REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1182        OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Crl. ) No. 6715 OF 2006)

Ponnam Chandraiah …

Appellant

Versus

State of A.P. …Respondent

With

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.   1183               OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.6792 OF 2006)

J U D G M E N T  

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Appellants  question  correctness  of  the  judgment

rendered  by  a  Division  Bench  of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  High

Court.

3. Sixteen persons including the appellants faced trial  for

alleged  commission  of  offences  punishable  under  Sections

147,148, 448 read with Sections 149, 302 read with Section

149  and  Section  324  read  with  Section  149  of  the  Indian

Penal  Code,  1860 (in short the  ‘IPC’)  Learned III  Additional

Sessions judge, Karimnagar for each one of them guilty.  In

appeal, High Court upheld the conviction of A1, A3, A7 to A9,

A12  and  A13  and  sentence  of  imprisonment  for  life  as

imposed by the trial court.  Rest of the accused persons were

acquitted.  The present appeals are by A7 to A9 and A 13.

4. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

PW-1 is the wife,. PW-2 is the father, PW-3 is the mother,

PW-4  is  the  brother  and  PW-5  is  the  sister-in-law  of  the

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deceased. The accused, deceased and the material witnesses

are residents of Neerukulla village. The deceased purchased

an  Auto  and  was  plying  in  between  Sulthanabad  and

Neerukulla. On 02-07-2003 at about 9-00 PM, the deceased

returned to his house from Sulthanabad and informed PWs.l

to 3 that when he requested A-1 and A-2 to travel in his Auto

as per the serial number, they refused to travel in his Auto

and  beat  him.   On  03-07-2003  morning,  PW-1  and  the

deceased  went  to  the  house  of  the  Sarpanch  and  raised  a

dispute.  'The  Sarpanch  called  A-1-and  informed  about  the

incident. A-1 admitted his guilt in the presence of PWs.9 and

10. On the same day at about 6-00 PM, A-1 to A-16 came to

the  house  of  the  deceased  and attacked  him.  A-1  beat  the

deceased with a stick. The deceased ran into the house and

bolted the door. In the meanwhile, when PW-2 intervened to

rescue the deceased, A-1 beat him with a stick. A-3 broke the

doors  and all  the  accused  entered  the  house  and  beat  the

deceased. Some of the accused were armed with iron rods and

axes.  They  beat  the  deceased  indiscriminately.  Then  the

deceased ran out from the house.  The accused chased and

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beat him indiscriminately. Finally, the deceased fell  down at

the Gram panchayat office on receipt of the injuries. Later, the

deceased was taken in an Auto to the Government Hospital,

Sulthanabad. On the advise of the Doctor, they went to the

Police Station and gave Ex P-1 report. On the basis of Ex.P-1,

the police registered a crime for the offences under Sections

147, 148, 448, 307, 327 read with 149 of I.P.C. Thereafter, the

deceased and PW-2, who received injuries, were referred to the

Government  Hospital,  Karimnagar.  The  deceased,  while

undergoing  treatment,  succumbed  to  the  injuries.  After  the

death of the deceased, the Sections of law were altered in the

crime through the  alteration memo.  The Inspector  of  Police

took  up  investigation,  prepared  the  rough sketch,  observed

the scene of offence, held inquest over the dead body of the

deceased, seized M.Os.1 and 2 and later sent  the dead body

for  postmortem examination. The accused were arrested and

weapons were recovered. After completion of the investigation,

the  police  laid  the  charge  sheet.  The  accused  denied  the

charges and claimed for trial.

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The  prosecution,  in  order  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the

accused, examined PWs.1 to 22 and marked Exs.P-.1 to P-39.

On behalf of the defence, no oral evidence was adduced, but

Ex.D-1, a portion of Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of PW-3

was marked.  

5. High  Court  by  a  common  judgment  disposed  of  four

appeals numbered as Criminal Appeal Nos. 1114, 1128, 1130

and 1155 of 2005.   

6. In support of the appeals learned counsel for the accused

persons submitted that the conviction is based primarily on

the evidence of witnesses who were related to the deceased.

Further the accusations even if accepted in toto do not make

out a case relatable to Section 302 IPC.

7. Learned counsel  for the respondent State on the other

hand supported the judgments of the Courts below.

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8. In  regard  to  the  interestedness  of  the  witnesses  for

furthering the prosecution version, relationship is not a factor

to affect the credibility of a witness.  It is more often than not

that a relation would not conceal the actual culprit and make

allegations against an innocent person. Foundation has to be

laid if a plea of false implication is made.  In such cases, the

court has to adopt a careful approach and analyse evidence to

find out whether it is cogent and credible.

9. In  Dalip  Singh and Ors.  v.  The  State  of  Punjab (AIR

1953 SC 364) it has been laid down as under:-

“A witness is normally to be considered independent  unless  he  or  she  springs  from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to  implicate  him  falsely.   Ordinarily  a  close relation would be the last to screen the real culprit  and  falsely  implicate  an  innocent person.  It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge  along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for  such  a  criticism  and  the  mere  fact  of relationship  far  from  being  a  foundation  is

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often a sure guarantee of truth.  However, we are  not  attempting  any  sweeping generalization.  Each case must be judged on its own facts.  Our observations are only made to  combat  what  is  so  often  put  forward  in cases before us as a general rule of prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must be  limited  to  and  be  governed  by  its  own facts.”

10. The  above  decision  has  since  been  followed  in  Guli

Chand and Ors. v.  State of Rajasthan (1974 (3) SCC 698) in

which Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras (AIR 1957 SC 614)

was also relied upon.

11. We may also observe that the ground that the witness

being  a  close  relative  and  consequently  being  a  partisan

witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance.  This

theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh’s

case  (supra)  in  which  surprise  was  expressed  over  the

impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of

the  Bar  that  relatives  were  not  independent  witnesses.

Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed:  

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“We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the  two eyewitnesses  requires  corroboration. If  the  foundation for  such an observation  is based  on  the  fact  that  the  witnesses  are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased we are unable to concur.  This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of  this  Court  endeavoured  to  dispel   in  – ‘Rameshwar v.  State of Rajasthan’ (AIR 1952 SC  54  at  p.59).   We  find,  however,  that  it unfortunately  still  persists,  if  not  in  the judgments of  the  Courts,  at  any rate  in the arguments of counsel.”

12. Again in Masalti and Ors.    v.  State of U.P.  (AIR 1965

SC 202) this Court observed: (p. 209-210 para 14):

“But it would, we think, be unreasonable to  contend that  evidence  given by witnesses should be discarded only on the ground that it is  evidence  of  partisan  or  interested witnesses.......The  mechanical  rejection  of such  evidence  on  the  sole  ground that  it  is partisan  would  invariably  lead  to  failure  of justice.   No  hard  and  fast  rule  can  be  laid down  as  to  how  much  evidence  should  be appreciated.   Judicial  approach  has  to  be cautious  in  dealing  with  such  evidence;  but the plea that such evidence should be rejected because it is partisan cannot be accepted as correct.”

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13. To the same effect is the decision in  State of Punjab v.

Jagir  Singh (AIR  1973  SC  2407)  and  Lehna v.  State  of

Haryana (2002 (3) SCC 76). Stress was laid by the accused-

appellants  on  the  non-acceptance  of  evidence  tendered  by

some  witnesses  to  contend  about  desirability  to  throw  out

entire  prosecution  case.  In  essence  prayer  is  to  apply  the

principle  of  “falsus  in  uno falsus  in  omnibus”  (false  in  one

thing, false in everything). This plea is clearly untenable. Even

if major portion of evidence is found to be deficient, in case

residue  is  sufficient  to  prove  guilt  of  an  accused,

notwithstanding  acquittal  of  number  of  other  co-accused

persons, his conviction can be maintained. It  is the duty of

Court  to  separate  grain  from  chaff.  Where  chaff  can  be

separated from grain, it would be open to the Court to convict

an accused notwithstanding the fact that evidence has been

found to be deficient to prove guilt of other accused persons.

Falsity  of  particular  material  witness  or  material  particular

would  not  ruin  it  from  the  beginning  to  end.  The  maxim

“falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India

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and  the  witnesses  cannot  be  branded  as  liar.  The  maxim

“falsus  in  uno falsus  in  omnibus”  has not  received  general

acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of

rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts

to, is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and

not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves

the question of weight of evidence which a Court may apply in

a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called

‘a mandatory rule of evidence’. (See  Nisar Ali v.  The State of

Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1957 SC 366).

14. The above position was elaborately discussed in  Sucha

Singh and Anr. v.  State of Punjab (2003 (6) JT SC 348), and

Israr v. State of U.P. (2005 (9) SCC 616)    

15. In  S.  Sudershan Reddy v.  State  of  A.P. (AIR  2006  SC

2716), it was observed; Relationship is not a factor to affect

credibility  of  a  witness.   It  is  more  often  than  not  that  a

relation would not conceal actual culprit and make allegations

against an innocent person.  Foundation has to be laid if plea

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of false implication is made.  In such cases, the court has to

adopt  a  careful  approach  and analyse  evidence  to  find  out

whether it is cogent and credible.

16. In  Criminal  appeal  Nos.  222  of  2007,  this  Court  has

occasioned to deal with the cases of some of the co-accused

persons.  In that case it was concluded as follows:

“If the evidence on record is considered on the touchstone  principles  set  out  above  the inevitable  conclusion  is  that  the  proper conviction  would  be  Section  304  Part  I  IPC instead of Section 302 IPC. The conviction of the  appellants  is  accordingly  altered  from Section 302 read with Section 149 to Section 304  Part  I  read  with  Section  149  IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the ends  of  justice.  The  findings  of  the  guilt  in respect  of  other  offences  and  the  sentences imposed  do  not  warrant  interference.  The sentence shall run concurrently.”        

17. In view of what has been stated in the aforesaid Criminal

Appeal, the appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent.   

18. The appeals are partly allowed.

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………………………….J. (Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT)

……………………….…J. (P. SATHASIVAM)

New Delhi, July 30, 2008

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