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PETITIONER: PARASRAMKA COMMERCIAL COMPANY

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/08/1969

BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) BENCH: HIDAYATULLAH, M. (CJ) RAY, A.N.

CITATION:  1970 AIR 1654            1970 SCR  (2) 136  1969 SCC  (2) 694  CITATOR INFO :  E          1972 SC1507  (15)

ACT: Arbitration  Act  (10   of    1940),  s.  14(1)-’Notice   in writing’  of  the making and signing of the   award-Copy  of signed award sent to parties-If operates as such notice.

HEADNOTE: The  disputes  between  the appellant  and  the  respondent, arising  out of a contract between them, were  referred  to. arbitration  under the arbitration clause in  the  contract. The  award  was  made  and signed on  April  26,  1950.  The arbitrator did not send any notice of the making and signing of  the  award but sent a copy of the signed  award  to  the appellant. The appellant acknowledged receipt of the copy by two  letters dated May 5, 1950 May 16, 1950.  On  March  30, 1951, the appellant filed an application in the  Subordinate Judge’s  Court for passing a decree in  terms of the  award. On  the  question whether the application was out  of  time, because, under Art. 178 of the Indian Limitation Act,  1908, the application had to be filed within 90 days of the  date. of service of the notice of the making of the award,     HELD: Under s. 14(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940,  when the  arbitrators have given their award, they shall sign  it and  shall  give notice in writing to the.  parties  of  the making  and  signing thereof and of the amount of  fees  and charges payable in respect of the arbirtation and the award. The notice need not be in the form of a separate letter.  It is  sufficient,  if it is in writing and  intimates  clearly that the award has been made and signed.  The non-mention of the amount of the fees and charges payable in respect of the arbitration  and award will not affect the notice as  it  is not  an essential part of it for the purpose of  limitation. In  the  present case, since the  appellant  had  sufficient notice  that the award had been made and signed when a  copy of  the  award  signed by the arbitrator  was  sent  to  the appellant, the application for passing a decree in terms  of the award was out of time.  [138 B, F-G; 139’ A, C-D]

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JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2532 of 1966.     Appeal  by  special leave from the  judgment  and  order dated August 8, 1963 of the Punjab High Court, Circuit Bench at Delhi in Civil Revision No. 330-D of 1954. B.P. Maheshwari and S.M. Jain, for the appellant. V.A. Seyid Muhammad and S.P. Nayar, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by     Hidayatullah, C.J.  This is an appeal against a judgment and  order of the Circuit Bench of the Punjab High Court  at Delhi 137 (Single  Judge)  in a matter arising under  the  Arbitration Act.  By  ,m agreement dated April 28,  1948  the  appellant company  entered into a contract with the Chief Director  of Purchase (Food) acting on behalf of the Government of India. It  is not necessary to give the details of  this  contract, because  the  matter was referred to  arbitration  under  an arbitration  clause  included in the agreement  between  the parties.  The award was made and signed on April 26,   1950. The  Arbitrator awarded Rs. 17,080-2-9 with costs in  favour of  the  company.  The Arbitrator, however, did not  send  a notice  as such of the making and signing of the  award  but sent a copy of the award signed by him to the company.   The company acknowledged the receipt of this copy by two letters which  are dated May 5 and May 16, 1950. It appears that  in the  original  which  was  retained in  the  office  of  the Arbitrator,  it was stated that there was a covering  letter giving  notice of the making of the award, but  the  company denied that any such letter had been sent.  However, nothing much turns on it as we shall show presently.     After the copy of the award was received by the company, it  filed an application under s. 14(1) of  the  Arbitration Act  in the Court of the Subordinate Judge, Delhi  on  March 30,  1951 for making the award ruIe of the court. It may  be mentioned  that  on July 3, 1951, the  Arbitrator  sent  the original  award to the court also.  Before  the  Subordinate Judge  objection  was taken by the Union of India  that  the application  of the company to the court was  delayed  since such  an application under s. 14(1) of the  Arbitration  Act under  Art. 178 of the Indian Limitation Act had to be  made within 90 days of the receipt of the notice intimating  that the  award  had  been  made  and  signed.   This   objection prevailed  with  the  Subordinate  Judge  who  rejected  the application.  A revision application was unsuccessfully made before  the High Court and it is the order on  the  revision application which is the subject of appeal before us.     Originally  the  revision  application  went  before   a learned  Single  Judge of the High Court.  He  referred  the matter  to a Division Bench which in its turn  referred  the case for decision to a Full’ Bench.  The Full Bench gave its opinion  on  November  17, 1961.  Although  the  Full  Bench discussed the matter it did not reach any conclusion in  the case, because it felt that whether the application under  s. 14(1) of the Arbitration Act had been made within 90 days or not,  was a question of fact which has to be decided by  the learned  Single Judge, and as the learned Single  Judge  had not  gone into that question, the matter had to go  back  to him. When the case came before the learned Single Judge,  he took some evidence and examined the question in detail.   We upheld the Sup CI /70--1o 138 decision  of  the  Subordinate  Judge  and   dismissed   the revision application.

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   It has been argued before us by Mr. B.P. Maheshwari that the judgment under appeal is erroneous, because s. 14(1)  of the  Arbitration Act requires that there should be a  notice in  writing and that notice had to be something besides  the award  of which a copy had been sent. He has cited a  number of  rulings  in support of his contention that a  notice  in writing  is  incumbent  before limitation under Art. 178  of the Limitation Act which applies to Art. 14(1) petitions can start.   In chief, he relies upon Ratnawa  v.  Gurishiddappa Gurushantappa  Magavi  &  Ors. ( 1 ),   Puppalla  Ramulu  v. Nagidi  Appelaslwami & Ors.(2), Jagdish v. Sunder(3),  Ganga Ram  v. Radha Kishan(4), Badaria Ramakrishnarnma &  Ors.  v. Vattikonda Lakshmibayamma & Ors.(5).     It is not necessary to go into the reasoning which  made the  learned  Judges in these cases to lay down  that  there must  be  a proper notice in writing of the  making  of  the award.   That follows in fact from the words of s. 14(1)  of the  Arbitration  Act.  That  section  says  that  when  the arbitrators  or  umpire have given their award,  they  shall sign  it and shall give notice in writing to the parties  of the making and signing thereof and of the amount of fees and charges  payable  in respect of the arbitration  and  award. What  will be considered a sufficient notice in  writing  of the  making and signing of the award is a question of  fact. In the cited cases emphasis sometimes has been laid upon the latter part of the sub-section which speaks of the amount of fees  and charges payable in respect of the arbitration  and award.  Sometimes emphasis has been placed upon the  opening words  namely  that  there should be a  notice  in  writing. Reading  the  word ’notice’ as we generally do,  it  denotes merely an intimation to the party concerned of a  particular fact.  It seems to us that we cannot limit the words "notice in  writing"  to  only a letter.  Notice  may  take  several forms.   It must, to be sufficient, be in writing  and  must intimate  quite  clearly that the award has  been  made  and signed.  In the present case, a copy of the award signed  by the  arbitrator was sent to the company.  It appears  to  us that  the company had sufficient notice that the  award  had been made and signed.  In fact the two letters of May 5  and May 16 to which we have referred quite clearly show that the company  knew  full well that the arbitrator had  given  the award,  made  it and signed it.  In these  circumstances  to insist  upon  a letter which perhaps was also  cent  (though there is some doubt about it) is to refine the law   (1) A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 135.          (2) A.I.R. 1957  A.P. 11.   (3)  I.L.R.  27 Pat. 86.               (4)  I.L.R.  [1955] Punj. 402. (5) I.L.R. [1958] A.P. 166. 139 beyond  the legitimate requirements.  The only omission  was that  there  was  no notice of the amount of  the  fees  and charges  payable in respect of arbitration and  award.   But that was not an essential part of the notice for the purpose of  limitation.  To emphasise the latter part as  being  the essential  part  of  the notice is to make  the  first  part depend  upon the determination of the fees and  charges  and their  inclusion  in the notice.  A written  notice  clearly intimating  the  parties concerned that the award  had  been made and signed, in our opinion certainly starts limitation.     In this view of the matter we are in agreement with  the decision  of the learned Single Judge who has  endorsed  the opinion  of the Subordinate Judge that limitation  began  to run  from  the receipt of the copy of the  award  which  was signed  by the Arbitrator and which gave due notice  to  the

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party  concerned  that the award had been made  and  signed. That is how the party itself understood when it acknowledged the  copy  sent to it.  Therefore, the application  must  be treated  as being out of time and the decision of  the  High Court to so treat it was correct in all the circumstances of the case.     We,  therefore,  do not see any reason to  interfere  in this appeal and it is dismissed.  But we make it clear  that the other part of the case, namely what is to happen to  the award sent by the Arbitrator himself to the court has yet to be  determined  and  what we say here will  not  affect  the determination  of  that  question.   Obviously  enough  that matter arises under the second subsection of s. 14 and  will have to be considered quite apart from the application  made by the company to have the award made into rule of Court.     It  was  represented  to us by Dr.  Syed  Mohammad  that objections  had been taken to the validity of the award  and they  remain still for decision.  Those of course must  fall to the ground with the application which we have found to be out of time.  As to whether similar objections can be raised in  answer  to  the  award filed  at  the  instance  of  the arbitrator  is  a question which we cannot go  into  in  the present  appeal  and  no  expression  of  opinion  must   be attributed to us on that point.  In the circumstances of the case we leave the parties to bear their own costs. V.P.S.                                     Appeal dismissed. 140