REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5561 OF 2008

Pradip Buragohain  …Appellant

Versus

Pranati Phukan …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. This appeal under Section 116 A of the Representation  

of People Act, 1951 arises out of an order passed by the  

High Court  of  Assam at Gauhati  whereby election petition  

No.5 of 2006 filed by the appellant herein challenging the

election of  the respondent  to the Assam State Legislative  

Assembly has been dismissed. The factual backdrop in which  

the election petition and the present appeal came to be filed  

may be summarised as under:

2. General  elections  to  the  Assam Legislative  Assembly  

were held in March 2006 in terms of a schedule announced  

by the Election Commission of India.  The appellant was an  

independent  candidate  for  No.120  Naharkatiya  Assembly  

Constituency that went to poll on 3rd April, 2006.  The result  

announced  by  the  Returning  Officer  for  the  said  

constituency,  however,  declared  the  respondent  Smt.  

Pranati  Phukan  set  up  by  the  National  Congress  Party  

elected  by  a  margin  of  nearly  20,000  votes  over  the  

appellant who emerged as her nearest rival. Aggrieved by  

the  outcome  of  the  electoral  contest  the  appellant  filed  

election  petition  No.5  of  2006  before  the  High  Court  at  

Gauhati  assailing  the  election  of  the  respondent  on  the  

ground that the same was vitiated by several acts of corrupt  

practice  allegedly  committed  by  the  respondent.  The  

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appellant  enumerated  seven  specific  instances  of  corrupt  

practices in support of his case. The first of these acts of  

corrupt practices alleged by the appellant was committed on  

29th March,  2006  at  Langherjan  Tea  Estate  where  some  

voters  residing  in  the  said  locality  and  enrolled  in  the  

electoral  rolls  for  polling  stations  no.38  and  39  of  the  

constituency  had  assembled.  According  to  the  appellant,  

when the respondent arrived at the place mentioned above  

she requested the gathering to cast their votes in her favour  

and gave Rs.500/- each to the voters present there.  

3. The second act of corrupt practice allegedly committed  

by the respondent was on the same day at about 9.00 p.m.  

when she along with her supporters and party workers went  

to Line No.9, Baghmara village near M/s Makum Motors and  

requested the voters of  polling stations no.77, 78 and 79  

assembled there to cast their votes in her favour by offering  

Rs.500/- each to those present there.

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4. The third act of corrupt practice allegedly committed by  

the  respondent  was  at  about  12.00  noon  on  31st March,  

2006  when  she  is  alleged  to  have  visited  labour  line  of  

Desam Tea Estate situated near the playground of Desam  

Tea Estate and induced the voters present there to cast their  

votes for her by offering them Rs.500/- each.  Shri Hiranya  

Mantri, election agent of the respondent, is also alleged to  

have offered Rs.500/- each to some of the voters named in  

the petition when he visited the labour line of Desam Tea  

estate  on  the  same  at  about  4.00  p.m.,  constituting  the  

fourth act of corrupt practice committed in the course of the  

electoral process.     

5. The fifth act of corrupt practice is alleged to have been  

committed  by  the  respondent  at  Chakalia  Harimandir  at  

Panibura village at about 1.30 p.m. on 1st April, 2006 when  

she  offered  Rs.500/-  each  to  the  voters  named  in  the  

petition to induce them to vote for her. Shri Hiranya Mantri,  

the election agent of the respondent, accompanied by Shri  

Rajen Lahon is also alleged to have visited Nabajyoti  L.P.  

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School premises at Panibura Pathar village on the same day  

and offered Rs.500/- each to some of the voters named in  

the petition who were present there, constituting the sixth  

act of corrupt practice.

6. The seventh act of corrupt practices committed by the  

respondent was in the form of a feast allegedly organized by  

her on the date of the poll i.e. 3rd April, 2006 in a premises  

belonging to a garden employee of Namrup Tea Estate near  

polling station no.88 of the constituency. According to the  

averments  made  in  the  election  petition  the  respondent  

visited the aforesaid place with her supporters Smt. Runu  

Arandhara,  President  of  Dibrugarh  Zila  Parishad  at  about  

10.00  a.m.  and  inaugurated  the  feast.  The  feast  was  

enjoyed  by  the  voters  of  polling  station  no.88  and  was  

arranged by congress workers with the help of the money  

allegedly given by the respondent.  It is also alleged that the  

respondent  herself  invited  the  voters  to  the  feast  and  

requested them to vote in her favour.   

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7. In the written statement filed by the respondent the  

allegations  made  in  the  election  petition  were  strongly  

refuted giving rise to fifteen issues.  Six out of these issues  

pertained to the maintainability of the election petition while  

the remaining nine dealt with the commission of the corrupt  

practices  alleged  against  the  respondent  and  the  

consequences flowing from the same.

8. In support of his case the appellant examined as many  

as  twenty  nine  witnesses  apart  from  getting  his  own  

deposition recorded.  The respondent also stepped into the  

witness  box  but  remained  content  with  examining  her  

election agent as RW 2. By the judgment impugned in this  

appeal, the High Court decided Issues 1 to 6 in favour of the  

appellant. Issue nos.7 to 13 relating to the acts of corrupt  

practices alleged by the appellant were, however,  decided  

against  the  appellant  and  in  favour  of  the  respondent,  

resulting in the dismissal of the election petition. The High  

Court held that the oral evidence adduced by the appellant  

in  support  of  his  allegations  did  not  establish  the  

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truthfulness thereof.  The High Court was also of the view  

that although complaints were alleged to have been made to  

the  authorities  conducting  and  supervising  the  election  

process  yet  copies  of  the  said  complaints  had  not  been  

produced.  The explanation offered by the appellant for non-

production of the said complaints was rejected by the High  

Court  as  unacceptable.  The  witnesses  examined  by  the  

appellant were found to be either partisan or untrustworthy  

on account of their association with the appellant and the  

Naharkatia Sports Association of which he is the President.  

Relying upon the decisions of this Court, the High Court held  

that a corrupt practice ought to be established by cogent  

and  reliable  evidence  which  evidence  the  appellant  had  

failed to adduce. The present appeal assails the correctness  

of the said order, as noted above.

9. The law relating to proof of corrupt practices under the  

Representation  of  People  Act  has  been  authoritatively  

declared by this  Court  in a long line of  decisions starting  

with  Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Raja Jwaleshwari  

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Pratap Narain Singh and Ors. (AIR 1951 SC 120).  It is  

not, in our opinion, necessary to refer to all  the decisions  

that have been delivered by this Court on the subject over  

the past six decades since  Sarju Pershad’s case (supra).  

Reference  to  some of  them only  should  suffice.   From a  

conspectus  of  the  pronouncements  of  this  Court  three  

distinct aspects emerge that need to be kept in view while  

dealing  with  an  election  dispute  involving  commission  of  

corrupt practices. The first and foremost of these aspects to  

be borne in mind is the fact that a charge of corrupt practice  

is  in  the  nature  of  a  criminal  charge  and  has  got  to  be  

proved  beyond doubt.  The  standard  of  proof  required  for  

establishing a charge of corrupt practice is the same as is  

applicable to a criminal charge.  This implies that a charge of  

corrupt practice is taken as proved only if there is clear cut  

evidence  which  is  entirely  credible  by  the  standards  of  

appreciation applicable to such cases. (See Rahim Khan v.  

Khurshid  Ahmed  and  Ors.  (1974)  2  SCC  660,  D.  

Vankata Reddy v. R. Sultan and Ors. (1976) 2 SCC 455  

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and  Ramji  Prasad  Singh  v. Ram  Bilas  Jha  and  Ors.  

(1977) 1 SCC 260.)            

10. The  second  aspect  that  distinctly  emerges  from  the  

pronouncements of this Court is that in an election dispute it  

is unsafe to accept oral evidence at its face value unless the  

same  is  backed  by  unimpeachable  and  incontrovertible  

documentary evidence. The danger underlying acceptance of  

such oral evidence in support of a charge of corrupt practice  

was  lucidly  stated  by  this  Court  in  Rahim  Khan’s case  

(supra) in the following words:

“We must emphasize the danger of believing  at its face value oral evidence in an election  case  without  the  backing  of  sure  circumstances  or  indubitable  documents.  It  must be remembered that corrupt practices  may  perhaps  be  proved  by  hiring  half-a- dozen witnesses apparently respectable and  dis-interested, to speak to short and simple  episodes such as that a small village meeting  took place where the candidate accused his  rival  of  personal  vices.  There  is  no  X-ray  whereby the dishonesty of the story can be  established  and,  if  the  Court  were  gullible  enough  to  gulp  such  oral  versions  and  invalidate  elections,  a  new  menace  to  our  electoral  system would  have been invented  through the judicial apparatus. We regard it  as extremely unsafe, in the present climate  of  kilkenny-cat  election  competitions  and  partisan witnesses wearing robes of veracity,  

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to upturn a hard won electoral victory merely  because lip service to a corrupt practice has  been  rendered  by  some  sanctimonious  witnesses.  The Court  must  look  for  serious  assurance,  unlying  circumstances  or  unimpeachable  documents  to  uphold  grave  charges of corrupt practices which might not  merely  cancel  the  election  result,  but  extinguish many a man’s public life.”

11. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in  M.  

Narayana Rao  v. G.  Venkata Reddy & Ors.  (1977) 1  

SCC 771 where this Court observed:

  “A charge of corrupt practice is easy to level  but  difficult  to  prove.  If  it  is  sought  to  be  proved  only  or  mainly  by  oral  evidence  without  there  being  contemporaneous  document to support it, court should be very  careful in scrutinizing the oral evidence and  should  not  lightly  accept  it  unless  the  evidence is credible, trustworthy, natural and  showing  beyond  doubt  the  commission  of  corrupt practice, as alleged.”

12. Reference  may also  be made to  the  decision  of  this  

Court  in  Dadasaheb  Dattatraya  Pawar  &  Ors.  v.  

Pandurang  Raoji  Jagtap  &  Ors.  (1978)  1  SCC  504  

where this Court expressed a similar sentiment and Laxmi  

Narayan Nayak v. Ramratan Chaturvedi & Ors. (1990)  

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2 SCC 173 where this Court upon a review of the decisions  

on  the  subject  held  the  following  principles  applicable  to  

election cases involving corrupt practices:

“(I) The pleadings of the election petitioner  in  his  petition  should  be  absolutely  precise  and clear containing all necessary details and  particulars  as  required  by  law  vide  Dhartipakar  Madan  Lal  Agarwal  v.  Rajiv  Gandhi  (1987)  Supp.  SCC 93  and  Kona  Prabhakara Rao v. M. Seshagiri Rao (1982) 1  SCC 442. (II) The allegations  in  the  election  petition  should  not  be  vague,  general  in  nature  or  lacking of materials or frivolous or vexatious  because the court is empowered at any stage  of the proceedings to strike down or delete  pleadings which are suffering from such vices  as not raising any triable issue vide Manphul  Singh v.  Surinder Singh (1973) 2 SCC 599,  Kona  Prabhakara  Rao  v.  M.  Seshagiri  Rao  Rao (1982) 1 SCC 442 and  Dhartipakar  Madan  Lal  Agarwal  v.  Rajiv  Gandhi  (1987)  Supp. SCC 93. (III) The evidence adduced in support of the  pleadings should be of such nature leading to  an  irresistible  conclusion  or  unimpeachable  result that the allegations made, have been  committed rendering the election void under  Section 100 vide  Jumuna Prasad Mukhariya  v.  Lachhi Ram AIR 1954 SC 686 and  Rahim  Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed (1974) 2 SCC 660. (IV) The evidence produced before the court  in  support  of  the  pleadings  must  be  clear,  cogent,  satisfactory,  credible  and  positive  and also should stand the test of strict and  scrupulous scrutiny vide  Ram Sharan Yadav  v.  Thakur Muneshwar Nath Singh (1984) 4  SCC 649.

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(V) It is unsafe in an election case to accept  oral evidence at its face value without looking  for assurances for some surer circumstances  or  unimpeachable  documents  vide  Rahim  Khan v. Khurshid Ahmed (1974) 2 SCC 660,  M.  Narayana  Rao  v.  G.  Venkata  Reddy  (1977) 1 SCC 771,  Lakshmi Raman Acharya  v.  Chandan  Singh  (1977)  1  SCC  423 and  Ramji Prasad Singh v. Ram Bilas Jha (1977)  1 SCC 260. (VI) The  onus  of  proof  of  the  allegations  made in the election petition is undoubtedly  on the person who assails an election which  has  been  concluded  vide  Rahim  Khan  v.  Khurshid Ahmed (1974) (2) SCC 660, Mohan  Singh  v.  Bhanwarlal AIR 1964 SC 1366 and  Ramji Prasad Singh v. Ram Bilas Jha (1977)  1 SCC 260.”

13. The decision of this Court in Thakur Sen Negi v. Dev  

Raj Negi and Anr. 1993 Supp (3) SCC 645  also states  

the same proposition and highlights the danger underlying  

acceptance  of  oral  evidence  in  an  election  dispute  as  

witnesses in such disputes are generally partisan and rarely  

independent. This Court observed:

    “It must be remembered that in an election  dispute the evidence is ordinarily of partisan  witnesses  and  rarely  of  independent  witnesses and, therefore, the court must be  slow in accepting oral  evidence unless  it  is  corroborated  by  reliable  and  dependable  material.  It  must  be  remembered  that  the  

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decision  of  the  ballot  must  not  be  lightly  interfered with at the behest  of  a defeated  candidate  unless  the  challenge  is  on  substantial grounds supported by responsible  and dependable evidence.”

14. The  third  aspect  that  is  equally  important  and  fairly  

well-settled is that while as a Court of first appeal there are  

no limitations  on the powers  of  this  Court  in  reversing a  

finding  of  fact  or  law  which  has  been  recorded  on  a  

misreading or wrong appreciation of the evidence or law, it  

would not ordinarily disregard the opinion by the trial Judge  

more so when the trial Judge happens to be a High Court  

Judge who has recorded the evidence and who has had the  

benefit  of  watching  the  demeanour  of  the  witnesses  in  

forming first-hand opinion regarding their credibility.   

15. In Sarju Pershad’s case (supra) this Court stated the  

approach  to  be  adopted  in  an  appeal  arising  out  of  an  

election dispute in the following words:

“The  question  for  our  consideration  is  undoubtedly  one  of  fact,  the  decision  of  which depends upon the appreciation of the  oral  evidence adduced in the case.  In such  

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cases, the appellate court has got to bear in  mind that it has not the advantage which the  trial  Judge  had  in  having  the  witnesses  before him and of observing the manner in  which they  deposed in  court.  This  certainly  does not mean that when an appeal lies on  facts, the appellate court is not competent to  reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial  Judge. The rule is - and it  is nothing more  than a rule of practice - that when there is  conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any  matter in issue and the decision hinges upon  the credibility of the witnesses, then unless  there  is  some  special  feature  about  the  evidence  of  a  particular  witness  which  has  escaped the trial Judge’s notice or there is a  sufficient balance of improbability to displace  his  opinion  as to where  the credibility  lies,  the appellate court should not interfere with  the finding of the trial Judge on a question of  fact.”

16. Reference may also be made to the recent decision of  

this Court in  P.C. Thomas v. P.M. Ismail & Ors. (2009)  

10 SCC 239 where this Court observed:  

“This  Court  in  Gajanan  Krishnaji  Bapat  (1995)  5  SCC  347  has  observed  that  although being the court of first appeal, this  Court  has no inhibition in  reversing such a  finding,  of  fact  or  law,  which  has  been  recorded  on  a  misreading  or  wrong  appreciation of the evidence or the law, but  ordinarily the appellate court attaches great  value  to  the  opinion  formed  by  the  trial  Judge, more so when the trial Judge happens  to be a High Court Judge, had recorded the  evidence and had the benefit of watching the  demeanour of witnesses in forming first-hand  opinion of them in the process of evaluation  of evidence. This Court should not interfere  with the findings of fact recorded by the trial  court unless there are compelling reasons to  do so.”

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17. Coming to the facts of the case at hand the evidence  

adduced by the appellant to substantiate the charges leveled  

by him against the respondent comprises oral depositions of  

as  many as  30 witnesses  including the appellant  himself.  

The High Court has critically evaluated the said evidence and  

given reasons why the same was insufficient to prove the  

charge of corrupt practice leveled against the respondent.  

The High Court noted, and in our opinion rightly so, that the  

evidence adduced by the appellant did not inspire confidence  

and  was  therefore  insufficient  to  establish  the  charge  of  

corrupt practice leveled against the respondent.  We have  

been  taken  through  the  deposition  of  the  witnesses  

examined by the parties at considerable length and we see  

no reason much less any compelling reason to take a view  

different from the one taken by the High Court regarding the  

credibility  or  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  led  by  the  

appellant  to  prove  the  charge.   We  do  not  consider  it  

necessary  to  discuss  the  deposition  of  each  witness  

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examined on behalf  of the appellant for that exercise has  

been  done  by  the  High  Court  in  detail  which  we  find  

satisfactory.  We may all  the same note a few significant  

features that emerge from the deposition of the witnesses  

examined by the appellant and that impinge seriously upon  

the case of the appellant.  The first and the foremost feature  

that needs to be noticed is the fact that neither the appellant  

nor his election agent (PW 30) claims to be a witness to any  

act of corrupt practice alleged against the respondent.  The  

entire case of the appellant as set up before the High Court  

and  even  before  us  is  that  the  acts  of  corrupt  practice  

allegedly  committed  by  respondent  were  reported  to  the  

appellant or his election agent by different individuals from  

time to time.  The second aspect which is noteworthy is that  

the  affidavit  sworn  by  the  witnessess  in  regard  to  each  

incident of alleged corrupt practice is a carbon copy of the  

other.   The  witnesses  have  admitted  in  their  cross-

examination that the affidavits were drawn by the counsel  

for the appellant in his chamber. A parrot like story has thus  

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emerged from the depositions of the witnesses in regard to  

each  one  of  the  incidents  which  we  consider  unsafe  to  

believe for purposes of setting aside an electoral process in  

which the appellant has lost the election by a huge margin of  

nearly 20000 votes.   

18. The third aspect which we find noteworthy is that the  

witnesses examined by the appellant appear to be partisan  

in  character.  For  instance  PW-23  Smt.  Gita  Romoni  has  

admitted  in  her  cross-examination  that  she  had  come to  

depose before the Court at the instance of the election agent  

of  the  appellant.   She has  also  admitted  that  she was a  

member  of  Naharkatia  Sports  Association  of  which  the  

appellant  is  the  President.   She  appears  to  have  readily  

accepted the bribe offered to her but failed to report  the  

matter to any authority except to the petitioner. Similarly,  

PW-23 Smt. Gita Romoni is also a sportsperson and plays  

football  for  Naharkatia  Sports  Association  of  which  the  

appellant is the President. This is true even in regard to PWs  

8 and 9 who happen to be father and daughter respectively,  

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the latter being a football player associated with Naharkatia  

Sports Association. The incident of bribery alleged against  

the respondent at labour line of Desam ea Estate was not  

reported by these two witnesses to anyone and not even to  

the Manager of the tea garden concerned.  So also PWs 15  

and 16 are father and daughter whose testimony has been  

disbelieved by the High Court for good reasons while dealing  

with Issue No.13 pertaining to the commission of  corrupt  

practice of bribery by Shri Hiranya Mantri, the election agent  

of the respondent at Nabajyoti L.P. School premises.  Suffice  

it  to  say  that  the  deposition  of  the  witnesses  has  been  

evaluated  by  the  High  Court  and  rejected  for  cogent  

reasons.  In  the  absence  of  a  palpable  error  in  the  

appreciation of the said evidence we see no reason to strike  

a discordant note.   

19. The  last  but  not  the  least  of  noteworthy  aspects  to  

which  we must  refer  at  this  stage is  the  absence of  any  

documentary  evidence  to  show that  any  complaints  were  

filed  by  the  appellant  or  his  election  agent  before  the  

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Election Commission of  India or  any other authority  upon  

receipt  of  reports  regarding  commission  of  the  corrupt  

practice by the respondent.  The appellant’s version in cross-

examination and that given by his election agent is that such  

complaints were filed before the Chief Election Commission,  

the  Chief  Election  Officer  of  the  District,  the  Returning  

Officer  and  the  Constituency  Magistrate  in  writing  and  

against proper acknowledgement.  But neither any copy of  

complaint so made nor the acknowledgment regarding their  

receipt by the concerned authorities has been produced at  

the trial.   What is  important is that copies of  the alleged  

complaints relating to the incident of bribery were said to be  

available  with the election agent of  the appellant  but  the  

same were not annexed to the petition or produced at the  

trial. The explanation offered for this omission on the part of  

the  appellant  and  his  election  agent  is  that  the  election  

petition had been filed hurriedly.  The High Court has, in our  

opinion,  rightly  rejected  that  explanation  as  totally  

unacceptable. Even assuming that the election petition had  

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been filed hurriedly on account of constraints of period of  

limitation  prescribed  for  the  same,  nothing  prevented the  

appellant  from  placing  the  said  complaints  on  record  or  

having the same summoned from the concerned authorities  

to  whom  they  were  addressed.  Non-production  of  the  

documents  admittedly  available  with  the  appellant  that  

would lend credence to the version set up by the appellant  

that  the  incident  of  corrupt  practice  was  reported  to  him  

and/or to his election agent would give rise to an adverse  

inference against the appellant that either such complaints  

were never made or if the same were made they did not  

contain  any  charge  regarding  the  commission  of  corrupt  

practices by the respondent in the manner and  on the dates  

and the places alleged in the petition. We may in this regard  

refer to illustration (g) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act  

which permits the Court  to  draw an adverse presumption  

against the party in default to the effect that evidence which  

could be but is not produced would, if produced, have been  

unfavourable to the person who withholds it.   The rule is  

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contained in the well-known maxim :  omnia praesumuntur  

contra spoliatorem. If a man wrongfully withholds evidence,  

every presumption to his disadvantage consistent with the  

facts admitted or proved will be adopted. We need to remind  

ourselves that in an election dispute where oral evidence is  

generally partisan in character as has been demonstrated in  

the  present  case,  the  non-production  of  documentary  

material that could lend support to the appellant’s charge of  

bribery  against  the  respondent  would  assume  great  

importance.  Absence  of  a  plausible  explanation  for  non-

production of the documentary evidence would completely  

discredit  the  version  which  the oral  evidence  attempts  to  

support.   

20. Before  parting  with  the  discussion  on  the  evidence  

adduced by the appellant we may note one other factor that  

needs to be mentioned.  In  her deposition the respondent  

has denied her presence at Langherjan Tea Estate on 29th  

March, 2006 or at any place near the said tea estate.  She  

also denied her presence on 29th March, 2006 at 9.00 p.m.  

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at  Line  No.9,  Baghmara  village  near  M/s  Makum  Motors  

where she is alleged to have committed the corrupt practice  

of offering bribe to the voters.  The allegation that she was  

at the Desam Tea Estate on 31st March, 2006 and went to  

the labour line of the said estate has also been denied by  

her specifically in her examination-in-chief. The fact that she  

had organized a public feast at a quarter belonging to tea  

garden employee on 3rd April, 2006, has also been similarly  

denied in no uncertain terms. It is significant that the above  

statements  and  denials  of  the  respondent  have  not  been  

seriously questioned in cross-examination. In the absence of  

cross-examination on these aspects regarding the denial of  

the respondent about her presence at the places where she  

is  alleged  to  have committed  the  corrupt  practices  would  

imply  that  the  statement  made  by  her  has  not  been  

seriously  disputed by the appellant.  At  any rate,  there  is  

nothing in the cross-examination to discredit the version of  

the respondent leave alone suggest that she was making a  

false statement regarding her presence at the places where  

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she  is  alleged  to  have  committed  the  acts  of  corrupt  

practices.                  

21. In conclusion we would say that even taking the most  

charitable  view  of  the  evidence  which  the  appellant  has  

adduced in support of his case, all that may be said is that a  

second  opinion  on  the  same material  was  possible.  That,  

however, is not by itself sufficient for this Court to upset the  

judgment of the High Court or interfere with the result of a  

hard earned electoral victory.  We may gainfully extract the  

following passage from the decision of  this  Court  in  Ram  

Singh and Ors.  v. Col.  Ram Singh 1985 (Supp) SCC  

611:     

“In borderline cases the courts have to  undertake the onerous task of, “disengaging  the  truth  from  falsehood,  to  separate  the  chaff from the grain”. In our opinion, all said  and  done,  if  two  views  are  reasonably  possible  -  one  in  favour  of  the  elected  candidate and the other against him - courts  should  not  interfere  with  the  expensive  electoral  process  and  instead  of  setting  at  naught the election of the winning candidate  should  uphold  his  election  giving  him  the  benefit of the doubt. This is more so where  allegations  of  fraud  or  undue  influence  are  made.”

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22. Having  regard  to  the  seriousness  of  the  charge  of  

corrupt  practice,  and the nature of  the evidence that has  

been  adduced  by  the  appellant  the  present  is  a  fit  case  

where  we  ought  to  give  the  benefit  of  doubt  to  the  

respondent and leave her election untouched.

23. In the result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed  

but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.

……………………………J. (D.K. JAIN)

……………………………J. (T.S. THAKUR)

New Delhi July 7, 2010

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