03 May 1962
Supreme Court
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PRABHU Vs STATE OF U. P.

Case number: Appeal (crl.) 50 of 1962


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PETITIONER: PRABHU

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF U. P.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/05/1962

BENCH:

ACT: Evidence--Murder--Recovery of blood stained axe and  clothes at  instance of accused--Statements by accused that axe  was one with    which he committed murder and that blood stained clothes were his--Admissibility of--Indian Evidence Act,1872 ( I of 1872), s. 27.

HEADNOTE: The appellant was tried and convicted for the murder of  one B. The evidence against him was circumstantial and consisted of  (1) a motive to kill B which he had in common  with  his father,  (II) the recovery at his instance of an axe,  shirt and dhoti stained with human blood and (III) his  statements made  to a Sub-Inspector of Police before the recovery  that the  axe  was one with which he had killed B  and  that  the shirt  and Dhoti belonged to him.  No  independent  evidence was  led to prove that the axe, shirt and dhoti belonged  to the appellant. Held,  that  the  statements  made  by  the  appellant  were inadmissible and the remaining evidence was’ not  sufficient to  bring home the guilt to the appellant.   The  statements were  incriminating ones made to a police officer  and  were bit by ss. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. The.  Statements were not admissible under s. 27 as they did not  lead  to  any  discovery within  the  meaning  of  that section. Pulukuri Kotayya v. King Emperor, (1947) L. R. 74 I.   A. 65, relied on. State  of  U. P. v. Deoman Upadhya, [1961] 1 S.  C.  R.  14, distinguished.

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 50  of 1962. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated September  12,  1961, of the Allahabad High  Court  (Lucknow Bench) at Lucknow in Criminal Appeal No. 494 of 1961. Nuruddin Ahmed, for the appellant. G.C. Mathur and 0. P. Lal, for the respondent. 1962.  May 3. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S.R.  DAS, J.--The learned Sessions Judge of  Rae  Bareli tried the appellant Prabhu on a charge of murdering his  own uncle and found him guilty of the offence and sentenced  him to  death.  There were an appeal to the High Court  and  the usual  reference for confirmation of the sentence of  death. The  High Court dealt with the appeal and reference  by  one judgment.  It accepted the reference,, dismissed the  appeal

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and  confirmed the conviction and sentence.   The  appellant then  asked for and obtained special leave-of this Court  to appeal  from the judgment and order of the High Court.   The present  appeal  has come to us in pursuance  of  the  leave granted by this Court. Shortly  stated  the case against the  appellant  was  this. Bhagwan Ahir, step-brother of the appellants father  Budhai, was a resident of  883 village  Bandi in the district of Rae Bareli, The  appellant and  his  father  Budhai lived  in  another  village  called Gulariya  at  a distance of about two or  three  miles  from Bandi.   Bhagwan had about four bighas of pasture  land  and seven  bighas of cultivated land.  He had no male issue,  He had  several daughters who were all married and  resided  at the  places of their respective husbands.  Bhagwan was  old, near  about  80 years of age according to  the  evidence  of Marka, and had no male member in the family to help him with his  cultivation.   Budhai, it appears, did  not  reside  in village Gulariya all the year round, but was engaged in some job  at Burdwan in Bengal.  Some four years before the  date on,  which  Bhagwan  was  said to  have  been  murdered  the appellant  and his mother came to reside with Bhagwan.   The idea  was that the appellant would be able to  help  Bhagwan with  his  cultivation.   The appellant  did  not,  however, render much assistance to Bhagwan and the prosecution  case, was  that after about a year of their stay,  Bhagwan  turned them  out of the house.  The appellant and his  mother  then went back to village Gulariya.  The prosecution case further was  that  about  a month and a half before  the  murder  of Bhagwan the appellant and his father came to Bhagwan and the appellants father asked Bhagwan to transfer some of his land to the appellant.  Bhagwan said that he had already kept the appellant  with him for a year and had found that he was  of no  assistance.  He, therefore, refused to give any land  to the appellant.  Bhagwan, it appears, had some granddaughters and  one of them called Kumari Sarju aged about  five  years was  staying with him.  Bhagwan said that he would give  his lands to his grand-daughter Sarju. On  the  night between March 19 and 20 , 1961,  Bhagwan  was sleeping in front of his house on 884 cot  with  his  grand-daughter.   One  Naiku  (P.W.  1)  was sleeping  at a short distance from Bhagwan’s  house.   Naiku was a neighbour of Bhagwan.  At about midnight Naiku  ’heard some  noise  and  called  out  to  Bhagwan.   There  was  no response.   Naiku  then heard the sound of shoes  as  though somebody was running away from the place.  Naiku called  out certain other persons and went near the place where  Bhagwan was lying on his cot.  It was found that Bhagwan bad a large number  of  injuries  on  the head and  neck,  most  of  the injuries  being of ’an incised nature.  Bhagwan was  already dead.  The little girl Sarju though stained with blood which flowed  from  the body of Bhagwan was not  herself  injured. She  was soundly sleeping on the cot and was not awake  when Bhagwan was killed.  Naiku gave an information to the police station  of what he had heard and seen, the distance of  the police  station being about eight miles from village  Bandi. The  information which Naiku gave did not disclose the  name of  any  accused person because Naiku had not seen  who  had killed Bhagwan. On  the information given by Naiku the local police  started investigation and when the dead body of Bhagwan was  brought back  to  the village after the postmortem  examination  for cremation, the appellant, it is stated, came to one Brij lal

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(P.  W. 2) of village Bandi.  This was on the third day after the murder.  The appellant made certain enquiries from  Brij lal which roused the latter’s suspicion.  The  Sub-Inspector of Police was then in the village and he was informed of the presence   of  the  appellant.   The  appellant   was   then interrogated  and the case of the prosecution was  that  the appellant  made  certain statements and  produced  from  his house  a kulhari, a shirt and a dhoti.  These were found  to be blood stained and subsequent examination by the Chemical 885 Analyst and the Serologist disclosed that they were  stained with human blood, This recovery of the blood stained kulhari (axe)  and  the  blood stained shirt  and  dhoti  was  made, according to the prosecution case, on March 22, 1961, in the presence  of  two  witnesses, Lal  Bahadur  Singh  and  Wali Mohammad, It would appear from what we have stated above that the case against  the  appellant rested on the evidence  relating  to motive  furnished by what happened, about a month  and  half before  the  occurrence when the appellant  and  his  father asked  for some land from the deceased, and the recovery  of the.  blood stained. axe and blood stained shirt  and  dhoti from the house of ’the appellant.  The appellant denied that he and his father had asked for any lands from the  deceased a  month and a half prior to the occurrence.  The  appellant also  denied that he had produced any blood stained  axe  or blood stained shirt and dhoti from his house, or had  handed them  over to the Sub-Inspector of Police.  He  denied  that the  clothes  or the axe belonged to him.  His  defence  was that be was living with his father in Burdwan and came  back to  the  village on March 21,1961.  He said  that  the  case against him was brought out of enmity. Learned  counsel for the appellant has taken us through  the evidence  in  the  case and has submitted  that  apart  from raising some suspicion against the appellant and his father, the  evidence  given by the prosecution does  not  establish beyond  any  reasonable  doubt that the  appellant  was  the murderer.  He has further submitted that certain  statements alleged to have been made by appellant to the  Sub-Inspector of  Police  in  connection with the recovery  of  the  blood stained   axe  and  blood  stained  shirt  and  dhoti   were inadmissible and the courts below were wrong in relying on 886 them.   He  has  contended  that  if  those  statements  are excluded from consideration, than the evidence which remains is insufficient to support the conviction of the  appellant, We  think  that these contentions are correct  and  must  be upheld. There can be no doubt that Bhagwan was murdered on the night in  question.  The postmortem examination disclosed that  he had sustained as many as thirteen injuries, eleven of  which were  incised on different parts of the body.  The  injuries inflicted  on the head and face had out through skull  bones and  the doctor who held the postmortem examination  was  of the  opinion that Bhagwan had died as a result of  fractures of  the  skull bones and hemorrhage and shock.   There  can, therefore,  be  no doubt that Bhagan was  murdered.   It  is equally  clear  that nobody saw who’  killed  Bhagwan.   The evidence of Naiku (P.W.1) shows clearly enough that  neither he nor other persons whom he called saw the appellant.   The grand-child  who  was sleeping with Bhagwan  was  also  fast asleep  and  did  not  even awake  when  the  injuries  were inflicted  on  Bhagwan.   Bhagwan might or  might  not  have raised  shouts  when the injuries were caused to  him.   The evidence of Naiku does not disclose that he heard any  other

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sound  excepting the sound of movement of steps of a  person wearing shoes. We  are  satisfied  that  the  evidence  as  to  motive   is satisfactory,  Both Naiku (P.W.1) and Brij Lal (P.W.2)  have stated  about  the  motive.  The appellant  and  his  mother stayed with Bhagwan about four years ago in order to  render assistance to Bhagwan in his cultivation. The appellant  did not, however, do any     work  and was turned out.  This  is proved by the  evidence of Naiku and Brij Lal.  The evidence of  the  aforesaid two witnesses also establishes  that  the appellant and his father came to Bhagwan about a month and a half before the occurrence and asked for some land.  Bhagwan refused to give any land to the appellant.  We 887 think  that this motive has been established even though  it would influence both the appellant and his father. The  main  difficulty  in  the case  is  that  the  evidence regarding  the  recovery  of blood  stained  axe  and  blood stained.  shirt and dhoti is not very satisfactory  and  the courts  below  were wrong in  admitting  certain  statements alleged  to  have been made by the appellant  in  connection with that recovery.  According to the recovery memo the  two witnesses who were present when the aforesaid articles  were produced  by the appellant were Lal Bahadur Singh  and  Wali Mohamad.   Lal  Bahadur Singh was  examined  as  prosecution witness No. 4. He did give evidence about the production  of blood stained articles from his house by the appellant.  The witness said that the appellant produced the articles from a tub  on the eastern side of the house.  The witness did  not however, say that the appellant made any statements relating to  the  recovery.  Wali Mohammad was not examined  at  all. One   other  witness  Dodi  Baksh  Singh  was  examined   as prosecution  witness No. 3. This witness said that a  little before  the  recovery the Sub-Inspector of Police  took  the appellant  into  custody and interrogated him ; then  the  a appellant  gave out that the axe with which the  murder  had been committed and his blood stained shirt and dhoti were in the  house and the appellant was prepared to  produce  them. These  statements to which Dobi Baksh (P.W.3)  deposed  were not   admissible  in  evidence.   They  were   incriminating statements  made to a police officer and were hit  by  ss.25 and  26 of the Indian Evidence Act.  The statement that  the axe was one with which the murder had been committed was not a statement which led to any discovery within the meaning of s.27 of the Evidence Act.  Nor was the alleged statement  of the  appellant  that  the  blood  stained  shirt  and  dhoti belonged to him was 888 a statement which led to any discovery within the meaning of s.27.  Section 27 provides that when any fact is deposed  to and discovered in consequence of information received from a person  accused of any offence, in the custody of  a  police officer,-so much of such information,.whether it amounts  to a  confession  or not, as, relates distinctly  to  the  fact thereby  discovery  may be proved.  In Pulukuri  Kotayya  v. King  Emperor  (1)  the Privy Council  considered  the  true interpretation of s.27 and said :               "It is fallacious to treat the ’fact  discove-               red’  within the section as equivalent to  the               object produced ; the fact discovered embraces               the  place from which the object  is  produced               and  the knowledge of the accused as to  this,               and the information given must relate distinc-               tly  to  this fact.  Information  as  to  past               user,  or  the  past history,  of  the  object

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             produced  is not related to its  discovery  in               the   setting  in  which  it  is   discovered.               Information  supplied by a person  in  custody               that ’I will produce a knife concealed in  the               roof  of  my  house’  does  not  lead  to  the               discovery of a knife ; knives were  discovered               many years ago.  It leads to the discovery  of               the  fact  that a knife is  concealed  in  the               house  of the informant to his knowledge,  and               if  the knife is proved to have been  used  in               the  commission  of  the  offence,  the   fact               discovered  is very relevant.  But if  to  the               statement  the  words be added ’with  which  I               stabbed  A.’,  these  words  are  inadmissible               since  they do not relate to the discovery  of               the  knife  in the house  of  the  informant."               (p.77) We are, therefore, of the opinion that the courts below were wrong in admitting in evidence the alleged statement of  the appellant that the axe had been used to commit murder or the statement that the blood (1)  (1947) L.R. 74 I.A 65. 889 stained  shirt and dhoti were his.  If these statements  are excluded  and we think that they must be excluded, then  the only  evidence which remains is that the appellant  produced from  the house a blood stained axe and some  blood  stained clothes.   The  prosecution gave no  evidence  to  establish whether  the  axe  belonged to the appellant  or  the  blood stained clothes were his. Therefore,   the  question  before  us  is  this.   Is   the production of the blood stained axe and clothes read in  the light of the evidence regarding motive sufficient to lead to the conclusion that the appellant must be the murderer ?  It is well-settled that circumstantial evidence must be much as to  lead to a conclusion which on any reasonable  hypothesis in consistent only with the guilt of the accused person  and not  with  his innocence.  The motive alleged in  this  case would operate not only on the appellant but on his father as well.   From  the  mere  production  of  the  blood  stained articles by the appellant one cannot come to the  conclusion that  the appellant committed the murder.  Even if  somebody else had committed the murder and the blood stained articles had been kept in the house, the appellant might produce  the blood  stained  articles  when  interrogated  by  the   Sub- Inspector  of  Police.  It cannot be said that the  fact  of production  is  consistent  only  with  the  guilt  of   the appellant and inconstant with his innocence.  We are of  the opinion  that  the chain of circumstantial evidence  is  not complete in this case and the prosecution has  unfortunately left missing links, probably because the prosecution adopted the   shortout  of  ascribing  certain  statements  to   the appellant which were clearly inadmissible. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted to us  that in  State  of  U.  P. v. Deoman  Upadhyaya  (1)  this  Court accepted as sufficient evidence (i)  (1961) 1 S.C.R. 14. 890 the production of a blood stained weapon.  We are unable  to agree.  The circumstantial chain in that case did not depend merely  on  the  production of the  gandasa,  but  on  other circumstance as well.  The Court held in that case that  the circumstantial  chain was complete and the decision did  not proceed merely on the production of a blood stained weapon. For  the reasons given above we would allow the  appeal  and

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set  aside  the conviction and sentence passed  against  the appellant.  The appellant must now be released forthwith. Appeal allowed.