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PETITIONER: PARTAP SINGH

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & OKS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT06/09/1985

BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) MISRA, R.B. (J)

CITATION:  1985 AIR 1695            1985 SCR  Supl. (2) 773  1985 SCC  (4) 197        1985 SCALE  (2)597

ACT:      Constitution of India, Articles 14 and 15      Hindu Succession  Act,  1956  s.  14  Compromise  order Property  allotted   to  widow  in  lieu  of  her  right  to maintenance Whether  becomes absolute  estate on  the coming into force  o the  Act -  Provision contained  in  s.  14(1) whether vague discriminatory and ultra vires.

HEADNOTE:      Amar Singh was the owner of certain agricultural lands. He died leaving behind him two widows by name Jagir Kaur and Har Kaur  and the  petitioner as  his adopted  son. Under an arrangement each  of the two widows had been given one Third share in  the Lands  in Lieu  of their right of maintenance. Har Kaur  surrendered her  one third  share in favour of the petitioner and  it was mutated in his favour. The petitioner filed a  suit against Jagir Kaur for obtaining a declaration that she  had no  right, title or interet of any sort in the lands belonging  to the  deceased. A  compromise decree  was passed on  July 18, 1945 under which Jagir Kaur could retain the one  third hare  in the Lands in question in lieu of her maintenance and  on  her  death  the  petitioner  could  get possession of  the same. Later on Jagir Kaur by a will dated January 25,  1971 bequeathed  the said  one  third  hare  in favour of  Hardam Singh,  respondent in  the S.L.P. She died within a few days thereafter.      The petitioner  filed another  suit claiming that Jagir Kaur had acquired one-third share in the Lands of Amar Singh for  the  first  time  under  the  compromise  decree  which conferred on her only a limited estate and that on her death he should  get possession of the same. The interest of Jagir Kaur in  the land  allotted to her for maintenance under the compromise decree  did not  become an absolute estate in her hand under  s. 14(1)  of the  Hindu Succession Act 1956. The Trial Court  dismissing the  suit held that since Jagir Kaur had a pre-existing right to clam maintenance from the estate of Amar Singh, her interest in the lands allotted to her had became enlarged into an absolute estate 774 on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act in 1956 and, therefore,  the petitioner could not claim the lands in question after her death on the basis of compromise decree.

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    Appeals to the District Judge as well as the High Court also failed.  The petitioner filed Special Leave Petition as well as  a Writ  Petition under  Article 32  questioning the constitutional validity  of s. 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act 1956  contending: (1) that the provision contained in 8. 14(1)  was   vague  and   uncertain  and   in  view  of  the observations made  by this  Court in V. Tulasamma &  Ors. v. V. Sesha  Reddi (dead)  by L.Rs.  1977 (3) S.C.R. 266-27 the section could not be relied upon any longer, and (2) that it was violative  of Articles  14 ant 15(1) as it had attempted to favour  only one  section of the community that was Hindu women on  the ground  of sex  to the  prejudice of  the male members of tat community.       Dismissing the Writ Petition as well as the S.L.P., ^       HELD:  1. Section  14(1) of  the Hindu  Succession Act 1956 is  not vague  and is  capable of  implementation. This Court gave  effect to  that provision in Tulasamma’s   case. The observations  were mate  only with a view to bringing to the notice  of Parliament  that  the  provisions  of  s.  14 required to  be recast  in order  to  avoid    any  possible litigation arising  on account  of the  clumsy language used therein. The  Court, however, did not find any difficulty in construing and  applying 8.  14 and  in declaring  that  the property which  had been  allotted to  the appellant  No.  1 under the  compromise in  lieu or  satisfaction of  right of maintenance became  her absolute property on the coming into force of  the Act.  The doubt,  if any, about the meaning of that section  was set  at rest  by the said decision. In the instant case,  the position  of Jagir  Kaur was  in  no  way different from the position of Appellant o. 1 in Tulasamma’s case. [778 B-E]       2.  Section 14(1)  of the Act was enacted to remedy to some extent the plight of a Hindu woman who could  no  claim absolute interest  in the  properties inherited  by her from her husband  but who  could only  enjoy them  with  all  the restrictions attached  to a  widow’s estate  under the Hindu Law. There is ¯ justification for the males belonging to the Hindu community  to raise  any objection  to the beneficient provisions contained in section 14(1) of the 775 Act on  the grounds of hostile discrimination. The provision is A further protected by the express provision contained in clause (3) of Article 15. [778 G-H, 779 A]

JUDGMENT:      CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION :  Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4934 of 1985.      From the  Judgment and  Order  dated  6.1.1984  of  the Punjab & Haryana High Court in R.S.A. No. 1254 of 1975.      WITH Writ Petition No. 3947 of 1985. C      (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).      P.C.  Khunger  and  A.M.  Tripathi  for  the  appellant Petitioner.      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by      VENKATARAMIAH, J.  The above petition for special leave is  filed  by  the  petitioner  under  Article  136  of  the Constitution requesting  the Court  to grant leave to him to prefer an  appeal against the judgment and order of the High Court of  Punjab Haryana  in R.S.A. No. 1254 of 1975. He has also  filed   a  writ  petition  under  Article  32  of  the Constitution questioning  the constitutionality  of  section 4(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred

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to as  ’the Act’).  Since the  two petitions  are connected, they are disposed of by this common judgment.      One Amar  Singh was  the owner  of certain agricultural lands measuring  in all  33 Bighas  5 Biswas  in the village Fatuhi Khera, Tehsil Muktsar in the State of Punjab. He died in or  about the  year 1932 leaving behind him two widows by name Jagir  Kaur and ar Kaur. The petitioner was his adopted son. Under  an arrangement  each of  the two widows had been given one-third  share  in  the  lands  belonging  to  their husband in  lieu of their right of maintenance. In November, 1942 ar Kaur surrendered her one-third share in the lands in favour of  the petitioner  and it was mutated in his name on March 23,  1943. In 1945 the petitioner filed a suit against Jagir Kaur,  the other  widow of Amar Singh, for obtaining a declaration that  she had no right, title or interest of any sort in  the lands  belonging  to  Amar  Singh.  During  the pendency of  the said suit a compromise was effected on July 18, 1945  under which  the parties  agreed that  Jagir  Kaur could retain 776 the one-third  share in the lands in question in lieu of her maintenance and  on her  death the petitioner should get the possession of  the same.  Accordingly a  decree was  passed. Later on  Jagir Kaur, who was in possession of the said one- third share  of the  lands, bequeathed  the  said  share  in favour of  Hardam Singh, the respondent in the Special Leave Petition, under  a ill on January 25, 1971 and died within a few  days  thereafter.  Thereafter  on  April  2,  1971  the petitioner filed  the present suit, out of which this appeal arises, claiming  that Jagir  Kaur  had  acquired  one-third share in  the lands  of Amar  Singh for the first time under the compromise  decree which conferred on her only a limited estate and that on her death he should get possession of the same. He  urged that  in the  circumstances, the interest of Jagir Kaur  in the  lands allotted  to her  for  maintenance under the  compromise decree  did  not  become  an  absolute estate in her hands under section 14(1) of the Act. Since it could not  be disputed  that Jagir  Kaur had  a pre-existing right to  claim maintenance  from the  estate of Amar Singh, the Trial  Court held that the interest of Jagir Kaur in the lands allotted  to her  had become enlarged into an absolute estate on the coming into force of the  Act  and, therefore,  the petitioner  could not  claim  the lands in  question after  her death  on  the  basis  of  the compromise decree.  Accordingly,  the  suit  was  dismissed. Against the  said judgment and decree of the Trial Court the petitioner filed  an appeal  before the  Additional District Judge, Faridkot.  In the  course  of  the  said  appeal  the petitioner conceded  that the  Will was  a genuine and valid one, but  it was contended that section 14(1) of the Act was not applicable  to the  case but  it was governed by section 14(2) of  the Act.  The appeal  was, however, dismissed. The Second Appeal  filed by the petitioner before the High Court of Punjab  & Haryana  against the judgment and decree of the District  Judge   was  also  dismissed.  The  Special  Leave Petition, referred  to above,  is filed against the Judgment and decree  passed by  the High  Court. Realising that it is not possible  for him to succeed in his suit in the presence of section  141) of  the act,  the petitioner  has filed the above Writ Petition questioning its constitutional validity.       Two  contentions are  urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner  in support of his plea that section 14(1) of the  Act   is  unconstitutional;   (1)  that  the  provision contained  in   section  14(1)  of  the  Act  is  vague  and uncertain; and  (2) that  it is  violative of Article 14 and

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15(1) of the Constitution as it has attempted to favour only one section of the community, i.e., Hindu omen on the ground of sex to the prejudice of the male 777 members of  that community.  In support of his first limb of attack he  relied on the following observations made by this Court in  V. A  Tulasamma & Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi (dead) by L.Rs. [1977] (3) S.C.R., at page 266-27 :           "It is  indeed unfortunate  that though  it became           evident as  far back as 1967 that sub Sections (1)           and (2)  of section  14  were  presenting  serious           difficulties  of   construction  in   cases   were           property was received by a Hindu female in lieu of           maintenance  and   the  instrument  granting  such           property prescribed a restricted estate for her in           the property  and divergence  of Judicial  opinion           was creating  a  situation  which  might  well  be           described as  chaotic, robbing  the  law  of  that           modicum of  certainty which it must always possess           in  order   to  guide  the  affairs  of  men,  the           legislature for  all these  years, did not care to           step  in  to  remove  the  constructional  dilemma           facing the  courts  and  adopted  an  attitude  of           indifference and  inaction, untroubled and unmoved           by  the  large  number  of  cases  on  this  point           encumbering the  files of  different courts in the           country,  when  by  the  simple  expedient  of  an           amendment,  it   could  have   silenced   judicial           conflict and  put an  end to  needless litigation.           This  is   a  classic   instance  of  a  statutory           provision  which,   by   reason   of   its   inapt           draftsmanship, has  created endless  confusion for           litigants and  proved a  paradise for  lawyers. It           illustrates  forcibly  the need of an authority or           body to  be  set  up  by  the  Government  or  the           Legislature which  would constantly  keep in touch           with the  adjudicatory authorities  in the country           as also  with the legal profession and immediately           respond by  making  recommendations  for  6uitable           amendments whenever  it is found that a particular           statutory  provision   is,  by   reason  of  inapt           language  or   unhappy   draftsmanship,   creating           difficulty  of   construction  or   is   otherwise           inadequate or  defective or  is not well conceived           and is  consequently  counter  productive  of  the           result it  was intended  to achieve. If there is a           close inter  action between  the adjudicatory wing           of  the   State  and  a  dynamic  and  ever  alert           authority or  body which  responds swiftly  to the           draw backs  and deficiencies in the law in action,           much of  the time  and money  which is  at present           expanded in fruitless litigation, would H 778           he   saved and  law would achieve a certain amount           of clarity,  certainty and  simplicity which alone           can make it easily intelligible to the people."       It  is  contended  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the petitioner quite  ingeniously that  since Parliament had not amended section 14 after the above judgment of this Court as indicated by  the Court,  the said  section could not relied upon any loner.      We do  not find  any substance  in the  contention that section 14(1)  of the  Act is  vague and  is not  capable of implementation because  this Court  gave effect of that sub- section in  the very judgment on which the petitioner relies

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notwithstanding  the  observations  extracted  above.  Those observations were  made by  this Court  only with  a view to bringing to  the notice of Parliament that the provisions of section 14  required to  be recast  in order  to  avoid  any possible  litigation   arising  on  account  of  the  clumsy language used in section 14 of the Act. The Court, how ever, did not  find any  difficulty  in  construing  and  applying section 14(1)  of the Act to the case of the appellant No. 1 in that  case and  in declaring  that the property which had been  allotted   to  her   under  compromise   in  lieu   or satisfaction of  right of  maintenance became  her  absolute property on  the coming into force of the Act. The doubt, if any, about  the meaning  of that  section was set at rest by the above  decision. In  the instant  case the  position  of Jagir Kaur  was in no way different from the position of the appellant No.  1 in  Tulasamma’s  case  (supra).  The  first ground, therefore should fail.      There is very little substance in the second contention raised by the petitioner also. The submission made on behalf of  the  petitioner  in  this  case  over-looks  the  benign constitutional provision  in clause (3) of Article 15 of the Constitution which provides that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the  State from  making any  special  provision  for women and children. The said provision over-rides clause (1) of Article  15 of  the Constitution  which provides that the State shall  not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Section 14(1) of the Act was enacted to remedy to some extent the  plight of  a Hindu  woman who  could  not  claim absolute interest  in the  properties inherited  by her from her husband  but who  could only  enjoy then.  with all  the restrictions attached  to a  widow’s estate  under the Hindu law. There  is now  hardly any  justification for  the males belonging to  the Hindu  community to raise any objection to the beneficent 779 provisions contained  in section  14(1) of  the Act  on  the ground of  hostile discrimination.  The above  provision  is further protected  by the  express  provision  contained  in clause (3)  of Article  15, since  it is a special provision enacted for  the benefit  of Hindu women. We do not find any merit in  the Writ Petition. The Writ Petition is dismissed. Consequently, the  Special Leave  Petition also  has  to  be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed. A.P.J.                                  Petitions dismissed. 780