PRABHA MATHUR Vs PRAMOD AGGARWAL .
Bench: C.K. THAKKER,D.K. JAIN, , ,
Case number: Crl.A. No.-001532-001532 / 2008
Diary number: 5483 / 2007
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1532 OF 2008 ARISING OUT OF
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO. 1368 OF 2007
PRABHA MATHUR & ANR. … APPELLANTS
VERSUS
PRAMOD AGGARWAL & ORS. … RESPONDENTS
J U D G M E N T C.K. THAKKER, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The present appeal is directed against
the judgment and order dated September 26, 2006
passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Criminal Writ Petition Nos. 9952-
53 of 2006. By the said order, the High Court
set aside the order dated July 16, 2005, passed
by the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra
and confirmed by the Additional Sessions Judge,
Agra on July 29, 2006 dismissing the complaint
filed by the complainants against the accused
for offences punishable under Sections 420,
467, 468, 471 read with Sections 34 and 120B,
Indian Penal Code, 1860. The High Court
remanded the matter to the trial Court with a
direction to make further inquiry in the matter
and to pass an appropriate order in accordance
with law.
3. Brief facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that Pramod Kumar Aggarwal and Smt.
Taruna Aggarwal, wife of Pramod Kumar Aggarwal
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the complainants’)
are in the business of sale and purchase of
property. It was the case of the complainants
that they contacted the appellants herein for
purchase of the property from the appellants
since appellants were having share in the
property situated at village Nagla Padi Muhai
Beni Prasad Tehsil, District Agra in front of
Civil Court, Agra which was a joint family
property. The complainants apprised the
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appellants-herein that they were interested in
purchasing share of the property owned by the
appellants. They were also to purchase the
remaining property from other co-owners.
According to the complainants, the appellants
sold their shares in the property to the
complainants. Payment was made by the
complainants to the appellants. It was the
allegation of the complainants that it was
agreed between the parties that sale-deeds
would be executed by the appellants in favour
of purchasers. Sale-deeds were also drafted.
The appellants, however, did not come to the
office of Sub-Registrar, Agra for registration
of sale-deeds. The appellants induced the
complainants, gave false assurances and cheated
them. Thereby the appellants committed offences
punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471
read with Sections 34 and 120B of the Indian
Penal Code (IPC). A complaint was, therefore,
filed by the complainants in the Court of
Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra, being
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Complaint Case No. 1962 of 2003. The learned
Magistrate after recording statements of
witnesses, examining documents produced by the
complainants and perusing inquiry report
submitted by the Police held that the entire
case was of a civil nature. There was,
therefore, no justification for initiating
criminal proceedings. He, accordingly,
dismissed the complaint.
4. Being aggrieved by the above order,
the complainants approached the revisional
Court by filing revisions being Criminal
Revision Nos. 235-36 of 2005. The Additional
Sessions Judge again considered the relevant
record, heard the arguments of both the parties
and held that no error was committed by the
trial Court in dismissing the complaint and the
revision petitions were liable to be dismissed.
Accordingly, both the revisions were dismissed
by the Additional Sessions Judge, Agra.
5. The complainants in view of dismissal
of complaints and revisions challenged those
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orders by instituting Criminal Writ Petition
Nos. 9952-53 of 2006 in the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad.
6. The High Court without issuing notice
to the appellants herein and without affording
opportunity of being heard, allowed both the
writ petitions, set aside the order passed by
the trial court and confirmed by the revisional
court and remanded the matter to the learned
Magistrate with a direction to make further
inquiry in the matter and to pass an
appropriate order in accordance with law. The
said order is challenged by the appellants
herein.
7. On March 08, 2007, notice was issued
and further proceedings were stayed. In the
said order, it was indicated that the notice
will state as to why the petition should not be
disposed of at the SLP stage by setting aside
the order of the High Court and by remitting it
for fresh disposal in accordance with law.
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8. Affidavits and further affidavits were
thereafter filed. The Registry was directed to
place the matter for final disposal on a non-
miscellaneous day and that is how the matter
has been placed before us.
9. We have heard the learned counsel for
the parties.
10. The learned counsel for the appellants
contended that the order passed by the High
Court deserves to be quashed and set aside on
the ground that the order was not in consonance
with principles of natural justice and fair
play. It was submitted that complaints were
filed against the appellants. Serious
allegations were leveled against them that they
had committed certain offences punishable under
the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The appellants
convinced the Court that the entire transaction
was in the nature of civil dispute between the
parties and criminal proceedings could not have
been initiated. After applying mind and
considering the relevant material on record,
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the trial Court was satisfied that no complaint
could have been filed against the appellants.
Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. The
said order was confirmed in revision by the
Additional Sessions Judge. The High Court could
not have set aside the order passed by the
Courts below without issuing notice and
affording opportunity of hearing to the
appellants. The order passed in the writ
petitions in violation of principles of natural
justice deserves to be set aside.
11. It was also submitted that under the
Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, (‘Rules’ for
short), when any person is joined as respondent
in a writ petition, notice must be issued to
such person if the Court does not reject the
petition. In the instant case, both the Courts
decided in favour of the appellants and the
complaint filed by the complainants was
dismissed. Even if the High Court felt that the
orders passed by the Courts below were not in
consonance with law, it was incumbent on the
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High Court to issue notice to the appellants
and only thereafter an appropriate order could
have been passed. Only on that ground, the
impugned order deserves to be set aside.
12. It was also submitted that even on
merits, the order passed by the High Court is
not sustainable.
13. The learned counsel for the
complainants supported the order passed by the
High Court and the directions issued therein.
It was submitted that whatever might have been
stated by the High Court in the course of
deciding writ petitions, the final direction to
the trial Court is to make further inquiry and
to pass an appropriate order. Such direction
could not be said to be contrary to law.
14. Regarding notice and hearing, the
counsel submitted that under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred
to as ‘the Code’), an accused has no locus
standi till summons or process is issued to
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him. It is not in dispute that no summons has
been issued to the appellants so far. Even the
High Court has also not directed the trial
Court to issue summons to the appellants and
hence, there is no question of giving notice or
affording hearing to the appellants. It is
only after the trial Court issues summons or
process that the appellants may challenge the
said action by taking appropriate proceedings
known to law. At this stage, however,
appellants cannot be heard to make grievance of
absence of hearing. Upholding of such
contention would indirectly give the appellants
locus standi unknown to the Code. It was,
therefore, submitted that the appeal deserve to
be dismissed.
15. The learned counsel for the State
supported the arguments advanced by the learned
counsel for the complainants.
16. Having heard the learned counsel for
the parties, in our opinion, the appeal
deserves to be allowed. It is no doubt true,
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as held by this Court in Smt. Nagawwa v.
Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi & Ors., (1976)
3 SCC 736 and reiterated in several other cases
that the accused has no locus standi at the
stage of investigation and he cannot insist for
hearing before process is issued against him.
It was also held in Chandru Deo Singh v.
Prokash Chandra Bose & Anr., (1964) 1 SCR 639
and in Shashi Jena & Ors. v. Khadal Swain &
Anr., AIR (2004) 4 SCC 236 that at the most, an
accused may remain present with a view to be
informed as to what is going on and nothing
more. It is equally correct that if a person
has no locus standi or right of hearing, such
right does not accrue in his favour by an
indirect process.
17. On the facts and in the circumstances
of the case, however, in our opinion,
submission of the learned counsel for the
appellants is well-founded that the High Court
ought to have issued notice and afforded
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hearing before passing the impugned order in
writ-petitions.
18. We have already noted that both the
Courts decided the case in favour of the
appellants and the complaint was dismissed. The
complaints approached the High Court by joining
appellants as respondents. The writ petitions
were not dismissed in limine. In accordance
with Rule 2 of Chapter XXII of the Rules,
notices ought to have been issued to the
appellants before the writ petitions were heard
and finally decided.
19. But even otherwise, issuance of such
notice to the appellants was necessary and was
in consonance with the principles of natural
justice and fair play.
20. Even on merits, the impugned order of
the High Court is not sustainable. The High
Court made certain observations against the
appellants which have prejudicially and
adversely affected them.
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21. In this connection, learned counsel
for the appellants invited our attention to the
following portion of the judgment of the High
Court;
“The Court of Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra dismissed the said complaint holding that simply because the deed was not executed according to the scheduled conditions no penal offence is made out. The Revisional Court also cited certain authorities and ultimately dismissed the Revision. I have given my anxious consideration to the matter and I find that this is not a question of not executing the sale deed according to the schedule or prescribed conditions, but it shows the criminal intention of the opposite parties who obtained the money by way of case and Bank draft an did not execute the sale deed. Had the opposite parties not induced the complainant to purchase the property, the complainant would not have parted with this huge amount which is a clear case of cheating. Thus, the order of the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra and that of Revisional Court are devoid of any force. The order dated 16.7.2005 passed by Special Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agra and the order dated 29.7.2006 passed by Revisional Court in Criminal Revision No. 235/05 and in Criminal Revision No. 236/05 are liable to be set aside”. (emphasis supplied)
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22. Bare reading of the above paragraph
shows that the High Court had given “anxious
consideration” to the matter and it found that
there was no question of not executing the sale
deed according to the schedule or prescribed
conditions by the appellants herein, but it
reflected “criminal intention”. It was further
observed that had the accused not induced the
complainants to purchase the property, the
latter would not have parted with huge amount.
It was thus a “clear case of cheating”. In
view of above findings, the High Court observed
that the Special Chief Judicial Magistrate and
Additional Sessions Judge were not right in
dismissing the complaints and the orders passed
by them were liable to be set aside.
Accordingly, both the orders were set aside by
the High Court and direction was issued to the
trial court to make further inquiry and pass
appropriate order.
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23. We see considerable force in the
argument of the learned counsel for the
appellants that the above finding as to mens
rea on the part of the appellants and that
‘clear case of cheating’ being made out, could
not have been arrived at without issuing notice
to the appellants and without affording
opportunity of being heard. The counsel is also
right in submitting that though final direction
to the trial Court is to hold further inquiry
and to make an appropriate order, in view of
earlier portion in the judgment probably, no
option has been left with the trial Court, but
to issue process. It is thus a case of fait
accompli.
24. From the record it is clear that the
present appellants were arrayed as respondents
in the writ petitions and yet the High Court
did not think it appropriate to observe natural
justice. In our opinion, the High Court could
not have set aside the judgments of Courts
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below and could not have made the aforesaid
observations.
25. Hence, without entering into larger
question and expressing any opinion one way or
the other as to the right of the accused of
claiming hearing before issuance of
process/summons, on the facts and in the
circumstances of the case, the impugned order
passed by the High Court deserves to be set
aside and is, accordingly, set aside.
26. For the foregoing reasons, the
impugned order passed by the High Court is set
aside and the matter is remitted to the High
Court. The High Court will issue notice to the
appellants herein, afford them opportunity of
hearing and pass an appropriate order in
accordance with law.
27. Before parting with the matter, we may
state that we may not be understood to have
expressed any opinion one way or the other so
far as merits are concerned. As and when the
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High Court will hear the matter, it will decide
the writ petitions without being influenced by
any observations made by it in the impugned
order or by us in this judgment.
28. Ordered accordingly.
…………………………………………………J. (C.K. THAKKER)
…………………………………………………J. (D. K. JAIN)
New Delhi. September 26, 2008.
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