23 August 1973
Supreme Court
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PRESIDENT OF THE BIHAR STATE BOARD OF RELIGIOUS TRUST & ANR Vs NALINI CHOUDHARI & ORS.(With connected appeals)

Case number: Appeal (civil) 2029 of 1970


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PETITIONER: PRESIDENT OF THE BIHAR STATE BOARD OF RELIGIOUS TRUST & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: NALINI CHOUDHARI & ORS.(With connected appeals)

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1973

BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. BENCH: ALAGIRISWAMI, A. KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:  1973 AIR 2578            1974 SCR  (1) 481  1973 SCC  (2) 752  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1986 SC1794  (7)

ACT: Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, ss. 43 and  67-Scope of.

HEADNOTE: Section 43(1) of the Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950, as  amended  in  1956, provides, that  all  disputes  as  to whether any immovable property is or is not a trust property shall  be  inquired into by the authority appointed  by  the State  Government; and s. 67 of the Act provides that  if  a trustee  fails  without  reasonable  cause  to  comply  with certain  matters or furnish certain particulars which he  is required  or called upon to furnish under the Act, he  shall be liable to punishment. The  respondents,  who were called upon to  furnish  certain particulars  falling  tinder s. 67, in relation  to  certain temples,  contended,  that there was no trust,  that  s.  43 provides  a machinery for deciding whether there is a  trust and  who  is the trustee of the trust, and that  a  decision under the section was a condition precedent to the launching of  a prosecution under s. 67.  The High Court accepted  the contention. Allowing the appeals to this Court, HELD : Neither expressly nor by necessary implication, s. 43 or  any  other  provision of the Act  bars  the  prosecution tinder s. 67 without a decision under 43- [486 B] In  a  prosecution under s. 67, it is open  to  the  persons prosecuted  to contend that there is no trust and that  they are  not trustees.  It would then be for the prosecution  to make out all the ingredients of the offence and the two main ingredients are : (1) that there is a trust and (2) that the person  prosecuted is a trustee.  In that case, it  will  be for  the  Court  before  which  the  prosecution  has   been instituted  to decide the questions on the  material  placed before it.  There is nothing preventing the criminal  courts from going into these questions. [484H-485C] Under  s.  43,  the only question that  can  be  decided  is whether  any immovable property is a trust property or  not. Under  the  section  as it originally stood,  the  Board  of religious  trusts  or any person interested in  a  religious

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trust  may, at any time, apply to the District Judge  for  a declaration  that any immovable property is trust  property; and  under the section, as amended in 1956, all disputes  as to  whether any immovable property is trust property,  shall be inquired into by the authority appointed.  But, in either case,  the  only  question that can  be  decided  under  the section is whether any immovable property is or is not trust property.  The section, before or after amendment, does  not provide for a decision as to whether there is any  religious trust or whether any person is a trustee. [485G-486B] It  is possible that, when a question is raised  before  the authority  under  the section whether  a  certain  immovable property  is  trust property or not, the  person  interested might  contend that the was no trust at all.  In such  case. the  authority,  for  the purpose of  deciding  whether  the property  is  trust property. will have  to  decide  whether there  is a trust at all.  But such a decision is. only  for the  purpose of deciding whether it has the jurisdiction  to decide  whether the property in question is trust  property. if it wrongly decides that there is a trust and that it  has jurisdiction.  such a decision can be questioned in a  civil court.  In any case, under the section, it cannot be decided whether any body is a trustee.  Thus, the only question that can be decided under s. 43 is 482 irrelevant to the case of the prosecution in respect of many of the offences mentioned in s. 67. [485D-G] Mahanth  Ramdhan  Purl v. President, S.B.R.T.  Pattna,  1955 B.L.J.R.  665, Bihar State Religious Trust Board v.  Mahanth Jaleshwar Gir & Ors., I.L.R. (1967) 46 Patna 23, B. S. Board of  R.T.  v. R. R. Gir, 1969 B.L.J.R. 63, S.S.   Cloubey  v. B.H.R.T. Board, [1969] B.L.J.R. 74 and Parmeshwari Pd. Singh v.  The  Bihar State Board of Hindu Religious  Trusts,  1968 P.L.J.R. 386, approved. Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji v. S. P. Salhi, [1959] Sup. 2 S.C.R. 583 explained. Mst.  Champa Sahu v. The Bihar Religious Trust Board  Patna, 24-8-1961 of the Patna High Court, overruled.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  2029  of 1970. Appeal from the judgment and decree dated December 22,  1969 of  the  Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 571  of  1969  and Civil Appeals Nos. 41 & 42 of 1970. Appeal  from the judgment and order dated December 22,  1969 of the Patna High Court in Criminal Miscellaneous Case  Nos. 1181 and 1182 of 1969. L.N. Sinha, Solicitor General of India and D. Goburdliun, for the appellants (in all the appeals). S.C. Sinha and Rathin Das, for respondent No. 1 (in  C.A. 2029 of 1970). S.K.  Sinha,  K.  K.  Sinha and  B.  B.  Sinha,  for  the respondent (in appeal No. 42 of 1970). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ALAGIRISWAMI, J. These three appeals arise out of the common judgment   of  the  High  Court  of  Patna  in  Civil   writ jurisdiction   Case   No.   571   of   1969   and   Criminal Miscellanceous  Cases  Nos.  1181 and  1182  of  1969.   The question  that arises for decision in all the three  appeals is  the  same: whether a decision under section  43  of  the Bihar  Hindu Religious Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter  to  be called the, Act) is a condition precedent to the,  launching

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of  a prosecution under section 67 of that Act.   The  facts necessary  may first be stated.  The 1st respondent  in  the Civil Appeal No. 2,029 of 1970 was called upon by the  Bihar State  Board  of  Religious Trusts  to  submit  a  statement relating  to the Giri Gobardhan Mandir of Bana Nava Gram  on pain  of prosecution under section 67.  Thereupon  he  filed the  writ,  out of which this appeal arises,  alleging  that there  was no temple of Giri Gobardhan but only the idol  of Giri  Gobardhan which was his family idol and the income  of the  land was not the income derived from the properties  of the  idol.  He further contended that there was no trust  of any  kind relating to the Properties and that no  member  of the  public had any access to the idol nor was any  offering made by them and prayed for the notices issued by the  Board to be quashed.  The respondent in Criminal Appeal No. 41  of 1970 who was prosecuted under  483 section  67 of the Act claimed that he was the sole  shebait of  a  temple  in  village  Basarhia  in  the  district   of Darbhanga.   He  also did not submit  the  account  demanded under  the Act on the ground that the property of which  the return was sought was not trust property and that without  a declaration  under  section 43 of the Act he  could  not  be prosecuted  under  section 67.  The respondent  in  Criminal Appeal No. 42 of 1970, who was similarly prosecuted  claimed that  the  temple  in village Basarhia in  the  district  of Purnema  of  which he was the sole shebait  was  within  the family dwelling house with which the public have no  concern and that he was, therefore, not liable to render an  account of  the  income and expenditure.  His other  contention  was also  similar to the contention of the respondent  in  Civil Appeal  No.  41 of 1970.  The High Court allowed  the  three petitions  and  quashed  the notice issued as  well  as  the prosecutions.   The Bihar Hindu Religious Trusts  Board  has filed these appeals.               Section 67(1) of the Act reads:               "If  a tustee fails without reasonable  cause,               the burden of proving which shall be upon him,               to comply with any order or direction made  or               issued  under  clause  (i), (o)  (q)  of  sub-               section (2) of section 28 or under section 58,               to  comply with the provisions of  sub-section               (1) of section 59, sub-section (1) of  section               60,  section 61 or section 62, or  to  furnish               any   statement,  annual  account,   estimate,               explanation  or other document or  information               relating to the religious trust of which he is               the  trustee, which he is required  or  called               upon to furnish under any of the provisions of               this  Act,  he shall be punishable  with  fine               which  may  extend, in the case of  the  first               offence,  to two hundred rupees, and,  in  the               case of the second or any subsequent  offence,               to  five  hundred rupees and,  in  default  of               payment of the fine, with simple  imprisonment               for  a term which may extend to six months  or               one year, as the case may be." Under section 59 of the Act, within six months from the date of  the publication in the Official Gazette of the names  of the  President and members of the first Board, the  trustees of  every religious trust existing on the said  date  should furnish  to  the Board a statement in  the  prescribed  form containing  the  prescribed particulars in  respect  of  the trust  of  which he is the trustee.  Under section  60,  the trustee of every religious trust has to prepare a budget  of

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such  trust  and send a copy thereof to  the  Board.   Under section  59 and 60 there is no obligation cast on the  Board to give a notice to the trustee calling upon him to  furnish the  statement contemplanted under s.59 or the budget  under s.60. The duties cast upon the trustee under those  sections are  irrespective  of  the fact whether a  notice  has  been issued  or not.  The fact that notices were issued does  not make  any difference to this position.  If for a failure  to comply  with the provisions of sg. 59 and 60  a  prosecution lies under s.67. the prosecution cannot fail, on the  ground that no notice was issued.  of course, it is open to a  per- son  who apprehends that action might be taken  against  him for his 844 failure  to comply with the provisions of either section  59 or  60,  or  on whom a notice is served calling  on  him  to comply with the provisions of those sections to approach the ordinary  civil  court for a declaration that  there  is  no trust  and that he is not a trustee and therefore he  cannot be  called upon to comply with the provisions of ss. 59  and 60 or prosecuted for failure to do so.  If without a  notice a prosecution is launched under section 67 it is open to the persons prosecuted to contendbefore the court that there is no trust and that they are not trustees. In that case it would be for   the prosecution to make outall         the ingredients of the offence to the satisfaction of thecourt before  which  the prosecution is launched.   The  two  main ingredients  would  be: that there is a trust and  that  the person prosecuted is a trustee.  Under the Act no  machinery has been set up for deciding the question whether there is a trust  and whether any person is a trustee of such a  trust. The  whole  basis of the contention of  the  respondents  in these three appeals which has in substance been accepted  by the  High Court of Patna is that section 43 provides such  a machinery.   It  is to be noticed that there is  nothing  in section  67  which bars a prosecution  under  that  section. Therefore,  the  question  that would arise  is  whether  by necessary  implication section 43 would bar any  prosecution under section 67.  Section 43 as it stood originally read:               "43. (1) The Board or any person interested in               a  religious trust may, at any time, apply  in               the  prescribed manner to the’ District  Judge               for a declaration that any immovable  property               is trust property.               This  section was amended in 1956 to  read  as               follows:               "43.  (1)  All.  disputes as  to  whether  any               immovable  property  is  or  is  not  a  trust               property shall be inquired into, either on its               own motion or on application, by the authority               appointed   in  this  behalf  by,  the   State               Government,  by notification, in the  Official               Gazette." It would be noticed that under the original section as  well as  under the section as amended in 1956 the  only  question that  can be decided is whether any immovable property is  a trust  property or not.  It does not provide for a  decision as to whether there is any religious trust, as defined under clause  (1) of section 2 of the, Act, or whether any  person is  a trustee or not.  It does not even provide for a  deci- sion  on  the-  question whether any  property  is  a  trust property.   It  provides only for decision on  the  question whether  any immovable property is a trust property.  It  is quite conceivable that a trust has no immovable property  at all but only movable property, or as happens more often  the

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trust  Propery  may consist of both  movable  and  immovable property.   Therefore, a decision under section 43 will  not be  a  final  or  a complete  adjudication  as  regards  the question whether there is any trust or whether any person is a  trustee.   It  stands to reason,  therefore,  that  under section 43 there cannot be a conclusive decision which  Will provide  an  answer  to  a  prosecution  under  section  67. Furthermore in any prosecution under every one  485 of  the sections mentioned in section 67 the  question  that arises  is whether the person prosecuted is a trustee.   And section 43 does not provide for a decision of that question. The only question that can be decided ’under that section is irrelevant to the case of prosecution in respect of many  of the  offences mentioned ill section 67.  Therefore,  when  a question  arises in a prosecution under section  67  whether any trust is a trust coming within the ambit of the Act  and whether  the  person  prosecuted  is a  trustee,    it  is a question  which the court before which the  prosecution  has been instituted has to decide on the material placed  before it.   of course the prosecution cannot succeed  unless  both these  propositions  are  established.   There  is   nothing preventing  the  criminal court from going into  both  these questions. A  decision under section 43 is not a decision by  a  court. It is only a decision by a tribunal and it is subject to the results of a suit to be instituted under that section within 90  days of the decision of the tribunal, Though  originally the   tribunal  consisted  of  a  District  Judge,  it   was nonetheless only a tribunal.  Normally when a power is  con- ferred on an ordinary court of the land to decide a question it   attracts  all  the  procedure  that  attaches  to   the proceedings  of  the court on which the power  is  conferred including  right of appeal, revision etc.  Such was not  the position  even before 1956.  That question no longer  arises because of the amendment made in 1956.  The position is  now beyond  doubt  that it is only a  tribunal  that  determines cases under section 43.  When the question is raised  before the  authority under section 43 whether a certain  immovable property  is  trust property or not  the  person  interested might say that there is no trust and the property is not the trust  property.  In such a case the authority may  for  the purpose  of deciding whether the property is trust  property have  to decide whether there is a trust at all.   But  such decision is only for the purpose of deciding whether it  has the jurisdiction to decide whether the property in  question is  trust property.  It is true that a subordinate  tribunal cannot  by a wrong decision on the question of  jurisdiction assume  jurisdiction  which  it does  not  possess.   If  it wrongly decides that it has jurisdiction on the ground  that there  is a trust, such a decision can be questioned  before the  ordinary  civil courts.  But in many cases  the  person interested  may  be  content with  merely  saying  that  the property in question is not trust property and not raise the other question whether there is a trust at all.  In any case under this section it cannot be decided whether anybody is a trustee. The  High  Court seems to have thought that  the  fact  that under  section 43, as it originally stood, the Board or  any person interested in a religious trust may at any time apply to  the  District  Judge for a  declaration  and  under  the section  as amended in 1956 all disputes shall  be  inquired into  by  the  authority appointed in this  behalf  makes  a difference to the question whether a prosecution under  s.67 was barred without a decision under s. 43.  It does no  such

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thing.  In either case the only question that can be decided under  that section is whether any immovable property is  or is not trust property.  Even under the section as amended in 1956  questions as regards any trust property, both  movable and immovable, which includes the question 486 whether  there is a trust at all cannot be decided.  In  any case the question as to whether a person is a trustee or not cannot be decided either under the original section or under the  section as amended ill 1956.  And that is the  crux  of the  question  in a prosecution under section  67.   We  are clearly  of the opinion that the High Court was in error  in proceeding  on  the  basis that  without  a  decision  under section 43 no prosecution can be launched under section  67. Neither expressly nor by necessary implication section 43 or any  other provision of the Act bars the  prosecution  under section 67 without a decision under section 43. The  Full Bench had taken a view contrary to that  taken  by earlier   decisions of the same court. in Manth Ramdhan Puri v. President, S.B.R.T., Patna(1) it was observed:               "If  in  every case where a  person  raises  a               claim that the property is not trust  property               the Board is bound to stay its hands by reason               of  such denial, then the Act will be  unwork-               able  and meaningless.... .. . Section  43  of               the Act is merely an enabling section...... It               should be obvious that section 43 can have  no               application  if the trust--is not a  religious               trust  at all.  Section 43 applies  only  when               the  Act applies.  If the Act does not  apply,               section  43 can have no application.   It  is,               therefore, unreasonable to infer from  section               43  that  any  denial by  a  person  that  the               property  is not trust property will  at  once               oust the jurisdiction of the Board." In  Bihar State Religious Trust Board v.  Mahanth  Jaleshwar Gir & Ors.(.2) is was pointed out :               "Under the provisions of section 43(1), of the               Bihar   Hindu  Religious  Trusts  Act,   1950,               disputes as to whether a particular  property,               and that too only when it is immovable, is  or               is  not  a property appertaining to  a  public               trust  can be enquired into by the  authority.               That is to say, if the dispute relates to  any               particular  immovable property  or  properties               forming  part of or appertaining to  a  public               trust,  such a dispute shall be enquired  into               by  the authority either of its own motion  or               on application of any person.  In terms, if  a               dispute,,  is in regard to the nature  of  the               trust  itself,  section 43 is  not  attracted.               Nobody can approach the authority, either  the               State Board of Religious Trusts, Bihar, or the               trustee or any other person, for a declaration               that  a  particular  endowment  or  trust   or               institution  is  not  a  public  trust  but  a               private   one.   nor  can  anybody   file   an               application  before the authority for  a  mere               declaration that it is a public trust.  It may               well  be that when question is  raised  before               the  authority  in  regard  to  a   particular               immovable  property  that it appertains  to  a               public  trust,  by  way of answer  to  such  a               claim,  the person or the trustee may raise  a               dispute that even though the parti-

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             (1) 1955 B. L. J. R. 665.               (2) 1. L. R. [1967] 46 Patna 23               487               cular  property appertains to the  trust,  the               trust is not a public one, and, therefore, the               property should be held as not appertaining to               a public trust.  Incidentally and  indirectly,               in such a case the question may arise for  the               determination,   of  the  authority  and,   on               determination  of this question, the  ultimate               declaration  which  the  authority  would   be               competent  to  give under sub-section  (3)  of               section 43 will be that the property is or  is               not  trust property.  But unless the  determi-               nation  of  the  character  of  the  trust  is               involved  incidentally,  and  indirectly,  the               authority,  either  within the terms  of  sub-               section  ( 1 ) or as made expressly  clear  by               the,  terms  of  subsection (3),  has  got  no               jurisdiction to adjudicate purely in regard to               the  nature  of  the  trust  and  to  give   a               declaration as to whether it is a public trust               or a private trust." and it was held that the non-determination of the,  question as to the nature of the trust by the authority under section 43  is not a bar to,the’ launching of the prosecution  under section  67.   In B.S. Board of R. T.v. R.R. Gir(1)  it  was held that               "the scope of Sec. 43 is that if a dispute was               in  regard to the nature of the trust  itself,               Sec.  43  was not ’at all attracted  and  that               neither  the  Board nor the Trustees  nor  any               other person could approach the Authority  for               a I declaration that a particular endowment or               trust  or institution was a public  trust  and               not a private one or vice-versa.  On the scope               and  ambit of Sec. 43 it was neither  open  to               the  special  officer, Bihar  Hindu  Religious               Trust   Board,  Patna,  who   approached   the               authority  for any such declaration or  order,               nor was it competent for the authority to make               the impugned order." In  S.  S. Choubey v. B.H.R.T. Board(2)  a  Divisiion  Bench followed  the earlier decision in Mahanth  Jaleshwar’s  case (supra).  It is interesting to note that Justice  Choudhary, who  was  a  member of this Bench was  also  the  Judge  who decided  the case in Cr.  Revision No. 170 of 1.961  (Mosst. Champa  Sahu  v.  The Bihar Religious  Trust  Board,  Patna) disposed of on 24th August, 1961, the only decision of’ that court which appealed to the Full Bench.  We must point  out, however,  that this decision is based on a plain  misreading of the decision of this Court in Mahant Ram Saroop Dasji  v. S.  P. Sahi(3).  In that decision this Court held  that  the Act does not apply to private trusts.  There was an  earlier decision  obtained in First Appeal No. 10 of 1941  that  the properties  under consideration there did not  constitute  a public  trust and this Court therefore pointed out  that  as long  as  the declaration made by the High  Court  in  First Appeal  No. 10 of 1941 stands and in the absence of  some  I evidence to the contrary, the appellant was entitled to  say that  the properties did not constitute a public  trust  and the Act and its provisions did not apply to it.  The further observations  of  this  Court did not say  that  a  decision under, section 43 was a pre-requisite to a prosecution under section 67.  This

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(1) 1969 B. L. J. R. 63.                        (2) 1969  B. L, J. R. 74. (3)  [1959] (Supp.) 2 S. C. R. 583 488 Court  left  it open to the respondents  therein,  i.e.  the Board, to take such steps as may be available to them in law to get it determined by a competent authority that the trust in question is a public trust.  The decision in  Parmeshwari Pd.   Singh  v.  The Bihar State Board  of  Hindu  Religious Trusts(1)  also followed the earlier decisions of the  Patna High   Court.   Thus  all  the  earlier  decisions  are   in consonance with the view which we have taken.  We hold  that the Full Bench was in error in the view it took. All the appeals are allowed.  The respondent in Civil Appeal No. 2029 of 1970 will pay the appellant’s costs. V.P.S. Appeals allowed. 1) 1968 P. L. J. R. 386 489