not mitigate the offence  to one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. There are  several cases where single blow inflicted by the accused, resulting in  death have been found to be sufficient for conviction under Section  302. We may refer to a few of them, namely, Virsa Singh v. State of  Punjab (AIR 1958 SC 465), Gudar Dusadh v. State of Bihar (AIR 1972  SC 952), Vasanta v. State of Maharashtra (1984 Supp. SCC 648), Jai  Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration) [1991 (2) SCC 32] and State  of Karnataka v. Vedanayagam [1995 (1) SCC 326].   

17.1)   In Virsa Singh (supra), this Court held that a culpable homicide   is a murder under Section 300 clause Thirdly, if the prosecution should  establish four elements \026 (i) the presence of a bodily injury, (ii) nature  of such bodily injury, (iii) intention on the part of the accused to inflict  that particular bodily injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or  unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended; and (iv)  the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of  nature (this part of enquiry being purely objective and inferential,  nothing to do with the intention of the offender). Dealing with the  question, as to how intention is to be inferred, Vivian Bose, J.  succinctly stated :

"In considering whether the intention was to inflict  the injury found to have been inflicted, the enquiry  necessarily proceeds on broad lines as, for example,  whether there was an intention to strike at a vital or  a dangerous spot, and whether with sufficient force  to cause the kind of injury found to have been  inflicted x x x x  The question is not whether the  prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial  one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that  is proved to be present. If he can show that he did  not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify  such an inference, then, of course, the intent that  the section requires is not proved. But if there is  nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the  appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is  that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its  seriousness, or intended some consequences, is  neither here nor there. The question, so far as the  intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to  kill, or to inflict an injury of a particular degree of  seriousness, but whether he intended to inflict the  injury in question; and once the existence of the  injury is proved the intention to cause it will be  presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances  warrant an opposite conclusion. But whether the  intention is there or not is one of fact and not one of  law. Whether the wound is serious or otherwise, and  if serious, how serious, is a totally separate and  distinct question and has nothing to do with the  question whether the prisoner intended to inflict the  injury in question\005."

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

17.2)   The following legal position regarding single blow injury, was  summed up in Jagrup Singh v. The State of Haryana (AIR 1981 SC  1552) thus :

"There is no justification for the assertion that the  giving of a solitary blow on a vital part of the body  resulting the death must always necessarily reduce  the offence to culpable homicide not amounting to  murder punishable under section 304, Part II of the  Code. If a man deliberately strikes another on the  head with a heavy log of wood or an iron rod or even  a lathi so as to cause a fracture of the skull, he  must, in the absence of any circumstances  negativing the presumption, be deemed to have  intended to cause the death of the victim or such  bodily injury as is sufficient to cause death. The  whole thing depends upon the intention to cause  death, and the case may be covered by either clause  Firstly or clause Thirdly. The nature of intention must  be gathered from the kind of weapon used, the part  of the body hit, the amount of force employed and  the circumstances attendant upon the death."             

18.     Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal  question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide  whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II.  Many petty or insignificant matters \026 plucking of a fruit, straying of a  cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of  a rude word or even an  objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group clashes  culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or  suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no  intention. There may be no pre-meditation. In fact, there may not  even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be  cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for  murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention  to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder  punishable under section 302, are not converted into offences  punishable under section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide  not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under  section 302. The intention to cause death can be gathered generally  from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other,  circumstances : (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the  weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot;  (iii) whether  the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body; (iv) the  amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was  in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi)  whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any pre- meditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the  deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and  sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix)  whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting  the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and  unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or  several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not  exhaustive and there may be several other special circumstances with  reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of  intention. Be that as it may.          19.     In this case, as noticed above, the  appellant was carrying a  Barisa, a dangerous weapon.  There was previous enmity. There was  an earlier incident, about half an hour earlier when the father and  brother of the deceased had been attacked by the appellant and his  father. The deceased was unarmed. There was no provocation, sudden

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

quarrel or fight. There was no indication of any cause for an  apprehension on the part of the appellant that the deceased may  attack him. The stabbing was with great force, causing an injury on a  vital part of body, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause  death. The description of the injury and cause for death given  by    PW-11, who conducted the post mortem is telling :

"An incised injury 5 cm x 3 cm x 12 cm deep over  right supra clavicular fossa above the medial end of  right clavicle.. sub-clavian artery is severed\005 An  incised injury 4cm x 1cm x 2cm deep over the apex  of right lung \005 deceased would appear to have died  due to haemorrhage and shock due to injuries to  right sub-clavian artery and upper lobe of right  lung."           The intention to cause death or at all events intention of causing bodily  injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause  death was made out. The circumstances to bring the case under  Exception (4) to Section 300 do not exist.

20.     We accordingly find no reason to interfere with the decision of  the High Court convicting the appellant.  The appeal is dismissed.