REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. 32840 OF 2009

PAZHASSI RAJA CHARITABLE  TRUST & ANR.     ….Petitioner (S)

VERSUS

UNON OF INDIA & ANR.       ……RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR,J.

1.     We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr.  

Krishnan  Venugopal,  Sr.  Adv.  and  the  counsel  for  the  

respondent Union of India, Mr. Ashok Bhan.   

2. This  matter  was  mentioned  yesterday  when  the  Court  

directed   it  to  be  listed  today  as  Item No.1.  The  petitioner  

claims  to  have  produced  a  Malyalam  film   of  national  

importance,  called  “PAZHASSI  RAJA”.  Its  purpose  is  to

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enlighten people about the heroic life history of ‘SHRI KERALA  

VERMA PAZHASSI RAJA”. For wider circulation the film has  

been dubbed into Hindi, Tamil and Telugu and English.  It is  

said to have been widely acclaimed.  The petitioner claims that  

inspite of the artistic and historic importance of the film, it has  

been arbitrarily not accepted for screening at the International  

Film Festival of  India – 2009.  Aggrieved against the wholly  

arbitrary  conduct  and  actions  of  the  selectors  at  the  Film  

Festival,  the  petitioner  has  unsuccessfully  approached  the  

Kerala, as well, Delhi High Court.   

3.          Learned counsel submitted that the Learned Single  

Judge  of  the  Delhi  High  Court  misdirected  itself  in  not  

granting the interim relief.  In view of the fact that the film  

festival was coming to an end on 3rd December 2009, in the  

absence of interim relief, the petitioner will be left remedy-less.  

Learned  counsel  submitted  that  the  Learned  Single  Judge  

failed to address any of the issues alleged in the writ petition.  

In view of the fact that there had been a flagrant disregard of a  

mandatory regulation, viz.,  the Regulation 8.2 of  the Indian

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Panorama Regulation, 2009, grant of interim relief would be a  

natural consequence.   

4. The petitioner has filed a writ petition in the Delhi High  

Court  which is  pending adjudication.   In the  aforesaid writ  

petition the Learned Single Judge of the High Court has issued  

notice to the respondents to show cause as to why rule nisi  be  

not issued.  Necessary direction has been issued for exchange  

of affidavits.   The matter has been directed to be listed for  

hearing on 13th of April 2010.  The petitioner approached the  

High  Court  earlier  by  way  of  writ  petition  making  similar  

grievance as is  made in the present proceedings.  This writ  

petition was disposed of on 27.10.2009 by granting liberty to  

the  petitioner  to  make  a  representation  to  the  respondent.  

Consequently  a  representation  was  made  on  30.10.2009.  

Several  issues  relating  to  the  merits  of  the  petitioner’s  film  

including  its  historical  importance  as  well  as  other  

irregularities and illegalities in the procedure followed by the  

Jury  in  the  selection  process  were  highlighted.   When  the  

representation  was  not  disposed  of  the  petitioner  filed  the  

second writ petition. At  the motion hearing of the writ petition

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an assurance was given by the respondents to consider the  

representation  of  the  petitioner  forthwith.   Thus,  this  writ  

petition  was  also  disposed  of  with  a  direction  to  the  

respondents to take a view on the representation.  Ultimately,  

the  representation  submitted  by  the  petitioner  has  been  

decided on 19.11.2009.  The claim of the petitioner has been  

rejected.   Therefore,  petitioner  approached  the  Delhi  High  

Court  for  the  third  time  by  way  of  writ  petition  i.e.,  Writ  

Petition  (c)  No.13352 of  2009.   In  this  writ  petition  a  Civil  

Miscellaneous Application No.14682 of 2009 was filed seeking  

a  direction  to  the  respondent  for  screening  the  film  of  the  

petitioner  as  a  special  entry.   This  Civil  Miscellaneous  

Application has been dismissed by the Learned Single Judge of  

the  Delhi  High  Court  by  the  impugned  order  dated  

26.11.2009.   

5.      We may also notice here that another aggrieved producer  

of another film had approached the Kerala High Court  with  

similar relief.  Initially a Single Judge of the Kerala High Court  

granted interim relief  and stayed the  screening of  all  films.  

The matter was carried in appeal before the Division Bench.

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Before  the  Division  Bench  it  was  submitted  that  the  writ  

petitioner will not come in the way of conducting the festival.  

He  would  be satisfied if  it  is  ensured that  the  respondents  

strictly complied with the regulation in future.    Necessary  

direction was issued by the Division Bench to the respondent  

that it shall abide by the regulation in future.  

6.       Mr. Venugopal vehemently argued that if the petitioner  

is  denied  the interim relief  the  writ  petition  itself  would  be  

rendered infructuous.   Learned counsel  also submitted that  

even though the remedy of approaching the Division Bench in  

Letters Patent Appeal is available, in the facts of this case it  

was necessary to move this Court as this Court can mould the  

relief under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.  Learned  

counsel submitted that the superior courts are not powerless  

to grant  interim relief,  even in cases, where there is a flagrant  

breach of statutory rules which are mandatory in nature.  

7.     Learned counsel has highlighted three main legal issues.  

Firstly,  he  submits,  that  where  there  is  a  right  there  is  a  

remedy.    In any event according to him the Learned Single  

Judge failed to exercise its jurisdiction in not addressing the

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controversy in issue.  Learned counsel further submitted that  

this Court can entertain an SLP in compelling circumstances  

even  if  the  normal  remedy  of  Letters  Patent  Appeal  is  not  

availed  by a  party.   In  support  of  his  submission,  Learned  

Counsel relied on a judgment of this Court in Pawan Kumar  

vs.  State  of  Haryana,  (2003)  11 SCC 241. We are  of  the  

considered  opinion  that  the  aforesaid  judgment  is  of  no  

assistance to the petitioner.  In that case this Court observed  

as follows:   

    “Apart  from  the  salutary  powers  exercisable by this Court under Article 142  of  the  Constitution  for  doing  complete  justice  to  the  parties,  the  powers  under  Article  136  of  the  Constitution  can  be  exercised by it in favour of a party even suo  motu  when  the  court  is  satisfied  that  compelling grounds for its exercise exist but  it  should  be  used  very  sparingly  with  caution  and  circumspection  inasmuch  as  only the rarest of rare cases.  One of such  grounds  may  be,  as  it  exists  like  in  the  present  case,  where  this  Court  while  considering  appeal  of  one  of  the  accused  comes to the conclusion that conviction of  appealing as well as non-appealing accused  both was unwarranted.  Upon the aforesaid  conclusion arrived at by the Apex Court of  the  land,  further  detention  of  the  non- appealing  accused,  by  virtue  of  the

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judgment  rendered  by  the  High  Court  upholding his conviction, being without any  authority of law, infringes upon the right to  personal liberty guaranteed to the citizen as  enshrined  under  Article  21  of  the  Constitution.  In our view, in cases akin to  the  present  one,  where  there  is  wither  a  flagrant violation of mandatory provision of  any  statute  or  any  provision  of  the  Constitution, it is not that this Court has a  discretion  to  exercise  its  suo  motu  power  but a duty is  enjoined upon it  to exercise  the same by setting right the illegality in the  judgment  of  the  High  Court  as  it  is  well  settled that illegality should not be allowed  to be perpetuated and failure by this Court  to interfere with the same would amount to  allowing the illegality to be perpetuated.  In  view o f the foregoing discussion, we are of  the  opinion that  accused  Balwinder  Singh  alias Binder is also entitled to be extended  the same benefit which we are granting in  favour of the appellant.”     

8. In  our  opinion  the  aforesaid  observations  reiterate  the  

well-settled  propositions  of  law  as  well  as   the  parameters  

within which this court will  exercise its power under Article  

142 of the Constitution of India to do complete justice in a  

particular case.  But those are the matters which are relatable  

directly to Article 21 and akin to deprivation of life.  In other  

words issues which would fall within the category of ‘rarest of

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rare’ cases.  This Court can grant the relief in cases: where  

manifest injustice has been done: or where there is manifest  

illegality or manifest want of jurisdiction. In the present case  

we are concerned with a purely commercial venture, where the  

film in question “Pazhassi Raja” is vying for fame with another  

commercial  film called “Mangal  Pandey”.   It  is not disputed  

that the film “Pazhassi Raja” has already been released on the  

commercial sectors.  It seeks to depict a view point on the first  

war  of  Independence  which  may  or  may  not  be  generally  

acceptable.  We are not called upon to decide on the issue in  

these proceedings.  In any event the film is a view point of the  

individuals or the team involved in the production of the film.  

We are unable to see how Article 21 can be said to have been  

infringed in the facts and circumstances of this case.   We are  

also not impressed with the submission of Mr. Venugopal that  

without grant of interim relief the petitioner would be rendered  

remedy-less.  In case it is ultimately found by the Delhi High  

Court or in any other proceedings that the Jury, selectors of  

the  films  to  be  screened,  have  acted  arbitrarily  or  in  

infringement of the statutory regulations, remedy of damages

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by  way  of  a  civil  suit  would  always  be  available  to  the  

petitioner.  The judgment relied upon by Mr. Venugopal in the  

case  of  Dhannalal vs.  Kalawatibai  and others (2002)  6  

SCC 16 reiterates the principle in the legal maxim Ubi jus ibi   

remedium which translates that “there is no wrong without a  

remedy.   Where  there  is  a  right  there  is  a  forum  for  its  

enforcement.” We have no reason to take a different view on  

this legal principle .  We are however of the opinion that the  

petitioner has not been rendered  remedy-less merely by denial  

of interim relief.

9. We are also not impressed with the submission of Mr.  

Venugopal that merely because the petitioner has been vigilant  

in projecting the grievance as well as his rights, interim relief  

ought to follow. The film of the petitioner has to compete with  

all other entries.  Its entry was dependent upon the relative  

merit assessment by the panel of jurors.  Its merit cannot be  

adjudged individually.  

10.        Mr. Venugopal then submitted that the selection  

process  has  been  vitiated  as  there  has  been  a  breach  of  

Regulation 8.2.  The regulation is as under:

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“8.2  The  Chairperson  of  the  Feature  Film  Jury  may  constitute  a  maximum  of  two  panels  from  amongst  the  members  of  the  jury.  Each panel will recommend not more  than  33  %  of  the  films  viewed  by  it  for  combined viewing by the full jury.”              

11. A perusal of the above would show that the Chairperson  

of  the  Feature  Film  Jury  has  the  power  to  constitute  a  

maximum  two  panels,  for  viewing  all  the  films  and  to  

recommend not more than 33 % of the films to be viewed by  

the full  Jury.   According to Mr.  Venugopal  one of  the Jury  

members, Mr. Bobby Bedi was not present for 13 out of a total  

15  days  that  the  Juries  saw  the  movies.   This  fact  was  

admitted   by  the  respondents  in  the  counter  filed  by  them  

before  the  High  Court  of  Kerala.   According  to  the  learned  

counsel  the  whole  selection  process  has  been  conducted  

arbitrarily, there has been criticism in the media with regard  

to  the  functioning  of  the  Jury.  In  our  opinion,  the  learned  

Single  Judge,   considering  the  same  submissions,  has  

correctly observed that all these issues will be determined at  

the  final  hearing,  upon  receipt  of  the  counter  of  the

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respondents.   The  Court  normally  would  not  substitute  its  

own opinion for that of the experts.  Decision about the quality  

and merit of  the film of the petitioner can only be taken in  

comparison to other entries.  That is the job of the experts.  

We see no reason  to defer with the view expressed by the  

learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court.  It is also held  

by  the  Delhi  High  court  that  merely  because  a  person has  

come to court,  would not ipso facto entitle the petitioner to  

relief on the very terms on which a prayer is made.  In our  

opinion  the  aforesaid  observation  cannot  be  said  to  be  as  

either illegal or erroneous.    

12.   Mr. Venugopal, has then submitted that the selection  

process has been altered midway.  This was in response to the  

submissions  made by  the  learned counsel  for  the  Union of  

India  before  the  High  Court.  The  learned  counsel  had  also  

made  a  reference  to   the  communication  dated  15.10.2009  

received  from Mr.  Bobby  Bedi  which was placed  before  the  

Delhi High Court. The response was to the following effect:  

“This is with reference to my appointment  as a member of the above jury.

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Due to the change in the final dates for  the jury viewings I had to reschedule some of  my travel plans and as a result was unable to  attend some of the viewings.  However, I had  discussed this with the Directorate and the  chairman  of  the  Jury  and  my  other  jury  group members and carried a DVD copy of all  the  films  that  I  would  be  missing.   I  can  confirm that all  the films in my group have  been seen by me and discussed with my team  members  Gautaman  Bhaskaran  and  Raja  Mitra and we have come up with a final list of  recommendations.”

13. It  was  also  submitted  before  the  High  Court  by  the  

learned counsel for the Union of India as follows:

“Mr. A.S. Chandhlok, learned Additional  Solicitor  General  has  pointed  out  that  on  viewing  the  film  in  question,  it  was  the  unanimous decision of the jury not to include  it in the Indian Panorama 2009.”

14. We are unable to discern from the aforesaid any change  

in the criteria. We have however refrained from expressing any  

opinion  on  the  same  since  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the  

petitioner is pending adjudication before the High Court.  

15. We may reiterate that the facts and circumstances in the  

present  case  were  not  such  as  to  permit  the  petitioner  to  

bypass the normal procedure  of filing,   Letters Patent Appeal

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against  the  order  of  the  learned  Single  Judge  before  

approaching this Court by special leave petition.  

16. In view of the aforesaid we decline to interfere with the  

order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Delhi High  

Court. The special leave petition is dismissed.

………….……………………….J     (TARUN CHATTERJEE)

          …...…………………………………J        (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)

NEW DELHI DECEMBER 02, 2009