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PETITIONER: PALA SINGH & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB

DATE OF JUDGMENT23/08/1972

BENCH: DUA, I.D. BENCH: DUA, I.D. SHELAT, J.M. KHANNA, HANS RAJ

CITATION:  1972 AIR 2679            1973 SCR  (1) 964  1972 SCC  (2) 640  CITATOR INFO :  R          1973 SC2187  (8)  R          1976 SC2304  (9)  R          1985 SC 131  (13)  RF         1992 SC2155  (2)

ACT: Code  of  Criminal  Procedure s. 417-Appeal  in  High  Court against  acquittal  by trial court--High  Court’s  power  to reverse judgment of acquittal-Practice and procedure. Code   of  Criminal  Procedure  s.  157-Delay   in   sending occurrence report to magistrate-Whether whole  investigation to be regarded as tainted. Constitution of India 1950, Art. 136-Interference by Supreme Court when justified.

HEADNOTE: The appellants along with some other accused were tried  for murder  under  s. 302 I.P.C. and connected  offences.   They were  acquitted  by  the Sessions  Judge.   The  High  Court reversing   the   judgment  of   acquittal   convicted   the appellants.   In appeal before this Court under article  136 of  the Constitution it was contended that in apprising  the evidence the High Court had not followed the principles laid down by this-Court in Sanwant Singh and other cases. Dismissing the appeal, HELD  : (i) The contention that because the judgment of  the trial court prima facie seemed reasonable there was no scope for  reassessment  of  the evidence by the  High  Court  was unacceptable.  The Court of appeal has full power under  the statute to go into the entire evidence and all the  relevant circumstances  of the case for coming to its own  conclusion about the guilt or innocence of the accused bearing in  mind the  initial  presumption of the innocence  of  the  accused person  and  the  fact that he was acquitted  by  the  trial court.   The High Court in the present case did  not  commit any error in the appraisal of the evidence on the record and in  arriving  at its own conclusion as to the guilt  of  the appellants.  The criticism about the insertion of s. 120B in the site plan might raise a slight suspicion but in view  of the  trustworthiness of the prosecution evidence led in  the case  that could not in any way justify any grave  suspicion

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of  the  prosecution story.  It could not be said  that  the High  Court  had not followed the principles  laid  down  in Sanwant  Singh’s case nor were its conclusions so  erroneous as  to justify interference by this Court under Art. 136  of the Constitution. [971-F-H; 972A-B] Sanwant  Singh v. State of Rajasthan, [1961] 3  S.C.R.  120, Rambhapala  Reddy v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 46  and Bansidhar Mohanty V.     State  of Orissa, A.I.R. 1955  S.C. 585, considered and applied. (ii) Section 157 Cr.  P.C. requires an occurrence report  to be  sent  forthwith  by the police officer  concerned  to  a magistrate  empowered  to take congnizance of  the  offence. This  is really designed to keep the magistrate informed  of the  investigation  of such cognizable offence so as  to  be able  to control the investigation and if necessary to  give appropriate  direction under s. 159.  But when it was  found in  the present case that the F.I.R. was  actually  recorded without delay and the investigation started on the basis  of the F.I.R. and there- was no other infirmity brought 965 to   the   Court’s  notice,  then,  however,   improper   or objectionable  the  delayed  receipt of the  report  by  the magistrate  concerned  it could not by  itself  justify  the conclusion  that  the  investigation  was  tainted  and  the prosecution insupportable.  It was not the appellants’  case that they had been prejudicial by this delay. [970 C-E]

JUDGMENT: CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 197 of 1969. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated May 15, 1969 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandi- garh in Criminal Appeal No. 385 of 1967. R.  L.  Kohli,  R.  C.  Kohli and  J.  C.  Talwar,  for  the appellants. Harbans Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Dua,  J. This appeal by special leave under Art. 136 of  the Constitution of India is directed against the judgment dated May  16,  1969  of  the High Court  of  Punjab  and  Haryana allowing  in  part the State appeal from the order  of  Shri Kartar   Singh,   Additional  Sessions   Judge,   Jullundur, acquitting the five accused, charged under ss. 302,  302/34, 120B  and  302/309, I.P.C. and convicting on  appeal  Trilok Singh  and Pala Singh, appellants,the former under  s.  302, I.P.C.  and the latter under S. 302 read with S. 34,  I.P.C; They were both sentenced to imprisonment for life. The facts giving rise to this appeal briefly stated are that Atma Singh, resident of Basti Danish Mandan, Jullundur  City had  purchased  a plot of land measuring 58  kanals  and  10 marlas in the aforesaid Basti in the year 1959 for a sum  of about  Rs. 16,000 from the Government at a, public  auction. This  piece  of land was at that time  being  cultivated  by Hazara  Singh, one of the five coaccused in the trial  court and  his  associates.  As they were disinclined to  give  up possession  Atma  Singh appointed Ram Singh (P. W.  14)  and Sham  Singh (Deceased) as his attorneys to represent him  in the   litigation  concerning  the  said  land.   These   two attorneys  obtained possession of the plot with the help  of the  police  and  through the intervention  of  the  revenue authorities  in June, 1963.  A few days later  Hazara  Singh and  7  or 8 others persons including Trilok Singh  son.  of Surain  Singh, accused no., I and Trilok Singh son of  Inder

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Singh,  accused  no. 5, threatened the  two  attorneys  with death unless they dissociated themselves with the litigation relating  to  this land.  Sham  Singh,  deceased,  thereupon applied, to the City Inspector of Police complaining against this  threat  as a result of which Hazara Singh  and  Trilok Singh  son  of Inder Singh were proceeded against  under  s. 107,  Cr.   P.C. The two attorneys, it  appears,  wanted  to plough  the land in question but were afraid of the  accused persons.  They approached the Superintendent of 966 Police  for  help which was made available to  them  against payment  of  the prescribed fee.  The land in  question  was actually  ploughed by the attorneys in the presence  of  the police on June 26, 1963 when Hazara Singh, Trilok Singh  son of Inder Singh and Harnam Singh, father of Pala Singh,  came there  armed with lathes but were apprehended.   The  police stayed  on the land in question for about 5 or 6  days.   On August  9, 1963 the crop standing on the said and was  found damaged.  At the instance of Ram Singh (P.W. 14) the  police prosecuted  Hazara  Singh,  his  brother  Tara  Singh,   his employee Channan and Trilok Singh son of Inder Singh, all of whom  were  found guilty and convicted.  In  November,  1963 Hazara  Singh, Harnam Singh, Bulkar Singh (’brother of  Pala Singh)  and other persons were prosecuted for ploughing  the said  land but: were acquited.  On December 15, 1963  Hazara Singh  and  17  or 18 other  persons  attached  Sham  Singh, deceased,  and  Ram Singh (P.W. 14).  The  police  proceeded against  Hazara  Singh, his wife Piar Kaur and  his  brother Mahal Singh, wife of Tara Singh, brother of Hazara Singh and Mangal  Singh, brother of Trilok Singh son of  Surain  Singh under  s.  107,  Cr.   P.C. During  the  pendency  of  these proceedings  Sham Singh, deceased, and Ram Singh  (P.W.  14) were attached by six persons including Hazara Singh, the two Trilok  Singh’s (Trilok Singh son of Surain  Singh,  accused no. 1 appellant no. 2 in this Court and Trilok Singh son  of Inder Singh accused no. 5 in the trial court) Channan Singh, Harnam  Singh  and Nangal Singh who were  committed  to  the sessions court to stand their trial for an offence under  s. 307,  I.P.C.  and other offences.  Sham, deceased,  and  Ram Singh  (P.W. 14) were to appear as prosecution witnesses  in that case which was adjourned to June 3 1966 because of  the absence  of  Trilok Singh, appellant.  On May  23,  1966  at about  7.30 a. m. Laxman Singh (P.W.2) was coming  from  his coal  depot in Basti Danishmandan, to his residential  house situated  in  a  lane in which Sham  Singh,  deceased,  also resided.   The  deceased  was at that time  going  ahead  of Laxman Singh and Narinder Singh, brother of the deceased was following Laxman Singh about 3 or 4 yards behind.  When Sham Singh  reached  near the shop of Babu Rain,  barber,  Tirlok Singh,  appellant,  and Dhira (accused no. 2  in  the  trial court) each armed with a kirpan and Pala Singh, accused, and Trilok  Singh son of Inder Singh  armed with a  Lathi  each, appeared  at  the  spot.  Trilok Singh son  of  Inder  Singh shouted  that  the enemy had come and  should  be  murdered. Dhira  aimed  a  kripan  blow at the  head  of  Sham  Singh, deceased,  who  caught hold of the kirpan but the  same  was pulled  away by Dhira.  Pala Singh there upon gave  a  lathi below  on the head of the deceased as a result of  which  he fell  on  the ground face downwards.  This was  followed  by three or four kirpan blows by the appellant Trilok Singh  on the  back of the next of the deceased.  The  occurrence  was witnessed by Gokal Chand (P.W.3) who practises in  Ayurvedic system of medicine and has  a 967 shop  nearby and Trilochan Singh (P.W. 9) a  tractor  driver

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who  happened  to pass that way to attend to his  duties  as such, The learned Additional Sessions Judge acquitted all the  ac- cused  persons  holding that  the  Assistant  Sub-Inspector, Kashmiri  Lal,  who  had investigated the  offence  had  not performed  his duties in a fair and straight forward  manner and that the prosecution evidence was not trustworthy so  as to  bring  home  the  offence  to  the  accused  beyond  the possibility   of  a  reasonable  doubt.   The  trial   court expressed  the  view that the first information  report  had been  recorded  after great delay and after there  had  been consultation  with  the interested  persons,.   The  special report had also not reached the duty magistrate- till  after the expiry of 8 or 9 hours though the duty magistrate  lives in  the  same town.  The inquest report prepared  by  A.S.I. Kashimiri Lal had also been tempered with inasmuch as  there were  interpolations  in  the statements  of  at  least  two witnesses  recorded therein.  Gokal Chand (P.W.3)  was  also disbelieved  by the trial court and so was  Trilochan  Singh (P.W.  9).   The  recovery of  blood-stained  sword  at  the instance  of Trilok Singh, appellant, was also discarded  as unreliable.   The site plan prepared by A.S.I. Kashmiri  Lal was  also held to have been prepared not, as it purposed  to be, before 9.45 a.m. but long thereafter when he had decided to implicate Hazara Singh also as a party to the  conspiracy under  s. 120B, I.P.C. As observed earlier, all the  accused were acquitted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. On appeal by the State the High Court considered  the entire evidence  in  great  detail and examined  all  the  material circumstances  which  had weighed with the  trial  court  in disbelieving the prosecution story, and in disagreement with the trial court, cameto   the   conclusion   that    the prosecution had fully proved the case     against  the   two appellants in this Court. Shri  R. L. Kohli, the learned counsel for  the  appellants, took  us through the relevant evidence and the judgments  of the two   courts below. The principal argument passed by him in support     of  this  appeal was  that  the  learned Additional Sessions Judge had on a consideration of the entire evidence come to a conclusion which is  reasonable and  had,  the  basis  of  that  conclusion  held  that  the prosecution witnesses were not reliable and that the accused were,  therefore,  entitled to acquittal.  The  High  Court, according   to  this  submission,  was  not   justified   in reappraising the evidence     for    itself   and    in disagreeing  with  the  reasoning of  the  trail  court  for convicting the appellants on appeal against acquittal. We  would  first  deal  with the  argument  that  the  first information report was recorded after a long delay, that the inquest report was tampered with by A.S.I. Kashmiri Lal, and that the special report was not sent to the duty  magistrate with the promptitude 968 expected  under  the Code of Criminal Procedure.   P.W.  13, S.I.Pritam Lal has deposed that on May 23, 1966 when he  was posted as Sub-Inspector, Police Station, Kotwal Jullundur he received  ruqa from Kashmiri Lal on the basis of  which  Ex. PD/1 was recorded by him.  He thereupon went to the spot  in Basti Danishmandan and reached there at 10 a.m. Dead body of Sham  Singh  had by that ’time already  been  despatched  by A.S.I.  Kashmiri  Lal  This  witness  then  took  over   the investigation  from  Kashmiri  Lal.   There  was  no  cross- examination  worth the name of this witness suggesting  that he had not told the truth in court.  The F.I.R. purports  to have been recorded at 9.5 a.m. on May 23, 1966.  The time of

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occurrence  is stated to be 7-30 a.m. on that very  day  and the distance between the place of occurrence and the  Police Station  is about 24 miles.  If S.I. Pritam Lal reached  the place  of  occurrence at 10 a.m. as deposed  by  him,  which statement  is  not  shaken  by  any  cross-examination  then plainly the F.I.R. cannot be considered to have been  lodged after  undue delay.  Nor can it be said that the do-ad  body of the deceased was despatched from the place of  occurrence after  undue delay.  Kashmiri Lal, A.S.I. appeared  as  P.W. 21.  According to his testimony on May 23, 1966 when he  was posted  as  A.S.I. in charge of police post  no.  5,  police station, Jullunder City at about 7.40 a.m. he was present at bus stand at Basti Gujan when Laxman Singh (P.W.3)  appeared before him and made statement Ex.  PD/I which was  forwarded by  the witness with his endorsement to the  police  station Jullundur  City for registration of the case at  about  8.30 a.m.  Kashmiri Lal accompanied Luxman Singh to the  spot  in Main  Bazar Basti Danishmandan reaching there at about  8.40 a.m. The dead body of Sham Singh was lying near the shop  of Babu  Ram and Narinder Singh, Gokul Chand and several  other persons were present there.  He prepared the inquest  report Ex.   PC and recorded the statements of Narinder  Singh  and Gokal  Chand and sent the dead body with the inquest  report to  the Mortuary for postmortem at about 9.45  a.m.  through constable   Takhat  Singh.   In  cross-examination  it   was elicited from him that he had prepared a site plan Ex.  PH/1 when  the dead body was still there meaning thereby that  he had prepared the site plan before 9.45 a.m. The deceased was at  that  time  wearing only a banian and  a  chaddar.   The suggestion  that it was he who had recorded the  F.I.R.  and that  he  had  prepared the site plan in  the  afternoon  in consultation with Luxman Singh, Narinder Singh and Ram Singh (P.Ws) in the presence of Inspector Janak Raj was denied  by him.   The inquest report Ex.  P/C was subjected  to  strong criticism  by  Shri  Kohli on three counts.   In  the  first instance it was urged that the statements of Narinder  Singh and  Gokal Chand which were attached to the  inquest  report originally referred to two injuries caused by Trilok  Singh, appellant, with his sword, but later the 969 digit 4 in one and the word four in the other were added  in those  statements so as to make them read as if two or  four injuries  were  inflicted  by Trilok  Singh  by  his  sword. According to Shri Kohli’s suggestion the medical examination disclosed that there were five injuries on the person of the deceased.  From this it was sought to be concluded that  the inquest  report was tampered with by A.S.I. Kashmiri Lal  so that the number of injuries mentioned therein may not differ from  the  number suggested by the  medical  evidence.   The second  criticism related to the insertion in the site  plan of  S. 120B which only relates to Hazara Singh,  whose  name had not been mentioned by anyone up to that stage.  From the insertion  of S. 120B in the site plan it was inferred  that Kashmiri  Lal had some enmity with Hazara Singh and that  he had,  therefore,  already made up his mind to  falsely  rope Hazara  Singh  in.   On  this  line  of.  reasoning  it  was suggested that the investigation carried out by Kashmiri Lal was  far from honest, faithful and fair.  It  was  contended that  when cross-examined Kashmiri Lal admitted that he  had inserted  the offence under S. 120B in the site plan at  the same  time,  when the offence under s. 302/34,  I.P.C.,  was mentioned.  The denial by this witness that he had  recorded the first information report and prepared the site plan late in  the evening in consultation with Laxman Singh,  Narinder Singh  and  Ram  Singh, P.Ws. argued  Shri  Kohli,  was  not

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correct.   In  our opinion the criticism  levelled  by  Shri Kohli does not justify the rejection of the F.I.R. or of the site  plan  and  the inquest report, as  suggested  by  Shri Kohli.  It is noteworthy that in Laxman Singh’s  information to  P.W.  21 there is a clear reference  to  Hazara  Singh’s grievance  and  his  interest in the land  in  dispute.   It cannot, therefore, be said that in the site plan mention  of Hazara  and  of  an offence under s.  120B,  being  a  later interpolation,  is  a  suspicious  circumstance   suggesting unfairness of the investigation. P.W. 21, when asked, denied that he had made  interpolations by  adding figure 4 in the statement of Narinder  Singh  and word four in the statement of Gokal Chand.  Now as stated by P.W.  13,  whom  we see no reason to  disbelieve,  that  the inquest  report was sent along with the dead body then  that report was prepared with due dispatch and sent in due course without  any delay.  It was not improperly retained for  any sinister  purpose  of finalising it after  consulting  other prosecution witnesses.  It was suggested by Shri Kohli  that after the post-mortem examination, inquest report was handed over  to  the police officers and they must  have  made  the necessary  insertions  in the two statements so as  to  make them conform to the medical report.  If that was the object, when, one would have, expected the statements to convey that there  were  five  injuries  and not  merely  two  or  four. However, assuming without holding, that in the 970 inquest  report  the  figure  4 and  word  four  were  added afterwards,  in  our view, this by itself does  not  detract from  the general trustworthiness of the inquest report  nor does  it  render the investigation suspicious so  as  to  be fatal to the prosecution. Shri Kohli strongly criticised the fact that the  occurrence report  contemplated  by  S. 157, Cr.P.C. was  sent  to  the magistrate  concerned  very late.  Indeed,  this  challenge, like  the argument of interpolation and belated despatch  of the inquest report, was developed for the purpose of showing that  the  investigation was not just, fair  and  forthright and, therefore, the prosecution case must be looked at  with great  suspicion.  This argument is also  unacceptable.   No doubt,  the  report reached the magistrate at about  6  p.m. Section  157,  Cr.   P.C. requires such report  to  be  sent forthwith  by the police officer concerned to  a  magistrate empowered  to  take  cognisance of such  offence.   This  is really  designed  to  keep the magistrate  informed  of  the investigation of such cognizable offence so as to be able to control   the  investigation  and  if  necessary   to   give appropriate  direction  under s. 159.  But when we  find  in this  case  that the F.I.R. was  actually  recorded  without delay  and  the investigation started on the basis  of  that F.I.R.  and  there  is no other  infirmity  brought  to  our notice, then, however improper or objectionable the  delayed receipt of the report by the magistrate concerned it  cannot by itself justify the conclusion that the investigation  was tainted  and the prosecution insupportable.  It is  not  the appellants  case  that  they have been  prejudiced  by  this delay. Shri  Kohli  took  us  through  the  evidence  of  the-  eye witnesses and pointed out certain minor discrepancies.   But his  main  contention  was based on the  argument  that  the judgment  of the trial court was reasonable and it was  open to a court to come to the conclusion to which it came.   The High  Court was, therefore, not justified in  reversing  the judgment of acquittal into one of conviction.  In support of his submission he relied on three decisions of this Court

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             1.    Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan(1).               2. Ramabhupala Reddy v. State of A  p. (2).               3. Bansidhar Mohanty v. State of Orissa(3). In  the latest decision of this Court in  Ramabhupala  Reddy (supra) it has been observed that the controversy in  regard to the scope (1)  [1961] 3 S.C.R. 120. (2) A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 460. (3) A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 585. 971 of an appeal against an order of acquittal has been  settled by  this Court in Sanwant Singh (supra) in which  the  legal position was summarised thus :                "1.  An  appellate Court has full  powers  to               review  the evidence upon which the  order  of               acquittal is founded;                2.   the   principles  laid  down   in   Sheo               Swarup’s case (61 I.A. 398) afforded a correct               guide for the appellate court’s approach to  a               case disposing of such an appeal;                3.   the  different phraseology used  in  the               judgments of this court such as :                (a)  ’substantial and compelling reasons’;                (b)  good and sufficiently cogent reasons’;                (c)’strong  reasons’  are  not  intended   to               curtail  the undoubted power of  an  appellate               court in an appeal against acquittal to review               the  entire  evidence and to come to  its  own               conclusion, but in doing so it should not only               consider  every  matter  on  record  having  a               bearing on the questions of fact and the  rea-               sons  given by the court below in  support  of               its order of acquittal but should express  the               reasons  in its judgment which led it to  hold               that the acquittal was not justified." This,  in our view, correctly summarises the legal  position as  finally settled by this Court.  The submission urged  by Shri Kohli, therefore,, that merely because the judgment  of the  trial court prima  facie seems reasonable there  is  no scope  for  reassessment of the evidence  by  the  appellate court  is unacceptable.  The court of appeal has full  power under the statute to go into the entire evidence and all the relevant  circumstances  of the case for coming to  its  own conclusion  about  the  guilt or innocence  of  the  accused bearing in mind the initial presumption of the innocence  of an accused person and the fact that he was acquitted by  the trial     court.   We  do  not think  that  the  High  Court committed any error in the appraisal of the evidence on  the record and in arriving at its own conclusion as to the guilt of the appellants.  The criticism about the insertion of  S. 120B  in  the plan Ex PH/1, in our view,  may  raise  slight suspecion  but  in  view  of  the  trustworthiness  of   the prosecution  evidence led in the case we do not  think  that in any way justifies any grave suspicion of the  prosecution story. Besides,  the  case is now before us under Art. 136  of  the Constitution.   We allowed Shri Kohli not only to state  the case broadly 972 and to take us through the judgments of the two courts below but  also to take us through such evidence as he  considered proper for persuading us to hold that the High Court had not followed  the principals laid down in Sanwant  Singh’s  case (supra) or that its conclusions were otherwise so  erroneous as  to justify interference by this Court under Art. 136  of

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the  Constitution.  We are not persuaded to hold that  there is any ground for differing with the conclusion of the  High Court. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must fail and  is dismissed. G.C.                              Appeal dismissed. 973