http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 10  

PETITIONER: PRINCIPAL, PATNA COLLEGE, PATNA, AND OTHERS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: KALYAN SRINIVAS RAMAN

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/09/1965

BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. (CJ) WANCHOO, K.N. HIDAYATULLAH, M. SHAH, J.C. SIKRI, S.M.

CITATION:  1966 AIR  707            1966 SCR  (1) 974  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1968 SC 453  (8)

ACT:     Patna   University  Act,   1951   (2,5  of  1951),    s. 34(b)--Regulations framed under--Regulation 4 requiring  75% attendance in lectures, tutorials and/or practicals in  each subject-Percentage whether to be taken together in all these or separately.     Certiorari--High   Court  when  should  interfere   with decision taken by educational authorities.

HEADNOTE: The respondent who was d student in the college of which the appellant  was the Principal, was declared  non-eligible  to appear  at  the  B.A.  Part  I  examination  of  the   Patna University  because his attendance an  Geography  practicals was   only  24%  whereas  the  percentage   required   under Regulation   4  framed  by  the  Academic  Council  of   the University was 75%.  He filed a writ petition under Art. 226 and  obtained from the High Court interim  orders  directing the  authorities to allow him to appear at the  examination. On  the merits the High Court held that under  Regulation  4 the  percentage of attendance in lectures  tutorials  and/or practicals in a particular subject had to be taken  together and not separately and so taken the respondent’s  percentage in  the  subject  of  Geography as a  whole  was  66%.   The shortage  being  less than 15%  it was  open  to  the  Vice- Chancellor under Regulation 5 to condone it . The High Court therefore by a writ  of certiorari quashed the order of  the first  appellant declaring the respondent  non-eligible  for appearing  at the examination. and directed the  authorities to  refer  the  question  of  condonation  of  shortage   in attendance to the Vice-Chancellor and if it was condoned  to declare  respondent’s result.  The appellants came  to  thin Court against this order by special leave. HELD:  (i)  The requirement of 75%  attendance  in  lectures tutorials  and practicals has to be read  disjunctively  and not  by  taking  them all together.  Otherwise  it  will  be possible  for a student in certain subjects to complete  the

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 10  

percentage  required  by attending all the lectures  and  no tutorials  at.  all.   This could not be  the  intention  in framing the Regulation and would not be in keeping with  the methodology  of modern education which lays great stress  on tutorial and practical work. [980 G; 981F] (ii)  It  is  true that the second clause  of  Regulation  4 requires   that    the  percentage  in  question  shall   be calculated  on the total number of lectures,  tutorials  and practicals  delivered and provided during the  session;  but the  provision is in the nature of a mere corollary  to  the main  provision  prescribed  by Regulation  4,  and  if  the requirement  as  to  75%  attendance  has  been   prescribed separately  in  relation  to  lectures.   tutorials   and/or practicals the second clause must be read accordingly.  Thus read  it only means that when the percentage  is  determined with  reference to lectures, tutorials and  practicals  what has to be taken into account is the total number of lectures delivered,  or  tutorials  or  practicals  held  during  the session. [981 G, H] 975 (iii) the petitioner filed his petition under Art. 226  only on the evening beforethe   examination  had   to   begin although   he   could  have  filed  it   earlier.   In   the circumstances  it would have been better if the  High  Court hadnot  passed interim orders.  Even on the merits,  where the  question is One of interpreting a regulation framed  by the  Academic council of a University the High Court  should ordinarily be reluctant to issue a writ of certiorari  where it   is   plain  that  a  regulation  is  capable   of   two constructions  and  it would generally not be  expedient  to reverse  a  decision of the educational authorities  on  the ground that the construction placed by the said  authorities on  the relevant regulations appears to the High Court  less reasonable  than  the alternative construction which  it  is pleased to accept. [985 B-F]

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 743 of 1965. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated may  14,  1965  of  the  Patna  High  Court  in  Civil  Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 345 of 1965. C.K.  Daphtary,  Attorney-General,  R. N. Sinha  and  S.  P. Varma, for the appellants. Basudev  Prasad, K. Rajendra Chaudhri, and K. R.  Chaudhuri, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Gajendragadkar,  C.J.  This appeal raises a  short  question about  the construction of Regulation 4 of  the  Regulations framed by the Academic Council of appellant No. 3, the Patna University, under S. 34(b) of the Patna University Act, 1951 (Bihar  Act  XXV of 1951).  The respondent  Kalyan  Srinivas Raman  was  a student who appeared at and  passed  the  test examination  held  by  the  Patna  College  for  sending  up students  for  the University examination B.A. Part  1.  His name  was shown in the list of candidates who were  eligible to appear for the said University Examination and this  list was published on March 26, 1965 by the college  authorities. On  March  29,  1965, however, a notice was put  up  on  the notice-board by appellant No. 1, the Principal of the  Patna College, indicating that the respondent was not eligible  to be  sent  up for the said University Examination,  1965  and that his roll number had been included in the list published

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 10  

earlier  due  to a clerical mistake.   The  respondent  felt aggrieved  by this notice and filed a writ petition  in  the Patna  High  Court  on  Sunday, the  18th  April,  1965  and presented it to the learned Chief Justice of the High  Court at  his  residence.  By this writ petition,  the  respondent prayed for a writ of mandamus, or for any appropriate  order or direction for quashing and canceling the notice issued by appellant No. 1 on the 29th March, 1965; 976 he  further prayed for an appropriate order or direction  to appellant   No.   1;  the  Vice-Chancellor  of   the   Patna University,  appellant No. 2; and appellant No. 3 to  permit him to appear at the said University Examination. The  learned  Chief Justice received the writ  petition  and directed  that  the same should be heard by a Bench  of  two Hon’ble   Judges   of  the  said  High   Court   at   night. Accordingly, the Division Bench heard the said writ petition at the residence of one of the two learned Judges and passed an interim order admitting the writ petition and  directing. that pending its hearing, the respondent should be permitted to  appear  at  the said Examination, but  that  his  result should  not be published until disposal of his  application. It appears that the writ petition itself had not been  sworn to andno   vakalatnama  had  been  filed  when  it   was presented to thelearned    Chief   Justice    and    was subsequently admitted by the Division Bench.  After  passing the  interim  order, the Division Bench  directed  that  the respondent  could  get the affidavit sworn  and  vakalatnama filed the next day. In  obedience  to the said interim order,  appellant  No.  1 forwarded  the respondent’s application to appellant No.  3, though he made it clear that the respondent had not attended adequate  number  of  practical classes and  his  record  of practical work was not satisfactory and as such, be did  not fulfill the requirements of the relevant Regulations.  As  a consequence,  the  respondent was allowed to appear  at  the said Examination. The  appellants  then  appeared before the  High  Court  and resisted  the  respondent’s  claim.   They  urged  that  the relevant  Regulations  did  not  justify  the   respondent’s contention  that  he  was eligible to  appear  at  the  said Examination  and  they contended that  the  impugned  notice issued by appellant No. 1 was fully justified. The  learned Judges who heard the writ petition  have,  how- ever,  rejected the contentions raised by the appellants  in regard  to the construction of the relevant regulations  and have held that under the said regulations, it was obligatory on  appellant No. 2 to have considered the question  whether the  deficiency  in  the  respondent’s  attendance  in   the practicals of Geography should be condoned or not.  That  is why the High Court has directed that a writ in the nature of certiorari  should be issued to quash the  impugned  notice, and  that a writ in the nature of mandamus should be  issued to  the appellants directing them to act in accordance  with regulation 5 in the light of the construction placed 977 by  the High Court on the said regulation.  The  High  Court has  also ordered that if the shortage in  the  respondent’s attendance was condoned by appellant No. 2, the respondent’s result  in  the  examination which he had  taken  under  the interim order of the Court will be published; otherwise  his appearance at the said examination will have to be  ignored. It  is against this order that the appellants have  come  to this  Court  by special leave; and so, the  principal  point which  arises  for  our decision in the  present  appeal  is

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 10  

whether the High Court his properly construed Regulation 4. The  relevant facts are not in dispute.  In  Geography,  the respondent  attended  73 out of 93 lectures, 15  out  of  20 tutorials,  and 6 out of 25 practicals.  His  percentage  of attendance  taken separately was 75, 75, and 24; but if  the said  percentage  was taken together, it would come  to  66. The respondent’s case was that under Reg. 4, he is  required to  keep  at  least  75 per  cent  attendance  at  lectures, tutorials  and practicals all taken together, and  that  the requirement  of  75  per  cent  attendance  has  not  to  be satisfied disjunctively by reference to lectures,  tutorials and  practicals. -On the other hand, the  appellants  argued that  the  requirement  of about 75% attendance  has  to  be satisfied by a candidate in reference to lectures, tutorials and  practicals taken separately, and not collectively;  and unless  that requirement is satisfied, the student does  not become  eligible to appear for the examination,  subject  to this  that  the shortage in attendance may  be  condoned  as provided  by the relevant regulations and in that case,  the student  may be permitted to appear at the examination.   It is  common ground that if the interpretation for  which  the appellants  contend  is  accepted,  the  notice  issued   by appellant  No. 1 would be valid; on the other hand,  if  the interpretation for which the respondent contends is  upheld, the  order passed by the High Court could not  seriously  be challenged,  because  on the construction suggested  by  the respondent  and accepted by the High Court, the shortage  in attendance, which is proved, could have been condoned by the Vice-Chancellor  if he thought it fair and reasonable to  do so’; and it is not disputed that the matter about  condoning the  shortage  in  attendance  of  the  respondent  was  not referred  to the Vice-Chancellor and he has not decided  the question as to whether the said shortage should be condoned. Let  us,  therefore, proceed to construe Regulation  4.  The Academic  Council of appellant No. 3 is an  authority  whose powers  and duties have been defined by s. 22 of  the  Patna University  Act; these include the power of  superintendence and control over Sip.  C. T./65-19 978 maintenance of standards of instruction and education.   The said  Council  is authorised by S. 34  to  make  regulations about the conditions under which a student shall be admitted to  the Decree or Diploma Course and to the examinations  of the  University  and  shall  be  eligible  for  Degrees  and Diplomas.   It is in pursuance of the powers thus  conferred on  the Academic Council that the relevant Regulations  have been  framed.  These Regulations were brought into force  on the 23rd January, 1961. Regulation  1 deals with lectures, tutorial instruction  and practical work.  It provides that a college or a  University Department or an Institute shall provide for the delivery of at  least so many lectures and so many periods  of  tutorial instruction  and  practical  work as may  be  fixed  by  the Academic  Council  from time to time for  students  who  are admitted in that College or the University Department or the Institute.   Proviso (1)((1) to the said Regulation,lo  lays down that in the Faculties of Arts, Science an(,’  Commerce, in  any  subject in which practical examination  ha,,,  been prescribed,  there shall be at least one practical class  of two periods’ duration in the Pre-University class.  For  the B.A.  and B.Sc. examinations in which practical  examination is  Described,  there shall be in each  year  two  practical classes per week each of two periods’ duration.  Proviso (40 to Reg.  I requires that except as provided in (1)(a) &  (d) of  this Regulation, in all Faculties in subjects  in  which

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 10  

practical  work  is  prescribed,  every  student  shall   be required  to do practical work- prescribed by  the  Academic Council,  regularly  and under proper  supervision  and  the number  of  lectures and hours of practical, work  for  each subject  shall  be  fixed  by  the  Academic  Council  after considering  the recommendations of the  Faculty  concerned. This  Regulation  clearly  brings  out  the  fact  that  the Academic  Council  attaches Considerable importance  to  the practical work- and the tutorial,; along with the  lectures, and  provides  that the student has to attend not  only  the lectures delivered, but has to do the practical work and  to attend tutorials. Regulation No. 4 which falls to be construed in the  present appeal reads thus :-               "Every candidate, presented by a College or  a               University   Department  at   any   University               examination shall be required to complete  the               regular  course of study, prescribed by  these               regulations,  in each subject which he  offers               for  the  examination.  No  student  shall  be               considered  to  have  completed  the   regular               course  of study in any subject unless he  has               attended at least                                    979                seventy-five   per  cent  of  the   lectures,               tutorials  and/or practicals, as the case  may               be, delivered or provided in that subject,  in               one or more colleges or University Departments               admitted in that subject, and has devoted  due               attention  to  that part of the  course  which               consists of tutorial instruction or  practical               work.                The  percentage,  specified above,  shall  be               calculated  on the total number  of  lectures,               tutorials and practicals delivered or provided               during the session". Regulation  No.  5  deals with  the  question  of  condoning shortage in attendance; it reads thus :-                "In   case  of  serious  illness   or   other               unavoidable   circumstances,  a  shortage   of               attendance   at   lectures,   tutorials    and               practicals  to the extent of fifteen per  cent               may be condoned.                Shortages  up  to  five  per  cent  shall  be               considered and may, in suitable circumstances,               be  condoned by the Principal of a College  or               the  Head  of a University Department  or  the               Director  of the Institute or the Head of  the               Institution concerned.                Shortages  exceeding  five per cent  but  not               exceeding fifteen per cent shall be considered               and   may,  in  suitable   circumstances,   be               condoned by the Vice Chancellor". The  last  regulation  to which reference must  be  made  is regulation No. 7; it reads thus                Every    candidate   for   each    University               Examination  shall produce a certificate  from               the Principal of the College, the head of  the               University   Department   or   the   Institute               concerned of (a) good conduct, (b)  completion               of  the  regular course of study,  (e)  having               fulfilled    the    prescribed    requirements               regarding  attendance at  lectures,  tutorials               and practicals, and (d) satisfactory record of               tutorial and/or practical work".

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 10  

In dealing with Reg. 4, it is necessary to bear in mind  two broad  considerations.  The first consideration is that  the modern  methodology of education in all civilised  countries attache,,; considerable importance to the tutorials and  the practical work done by the student in addition to  attending lectures.   The  tendency in modern times is  to  bring  the students into direct per- 980 sonal contact with the tutors so as to enable the tutors  to guide  and coach the students individually as far as may  be possible.   For that purpose, small groups of  students  are formed  who are placed under different tutors for  different subjects.  The importance of practicals has also been  well- recognised  and education does no longer depend merely  upon lectures  as it used to do at one time in our country.   The second  consideration  which may not be Irrelevant  is  that ever  since the present regulations were brought into  force in   1961,   appellant  No.  3  and  colleges   within   its jurisdiction appear to have consistently interpreted Re-.  4 in the manner suggested by appellant No. 3. It is of  course true  that  the  two considerations to which  we  have  just referred  cannot materially govern the construction  of  the regulation; that must inevitably depend upon the words  used by  the  regulation itself; but in interpreting  the  words, these two considerations may not be treated as irrelevant. The  appellants contend that the High Court was in error  in holding that the requirement of about 75% attendance had  to be   considered  collectively  by  taking,   the   lectures, tutorials  and/or practicals together.  Their case  is  that the  said requirement applies to lectures, tutorials  and/or practicals separately.  It is plain that the words  "and/or" have  been used in the regulation, because in some  subjects both  tutorials  and practicals are prescribed,  whereas  in some  others either tutorials or practicals are  prescribed; and  so,  the  effect of the words "and/or"  is  that  where tutorials   and   practicals  are   both   prescribed,   the requirement  of  75%  attendance  has  to  be  satisfied  in reference  to  each  one of  them;  where,  however,  either tutorials or practicals are prescribed, the said requirement has to be satisfied by reference to either ,lie tutorials or the practicals whichever may have been prescribed in a given subject.   The  High Court has, no doubt, made  in  emphatic finding  that  the relevant words used  in  this  regulation admit  of  only  one  construction, and  that  is  that  the requirement of 75% attendance has to be judged by  reference to lectures, tutorials and/or practicals all taken together. We are unable to agree.  It seems to us that in the context, it is more reasonable to hold that the said requirement must be  read disjunctively; and so, it must be satisfied by  the student by reference to lectures, tutorials and/or practices as the case may be. In  construing Reg. 4, we must have regard to the fact  that the  last part of the Regulation requires that  the  student must  have devoted due attention to that part of the  course which  consists of tutorial instruction or  practical  work; and this requirement neces 981 sarily postulates that the student has to do some  practical work and has to receive tutorial instruction. The  requirement  of Reg,. 7 also emphasises the  fact  that every student who can be said to have completed the  regular course  of study as prescribed by Reg. 4, must  satisfy  the requirement  as  to attendance at  lectures,  tutorials  and practicals  and must claim satisfactory record  of  tutorial and/or  practical  work.  Reg. 7(d) which  we  have  already

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 7 of 10  

cited, emphasizes, as does the last portion of Reg. 4,  that every student has to do tutorials and/or practical work,  as the  case  may  be.  In other  words,  where  tutorials  and practicals are both prescribed, the student must not only do tutorials and practicals, but must have satisfactory  record in   that  behalf.   Where  tutorials  or   practicals   are prescribed, a similar test has to be satisfied. In  view  of this position, it seems somewhat  difficult  to accept the correctness of the conclusion reached by the High Court that the requirement of about 750% attendance must  be taken collectively. It is clear that if the said requirement is read collectively, a student may be entitled to claim  to have completed the regular course of study without attending any single practical or tutorial, as the case may be, if  he has attended all the lectures in a given subject.  Take, for instance, the case of English, History, or Political Science in  the group for which the respondent was studying.  It  is not  disputed by Mr. Basudev Prasad that in  these  subjects theoretically, it would be open to the student to attend the maximum  number  of lectures and not to do any  tutorial  at all.   In other words, the construction placed by  the  High Court  upon  Reg. 4 leads to this  unreasonable  consequence that attendance at the lectures alone may, in a given  case, entitle  a student to appear for the examination, though  he may  have  done no tutorial at all.  In  our  opinion,  this could not have been the intention of the regulation.  It  is true  that  the  second clause of Reg 4  requires  that  the percentage  in  question shall be calculated  on  the  total number  of lectures, tutorials and practicals  delivered  or provided  during the session; but this provision is  in  the nature of a mere corollary to the main provision  prescribed by regulation 4, and if the requirement as to 75% attendance has  been  prescribed separately in  relation  to  lectures, tutorials  and/or practicals, the second clause in  question must  be  read accordingly.  Thus read, it only  means  that when the percentage is determined in reference to  lectures, tutorials and practicals, what has to be taken into  account is the total number of lectures delivered, or tutorials  and practicals  held  during the session in question.   We  have carefully 982 considered the reasons given by the High Court in support of its conclusion, but we are not satisfied that those  reasons justify the construction which the High Court has placed  on the material words used in Reg. 4. The High Court appears to have taken the view that its  con- clusion  about the effect of Reg. 4 is supported by the  old regulation which was superseded in 1961.  The old regulation was 1(7); it read thus                "1.  A  College or  a  University  Department               admitted  in any University examination  shall               provide  for the delivery of at least so  many               lectures  and for at least so many periods  of               tutorial instruction and practical work as may               be fixed by the Academic Council from time  to               time  for students who take Lip that  subject,               provided that-                (7)in order to qualify to appear at any  of               the  University examinations in any Faculty  a               candidate shall be required-                (i)  to  attend at least 75 per cent  of  the               lectures delivered in each subject offered  by               him for such University examination,                (ii)to  attend in each subject at  least  75               per cent of the tutorials classes, of the Moot

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 8 of 10  

             Courts  and of the practical classes,  as  the               case may be;                (iii)in the case of I.A., I.Sc., I.Com.,               B.A.,  B.Sc.,  and  B.Com.  examinations,   to               secure marks not less than 25 per cent out  of               the  total marks of 3 periodical  examinations               in  each subject within two years, subject  to               the  condition that a candidate should  secure               20  per  cent of the marks  allotted  for  the               practical examination.                Regulation  5  of the  said  old  Regulations               reads thus                "(1)  No student shall be considered to  have               completed  the regular course of study in  any               subject  for  the I.A., I.Sc.,  I.Com.,  B.A.,               B.Sc., and B.Com. exa-                983                minations   unless  he  has   satisfied   the               conditions laid down in clause 7 of regulation               1  of this Chapter and ,or examinations  other               than these, unless he has attended at least 75               per  cent  of  the  lectures,  tutorials   and               practicals,  as the case may be, delivered  in               that  subject,  in  one or  more  Colleges  or               University   Departments  admitted   in   that               subject, and has devoted due attention to that               part of the course which consists of  tutorial               instruction or practical work;                (2)The percentage, specified in clause (1),               shall  be  calculated on the total  number  of               lectures   delivered  during  the   prescribed               session". It would be noticed that under Reg. 1(7) read with Reg. 5 of the  old Regulations, the position was that with  regard  to the examinations specified in the first part of Reg. 5  (1), the requirement as to 75% attendance was expressly specified separately  in reference to the lectures, tutorial  classes, Moot Courts, and the practical classes, as the case may  be. Sub-clauses (i) & (ii) of cl. (7) of Reg.  1 are quite clear and  unambiguous  in that behalf. with regard to  the  other examinations  falling  under the latter part of  Re-.  5(1), however,  the  position  was that Reg.  1(7)  was  not  made applicable  to  them just as it was made applicable  to  the examinations mentioned in the first part; and so, Reg.  5(1) compendiously  prescribes  the  requirement  as  to  75%  by putting the lectures, tutorials and practicals all together. The context shows that the requirement as to 75%  attendance by reference to the lectures, tutorials and practicals which is prescribed for this latter category of examinations,  was not of a different character at all.  Thisrequirement bad to be satisfied by reference to each one of them, viz.,  the lectures,  tutorials  and  practicals as the  case  may  be. Instead  of repeating sub-clauses (i) & (ii) of  Reg.  1(7), Reg. 5(1) merely for the sake of convenience, has compressed the  said two clauses into one clause; and so, we think  the High Court was in error in assuming that under the old regu- lations  with regard to this latter class  of  examinations, the  requirement  as  to  75%  attendance  was  in  any  way different  from  the  same  requirement  in  regard  to  the examinations  mention-Id  in  the first  part  of  the  said regulation. But assuming for the sake of argument that the said require- ment  was  different  in regard to the  latter  category  of examinations’.  it is not easy to see how that  can  support the  conclusion that the present Reg. 4 has assimilated  all

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 9 of 10  

the examinations to the said latter class of examinations in Reg. 5 (1 ) by prescribing that 984 75%  attendance  need not be in relation  to  the  lectures, tutorials  and  practicals  separately,  but  should  be  in relation  to  all  the three  taken  collectively.   In  our opinion,  having  regard to the context, it  would  be  more reasonable  to hold that the present regulation,  prescribes the requirement as to 75% attendance in lectures,  tutorials and/or  practicals separately in relation to all the  exami- nations. Mr.  Basudev Prasad has sought to rely on regulation 9  con- tained  in Chapter VI of the Examination  Regulations  which deal  with B.A. Part I Examination of the Three-year  Degree Course  in Arts. The said regulation provides that in  order to pass the DegreePart  I  examination, a  candidate  must obtain not less than 30 percent  of  the total  marks  in each  subject and 33 percent the aggregate.  He argues  that the provision of Re-. 9 would support the respondent’s  case that it could not have been the intention of Regulation 4 to require that the regular course of Study contemplated by  it postulates  75  per cent attendance  at  lectures  tutorials and/or  practicals taken severally and not  conjointly.   We are  unable to see how the provision made by Reg. 9  dealing with  the  examinations can be material  in  construing  the words used in Reg. 4. Therefore, we do not think Mr. Basudev Prasad is right in contending that Reg. 9 of the Examination Regulations Supports the respondent’s case. It  appears that before the writ petition was filed  by  the respondent in the present case, his father Mr. C. K.  Raman, I.C.S.,  wrote a long letter on April 11, 1965 to  appellant No. 1 inviting him to reconsider his decision in the case of his  son  and  to  allow his  son  to  take  the  University examination  in question.  In this long communication  which is argumentative, the respondent’s father has adopted a tone which indicates that he attempted to throw his weight  about in persuading appellant No. 1 to cancel the impugned notice. Appellant  No. 1 promptly replied to the said  communication and  informed the respondent’s father that he  had  referred the  case  of the respondent to the Vice-Chancellor  with  a statement  of  his attendance together with his  letter  for such  action  as he thought best  under  the  circumstances. Appellant No.  1 added that the Vice-Chancellor had  decided that  it was not possible to accept the request made by  the respondent’s  father as the University regulations  did  not permit the same. It would be recalled that the impugned notice was  published on   March  29,  1.965,  and  the  letter  written  by   the respondents  father  on  the  11th  April  was  replied   by appellant No. 1 on the 985 12th  April.  Even so, the respondent did not file his  writ petition  until  Sunday,  the 18th April;  and  as  we  have already  mentioned, the writ petition was presented  at  the bungalow  of the Chief Justice and was heard  for  admission and  interim  orders on Sunday night.  It is  true  that  if justice  demands  that the Court should receive  a  petition even  on  Sunday, the Court should and ought to  accept  the petition; but having regard to the fact that the  petitioner postponed the filing of the application until Sunday ( 18-4- 1965)  night, and other relevant circumstances to  which  we have already adverted, we think it would have been better if the  High Court had not passed an interim order on the  said night  as it has done.  It is hardly necessary to  emphasise that  in dealing with matters relating to orders  passed  by

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 10 of 10  

authorities  of educational institutions under Art.  226  of the  Constitution,  the High Court should normally  be  very slow  to  pass  ex parts interim  orders,.  because  matters falling   within   the  jurisdiction  of   the   educational authorities  should normally be left to their decision,  and the  High  Court  should interfere with them  only  when  it thinks  it must do so in the interests of justice.  Even  on the  merits, we think we ought to point out that  where  the question involved is one of interpreting a regulation framed by  the  Academic Council of a University,  the  High  Court should ordinarily be reluctant to issue a writ of certiorari where it is plain that the regulation in question is capable of  two  constructions,  and  it  would  generally  not   be expedient  for the High Court to reverse a decision  of  the educational authorities on the ground that the  construction placed  by the said authorities on the  relevant  regulation appears to the Hi Court less reasonable than the alternative construction  which it is pleased to accept.  The limits  of the High Court’s jurisdiction to issue a writ of  certiorari are well-recognised and it is, on the whole, desirable  that the  requirements  prescribed by judicial decisions  in  the exercise  of writ jurisdiction in dealing with such  matters should be carefully borne in mind. In  the result, the appeal is allowed, the order  passed  by the% High Court is set aside and the writ petition filed  by the   respondent   is   dismissed.    Under   the    unusual circumstances  of this case, we direct that  the  respondent should pay the costs of the appellants throughout. Appeal allowed.. 986