06 May 2009
Supreme Court
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PREM SINGH Vs STATE OF HARYANA

Case number: Crl.A. No.-000934-000934 / 2009
Diary number: 24689 / 2008
Advocates: CHANDER SHEKHAR ASHRI Vs PRAGATI NEEKHRA


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REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.     934          OF 2009 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7000 of 2008]

PREM SINGH & ORS.     … APPELLANTS

Versus

STATE OF HARYANA            … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

S.B. Sinha, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal by special leave is against a judgment and order dated  

25.2.2008  passed  by  a  Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  of  Punjab  &  

Haryana  at  Chandigarh affirming a  judgment  of  conviction and sentence  

dated  9.9.1998  passed  by  the  Sessions  Judge,  Rohtak  convicting  the  

appellants herein for commission of an offence under Section 302/34 of the  

Indian Penal Code (for short, “IPC”)

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3. A  First  Information  Report  (for  short,  “FIR”)  was  lodged  on  

8.10.1994 at about 5.50 p.m. by Prem Singh (P.W.1) inter alia alleging that  

Chand  Ram,  Ajmer  and  Dilbagh  and  the  appellants  (Prem  Singh  and  

Karambir @ Pappu) herein were responsible for causing death of his brother  

Krishan (the deceased).  

They were charged under Sections 148 and 302/149 of the IPC.

The prosecution in order to prove its case examined six witnesses.   

4. P.W. 1 in his deposition before the learned Sessions Judge stated that  

on the date of occurrence he was in his Bajra field along with the deceased.  

At  about  1.00  p.m.  one  Samunder  and accused  Ajmer  were  taking  their  

bullock  cart  through  their  mustard  crop  which  was  objected  to  by  the  

deceased as a result whereof they were forced to take back the same.  They  

went away threatening to see the deceased later. At about 3.00 p.m. on the  

same day, accused persons came and started assaulting the deceased.  Prem  

Singh (Accused No.2) is said to have given a jelly blow on the chest of the  

deceased whereas Karambir @ Pappu (Accused No. 3) inflicted a farsa blow  

on his head; Chand Ram (Accused No.1) is said to have given a jelly blow  

on his abdomen whereas Ajmer (Accused No.4) inflicted a jelly blow on his  

left knee. Dilbagh (Accused No. 5) is said to have given a jelly blow with a  

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lathy  on  the  back  of  the  deceased.   While  being  taken  to  hospital,  the  

deceased died at about 5.00 p.m.  

5. The learned trial judge on analysis of the entire evidence brought on  

record and after noticing the purported contradictions in the statements of  

the prime witnesses, namely, Prem Singh (P.W.1) and Baljit Singh (P.W.4)  

found all of them guilty for commission of murder of the deceased.  The  

High Court, however, while disposing of the appeal preferred by them inter  

alia on the premise that the injuries attributed to the three others apart from  

the appellants herein having not been found on the person of the deceased  

gave them the benefit of doubt while affirming the judgment of conviction  

and sentence against the appellants.  

6. Mr.  Anil  Agrawal,  learned  counsel  appearing  on  behalf  of  the  

appellant would raise the following contentions before us in support of this  

appeal:

i. All the accused persons having been charged for commission of  

murder of the deceased Krishan under Section 302/149 of the  

IPC and three of them having been acquitted, appellants could  

not have been convicted under Section 302 of the IPC.

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ii. Both the courts below having noticed the serious discrepancies  

and  contradictions  in  the  evidences  of  P.Ws.  1  and  4,  the  

impugned judgment is wholly unsustainable.

7. Ms. Pragati Neekhra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State,  

however, would support the impugned judgment.

8. P.W.  1  –  Prem  Singh  –  was  with  the  deceased  from  the  very  

beginning.  He was a witness to both the stages of occurrence, namely, the  

act of the two accused to drive bullock cart through the agricultural field  

where mustard crop had been grown as also the assault on the deceased by  

all the accused persons which had taken place at about 3.00 p.m.   

Indisputably, the deceased was taken to a hospital.  The hospital and  

the  Police  Station  at  Meham  was  situated  at  a  distance  of  about  10  

kilometers from the village Nidana where the incident had taken place.  P.W.  

4 – Baljit Singh was also nearby.  The deceased was taken to the hospital by  

a buggi.  The FIR was lodged at about 5.10 p.m. and it was recorded at 5.50  

p.m.  P.W. 3 – Om Prakash Patwari drew the sketch map.    

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9. As was stated by Dr. Narender Singh (P.W.2),  Medical Officer In-

Charge of the Madhath Dispensary, Rohtak, following injuries were found  

on the person of the deceased :

“1. A contusion  reddish  colour  8  cm x .5  cm  about 7 cm below right axilla on right chest.

2. A semi circular wound (punctured) .9 cm x  .6 cm x 4 cm, (punctured wound) just above  sternal notch.

3. A semi circular wound (punctured) .9 cm x  .6 cm x 4 cm, 5cm away from above injury  on  left  chest  below  left  sternoclavicular  joint.”

All  the  injuries  were  found  to  be  sufficient  to  cause  death  in  the  

ordinary course of nature.   

Correctness of the said medical report is not in dispute.  Homicidal  

nature of death of the deceased is also not in dispute.   

10. We have gone through the evidence of the first informant Prem Singh  

(P.W.1)  and  Baljit  Singh  (P.W.4).   Whereas  P.W.1  was  examined  on  

9.2.1996, P.W. 4 was examined on 9.5.1997.

11. Both the learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court did not find  

any material discrepancy in their depositions.  Some contradictions and/or  

inconsistencies in their testimonies were natural, but they were found to be  

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not very material.   We may in this regard place on record the following  

findings of the learned Sessions Judge:

“There is nothing on record to prove that the two  witnesses  had  swerved  from  the  path  of  truth,  either by suppression or by concoction or by the  embellishment  of  facts  which  are  untrue.  Undeniably,  there  are  contradictions  in  their  testimonies  and  they  have  made  slight  improvements  from  the  version  given  by  them  before the police,  but  the hub of  their  testimony  remains  intact  and  the  criticism  leveled  against  their  testimonies  does  not  seem  to  be  well  founded.”

The appreciation of evidence on the part of the learned Sessions Judge  

cannot  be  faulted.   In  his  judgment,  he  had analysed  the  depositions  of  

P.W.1 and P.W. 4 at great details.  He not only placed on record the slight  

improvements made by the witnesses from their statements made before the  

police but also pointed out some inconsistencies in their depositions in the  

court.  But the testimonies in material particulars were found to have been  

truthful.   

The High Court recorded a judgment of acquittal in favour of Chand  

Ram, Ajmer and Dilbagh only on the premise that the role said to have been  

played by them was not corroborated by the medical evidence.  The High  

Court  arrived  at  the  said  finding  despite  the  fact  that  it  placed  implicit  

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reliance upon the testimonies of P.W.1 - Prem Singh and P.W. 4 – Baljit  

Singh, opining:

“PW-1  Prem Singh  and  PW-4  Baljit,  being  real  brothers of the deceased, will be the last persons to  leave  out  the  real  accused  and  implicate  the  appellants.  Their presence in the fields was quite  natural.  Their  version  has  remained  unshaken  in  the cross-examination.  No major discrepancy has  been pointed out in the testimony of PW-1 Prem  Singh and PW-4 Baljit.  We are of the view that  there is no reason to reject the testimony of PW-1  Prem Singh and PW-4 Baljit qua appellants Prem  and Karambir @ Pappu.  Adequacy or absence of  alleged motive has no significance where reliable  eyewitnesses’ account is available.”

12. Strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel on a decision  

of this Court in  Balaka Singh and Ors. vs.  The State of Punjab  [(1975) 4  

SCC 511] wherein the four accused who were said to have taken active part  

in the assault of the deceased had not been named in the inquest report as  

also in the brief statement by the very person who had lodged the FIR prior  

thereto.  The Court found that their names were deliberately added in the  

inquest  report  at  the  instance  of  the  prosecution  and  thus  there  was  no  

guarantee as regards their participation in the assault on the deceased.  The  

injuries found on the body of the deceased were either contusions, abrasion  

or lacerated wounds. No penetrating or incised wounds were found to be  

present and, thus, the use of sharp-cutting instrument, such as, barchha or  

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spear was held to be belied.  This Court in the peculiar facts of that case held  

that grain cannot be separated from the chaff being inextricably mixed up as  

in  the  process  of  separation  the  Court  would  have  to  reconstruct  an  

absolutely a new case for the prosecution by divorcing the essential details  

presented  by  it  completely  from the  context  and the  background against  

which they are made.  It is on the aforementioned finding the prosecution  

case was not believed.  Such is not the case here.   

13. It is now a well settled principle of law that the doctrine ‘falsus in uno  

falsus in omnibus’ has no application in India.  

In Jayaseelan vs. State of Tamil Nadu [2009 (2) SCALE 506], this  

Court held:

“The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" has  not  received  general  acceptance  nor  has  this  maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It  is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to,  is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded,  and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine  merely involves the question of weight of evidence  which  a  Court  may  apply  in  a  given  set  of  circumstances, but it is not what may be called 'a  mandatory rule of evidence.”   

{See also Mani @ Udattu Man & Ors. vs. State Rep. by Inspector of Police  

[2009 (3) SCALE 431]}  

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14. It is also not a case where the testimonies of the eye-witnesses had  

been totally disbelieved.   

Benefit of doubt has been given only because the testimonies of the  

witnesses in regard to the place of assault on the person of the deceased were  

not corroborated by the medical evidence.  The High Court failed to notice  

that  all  the  accused  persons  were  charged  of  having  common  object  of  

causing murder.  A few of them might have taken active part  and others  

might have aided and abated the commission of the offence.  It is, however,  

neither possible nor necessary to delve into the said question as the State has  

not filed any appeal questioning the correctness of the said order.  The fact,  

however, remains that both the courts below have placed implicit reliance on  

both P.W.1 and P.W.4.  We see no reason to take a different view.

15. The second contention of the learned counsel, in our opinion, is also  

without any merit. It may be true that all the five accused persons were said  

to have a common object; they were punished under Section 302/149 of the  

IPC; but the same would not mean that only because three of them were  

given benefit of doubt on a premise which may not be wholly correct, no  

case of common intention has been made out against the appellants.   

They came together armed.  They had threatened the deceased.  They  

went back together.  It has not been established that the appellants herein  

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had in any way been prejudiced by non-mentioning of Section 34 of the IPC  

in the concluding portion of the judgment of the High Court.   The High  

Court, in its judgment, however, categorically stated:

“ As  regards  Karambir  @  Pappu,  who  has  been attributed simple injury on the head, we are  of  the  view that  both the accused clearly  shared  common  intention.   They  came  prepared  with  deadly  weapons  and  both  have  assaulted  the  deceased on vital parts of the body.  It is not a case  of sudden occurrence.  The deceased died almost  immediately  as  a  result  of  the  injuries  received.  There  is  no reason to  doubt  sharing  of  common  intention by Karambir @ Pappu.  He cannot, thus,  avoid responsibility for causing of the death.  Even  if injury individually attributed to him is held to be  simple,  it  cannot be held that  he could not  have  pre-conceived the result of the assault.

Accordingly, while conviction and sentence  of Chand Ram, Ajmer and Dilbagh are set aside  and qua them, the appeal is allowed and they are  acquitted,  conviction  and  sentence  of  Prem  and  Karambir @ Pappu is  upheld and qua them, the  appeal is dismissed.”

16. A judgment as is well known is not to be read as a statute.  It must be  

read reasonably and in its entirety.  The effect of a judgment must be found  

out from the wordings used by it and the attending circumstances in which  

they have been used.  The High Court, on a plain reading of its judgment has  

attributed common intention on the part of the appellants in committing the  

aforementioned crime.   Their  conviction under Section 302/34,  therefore,  

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was justified.  In absence of any prejudice having been shown on the part of  

the accused, this court on such technicalities alone would not interfere with  

the impugned judgment.   

In  Dhaneswar Mahakud & Ors. vs.  State  of Orissa [(2006) 9 SCC  

307], this court held:

“23. The nature of the injuries sustained by the  deceased  clearly  indicates  the  intention  of  the  accused-appellants to do away with the deceased.  The  evidence  of  the  witnesses  along  with  the  injuries  reported  in  post-mortem  reports  clearly  bring  out  the  common  intention  of  the  accused- appellants  and we do not think that the accused- appellants would be prejudiced merely because the  charge  was framed under  Section  302 read  with  Section 149, IPC and not under Section 302 read  with Section 34,  IPC. From the evidence of two  witnesses,  PW-5 and PW-7, it  would appear that  the  accused-appellants  shared  the  common  intention to cause death of the victims.”

17. While we say so, we are not oblivious of the distinction between the  

common object and common intention. But when a common intention can  

also be found out  on the basis of the testimonies  made by the witnesses  

examined on behalf of the prosecution, the High Court in a situation of this  

nature was totally justified in affirming the said opinion.

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See Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana [(2000) 4 SCC 484 paragraph  

22 to 25]

Recently in Y. Venkaiah vs. State of A.P.[2009 (4) SCALE 154], this  

Court held:

“31. The  Constitution  Bench  of  this  Court  in  Mohan Singh and Anr. v.  State of Punjab – AIR  1963 SC 174, construed the scope of Section 34  and compared it with Section 149 and pointed out  the  essential  distinction between the two.  Justice  Gajendragadkar  (as  His  Lordship  then  was)  speaking for the Constitution Bench held that like  Section 149,  Section 34 also deals with cases of  constructive criminal liability in the sense where a  criminal  act  is  done  by  several  persons  in  furtherance of the common intention of all, each of  such  persons  is  liable  for  that  act  in  the  same  manner as if it were done by him alone. According  to the Constitution Bench, the essential constituent  of the vicarious criminal liability contemplated by  Section 34 is the existence of common intention.  When  such  common  intention  animates  the  accused persons  and leads  to  the  commission  of  the criminal offence charged, each of the persons  sharing  the  common  intention  is  constructively  liable  for  the criminal  act  done by one of  them.  The  Constitution  Bench  held  that  in  some ways  Section 34 and Section 149 are similar and in some  areas  they  may  overlap  but  nevertheless  the  common  intention,  which  is  the  sine-qua-non  of  Section  34  is  different  from the  common  object  which  brings  together  an  unlawful  assembly  of  persons within the meaning of Section 149 of the  Code.”

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18. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal.  It is  

dismissed accordingly.   

.……………………………….J. [S.B. Sinha]

...…………………………..…J. [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

New Delhi; May 06, 2009

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