http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 6  

PETITIONER: PADAM SEN AND ANOTHER

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27/09/1960

BENCH: DAYAL, RAGHUBAR BENCH: DAYAL, RAGHUBAR IMAM, SYED JAFFER SARKAR, A.K.

CITATION:  1961 AIR  218            1961 SCR  (1) 884  CITATOR INFO :  E          1962 SC 527  (21,44)  R          1966 SC1899  (5)  D          1975 SC1685  (9)  RF         1983 SC1272  (21)  R          1986 SC 421  (35)

ACT:  Commissioner--Appointment      for      seizing      account  books--Validity of--Inherent Powers of civil Court--Code  of  Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), ss. 75, 151, O. XXVI.  Public   Servant--Commissioner  appointed  by  Civil   Court  without jurisdiction--Whether in Possession of the situation  of a Public servant--Indian Penal Code, 1860 (XLV of  1860),  S. 21, EXP. 2.

HEADNOTE:  A  Munsif appointed one R as a commissioner for seizing  the  account books of the plaintiff in a suit and to produce them  before him.  R seized the account books, and while they were  still in his possession the appellants offered a bribe to  R  for being allowed to tamper with them.  The appellants  were  tried and convicted under s. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code.  The appellants contended that the Munsif had no jurisdiction  to  appoint a commissioner for seizing account  books,  that  the appointment of R as a commissioner was null and void and  that  consequently  R  was  not a  public  servant  and  the  appellants  committed  no offence in offering him  a  bribe.  The respondent urged that the Munsif had jurisdiction  under  his  inherent powers under s. 151, Code of Civil  Procedure,  to appoint the commissioner and that in any case as R was in  actual  possession  of  the situation of  a  public  servant  within  Explanation 2 to S. 21 Of the Indian Penal Code,  he  would be deemed to be a public servant.  Held, that R was not a public servant and the appellants did  not  commit any offence under s. 165-A of the Penal Code  by  offering him a bribe.  The Munsif had no inherent powers to appoint a  commissioner  to seize account books and his order was null and void.  The  inherent powers under s. 151, Code of Civil Procedure,  were  with  respect to the procedure to be followed by a Court  in  deciding  the  cause before it; such powers did  not  extend

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 6  

over the substantive rights of litigants.  A party had  full  rights over his account books and the Court had no  inherent  power to forcibly seize his property.  Explanation 2 to S. 21, Indian Penal Code, applied only to a  person actually in possession of a pre-existing office of  a  public  servant.  In the present case there was no  post  or  office of a commissioner in existence which could be said to  have  been  occupied  by R. His  appointment  being  without  jurisdiction R could not be deemed to be a public servant.  885

JUDGMENT:  CRIMINAL   APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:  Criminal   Appeal   No.  149/1958.  Appeal  from the judgment and order dated October 27,  1958,  of  the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 1154  of  1956.  N. C. Chatterjee and R. L. Kohli, for the appellant.  G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, for the respondent.  1960. September 27.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered  by  RAGHUBAR DAYAL J.-This is an appeal by Padam Sen and Shekbar  Chand  against  the  order  of  the  Allahabad  High   Court  dismissing  their  appeal against the order of  the  Special  Judge, Meerut, convicting them of an offence under s.  165-A  of  the Indian Penal Code.  The High Court granted leave  to  appeal against its order.  One  Genda  Mal, father of Shekhar Chand, appellant  No.  2,  sued  Mithan Lal and others in the Court of  the  Additional  Munsif,  Ghaziabad,  for money on the  basis  of  promissory  notes  executed  by  the  defendants  in  his  favour.   The  defendants  apprehending that the plaintiff would  fabricate  his books of account with respect to payments made by  them,  applied  for  the  seizure  of  the  account  books  of  the  plaintiff.  The Additional Munsif, by his order dated  March  27,   1954,   appointed   Sri   Raghubir   Pershad,   Vakil,  Commissioner   to  seize  those  books  of   account.    The  Commissioner accordingly seized those books and brought them  to Ghaziabad.  The appellants were convicted by the Special Judge under  s.  165-A  of the Indian Penal Code for having offered bribe  to  the Commissioner for being allowed an opportunity to  tamper  with those books of account.  Their conviction was upheld by  the High Court.  The two Courts below have found that the appellants went  to  the Commissioner’s Office on March 30, 1954, and offered him  Rs.  900  as bribe.  The appellants do not  challenge  these  findings  of fact recorded by the Courts below.  Their  only  contention is that      113  886  Sri  Raghubir  Pershad, the Commissioner, was not  a  public  servant, and therefore even on the basis of the findings  of  fact arrived at by the Courts below, they did not commit any  offence under s. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code.  It   has  been  contended  for  the  appellants   that   the  appointment of Sri Raghubir Pershad as Commissioner was null  and void as the Additional Munsif had no power to appoint  a  Commissioner for the purpose of seizing the account books of  the  plaintiff  on  an  application  b  application  by  the  defendants, the power of a Civil Court to issue a commission  being  limited by the provisions of s. 75 and Order XXVI  of  the  Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter called the  Code),

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 6  

and  the  Court  having  no  inherent  power  to  appoint  a  Commissioner  for  any purpose not mentioned in  s.  75  and  Order XXVI of the Code.  On behalf of the State it is  urged  that the Court can appoint a Commissioner in the exercise of  its inherent powers saved by s. 151 of the Code for purposes  which  do not come within the provisions of s. 75 and  Order  XXVI of the Code.  It  is  further  submitted for the State that  even  if  the  Additional  Munsif had no power to appoint the  Commissioner  for seizing the books of account, Sri Raghubir Pershad would  be deemed to be a public servant in view of Explanation 2 to  s.  21  of the Indian Penal Code because he  was  in  actual  possession of the situation of a public servant for he acted  as Commissioner and was recognized as such by the appellants  and others connected with the civil suit.  Section  75  of  the  Code empowers the  Court  to  issue  a  commission, subject to conditions and limitations which  may  be  prescribed, for four purposes, viz., for  examining  any  person,  for making a local investigation, for examining  or  adjusting  accounts and for making a partition.  Order  XXVI  lays  down  rules relating to the issue of  commissions  and  allied  matters.   Mr. Chatterjee, learned counsel  for  the  appellants, has submitted that the powers of a Court must be  found within the four corners of the Code and that when  the  Code  has  expressly  dealt  with  the  subject  matter   of  commissions in s. 75 the Court cannot  887  invoke  its inherent powers under s. 151 and thereby add  to  its  powers.   On the other hand, it is  submitted  for  the  State, that the Code is not exhaustive and the Court, in the  exercise of its inherent powers, can adopt any procedure not  prohibited by the Code expressly or by necessary implication  if the Court considers it necessary, for the ends of justice  or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.  Section 151 of the Code reads:                "  Nothing  in this Code shall  be  deemed  to                limit or otherwise affect the inherent  powers                of  the  Court to make such orders as  may  be                necessary  for  the  ends  of  justice  or  to                prevent abuse of the process of the Court ".  The  inherent  powers of the Court are in  addition  to  the  powers  specifically  conferred on the Court  by  the  Code.  They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must  be  held  that the Court is free to exercise  them  for  the  puposes mentioned in s. 151 of the Code when the exercise of  those  powers  is not in any way in conflict with  what  has  been   expressly  provided  in  the  Code  or  against   the  intentions  of the Legislature.  It is also well  recognized  that  the inherent power is not to be exercised in a  manner  which  will be contrary to or different from  the  procedure  expressly provided in the Code.  The question for determination is whether the impugned order  of  the  Additional Munsif appointing Sri  Raghubir  Pershad  Commissioner  for seizing the plaintiff’s books  of  account  can  be said to be an order which is passed by the Court  in  the  exercise of its inherent powers.  The  inherent  powers  saved  by  s.  151  of the Code  are  with  respect  to  the  procedure to be followed by the Court in deciding the  cause  before it. These powers are not powers over the  substantive  rights  which any litigant possesses.  Specific powers  have  to be conferred on the Courts for passing such orders  which  would  affect  such rights of a party.  Such  powers  cannot  come within the scope of inherent powers of the Court in the  matters of procedure, which powers have their source in  the  Court  possessing all the essential powers to  regulate  its

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 6  

practice  888  and  procedure.  A party has full rights over its  books  of  account.  The Court has no inherent power forcibly to  seize  its property.  If it does so, it invades the private  rights  of  the party.  Specific procedure is laid down in the  Code  for getting the relevant documents or books in Court for the  purpose  of  using  them as evidence.  A party  is  free  to  produce such documents or books in support of its case as be  relevant.   A  party can ask the help of the Court  to  have  produced  in Court by the other party such documents  as  it  would  like to be used in evidence and are admitted by  that  party to be in its possession.  If a party does not  produce  the  documents  it is lawfully called upon to  produce,  the  Court  has the power to penalize it, in accordance with  the  provisions of the Code.  The Court has the further power  to  draw  any  presumption  against such a party  who  does  not  produce the relevant document in its possession,  especially  after  it  has been summoned from it.  Even  in  such  cases  where  the Court summons a document from a party, the  Court  has  not  been given any power to get hold of  the  document  forcibly from the possession of the defaulting party.  The  defendants had no rights to these account books.   They  could  not  lay  any claim to them.  They  applied  for  the  seizure  of  these books because they apprehended  that  the  plaintiff  might  make such entries in those  account  books  which  could  go against the case they were  setting  up  in  Court.   The  defendants’  request really  amounted  to  the  Court’s collecting documentary evidence which the defendants  considered  to be in their favour at that point of time.  it  is no business of the Court to collect evidence for a  party  or   even  to  protect  the  rival  party  from   the   evil  consequences  of  making forged entries in those  ac.  count  books.  If the plaintiff does forge entries and uses  forged  entries  as evidence in the case, the defendants would  have  ample opportunity to dispute those entries and to prove them  forgeries.  We  are therefore of opinion that the Additional Munsif  bad  DO   inherent   power  to  pass  the  order   appointing   a  Commissioner to seize the plaintiff’s  889  account books.  The order appointing Sri Raghubir Pershad as  Commissioner for this purpose was therefore an order  passed  without  jurisdiction  and  was therefore a  null  and  void  order.  Learned counsel for the State, Mr. Mathur, has submitted  in  the  alternative that the impugned procedure adopted by  the  Additional  Munsif  comes within certain provisions  of  the  Code and has referred to r. 5 of Order XXXVIII and rr.  1(b)  and  7 of Order XXXIX and r. 1 of Order XL of the Code.   We  do  not agree with this contention. The impugned  order  was  not passed under any of these provisions.  It was clearly an  order  which the Additional Munsif purported to pass in  the  exercise  of  the inherent powers of the Court.   The  order  was:  "  It is strange that an application of this kind  has  been  made  at this late stage, after over 2 years.   However,  in  the  interests of justice, issue commission to Sri  Raghubir  Pershad.   Ho must go and recover Bahi Khatas for  the  year  1951 from the plaintiff and produce the same in Court.  Fees  Rs.  20,  plus T. A. Report within six days.  Costs  of  the  commission will not be taxed."  Further,  the  provisions of r. 5 of Order  XXXVIII  are  to  prevent   a  decree  that  may  be  passed  being   rendered  infructuous  and r. 1(b) of Order XXXIX is applicable  where

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 6  

the  defendant  threatens  to dispose  of  his  property  to  defraud  creditors.   None  of  these  provisions  has   any  application  to  the facts of the present case.  Rule  7  of  Order  XXXIX empowers the Court, on the application  of  any  party  to  a  suit,  to make an  order  for  the  detention,  preservation  or  inspection of any property  which  is  the  subject-matter of such suit or as to which any question  may  arise therein.  The account books of the plaintiffs were not  ’  property ’ which were the subject-matter of the suit  nor  such  that  about them a question could arise in  the  suit.  The  account  books  could,  at best,  have  been  piece  of  evidence,  if  the plaintiff or the defendant had  cared  to  rely on them.  We therefore hold that the Additional  Munsif  had no power under the Code to appoint the Commissioner  for  seizing the plaintiff’s books of account.  890  Lastly  it  was  urged  for  the  State  that  even  if  the  appointment of Sri Raghubir Pershad as Commissioner was null  and  void  as the Additional Munsif had no  jurisdiction  to  appoint a Commissioner for seizing the account books of  the  plaintiff,  Sri Raghubir Pershad should be treated to  be  a  ’public  servant’ in view of Explanation 2 to s. 21  of  the  Indian  Penal  Code.   It  has not  been  disputed  for  the  appellant that if the appointment Of Sri Raghubir Pershad as  Commissioner  bad  been valid, he would have been  a  public  servant in view of the Fourth Clause to s. 21 of the  Indian  Penal Code.  Explanation 2 to s. 21 reads:                "Wherever  the words ’public  servant’  occur,                they  shall be understood of every person  who                is in actual possession of the situation of  a                public  servant, whatever legal  defect  there                may be in his right to hold that situation."  The  contention  for the State is that though  there  was  a  legal  defect  in  Sri  Raghubir  Pershad’s  appointment  as  Commissioner  on account of the Additional Munsif having  no  power  to appoint a Commissioner for the purpose of  seizing  the  plaintiff’s books of account, that will not affect  his  being a public servant as he was in actual possession of the  situation  of a public servant.  We do not agree  with  this  contention, and are of opinion that the Explanation  applies  only  when  there be a post in existence.   The  Explanation  does  not apply when there is no pre-existing post  or  when  the person appointing has no authority to appoint.  The   word   ’situation’   according   to   Webster’s    New  International  Dictionary  of the English  Language,  means:  position  or  place  of  employment,  place,  office;  as  a  situation in a store.  The apposite meaning for the purposes  of  this  Explanation would be  ’office’.   ’Office’  again,  according  to  the same Dictionary, means  a  special  duty,  trust,  charge  or  position, conferred by  an  exercise  of  governmental authority and for a public purpose ; a position  of  trust or authority conferred by an act  of  governmental  power ; a right to exercise a public function or  employment  and  receive the emoluments (if any) thereto belonging;  as,  an executive or judicial office.......... In a wider sense,  any position or place in the employment of the  891  government,  especially  one  of trust  or  authority.   The  Dictionary  further  notes  the  differences  in  the   con.  notations  of the various words office,  post,  appointment,  situation  and  place and says: Office commonly  suggests  a  position  of  (especially public) trust or authority  ;  and  situation emphasizes the idea of employment, especially in a  subordinate position; as, to seek a situation as  governess,  as private secretary.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 6 of 6  

It  is  therefore  clear  that  it  is  necessary  for   the  application  of this Explanation that the  person  concerned  should be in actual possession of the pre-existing office of  a  public  servant.  If there be no office  or  post,  there  could  be  no  question  of any  person’s  being  in  actual  possession  thereof,  and  of the  person  concerned  coming  within the terms of this Explanation.  There was no post  or  office  of a Commissioner in existence.  All  that  happened  here  was that Sri Raghubir Pershad was authorized to  seize  and  keep  certain  documents in  his  possession.   In  the  present  case  there  was neither  any  existing  office  of  Commissioner, nor the Additional Munsif had power to appoint  Sri  Raghubir  Pershad as Commissioner for  the  purpose  of  seizing  the  plaintiff’s account books and  therefore  this  Explanation  does  not  apply  to  the  appointment  of  Sri  Raghubir Pershad as Commissioner.  It follows, there.  fore,  that  Sri  Raghubir Persbad cannot be held to  be  a  public  servant.  We  therefore accept the contention for the  appellants  and  hold that Sri Raghubir Pershad was not a public servant  and  that  therefore  the appellants did not commit  any  offence  under  s. 165-A of the Indian Penal Code by  their  offering  him money in order to have an opportunity to tamper with the  books  of account which were in his custody.   We  therefore  allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Court below and  acquit  the  appellants of the offence under  s.  165-A  and  direct that the fine, if paid, be refunded.  The  appellants  are on bail and therefore the bail bonds will be cancelled.          Appeal allowed.  892