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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  5354 of 2006

PETITIONER: P.K. Sreekantan & Ors

RESPONDENT: P. Sreekumaran Nair & Ors

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/12/2006

BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & S.H.KAPADIA

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No.2896 of 2003)

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.  

Leave granted.

Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the  Division Bench of the Kerala High Court allowing the appeal  filed by the respondent Nos. 1 & 2 while dismissing the appeal  filed by the appellants and the State.

Background facts in a nutshell are as follows: An extent of 2.81.20 Hectares of land comprised in  Survey No.1780/1, 1780/4, 1780/9, 1781/1,8,9, 1889/1,2 of  the Kadakampally Village was acquired for the purpose of  establishment of  E.E.C. market at Anayara. Notification under  Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (in short the  ’Act’) was published on 29.5.1992.  The possession of the land  was taken on 23.7.1992 and an award was passed on  13.7.1992 fixing a total compensation of Rs.45,08,111/-.   Dissatisfied with the compensation awarded, applications were  filed before the Land Acquisition Officer for referring the  matter for adjudication to the Reference Court.

The District Collector by his letter dated 18.7.1994  forwarded the relevant records in respect of the matter for  determination under Section 18 of the Act. Along with the said  letter, the names and addresses of the interested parties, who  had filed the reference applications, were also furnished in the  separate sheet attached.  As per the sheet attached with the  said covering letter, the appellant no.1-P.K. Sreekantan  submitted his application dated 4.8.1993.  Respondent no.1 P.  Sreekumaran Nair submitted his application dated 26.8.1993  and the claimants 3, 4 and 5 submitted their applications on  4.8.1993. The  reference application dated 4.8.1993 was given  by the appellant no.1 pursuant to the receipt of the award  notice dated 13.7.1993 whereby the claimant was informed of  the compensation awarded for the property acquired from him.   In the said reference application it was stated that an extent of  86 Ares and 41 Sq. metres of property out of the total extent of  2 acres and 41 = cents of property comprised in Survey  No.1889 of Kadakampally Village was obtained by him by  virtue of the partition deed dated 21.2.1975. It was specifically  pleaded that the property is situated in an important locality  within city limits having road frontage and easy access, it is a  building site and a garden land and it shall fetch a minimum

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market value of Rs.5,000/- per cent. It was further stated that  the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer is  too low and meager considering the importance of the locality.  The award amount was claimed to have been received under  protest and, therefore, the Land Acquisition Officer was  requested to refer the matter to the Reference Court for  adjudicating the land value.  Similar claims were made by the  other applicants as well. From the reference application so  submitted it could be seen that the dispute was only regarding  the amount of compensation awarded to the respective land  acquired from each one of the applicants, as according to  them, amount awarded is low compared to the market value.

Pursuant to the reference so made by the District  Collector, the Reference Court issued notice to the parties  whereupon the parties filed their respective statements.

Various questions were raised in the appeals which were  filed before the High Court.  In the appeal filed by the present  respondents 1 & 2 it was contended that the Court below has  no jurisdiction to go beyond the issues of reference. It had  exceeded its jurisdiction in going beyond the issues raised in  the reference applications and adjudicating disputes not  raised by the parties in the reference applications.  The appeal  by the present appellant related to the appropriation of the  compensation awarded. State’s appeal essentially was against  the valuation. As noted above, the appeal filed by the  respondent Nos. 1 & 2 was allowed with the following  observation:-                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    

"In the light of the principles as laid  down in the above decisions and in the  absence of any reference made on the  question regarding the extent of the land  acquired from each of the claimants and in  the absence of any dispute regarding the  apportionment of the amount and in view of  the fact that the only question that is referred  by the District Collector is regarding the claim  for enhancement of the compensation for the  land acquired as shown in the award, we find  that the court below had no jurisdiction to  entertain the dispute regarding the extent of  the land acquired from each of the claimants.

Hence we set aside the judgment and  decree of the court below so far as it  proceeded to determine the questions which  are not referred to it.  The parties will be  entitled to compensation for the extent of the  land acquired from them as shown in the  award at the rate fixed by the court below."

During the pendency of the appeal before this Court the  original respondent No.2\026K.P. Saraswathy Amma died and her  legal heirs were substituted by order dated 23rd January, 2004  passed in I.A. No.1 of 2003.

In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the  appellants submitted that the Collector was required to refer  the actual dispute between the parties and merely because the  question of inter se appropriation was not referred, that did  not exclude the jurisdiction to decide that issue.  Reference in

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this context was made to Section 31 of the Act.  

Learned counsel of the respondents on the other hand  took the stand that in a reference in terms of Section 18 of the  Act there is no scope for adjudicating the inter se dispute  relating to aforesaid matter.  That is a matter covered by  Section 30 of the Act.  

Sections 18 and 30 of the Act read as follows: "18. Reference to Court.--(1) Any person  interested who has not accepted the award  may, by written application to the Collector,  require that the matter be referred by the  Collector for the determination of the Court,  whether his objection be to the measurement  of the land, the amount of the compensation,  the persons to whom it is payable, or the  apportionment of the compensation among  the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on  which objection to the award is taken:    Provided that every such application shall be  made--  

(a)     if the person making it was  present or represented before the  Collector at the time when he made his  award, within six weeks from the date of  the Collector’s award;  

(b)   in other cases, within six weeks of  the receipt of the notice from the  Collector under section 12, sub-section  (2); or within six months from the date  of the Collector’s award, whichever  period shall first expire. 30. Disputes as to apportionment.--When  the amount of compensation has been settled  under section 11, if any dispute arises as to  the apportionment of the same or any part  thereof, or as to the persons to whom the  same or any part thereof is payable, the  Collector may refer such dispute to the  decision of the Court."

The reference court derive jurisdiction from the reference  made. References under Section 18 and Section 30 are  conceptually different from each other.  The decree in terms of  Section 18 is different from the one in terms of Section 30.   Remedy available in terms of Section 55 of the Act is against a  decree.  The question whether reference court can deal with  the question covered by Section 30 of the Act in a reference  made under Section 18 of the Act and vice versa has been the  subject matter of judicial determination.  In (Rai) Pramatha  Nath Mullick Bahadur v. Secry. of State (AIR 1930 PC 64) it  was held that the jurisdiction of the courts under the Act is a  special one and strictly limited to the terms of Sections 18, 20  and 21.  It only arises when a specific objection has been  taken to the Collector’s Award and it is confined to a  consideration of that objection.  Therefore, it is certain that  when the only objection taken is to the amount of  compensation that alone is the matter referred and the Court  has no jurisdiction to determine or consider anything beyond  it.

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 In Prayag Upnivesh Awas Evam Nirman Sahkari Samiti  Ltd.  v. Allahabad Vikas Pradhikaran and Anr. (2003 (5) SCC  561) the question related to the exercise of jurisdiction under  Section 30 of the Act vis-‘-vis Section 18. Determination in  terms of Section 30 has settings of a decision in the partition  suit.  In Ajjam Linganna and Others v. Land Acquisition  Officer, Revenue Divisional Officer, Nizamabad and Others.  [2002 (9) SCC 426] it was held that the Reference Court has  no power to convert the reference under Section 30 into one in  Section 18 of the Act at the instance of those who did not  apply for reference earlier.

Every tribunal of limited jurisdiction is not only entitled  but bound to determine whether the matter in which it is  asked to exercise its jurisdiction comes within the limits of its  special jurisdiction and whether the jurisdiction of such  tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain facts or  circumstances. Its obvious duty is to see that these facts and  circumstances exist to invest it with jurisdiction, and where a  tribunal derives its jurisdiction from the statute that creates it  and that statute also defines the conditions under which the  tribunal can function, it goes without saying that before that  tribunal assumes jurisdiction in a matter, it must be satisfied  that the conditions requisite for its acquiring seisin of that  matter have in fact arisen. As observed by the Privy Council in  Nusserwanjee Pestonjee v. Meer Mynoodeen Khan LR. [(1855)  6 M.I.A. 134 (PC)], wherever jurisdiction is given to a court by  an Act of Parliament and such jurisdiction is only given upon  certain specified terms contained in that Act it is a universal  principle that these terms must be complied with, in order to  create and raise the jurisdiction for if they be not complied  with the jurisdiction does not arise. [See: Mohammed  Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra (1979 (2) SCC 572)]

In_Kothamasu Kanakarathamma and Others v. State of  Andhra Pradesh and Others (AIR 1965 SC 304) it was held as  follows: "All the same since the point was permitted to  be urged before it by the High Court and has  been raised before us on behalf of the State it  is necessary to decide it. On behalf of the  appellants it was contended before the High  Court that by reason of the failure of the State  to raise the plea before the Subordinate Judge  as to the absence of a reference the State  must be deemed to have waived the point. The  High Court accepted this argument upon the  view that this was not a case of inherent lack  of jurisdiction and that the defect in the  procedure was such as could be waived. In  our opinion the view of the High Court is not  correct. Section 12(1) of the Land Acquisition  Act provides that after an award is filed in the  Collector’s office it shall, except as provided in  the Act, be final and conclusive evidence as  between the Collector and the persons  interested of the true area and value of the  land and the apportionment of the  compensation among the persons interested.  The only manner in which the finality of the  award can be called into question is by resort  to the provisions of Sec.18 of the Land  Acquisition Act, sub-section (1) of which reads  thus :

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"Any person interested who has not  accepted the award may, by written  application to the Collector, require  that the matter be referred by the  Collector for the determination of the  Court, whether his objection be to the  measurement of the land, the amount  of the compensation, the persons to  whom it is payable, or the  apportionment of the compensation  among the persons interested."  The proviso to sub-section (2) prescribes the  time within which an application under sub-s.  (1) is to be made. Section 19 provides for the  making of a reference by the Collector and  specifies the matters which are to be  comprised in that reference. Thus the matter  goes to the court only upon a reference made  by the Collector. It is only after such a  reference is made that the court is empowered  to determine the objections made by a  claimant to the award. Section 21 restricts  the scope of the proceedings before the court  to consideration of the contentions of the  persons affected by the objection. These  provisions thus leave no doubt that the  jurisdiction of the court arises solely on the  basis of a reference made to it. No doubt, the  Land Acquisition Officer has made a reference  under s. 30 of the Land Acquisition Act but  that reference was only in regard to the  apportionment of the compensation amongst  the various claimants. Such a reference would  certainly not invest the court with the  jurisdiction to consider a matter not directly  connected with it. This is really not a mere  technicality for as pointed out by the Privy  Council in Nusserwanjee Pestonjee & Ors. v.  Meer Mynoodeen Khan Wullud Meer  Sudroodeen Khan Bahadoor, 6 Moo Ind  App.134 at p.155(PC) wherever jurisdiction is  given by a statute and such jurisdiction is  only given upon certain specified terms  contained therein it is a universal principle  that those terms should be complied with, in  order to create and raise the jurisdiction, and  if they are not complied with the jurisdiction  does not arise. This was, therefore, a case of  lack of inherent jurisdiction and the failure of  the State to object to the proceedings before  the court on the ground of an absence of  reference in so far as the determination of  compensation was concerned cannot amount  to waiver or acquiescence. Indeed, when there  is an absence of inherent jurisdiction, the  defect cannot be waived nor can be cured by  acquiescence."  

Above being the position, the High Court’s view that it  was impermissible to deal with the matter covered under  Section 30 of the Act while dealing with a reference in terms of    Section 18 of the Act is irreversible.   

However, it is to be noted that there is no time limit for  seeking reference under Section 30 of the Act, though it

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should always be done within a reasonable time. The  reasonableness of time flows from the need for a finality to  judicial proceedings.   

In the background of the facts situation of the present  case, it would be appropriate to permit the appellants to make  an application before the competent Land Acquisition  Authority seeking reference in terms of Section 30 of the Act.   If that is done, the necessary reference shall be made  expeditiously.  The amount in deposit shall be transmitted to  the concerned court.  It shall be open to the parties to seek  withdrawal of such portion of the awarded amount in deposit  on such terms as may be deemed proper by the said Court.  Learned counsel for the parties stated that motion shall be  moved for getting withdrawal with security.  That is an aspect  that the concerned court shall deal with in accordance with  law.

Appeal is dismissed except to the extent indicated.  No  costs.