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PETITIONER: P.J. RATNAM

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: D. KANIKARAM AND OTHERS

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10/04/1963

BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA BENCH: AYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ) SHAH, J.C.

CITATION:  1964 AIR  244            1964 SCR  (3)   1  CITATOR INFO :  R          1985 SC  28  (30)

ACT:       Professional  misconduct--Complaint--Enquiry--Advocate misappropriating    client’s     money--If     guilty     of professional    misconduct--Proceeding   in    respect    of professional misconduct and proceeding in a criminal  Court- Object   of-Differentiation-Punishment-Legal   practitioners Act,  1879   (18 of 1879), ss. 12, 13--Indian  Bar  Councils Act, 1926 (38 of 1926), s. 10 (2).

HEADNOTE:     The  respondents  and one other   Kagga  Veeraiah,  were plaintiffs  in a suit for possession of  certain  lands  and the  appellant was their Advocate.  Tim suit  was  dismissed and  an appeal was preferred therefrom to  the   Subordinate Judge.  Pending  the  disposal  of  the  appeal,  the  court directed the sale proceeds of the standing crops on the suit land  to be deposited into court, and a sum of  Rs.  1,600/- was  so deposited.  The plaintiff’s appeal was  allowed  and the defendants  preferred a second appeal to the High Court. Pending   disposal  of  the  second   appeal,    plaintiff’s application  for  withdrawing the amount was allowed by  the court   on   furnishing security of immovable  property.   A cheque petition was filed which was allowed and thereafter a cheque  for   Rs.  1,452/4/- was issued  in  favour  of  the appellant.   The  appellant  an   Advocate admitted that  he had  received  and. had cashed the cheque on behalf  of  his clients  who were  entitled to be paid this sum. The  second appeal  was allowed by the  High Court and  the  plaintiff’s suit was dismissed, as a result of which the plaintiffs  had to  refund  the  sum  of the defendants  in  the  suit.  The plaintiffs  made a written demand on the appellant  for  the proceeds  of the cheque that had been cashed by him and  not paid over to them.  The appellant in reply claimed  to  have paid  over the sum to them on their passing a receipt  which happened to be in the bundle. of  case-papers returned  to 2 them.   The respondents filed  a complaint under as. 12  and 13  of the Legal Practitioners Act.  The explanation of  the Advocate was called for and the District Judge was  directed

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to hold an enquiry and forward his report to the High Court. His   report   was  that  the  appellant’s  case   was   not unbelievable  and he was entitled to  the benefit of  doubt. The matter was heard by a Bench of three Judges of the  High Court,  who held him guilty of professional  misconduct  and suspended  him  for five years  from   practice.   In   this Court   the  appellant contended, (1)  that the Bar  Council had  not been consulted before the case was referred to  the learned  District  Judge  for inquiry and  report  and  this vitiated the legality of the entire proceedings against  the appellant.  (2) That the complaint filed by the  respondents on the basis of which action was taken against the appellant was  not  shown to have been signed by  them,  nor  properly verified by them as required by the rules of the High Court. (3)  That as in  substance the charge against  the appellant was  misappropriation  of  moneys belonging to the  clients, the  High Court should have left the complainants  to  their remedy  of  prosecuting the appellant and  should  not  have proceeded to deal with him under s. 10 of the  Bar  Councils Act.   (4)  That there was a procedural irregularity in  the mode in which the case against the appellant was  conducted. (5)  That one of the plaintiffs--Kagga Veeraiah had  himself admitted in his evidence that he and others had received the proceeds  of the cheque which the appellant had  cashed  and that  in  the  face of this admission  the  High  Court  was clearly  wrong in finding that the appellant had  failed  to pay over the money to his clients.     Held   (1) that the fact that in the order of  reference of  the proceedings under s. 10(2) of the Bar Councils  Act, to  the District Judge, there is no explicit statement  that the  Bar  Council  had previously  been  consulted,  is  not decisive  on  the point.  There would be  a  presumption  of regularity  in respect of official and judicial acts and  it would  be for. the party who challenges such  regularity  to plead  and  prove his case.  Since, this objection  was  not raised  in the High Court, even when the  appellant  applied for  a  certificate,  this Court  will  not  entertain  this objection which rests wholly upon a question of fact.     (2)   The  complaint  petition had been  signed  by  the respondents  and properly verified and even otherwise  since the  High Court was competent to initiate these  proceedings suo  motu  under s. 10(2) of the Act, the  point  raised  is wholly without substance.     (3)   There is a clear distinction between  cases  where the misconduct is one in relation to the practitioner’s duty to 3 his  client  and  other cases where it is not  so.   In  the former  Class  of cases the court would  be  exercising  its discretion properly if it proceeded to deal with the  charge as  a piece of professional misconduct without  driving  the complainant to seek his remedy in a criminal court.  80  far as  the  facts  and circumstances of the  present  case  are concerned,  it must be held, that the High Court  was  fully justified  in proceeding against  the appellant   under  the provisions of s. 10  of the Bar Councils Act.     Chandi Charan Mitter a Pleader, In re. (1920) I.L.R.  47 Cal.  1115  and  Emperor v. satish  Chandra  Singha,  (1927) I,L.R. 54 Cal. 721, distinguished. Stephens v. Hills, [1842] 152 E.R. 368, referred to.     (4)  No complaint, that the appellant was prejudiced  by the manner in which the inquiry was conducted in the  matter of  the  order in which the evidence was adduced,  was  made either  before the District Judge or before the  High  Court and  there  is  nothing on the record to  suggest  that  any

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prejudice had occurred to the appellant.     (5)   The  evidence  of Kagga   Veeraiah  was  correctly characterised  by the High Court as devoid of truth and  the appellant,  therefore, cannot rely on any admission of  this witness  as evidence of the plaintiffs having  received  the sum.     Having regard to the gravity of the offence, there is no justification  for reducing the period of  suspension.   The appeal therefore, must be dismissed.

JUDGMENT:     CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION:Civil Appeal No.  321  of 1962.     Appeal  by  special leave from the  Judgment  and  order dated  August  4, 1959 of the Andhra Pradesh High  Court  in Referred Case No. 29 of 1957.. M. Rajagopalan and K.R. Choudhri, for the appellant. The respondent did not appear. April 10.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by AYYANGAR J.--This appeal has been filed by special leave  of this Court against the judgment of 4 the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by which the appellant  who is  an Advocate was held guilty of  professional  misconduct and had been suspended from practice for five years.     The  facts  relating  to  the  misconduct  charged  were briefly  these:   The three respondents before  us  and  one other--Kagga Veeraiah--were plaintiffs m O.S. 432 of 1951 on the  file of District Munsiff, Guntur in which a  claim  was made for possession of certain lands.  The appellant was the Advocate  for these plaintiffs.  The suit was  dismissed  by the  Trail  Court and an appeal was filed therefrom  to  the Subordinate  Judge, Guntur and pending the disposal  of  the appeal  there  was a direction by the Court that  the  crops standing on the suit-land be sold and the proceeds deposited into  Court.  In  pursuance of this order a sum of about Rs. 1,600/- was deposited into Court-on December 19, 1951.   The appeal  by  the plaintiffs was allowed  by  the  Subordinate Judge.  The’  unsuccessful  defendants preferred   a  second appeal  to the  High Court,  but  meanwhile  the  plaintiffs made an application for withdrawing the amount deposited  in Court.  By virtue of interim orders passed by the Court they were  granted liberty, to withdraw the sum pending  disposal of  the  second  appeal  in the High.  Court  filed  by  the defendants  on furnishing security of  immovable   property. The security was furnished  and. the withdrawal was ordered. A  cheque  petition E.A. 250 of 1952 was  accordingly  filed which  was  allowed and thereafter a cheque  was  issued  in favour  of  the Advocate--the appellant before  us--for  Rs. 1,452/4/-, this being the sum remaining to the credit of the plaintiffs after deduction of poundage etc.  It was admitted that  this cheque was cashed by the appellant on  April  23, 1953.   The appellant did not dispute that. he  cashed  this cheque  on  behalf of his clients or that  the  latter  were entitled   to   be  paid  this  sum  and  the   charge    of professional  misconduct against  the 5 appellant was that the Advocate had not made this payment in spite  of  demands  but that on the other  hand  he  falsely claimed to have paid them this sum.     To resume the narrative of the matters leading to  these proceedings,  the  second appeal before the High  Court  was disposed  of  in August, 1955 and by the  judgment  of  that

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Court  the  appeal  was allowed  and  the  plaintiff’s  suit dismissed.   The plaintiffs had therefore to refund the  sum to  the  defendants in the suit.  On February  8,  1956  the plaintiffs made a written  demand on the  appellant  for the sum  complaining that the cheque had been cashed by him  but that its proceeds had not been paid over.  On April 14, 1956 the  appellant replied to this notice claiming to have  paid over  the  sum  to them on their  passing   a   receipt  and stating.that  the  receipt happened to be in the  bundle  of case-papers which had been returned to them.     But  even  before the receipt of this  reply  the  three respondents before us filed a complaint under ss. 12 and  13 of  the Legal Practitioners Act alleging the non-payment  of the  money  and  charging  the  Advocate  with  professional misconduct in respect of it, and praying for an enquiry into his  conduct.  The appellant was an Advocate and  hence  the complaint  was treated as one under s. 10 (2) of the  Indian Bar Councils Act, 1926. The explanation of the Advocate  was called  for. and thereafter the District. Judge, Guntur  was directed.  to  hold  an inquiry   into  the  allegations  of professional  misconduct against the appellant  and  forward his  report  to the High Court.  An  elaborate  inquiry  was thereafter  held  by the learned District Judge  who,  after considering the .evidence, submitted a report recording  his conclusion  that the appellant’s case was not  unbelievable" and  that on that ground he was entitled to the  benefit  of doubt.   The matter then came up before the High  Court  for consideration on this report.  Some point 6 appears  to  have been made before the  Court  that  certain material witnesses had not been examined. Agreeing with  the submission  they directed  the District Judge to summon  and examine   them  and  this  was  accordingly   done,    their evidence  was recorded and submitted to the High Court.  The matter  was thereafter heard by a Bench of 3 Judges and  the learned Judges being of the opinion that the charge  against the  appellant viz., that he did not pay over the amount  of ’the  cheque to his clients was clearly made out,  held  him guilty of professional misconduct and imposed the punishment of  suspension  from  practice,  as  stated  earlier.    The appellant   then   applied  and  obtained  leave   of   this court--special  leave  under  Art.  136  to  challenge   the correctness of these findings and that is how the matter  is before us.     Before  proceeding  further we desire  to  indicate  the nature of the jurisdiction of this Court in such matters and in  broad outline the principles which it would  observe  in dealing with them.  The jurisdiction  exercised  by the High Court in  cases of professional misconduct is neither  civil nor criminal as these expressions are used in Arts. 133  and 134 of the Constitution. In one aspect it is a  jurisdiction over  an officer of the Court and  the Advocate owes a  duty to  the  Court  apart from his duty  to  his  clients.    In another   aspect  it  is  a   statutory power and  we  would add   a duty vested in the Court  under  s. 10 of  the   Bar Councils   Act  to  ensure that  the  highest  standards  of professional  rectitude are maintained, so that the Bar  can render its expert service  to the public in general and  the litigants  in  particular  and  thus   discharge  its   main function   of  co-operating  with  the  judiciary   in   the administrance  of  justice  according  to  law.   This  task which is at once  delicate  and responsible the statute vest in  the High Court and therefore the primary  responsibility of ensuring it rests with it, 7

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This  Court is in consequence  most  reluctant to  interfere with  the  orders  of High Courts in  this  field,  save  in exceptional cases when any question of principle is involved or  where this Court is persuaded that any violation of  the principles  of  natural  justice has  taken  place  or  that otherwise  there has been a miscarriage of  justice.   Where however  none of these factors, are present, it is  not  the practice  of  this  Court to permit the  canvassing  of  the evidence  on  the record either for reappraising  it  or  to determine  whether  it  should  be  accepted  or  not.   The findings  of the High Court therefore on questions  of  fact are  not open before us and this Court would  only  consider whether  on  the facts found,  the  charge  of  professional misconduct is established.     Learned  Counsel  for  the  appellant  urged  before  us several  grounds  in support of the appeal but  we  consider that  none  of them merits serious attention. It  was  first submitted  that  the   Bar Council had  not  been  consulted before  the case was referred to the learned District  Judge for  inquiry and report and that this vitiated the  legality of  the  entire  proceedings  against  the  appellant.   Our attention was drawn to the terms of s. 10 (2) of the  Indian Bar Councils Act reading:               "10. (2)  Upon receipt of a complaint made  to               it  by any Court or by the Bar Council, or  by               any  other person that any such  Advocate  has               been  guilty  of misconduct,  the  High  Court               shall,  if it does not summarily  reject   the               complaint,  refer the case for inquiry  either               to  the  Bar Council, or,  after  consultation               with  the  Bar  Council, to  the  Court  of  a               District  Judge (hereinafter referred to as  a               District  Court) and may of its own motion  so               refer  any  case  in which  it  has  otherwise               reason  to believe that any such advocate  has               been so guilty." and  the  argument was that the matter could not  have  been remitted for inquiry to a District Judge 8 unless  the. statutory pre-condition of  consultation.  with the  Bar Council had taken place.  It is not  necessary   to consider    in   this  case  whether  this   provision   for consultation is mandatory or not but we shall assume that it is  so.  There was however no hint of this objection to  the validity of the proceedings up to the stage of the appeal in this Court.  The question whether there has or has not  been a  consultation  is one of fact and if this point  had  been raised  in  the High Court we would have information  as  to whether  there  had been  such consultation or not,  and  if not  why there was none. Even when the appellant applied  to the High Court for a certificate  of fitness  under Art. 133 (1)(c)  this  objection was not suggested as a  ground  upon which  the validity  of the  proceedings would be  impugned. In    these   circumstances    we    are  not  disposed   to entertain this objection which rests wholly upon a  question of  fact.   The fact that in the order of reference  of  the proceedings under s. 10 (2)to the District Judge there is no explicit statement that the Bar Council had previously  been consulted  is not decisive on the point.  There would  be  a presumption  of  regularity  in  respect  of  official   and judicial  acts and it would before the party who  challenges such regularity to  plead and  prove his case.     It  was next contended that  the complaint filed by  the respondents  on the basis of which action was taken  against the appellant was not shown to have been signed by them, nor

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properly  verified by them as required by the rules  of  the High  Court.  We consider this objection  frivolous  in  the extreme.  It  was argued by the appellant  before  the  High Court  that there was  dissimilarity  between   the  several signatures  of the three respondents found in  the  petition sent  by  them and that to be found in the plaint  etc.,  of O.S.  432 of 1951  and that this was some proof that it  was not the respondents who were 9 really  responsible  for  the  petition  but  that   someone inimically  disposed towards  the  appellant.   The  learned Judges  of  the High   Court  rejected  this  submission  in these words:               "For one thing, we are unable to find any such               dissimilarity.  Even so, that has not much  of               a   bearing  on  the  question   whether   the               respondent  (appellant)  had  discharged   the               burden  viz., of proving that he had made  the               payment  to  the petitioners.   This  argument               would  have had some force if the  petitioners               had    not   given  evidence    against    the               respondent.   Further, no such suggestion  was               put  to any of the plaintiffs." This  is  on  the  question  of  the  dissimilarity  of  the signatures   on   which   rests  the   argument   that   the respondents were not the  complainants.  Coming next to  the point  about the  verification  of the complaint the  matter stands    thus:   The  three complainants  (the  respondents before  us)  originally filed a petition on March  ?6,  1956 before  the  District  Judge  but  this  did  not  bear  the attestation  of  a gazetted officer or  other  authority  as required by the rules.  This defect was made good by a fresh petition which they filed before the District Judge on April 16,  1956.   After  the petition was  signed  by  the  three petitioners they added  a verification in these terms:               "We  do  hereby state that  the  facts  stated               above  are true to the best of our  knowledge,               information and belief," and  then they-signed again.  These three  signatures,  they made   before  the   District  Judge  who   attested   their signatures  on  the same day and when  for-.  warding   this complaint  to the High Court on 10 April 18, 1956 the learned District Judge stated these facts and added:               "The   petitioners   appeared   before  me  on               April 16, 1956.  I got them sign the  petition               in my presence and I attested the same." It  is thus clear that they made  three signatures in  token of  their  signing  the petition,  the  verification  and  a further  affirmation before the District Judge who  attested the  same.  Learned Counsel did not suggest before  us  that the  District Judge was in error about the identity  of  the parties  who appeared before him and affixed the  signatures in three places in the complaint before him.  It is  because of  these  circumstances  that  we  have  stated  that  this objection  was most frivolous.  It is only necessary to  add that  seeing  that the High Court is competent  to  initiate these proceedings suo  motu under s. 10 (2) the point raised is wholly without substance.     The  next submission of learned Counsel was that  as  in substance    the   charge   against   the   appellant    was misappropriation  of  money belonging to  the  clients,  the learned  Judges  of  the High Court  should  have  left  the complainants  to their remedy of prosecuting  the  appellant

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and  should not have proceeded to deal with him under s.  10 of  the  Bar Councils Act.  In support  of  this  submission learned  Counsel referred us in particular to two  decisions of  the  Calcutta  High Court   reported  in  Chandi  Charan Mitter, a Pleader, In re (1), and Emperor v. satish  Chandra Singha (2).     We do not consider that the case before us furnishes  an occasion for any exhaustive review of the decisions upon the subject  or formulating finally the principles which  govern the  exercise  of  the  discretion by a  Court  to  which  a complaint  is  made  under s. 10 of  the  Bar  Councils  Act whether it should (1)  (1920) I.L.R.47 Cal. 1115.  C2) (1927) I.L.R.  54  Cal, 721. 11 proceed  under  it  or leave the  complainant  to  launch  a prosecution  against  the advocate and await the  result  of such criminal proceedings. We  consider it sufficient to state this.  The object  of  a proceeding  in  respect of professional  misconduct  differs totally from the object of a proceeding in a criminal court. Proceedings under the Bar Councils Act and similar  statutes arc  taken in order to.ensure that the highest standards  of professional  conduct  arc  maintained at  the  bar.   These proceedings,  though in a sense penal, arc  solely  designed for the purpose of maintaining discipline and to ensure that a  person does not continue in practice who by  his  conduct has  shown  that  he  is  unfit so  to  do.   It  is  not  a jurisdiction  which is exercised in aid of the Criminal  law for  the only question for the court to consider is  whether the practitioner has so misconducted himself as no longer to be  permitted  to  continue a member of  an  honourable  and responsible profession.  The object of Criminal proceedings, on the other hand, is to enforce the law of the land and  to secure  the  punishment  of an offender.   No  doubt,  if  a criminal prosecution is initiated in respect of the  subject matter  of the complaint and the charge is held  proved  the conviction  might be a ground for a later  proceeding  under the  Bar Councils Act.  No doubt, also, if the  practitioner is  acquitted  or  discharged by a  criminal  court  on  the merits,  the  facts  would not  be  reinvestigated  for  the purpose  of rounding a charge of professional misconduct  on those  very facts.  The object of the two proceedings  being thus  different,  it  is not any rule of law  but  merely  a matter .of discretion depending on the facts of each case as to  whether the Court would straightaway proceed to  enquire into  the allegation of professional misconduct or leave  it to  the complainant to prosecute the practitioner and  await the  result of such a proceeding.  It was not  suggested  by Counsel for the appellant that it was incompetent for or 12 beyond  the jurisdiction of the Court, ’to proceed  with  an enquiry  in a case where the misconduct charged against  the advocate or practitioner  amounted to an offence  under  the ordinary  criminal  law. Neither of the cases relied on  lay down  any such proposition and is not of much assistance  to the  appellant  in the present case.  It  is  sufficient  to extract  the  head-note  to the report of  the  decision  in Chandi Charan Mitter (x), indicate that it bears no  analogy to the case now on hand.  The  relevant portion of the head- note reads:               "Where  the misconduct alleged has  no  direct               connection with the conduct of the pleader  in               his  practical and immediate relation  to  the               court, ordinarily, there should be a trial and

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             conviction  for  criminal  misconduct   before               disbarment will be Ordered." The charge against the practitioner in that case related  to a  matter which had nothing to do with his  relationship  to his  clients, or the court, and in the circumstances it  was held  that the direction would be properly exercised if  the initiation  of professional misconduct proceedings   awaited the result of the prosecution.  It is obvious that the  case before us is  far  different.  Emperor  v.  Satish   Chandra Singha  (2), was also a similar case.  The   charge  against the   practitioner   was  of  forging   court   records   by interpolating some words in an original plaint. In  the case now before us, however, the misconduct  charged is   intimately  connected with and arises out of  the  duty which  the  Advocate  owed  to  client.   This   distinction between   misconduct which is intimately connected with  the duties which the practitioner owes to his clients and  cases where it is not so connected as bearing upon the exercise of the  Court’s  discretion  to  proceed  or  not  to   proceed straightaway   with   an   inquiry   into   the   advocate’s professional misconduct  was emphasised by Lord (1) (1920) I.L.R, 47 Cal, 1115,    (2) (1927)I.L. R. 54 Cal, 721, 13 Abinger   in  stephans  (1),  which  dealt  with   case   of professional misconduct against an attorney in England.  The learned Judge said:               "If the attorney has been guilty of  something               indictable  in itself but not arising  out  of               the   cause   (in   which   he   is    engaged               professionally)  the Court would  not  inquire               into that with a view to striking him off  the               roll  but would leave the party  aggrieved  to               his remedy by a criminal prosecution." There  is thus a clear distinction between cases  where  the misconduct is one in relation to the practitioner’s duty  to his client and other cases where it is not so. In the former class of cases the court would be exercising its  discretion properly if it proceeded to deal with the charge as a  piece of  professional misconduct without driving the  complainant to seek his remedy in a Criminal Court.  So far as the facts of  the  present case are concerned the appellant  got   his client’s money in his hands in the course of the proceedings of a suit in which he was engaged and the charge against him was that he failed to repay the money. In the  circumstances we  consider  that  the High Court was  fully  justified  in proceeding  against the appellant under the provision of  s. 10 of the Bar Councils Act.     The next complaint of the learned Counsel was that there was a procedural irregularity in the mode in which the  case against  the  appellant  was conducted.  This  was  said  to consist  in  the fact that some evidence on behalf,  of  the complainants (the respondents before us)was permitted to  be led  after  the appellant had examined himself  and  it  was urged  that  thereby  the  complainants  had  been  afforded opportunity  of  filling  up any lacuna in  their  case.  We consider   that there  is no substance  in  this  objection. No complaint that the appellant  was 14 prejudiced by the manner in which the inquiry was  conducted in  the  matter  of  the order in  which  the  evidence  was adduced,  was  made  either before the  District  Judge  who conducted  the  inquiry or before the High  Court  when  the report  of  the  District Judge  was  considered.   We  have ourselves  examined  the record and find that  there  is  no

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basis  for any suggestion that any’ prejudice had,  occurred by reason of the order in which the witnesses were examined.     It  was then suggested that one of the  plaintiffs-Kagga Veeraiah--had  himself admitted in his evidence  before  the District Judge that he and others had received the  proceeds of the cheque which the appellant had cashed and that in the face of this admission the learned Judges of the High  Court were clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had  failed to  pay over the money to his clients.  A few facts have  to be  mentioned to appreciate this contention as well  as  the answer to it.  As stated earlier, there were four plaintiffs in the suit--O.S. 432 of 1951 and plaintiffs. 1 to 3 are the complainants--now  respondents 1 to 3 before us.  The fourth plaintiff  was one Kagga Veeraiah.  It was the case  of  the appellant  that  this  money  , was paid  to  all  the  four plaintiffs  i.e.,  was paid to the plaintiffs when  all  the four  of  them  were  present.   It  was  the  case  of  the complainants that Kagga Veeraiah--the 4th plaintiff died  in 1957.   It  was m  these circumstances  that  the  appellant alleged that Kagga Veeraiah was alive and a man claiming  to be Kagga Veeraiah was produced before the District Judge who examined  him  as  court witness No. 7.   The  man  who  was examined  did  depose  that  the  money  was  paid  to   the plaintiffs in his presence and, no doubt, if that  statement along  with  the identity of the deponent was  accepted  the appellant’s  defence would have been made out.  The case  of the  complainants,  however, was that the  man  examined  as court  witness  No. 7 was an impersonator.   To  prove  the; death of the 15 real  Kagga  Veeraiah an extract from the death  certificate was produced in court by the complainants. The attention  of court  witness No. 7 was drawn to the fact that  in  another proceeding (0. S. 732 of 1955) to which Kagga Veeraiah was a party a memo was filed into Court stating that he was  dead. The  witness’s explanation for this was that as he  was  not available  the memo to that effect was filed.   The  witness was  severely  cross  examined about  his  identity  and  in particular, questioned about the details of the parties  and other  details regarding the subject-matter of O.S.  432  of 1951  and his answers were most unsatisfactory, to  say  the least.  The Learned Judges of the High Court considered  all this  evidence  and recorded two alternative  findings  :(1) that  the person examined as C.W. 7 was not  Kagga  Veeraiah but   was  an  impersonator  seemed  to  accord   with   the probabilities, and (2) that even if C.W. 7 be in truth Kagga Veeraiah as he claimed, they would not accept  his  evidence as there was not ’even a modicum of truth in his deposition’ and they would unhesitatingly reject  it.  The   submission, however,   of learned Counsel was that there was before  the High  Court  the  thumb impression of this  witness  to  his deposition before the District Judge as C.W. 7 and the thumb impression of the 4th plaintiff in O.S. 432 of 1951 and that on  a  comparison   of  these two  the  court  should   have accepted  the identity of C.W. 7 as Kagga Veeraiah--the  4th plaintiff.  It is really not necessary to pursue this matter or the details of the evidence relating to it because  there is  no ground at all for interfering with the   appreciation by  the learned Judges of the High Court of the  credibility of  this  witness’s  deposition apart  altogether  from  the question as to whether Kagga Veeraiah was dead and if he was not, whether C.W. 7 was Kagga Veeraiah. The admissions  that this witness made and the ignorance that he displayed  about the  proceedings  in the suit stamped him as  a  witness  of untruth  and the learned Judges correctly characterised  his

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evidence 16 as  devoid  of  "even a modicum of  truth."   The  appellant cannot  therefore rely on any admission on the part of  this witness  as evidence of the plaintiffs having  received  the sum which was admittedly in his hands.     Lastly,  it  was  urged that  the  order  directing  the suspension  of the appellant for a period of five years  was too  severe  and  that  we  should  reduce  the  period   of suspension  even  on the basis that the charge  against  the appellant  be  held to be established. We can  only  express surprise  that  Counsel should have made bold to  make  this submission.   The  appellant  had  got  into  his  hands   a considerable  sum of money belonging to his clients and,  on the  finding of the High Court, had failed to, pay  it  back when  demanded. Not content with this he had put  forward  a false defence of payment and had even sought to sustain  his defence by suborning witnesses.  In the circumstances, even, if  the learned Judges of the High Court had struck off  the name  of the appellant from the roll of advocates  we  would have considered it a proper punishment having regard to  the gravity  of  the  offence.   The  order  now  under   appeal therefore errs, if at all, on the side of leniency and there is no justification for the  request  made on behalf of  the appellant.               The appeal fails and is dismissed. 17