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PETITIONER: P. S. R. SADHANANTHAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: ARUNACHALAM & ANR.

DATE OF JUDGMENT01/02/1980

BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. BENCH: PATHAK, R.S. KRISHNAIYER, V.R. FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA DESAI, D.A. KOSHAL, A.D.

CITATION:  1980 AIR  856            1980 SCR  (2) 873  1980 SCC  (3) 141  CITATOR INFO :  D          1988 SC1531  (182)  D          1991 SC2085  (7)

ACT:      Constitution  of   India  1950,  Article  136-Scope  of jurisdiction-High Court  in appeal  setting aside conviction and sentence  by trial  court for murder-No appeal preferred by government-Private  party if  could  invoke  jurisdiction under Article 136.      Words & Phrases-’Crime’-Definition of.

HEADNOTE:      The petitioner  was acquitted  by  the  High  Court  in appeal, of  charges under  sections 302  and 148 I.P.C., but the brother of the deceased-not the State nor even the first informant, petitioned  this Court  under Article  136 of the Constitution for  special leave to appeal against acquittal, got leave,  had  his  appeal  heard,  which  was  ultimately allowed the  court setting  aside the  judgment of  the High Court, and  restoring the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial  court under section 302 I.P.C. (Arunachalam v. S. R. Sadhananthan [1979] 3 S.C.R. 482).      The petitioner filed the writ petition under Article 32 of the  Constitution, contending:  (1) that  Article 136 did not empower the grant of special leave to the brother of the deceased and the grant of special leave by the Court and its entertaining  the   appeal  violated   Article  21   of  the Constitution, and  (2) before  the Court  may grant  special leave under Article 136 there must be an antecedent right of appeal absent  which the question of leave by the Court does not arise.      Dismissing the petition, ^      HELD: (per  Krishna Iyer,  Murtaza Fazal Ali and Desai, JJ).      1. Justice  is functionally  outraged not  only when an innocent person  is punished but also when a guilty criminal gets away with it stultifying the legal system. [877H, 878A]      2. An  insightful understanding of the sweep, scope and

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character of  Art. 136  will  easily  dispel  the  dichotomy between an antecedent right of appeal and a subsequent grant of leave. [878D]      3. The  jural reach  and plural  range of  the judicial process to  remove injustice  in a  given society  is a sure index of the versatile genius of law-in-action as a delivery system of  social justice. Our constitutional order vests in the summit  court a  jurisdiction to  do  justice,  at  once omnipresent and omnipotent but controlled and guided by that refined yet flexible censor called judicial discretion. This nidus of  power and  process, which  master-minds the  broad observance throughout  the Republic  of justice according to law, is Art. 136. [878E-F] 874      4. In  express terms,  Art. 136 does not confer a right of appeal  on  a  party  as  such  but  it  confers  a  wide discretionary power  on the  Supreme Court  to interfere  in suitable cases. Article 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary power;  it is extra-ordinary in its amplitude, its limit, when  it chases  injustice, is  the sky  itself. This Court  functionally   fulfils  itself  by  reaching  out  to injustice wherever  it is  and this power is largely derived in the common run of cases from Art. 136. [878G-H, 879A]      5. There  is a  procedure necessarily  implicit in  the power vested in the summit court. It must be remembered that Art. 136  confers jurisdiction  on the  highest  court.  The founding fathers  unarguably intended  in the  very terms of Art. 136 that it shall be exercised by the highest judges of the land  with scrupulous  adherence to  judicial principles well-established  by   precedents  in   our   jurisprudence. Judicial discretion  is canalised  authority, not  arbitrary eccentricity. [879A-C]      6. It  is  manifest  that  Art.  136  is  of  composite structure, is  power-cum-procedure-power in  that  it  vests jurisdiction in  the Supreme Court, and procedure in that it spells a  mode of  hearing. It  obligates  the  exercise  of judicial   discretion   and   the   mode   of   hearing   so characteristic of  the court  process. In short, there is an in-built prescription  of power  and procedure  in terms  of Art. 136 which meets the demand of Art. 21. [879E-F]      7. If  Art. 21  is telescoped into Art. 136, it follows that fair  procedure is  imprinted on the special leave that the court  may grant  or refuse.  With a  motion is made for leave to appeal against an acquittal, this Court appreciates the gravity  of the  peril to  personal liberty  involved in that proceeding.  While considering  the petition under Art. 136 the court will pay attention to the question of liberty, the person  who seeks  such leave from the court, his motive and his  locus standi and the weighty factors which persuade the court to grant special leave. [879F-G]      8. ’The  wider the discretionary power the more sparing its exercise. The Court may not, save in special situations, grant leave  to one  who is  not eo  nomine a  party on  the record. [880C-D]      9. Sometimes indifference of bureaucratic officials, at other  times  politicisation  of  higher  functionaries  may result in  refusal to  take a  case to this Court under Art. 136 even  though the justice of the lis may well justify it. In the  absence  of  an  independent  prosecution  authority easily accessible  to every  citizen, a wider connotation of the expression  ’standing’ is  necessary  for  Art.  136  to further  its  mission.  There  are  jurisdictions  in  which private  individuals-  not  the  State  alone-may  institute criminal proceedings. [880G-H, 881A]      10. The  narrow limits set, into the concept of ’person

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aggrieved’ and ’standing’ needs liberalisation. [881E]      Baker v.  Carr (1962) 369 U.S. 186, Attorney-General of the Gambia  v. Pierra  Sarr  N’Jie,  [1961]  A.C.  617,  Bar Council of  Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar, [1975] 2 SCC 702 referred to.      (Per Pathak and Koshal, JJ concurring).      1. Article 136 seeks to confer on the Supreme Court the widest  conceivable  range  of  judicial  power,  making  it perhaps among  the most  powerful courts  in the  world. The judicial  power  reaches  out  to  every  judgment,  decree, determi- 875 nation,  sentence   or  order   affecting  the   rights  and obligations of persons in civil matters, of life and liberty in criminal matters as well as matters touching the Revenues of  the   State.  It  is  an  attempt  to  ensure  that  the foundations of  the Indian Republic, which have been laid on the bed-rock  of justice,  are  not  undermined  by  justice anywhere in the land. [884CE]      Bharat Bank  Ltd. v.  Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd. [1950] S.C.R.  459,  474,  Durga  Shankar  Mehta  v.  Thakur Raghuraj  Singh  and  Others,  [1955]  1  S.C.R.  267,  272, referred to.      2. Article  136 vests  in the  Supreme Court, a plenary jurisdiction in  the  matter  of  entertaining  and  hearing appeals by  grant of special leave. However, a limitation is inbuilt into the jurisdiction of the Court and it flows from the nature  and character of the case intended to be brought before the  Court, and  it requires  compliance despite  the apparent plenitude  of power  vested in  the Court.  When  a petition is  presented to  the Court  under Article 136, the Court will  have due  regard to  the nature and character of the cause  sought to  be brought before it when entertaining and disposing of the petition. [884E-G]      3. A  crime is  an act  deemed by  law to be harmful to society in  general, even  though its immediate victim is an individual. Murder  injures primarily the particular victim, but its  blatant disregard  of human  life puts  it beyond a matter of  mere compensation  between the  murderer and  the victim’s family.  Those who  commit such  acts are proceeded against by  the State  in order that, if convicted, they may be punished.  No private  person has  a direct interest in a criminal proceeding  although exception  may be  made by the Statute in certain cases. [885C-F]      Kenny’s Outlines  of Criminal Law, 16th Edn., p. 2 para 3 Blackstones Commentaries, III p. 2, Mogul Steamship Co. v. Mc Greger Gew & Co. [1889] 23 QBD 598; referred to.      4. The  notion of  crime  as  a  threat  to  the  whole community is  the material  counter-part of  the formal rule that the State alone is master of a criminal prosecution. In a  criminal   proceeding,  the   State  stands   forward  as prosecutor on public grounds. No private person has a direct interest in a criminal proceeding, although exception may be made by the statute in certain cases. A criminal prosecution is not  intended for  the private satisfaction of a personal vendetta or  revenge. In  India, the  criminal law envisages the State as the prosecutor. [885E-F]      Salmond on  Jurisprudence, 12th  Edn. p. 92 para 14 and Current  Legal  Problems,  1955;  Glanville  Williams,  "The Definition of Crime", p. 107 at p. 122; referred to.      5. Under  the Code  of Criminal Procedure 1973, s. 378, the right  of appeal  vested in  the State has now been made subject to  leave being  granted to  the State  by the  High Court. The  complainant  continues  to  be  subject  to  the prerequisite condition  that he must obtain special leave to

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appeal. The  fetters so  imposed on  the right to appeal are prompted by  the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by  a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and  tension of  a further  examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [886B-C] 876      Law Commission  of India  48th Report  1972  pp.  17-21 referred to.      6. What  follows from  the grant of special leave is an appeal, and  the jurisdiction must, therefore, be invoked by a petitioner  possessing a  locus standi  recognised in law. [887F-G]      7. Access  to the jurisdiction under Article 136 cannot be permitted  to a  private party  who seeks  to employ  the judicial process  for the satisfaction of private revenge or personal vendetta.  Nor can it be permitted as an instrument of coercion  where a  civil action would lie. In every case, the Court  is bound  to consider  what is the interest which brings the  petitioner to  court and whether the interest of the public  community will  benefit by  the grant of special leave. [887B-C]      8. The  Court should entertain a special leave petition filed by  a private  party, other  than the  complainant, in those cases  only where  it is  convinced  that  the  public interest justifies  an appeal against the acquittal and that the State  has refrained  from petitioning for special leave for reasons which do not bear on the public interest but are prompted by  private influence,  want of bona fide and other extraneous considerations. [887E-F]      9. The procedure followed by this Court in disposing of a  petition   under  Article  136  is  consistent  with  the procedure contemplated  by  Article  21  for  the  Court  in exercising its  jurisdiction will  do so  as a  court of law following the  well-known norms of procedure which have been recognised  for   long  as   governing  and   informing  the proceedings of  all courts.  Article 21  is, therefore,  not violated. [887G-H, 888A]

JUDGMENT:      ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 355 of 1979.            (Under Article 32 of the Constitution)      P. R.  Mridul, K.  Jayaram, K. Ram Kumar and Aruneshwar Gupta for the Petitioner.      Soli J. Sorabjee, Solicitor General, R. N. Sachthey, E. C. Agarwala and Miss A. Subhashini for Respondent No. 1.      The Judgment  of V.  R. Krishna  Iyer, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, and  D. A. Desai, JJ. was delivered by Krishna Iyer, J. and concurring opinion of R. S. Pathak and A. D. Koshal, JJ. was delivered by Pathak, J.      KRISHNA  IYER,  J.  Is  it  constitutionally  valid  or desirable on  principle to permit a private citizen, who has but loose  nexus with  the victim  of a crime, to invoke the special power  under Art.  136 of the Constitution for leave to appeal  against an  acquittal  of  the  alleged  criminal thereby putting in peril  his life or liberty in the absence of any  legislative provision arming such officious outsider with the  right to  appeal? This issue, profound on its face but unsound  on reflection,  falls for decision in this writ petition under  Art. 32  of  the  Constitution.  The  facts, compressed into a single sentence, are that the peti- 877 tioner was acquitted of a murder charge by the High Court in appeal but  the brother  of the  deceased-not the  State nor

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even the  first informant-moved  this Court  under Art. 136, got leave  and had  his appeal  heard which  resulted in the petitioner (accused)  being convicted  and sentenced  to the life term  under s.  302 I.P.C. The present contention urged to upset  that conviction,  is that  the leave to appeal and the  subsequent   proceedings   were   unconstitutional   as violative of  Art. 21  the procedural magna carta protective of life  and liberty-and, therefore, the sentence must fail. This plea,  faintly presented  before this  Court  when  the appeal  was   heard,  was  briefly  considered  and  rightly rejected. This second battle, doomed to fail like the first, demands of  us a  condensed ratiocination in negation of the contention hopefully  urged by  Sri Mridul,  counsel for the petitioner.      Two inter-laced  issues arise  and they turn on (a) the content and character of Art. 136 vis-a-vis Art. 21, and (b) the locus  standi of  a Good  Samaritan, if  we may use that expression to  refer to a public-spirited citizen seeking to trigger the legal process to see that justice is done to his neighbour.      Article 21,  in its  sublime brevity,  guardians  human liberty  by  insisting  on  the  prescription  of  procedure established by law, not fiat as sine qua non for deprivation of personal  freedom. And  those procedures  so  established must be  fair, not  fanciful, nor formal nor flimsy, as laid down in  Maneka Gandhi’s  case. So, it is axiomatic that our constitutional  jurisprudence  mandates  the  State  not  to deprive a  person of  his personal liberty without adherence to fair  procedure laid down by law. The question is whether there is  any procedure,  fair or otherwise, which enables a kindly  neighbour   who  is   not  a  complainant  or  first informant,  to  appeal  to  the  Supreme  Court  against  an allegedly erroneous  acquittal by the High Court. The corpus juris contains  no black-letter  law arming  any such purely compassionate  soul  to  approach  this  Court,  argues  Sri Mridul; and  so, his client’s liberty has been deprived by a proceeding  initiated   by  someone  without  any  procedure established by law. We see the dexterity in the advocacy but reject  its   efficacy.  Nor   are  we  impressed  with  the submission that  the brother of the deceased in the case, or any other  high-minded citizen,  is an officious meddler who has  no  business  nor  grievance  when  the  commission  of grievous crime  is going  unpunished. There  is a  spiritual sensitivity for  our criminal  justice system which approves of the  view that  a wrong done to anyone is a wrong done to oneself,  although  for  pragmatic  considerations  the  law leashes  the   right  to   initiate  proceedings   in   some situations. Again,  ’justice is  functionally  outraged  not only when an 878 innocent person  is punished but also when a guilty criminal gets away  with it  stultifying the  legal system.  The deep concern of  the law  is to  track down,  try and  punish the culprit, and if found not guilty, to acquit the accused.      It is  imperative under  Art. 21  that there  should be some civilised  procedure  for  holding  a  man  guilty  and depriving him of his liberty. Undoubtedly, this Court, if it grants leave under Art. 136 and eventually finds him guilty, deprives him  of his  liberty; and  so the  crucial question that falls  for decision  is as  to  whether  there  is  any procedure  as  predicated  by  Art.  21  independent  of  or implicit in  Art. 136.  It is  apparent  that  there  is  no statutory provision  which creates  a  right  of  appeal  in favour of  a stranger enabling him to challenge an acquittal by the  High Court.  The Criminal  Procedure Code  does  not

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create such  a right  of appeal  and, speaking  generally, a right of  appeal is  the  creature  of  statute.  So  it  is submitted that  before the  court may  grant  special  leave under Art.  136 there must be an antecedent right of appeal, absent which  the question  of leave  by the  court does not arise.  The   argument  is   ingenious  but   inference   is fallacious.      An insightful  understanding of  the sweep,  scope  and character of  Art. 136  will  easily  dispel  the  dichotomy between an antecedent right of appeal and a subsequent grant of leave, which is the corner-stone of the contention of the petitioner.      The jural  reach  and  plural  range  of  the  judicial process to  remove injustice  in a  given society  is a sure index of the versatile genius of law-in-action as a delivery system  of   social   justice.   By   this   standard,   our constitutional  order   vests  in   the   summit   court   a jurisdiction  to   do  justice,   at  once  omnipresent  and omnipotent but  controlled and  guided by  that refined  yet flexible censor  called judicial  discretion. This  nidus of power and  process, which  master-minds the broad observance throughout the Republic of justice according to law, is Art. 136.      Specificity being  essential to legality, let us see if the broad  spectrum spread-out  of Art.  136 fills  the bill from the point of view of "procedure established by law". In express terms, Art. 136 does not confer a right of appeal on a party as such but it confers a wide discretionary power on the Supreme  Court  to  interfere  in  suitable  cases.  The discretionary dimension  is considerable but that relates to the power of the court. The question is whether it spells by implication, a fair procedure as contemplated by Art. 21. In our view, it does. Article 136 is a special jurisdiction. It is residuary  power; it  is extra ordinary in its amplitude, its limit, when it chases injustice, in the sky itself. This Court  functionally   fulfils  itself  by  reaching  out  to injustice 879 wherever it  is and  this power  is largely  derived in  the common run  of cases  from Art. 136. Is it merely a power in the Court to be exercised in any manner it fancies? Is there no procedural  limitation in  the manner of exercise and the occasion for exercise ? Is there no duty to Act fairly while hearing a case under Art. 136, either in the matter of grant of leave  or, after such grant, in the final disposal of the appeal ?  We have hardly any doubt that there is a procedure necessarily implicit  in the  power  vested  in  the  summit court.  It   must  be   remembered  that  Art.  136  confers jurisdiction on  the highest  court.  The  founding  fathers unarguably intended  in the  very terms  of Art. 136 that it shall be  exercised by  the highest  judges of the land with scrupulous adherence to judicial principles well-established by precedents  in our  jurisprudence. Judicial discretion is canalised authority  not  arbitrary  eccentricity.  Cardozo, with elegant accuracy, has observed :           The judge,  even when  he is  free, is  still  not      wholly free.  He is  not to innovate at pleasure. He is      not a  knighterrant roaming  at will  in pursuit of his      own ideal  of beauty  or of goodness. He is to draw his      inspiration from  consecrated principles.  He is not to      yield to  spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated      benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by      tradition,  methodized   by  analogy,   disciplined  by      system, and  subordinated to  ’the primordial necessity      of order  in  the  social  life.  Wide  enough  in  all

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    conscience is the field of discretion that remains."      It is manifest that Art. 136 is of composite structure, is power-cum-procedure-power  in that  it vests jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, and procedure in that it spells a mode of hearing. It obligates the exercise of judicial discretion and the  mode of  hearing so  characteristic  of  the  court process. In  short, there  is an  in-built  prescription  of power and  procedure in  terms of  Art. 136  which meets the demand of Art.21.      We may  eye the  issue slightly differently. If Art. 21 is telescoped  into Art.  136, the  conclusion follows  that fair procedure  is imprinted  on the  special leave that the court may  grant or  refuse. When a motion is made for leave to appeal  against an  acquittal, this Court appreciates the gravity of  the peril  to personal  liberty involved in that proceeding. It  is fair to assume that while considering the petition under  Art. 136 the court will pay attention to the question of  liberty, the  person who  seeks such leave from the court,  his motive  and his locus standi and the weighty factors which  persuade the  court to  grant special  leave. When this conspectus of processual circumstances and 880 criteria play  upon the jurisdiction of the court under Art. 136, it  is reasonable  to conclude  that the desideratum of fair procedure implied in Art. 21 is adequately answered.      Once we  hold that  Art. 136  is a  composite provision which vests  a wide  jurisdiction and,  by the  very fact of entrusting this  unique jurisdiction  in the  Supreme Court, postulates,  inarticulately   though,  the   methodology  of exercising that power, nothing more remains in the objection of the  petitioner. It is open to the Court to grant special leave and  the  subsequent  process  of  hearing  are  well- established. Thus,  there is an integral provision of power- cum-procedure which  answers with the desideratum of Art. 21 justifying deprivation of life and liberty.      The wider  the discretionary power the more sparing its exercise. Times  out of  number this Court has stressed that though parties  promiscuously ’provoke’  this  jurisdiction, the Court  parsimoniously invokes  the power.  Moreover, the Court may  not, save  in special  situations, grant leave to one who  is not  eo nomine  a party  on  the  record.  Thus, procedural limitations  exist and  are governed by well-worn rules of guidance.      Sri Mridul  urged that  every inquisitive benefactor or offensive adventurer cannot ’rush in’ and upset a verdict of acquittal by resort to Art. 136. This is really a matter for exercise of judicial discretion and the Court can be trusted to bear  in mind  time-honoured practices  and the values of Art. 21.  But no  dogmatic proscription  of leave under Art. 136 to  a non-party  applicant can  be laid down inflexibly. For access to justice is not a cloistered virtue.      It is  true that  the strictest vigilance over abuse of the process  of the  court, especially  at  the  expensively exalted level of the Supreme Court, should be maintained and ordinarily  meddlesome  bystanders  should  not  be  granted ’visa’. It  is also  true that  in the criminal jurisdiction this strictness  applies a fortiori since an adverse verdict from this  Court may  result in irretrievable injury to life or liberty.      Having said  this, we must emphasise that we are living in times  when many  societal pollutants create new problems of unredressed  grievance when  the State  becomes the  sole repository for  initiation of  criminal  action.  Sometimes, pachydermic indifference of bureaucratic officials, at other times politicisation  of higher  functionaries may result in

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refusal to  take a  case to  this Court  under Art. 136 even though the  justice of  the lis  may well  justify it. While "the criminal law should not be used as a weapon in personal vendettas between  private individuals",  as Lord  Shawcross once  wrote, in the absence of an indepen- 881 dent  prosecution   authority  easily  accessible  to  every citizen, a wider connotation of the expression ’standing’ is necessary for  Art. 136  to further  its mission.  There are jurisdictions in  which private  individuals-not  the  State alone-may institute  criminal proceedings.  The  Law  Reform Commission (Australia)  in its  Discussion Paper  No.  4  on "Access to Courts-I Standing: Public Interest Suits" wrote:           The general  rule, at  the present  time, is  that      anyone may  commence proceedings  and prosecute  in the      magistrate’s court.  The argument for retention of that      right arises  at either  end of  the spectrum-the great      cases and the frequent petty cases. The great cases are      those  touching  government  itself-a  Watergate  or  a      Poulson. However  independent they  may legally  be any      public official,  police or prosecuting authority, must      be  subject  to  some  government  supervision  and  be      dependent  on   government  funds;  its  officers  will      inevitably have  personal links  with government.  They      will be part of the "establishment". There may be cases      where  a  decision  not  to  prosecute  a  case  having      political  ramifications   will  be  seen,  rightly  or      wrongly,  as   politically  motivated.   Accepting  the      possibility of  occasional abuse  the  Commission  sees      merit in retaining some right of a citizen to ventilate      such a matter in the courts.      Even the  English System,  as pointed by the Discussion paper, permits  a private  citizen to file an indictment. In our view,  the narrow  limits set,  in vintage  English law, into the  concept of ’person aggrieved’ and ’standing’ needs liberalisation in  our democratic  situation. In Dabholkar’s case this  court imparted such a wider meaning. The American Supreme  Court  relaxed  the  restrictive  attitude  towards ’standing’ in  the  famous  case  of  Baker  v.  Carr.  Lord Denning, in  the notable case of the Attorney-General of the Gambia v. Pierra Sarr N’ Jie, spoke thus:           ....the  words  ’person  aggrieved’  are  of  wide      import and  should not  be subjected  to a  restrictive      interpretation. They  do not include, of course, a mere      busybody who  is interfering  in things  which  do  not      concern him; Prof. S. A. de Smith takes the same view :           All developed  legal systems  have had to face the      problem of  adjusting conflicts  between two aspects of      the public 882      interest-the  desirability  of  encouraging  individual      citizens to  participate actively in the enforcement of      the law,  and the  undesirability  of  encouraging  the      professional litigant  and the meddlesome interloper to      invoke the  jurisdiction of  the courts in matters that      do not concern him. Prof. H.W.R. Wade strikes a similar note :           In other  words, certiorari  is not  confined by a      narrow conception  of  locus  standi.  It  contains  an      element of  the actio  popularis. This  is  because  it      looks beyond  the personal  rights of the applicant; it      is designed  to keep the machinery of justice in proper      working order  by  preventing  inferior  tribunals  and      public authorities from abusing their powers.

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    In Dabholkar’s  case, one  of us  wrote in his separate opinion :           The  possible  apprehension  that  widening  legal      standing with  a public  connotation may unloose a food      of  litigation   which  may  overwhelm  the  judges  is      misplaced because  public resort  to court  to suppress      public mischief is a tribute to the justice system.      This view  is echoed  by  the  Australian  Law  Reforms Commission.      The crucial  significance of  access jurisprudence  has been best expressed by Cappelletti:           The right  of  effective  access  to  justice  has      emerged with  the new  social rights.  Indeed, it is of      paramount importance  among  these  new  rights  since,      clearly, the  enjoyment of  traditional as  well as new      social  rights   presupposes   mechanisms   for   their      effective protection.  Such  protection,  moreover,  is      best assured  by a workable remedy within the framework      of the judicial system. Effective access to justice can      thus be  seen as  the most  basic requirement-the  most      basic ’human  right’-of  a  system  which  purports  to      guarantee legal rights.      We are  thus satisfied  that the  bogey  of  busybodies blackmailing adversaries  through  frivolous  invocation  of Art.136 is  chimerical. Access to Justice to every bona fide seeker is  a democratic  dimension of remedial jurisprudence even as public interest litigation, class action. 883 pro bono  proceedings, are.  We cannot  dwell in the home of processual obsolescence  when  our  Constitution  highlights social justice  as a goal. We hold that there is no merit in the contentions  of the  Writ  petitioner  and  dismiss  the petition.      PATHAK, J:  The High  Court of  Madras in its appellate jurisdiction  acquitted  the  petitioner,  Sadhanantham,  of charges under  s. 302  and s.  148,  I.P.C.  Arunachalam,  a brother of  the deceased,  petitioned to  this  Court  under Article 136  of the Constitution for special leave to appeal against the  acquittal. The court granted special leave, and ultimately  allowed   the  appeal,   Arunachalam  v.  P.S.R. Sadhanantham, and  setting aside  the judgment  of the  High Court restored  the conviction  and sentence  imposed by the trial court  under s.  302, I.P.C.  The petitioner has filed this writ petition contending that the judgment and order of this Court  is a  nullity  and  should  be  set  aside.  The principal contention  is that  Article 136  did not  empower this Court  to grant special leave to Arunachalam (the third respondent) and  the grant of special leave by the Court and its entertaining  the appeal  violates  Article  21  of  the Constitution.      The maintainability  of the  appeal on  the ground that Arunachalam was  not entitled  to petition under Article 136 of the  Constitution for special leave was challenged before the Bench  hearing the  appeal, but the Bench over-ruled the objection holding  that it had ample power under Article 136 to entertain  the special leave petition. The learned Judges laid down  that the  Court  had  jurisdiction  to  entertain appeals against  judgments of acquittal by the High Court at the instance of private parties.      We have  read the judgment of our learned brother V. R. Krishna Iyer,  but because of the importance of the question we consider it necessary to set down our own view.      The  expense  of  the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the Supreme Court  flows  from  an  entire  code  of  provisions contained in  the Constitution.  It includes  an  appeal  on

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certificate by  the High  Court under  Article 132  that the case involves  a substantial  question  of  law  as  to  the interpretation of  the Constitution  in a civil, criminal or other proceeding  disposed of by a judgment, decree or final order of  a High  Court, and  an appeal on certificate under Article 133 that the case involves a substantial question of law of  general importance  which calls  for decision by the Supreme Court.  In a  criminal proceeding,  disposed of by a judgment or final order or sentence of a High Court, besides cases where  the High  Court has  convicted the  accused and sentenced him  to death  either on  reversing in  appeal  an order of acquittal by 884 the trial  court or  on the  case being  withdrawn from  the subordinate court to itself for trial, an appeal lies to the Supreme Court  where the High Court "certifies that the case is fit  one for  appeal to  the Supreme  Court". Article 135 confers jurisdiction  and power  on the  Supreme Court  with respect to  any matter  to which  Article 133 or Article 134 does  not   apply  if   such  jurisdiction  and  power  were exercisable by  the Federal  Court  immediately  before  the commencement of the constitution. Article 136 declares:           "136.  (1)   Notwithstanding  anything   in   this      Chapter, the  Supreme Court  may,  in  its  discretion,      grant  special  leave  to  appeal  from  any  judgment,      decree, determination,  sentence or  order in any cause      or matter  passed or  made by  any court or tribunal in      the territory of India."      Then follow  other provisions  to  which  we  need  not refer.      Plainly, the  jurisdiction  conferred  by  Article  136 seeks to  confer on  this Court the widest conceivable range of judicial power, making it perhaps among the most powerful courts in  the world.   The  judicial power  reaches out  to every judgment,  decree, determination,  sentence  or  order effecting the  rights and  obligations of  persons in  civil matters, of  life and liberty in criminal matters as well as matters touching the Revenues of the State. It is an attempt to ensure that the foundations of the Indian Republic, which have  been   laid  on  the  bed-rock  of  justice,  are  not undermined by  injustice anywhere  in the  land; Bharat Bank Ltd. v.  Employees of  the Bharat  Bank Ltd.  As  the  Court observed in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh and Others. Article  136 vests  in the  Supreme Court  a plenary jurisdiction in  the  matter  of  entertaining  and  hearing appeals by grant of special leave.      Nonetheless,  there  is  a  limitation  which,  in  our opinion, is  of immediate  relevance.  It  is  a  limitation inbuilt into  the jurisdiction  of the  Court and flows from the nature  and character of the case intended to be brought before  the   Court.  It  is  a  limitation  which  requires compliance despite the apparent plenitude of power vested in the Court.  When a  petition is presented to the Court under Article 136,  the Court  will have  due regard to the nature and character  of the  cause sought  to be brought before it when entertaining and disposing of the petition.      The question is: Does the brother of a deceased person, who has  been murdered,  possess the right to petition under Article 136 of the 885 Constitution  for   special  leave   to  appeal  against  an acquittal of  the accused  ? It  is a question which touches directly on  the  nature  of  a  crime  and  of  a  criminal proceeding.      Several different  definitions of  a  crime  have  been

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attempted (and  there are  some jurists  who say  that it is impossible of  definition), but  there is broad agreement on one attribute of its nature, that it is an illegal act which amounts  to  a  wrong  against  the  public  welfare.  Mogul Steamship Co. v. Cm Greger Gew & Co. As a concept, crime has been defined  as "any  conduct which a sufficiently powerful section of  any given  community feels  to be destructive of its own  interests, as  endangering its safety, stability or comfort," which  "it usually  regards as  especially heinous and  seeks   to  repress  with  corresponding  severity;  if possible it  secured that  the forces  which  the  sovereign power in  the State can command shall be utilised to prevent the mischief  or to  punish anyone  who is  guilty  of  it." Crimes  were  defined  by  Blackstone  as  "the  breach  and violation of public rights and duties which affect the whole community." A  crime, therefore,  is an act deemed by law to be harmful  to society  in general even though its immediate victim  is  an  individual.  Murder  injures  primarily  the particular victim,  but its  blatant disregard of human life puts it  beyond a  matter of  mere compensation  between the murderer and the victim’s family. Those who commit such acts are proceeded  against  by  the  State  in  order  that,  if convicted, they  may be  punished. The  notion of crime as a threat to  the whole  community, is the material counterpart of the  formal rule  that the  State alone  is master  of  a criminal prosecution.  In a  criminal proceeding  the  State stands forward  as prosecutor  on public grounds. No private person has  a direct  interest  in  a  criminal  proceeding, although exception  may be  made by  the statute  in certain cases. It is common knowledge that a criminal prosecution is not intended  for the  private satisfaction  of  a  personal vendetta or revenge.      In India  also, the criminal law envisages the State as the prosecutor.  Under the  Code of  Criminal Procedure, the machinery of the 886 State is set in motion on information received by the police or on  a complaint  filed  by  a  private  person  before  a Magistrate. If the case proceeds to trial and the accused is acquitted, the  right to  appeal against  the  acquittal  is closely circumscribed. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1895 the State was entitled to appeal to the High Court, and the complainant could do so only if granted special leave to appeal by  the High Court. The right of appeal was not given to other  interested persons.  Under the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure 1973,  the right of appeal vested in the State has now been made subject to leave being granted to the State by the High  Court. The  complainant continues to be subject to the pre-requisite  condition that  he  must  obtain  special leave to  appeal. The  fetters so  imposed on  the right  to appeal are  prompted by  the reluctance  to expose a person, who has  been acquitted  by a  competent court of a criminal charge, to  the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. The Law Commission of India gave anxious thought to this matter, and while  noting that  the Code recognised a few exceptions by  way   of  permitting  a  person  aggrieved  to  initiate proceedings in  certain cases and permitting the complainant to appeal  against an  acquittal with  special leave  of the High   Court,   expressed   itself   against   the   general desirability to  encourage  appeals  against  acquittal.  It referred  to  the  common  law  jurisprudence  obtaining  in England and  other countries where a limited right of appeal against acquittal  was vested  in the  State and  where  the emphasis rested  on the  need to  decide a  point of  law of

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general  importance   in  the   interests  of   the  general administration and  proper development  of the criminal law. But simultaneously the Law Commission also noted that if the right to  appeal against acquittal was retained and extended to a  complainant the  law should logically cover also cases not instituted on complaint. It observed:           "Extreme cases  of manifest  injustice, where  the      Government fails  to act, and the party aggrieved has a      strong  feeling   that  the   matter  requires  further      consideration, should  not, in our view, be left to the      mercy  of  the  Government.  To  inspire  and  maintain      confidence  in  the  administration  of  justice,  that      limited right  of appeal  with leave given to a private      party should  be retained,  and  should  embrace  cases      initiated on  private complaint  or  otherwise  at  the      instance of an aggrieved person." 887 However, when  the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 was enacted the statute,  as we have seen, confined the right to appeal, in the case of private parties to a complainant. This is, as it were, a material indication of the policy of the law.      Having regard  to the  fundamental nature of a criminal proceeding to  which reference  has been  made,  it  is  now appropriate to  examine the  considerations which  the Court should keep in mind when entertaining a petition for special leave to  appeal by  a private  party against  an  order  of acquittal. From what has been said, it is plain that ’access to the jurisdiction under Article 136 cannot be permitted to a private party who seeks to employ the judicial process for the satisfaction  of private  revenge or  personal vendetta. Nor can it be permitted as an instrument of coercion where a civil action would lie. In every case, the Court is bound to consider what is the interest which brings the petitioner to court and  whether the interest of the public community will benefit by  the grant  of special leave. ’In a jurisprudence which  elevates   the  right   to  life  and  liberty  to  a fundamental priority,  it is  incumbent upon  the  court  to closely scrutinise  the motives  and urges of those who seek to employ  its  process  against  the  life  or  liberty  of another.’ In this enquiry, the Court would perhaps prefer to be satisfied  whether or  not the  State has good reason for not coming  forward itself to petition for special leave. We think that  the  Court  should  entertain  a  special  leave petition  filed   by  a   private  party,   other  than  the complainant, in  those cases only where it is convinced that the  public   interest  justifies   an  appeal  against  the acquittal and  that the State has refrained from petitioning for special  leave for  reasons which  do not  bear  on  the public interest  but are  prompted by private influence want of bona  fide and  other extraneous considerations. We would restrict accordingly  the right  of a  private party,  other than the  complainant, to petition for special leave against an order  of acquittal.  It is  perhaps desirable to keep in mind that what follows from the grant of special leave is an appeal, and  the jurisdiction must, therefore, be invoked by a petitioner possessing a locus standi recognised in law.      In  regard   to  the  question  whether  the  procedure followed by  this Court  in  disposing  of  a  petition  for special leave  under Article  136  is  consistent  with  the procedure contemplated  by Article 21, we have no hesitation in holding that the principle is inbuilt within the terms of Article  136   itself  that  the  Court  in  exercising  its jurisdiction will  do so  as a  court of  law following  the well-known norms of procedure which have been recognised for long as governing and informing the

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888 proceedings of  all courts. We have no hesitation in holding that Article 21 is not violated.      The petitioner  has failed to establish that there is a case  for  interfering  with  the  judgment  of  this  Court allowing the appeal.      The  writ   petition   is   dismissed,   but   in   the circumstances there is no order as to costs. N.V.K.                                  Petition dismissed. 889