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PETITIONER: P. D. SHARMA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE BANK OF INDIA

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/02/1968

BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. BENCH: HEGDE, K.S. MITTER, G.K.

CITATION:  1968 AIR  985            1968 SCR  (3)  91  CITATOR INFO :  R          1978 SC1283  (11)  R          1979 SC1328  (10)

ACT: Industrial    Disputes   Act   1947   (14   of   1947)    s, 33(3)--Application  to discharge protected  workman--Pending reference over--Competence to entertain the application. Constitution  of  India,  Art.  136--High  Court   summarily dismissed   writ  petition  against  Industrial   Tribunal’s order--Application  for certificate under Arts. 132 and  133 pending--Special  leave  granted against  Tribunal’s  order, whether to be revoked.

HEADNOTE: During  the  pendency of an industrial dispute,  before  the Tribunal  between the respondent-employer and  its  workmen, the respondent decided to dismiss the appellant a ’protected workman’.   So the respondent applied under s 33(3)  of  the Industrial  Disputes Act to the Tribunal for  permission  to discharge   him.   The  Tribunal  made  the  award  in   the reference.  The Labour Court to which the application  under s.  33(2) was transferred. held that the award in  Reference having  been  made, it had no competence to  deal  with  the application  under  s. 33(3).  The appellant  filed  a  writ petition  in  the High Court challenging this order  of  the Labour  Court.  The writ petition was  summarily  dismissed. Thereafter  ,  the appellant applied to the High  Court  for certificate  under  Articles  132(1) and  133(1)(c)  of  the Constitution.   During  pendency  of  the  application   for certificate the appellant moved this Court for Special Leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution against the order of  the Labour  Court,  which was granted.  In the  petition  for  a special  leave the fact of the filing of the  writ  petition and  its  dismissal  was mentioned.  Later  the  High  Court rejected  the  application for certificate.   The  appellant contended that once an application under s. 33(3) is validly made, the Tribunal must decide whether permisson sought  for should  be  granted or refused even  though  the  industrial dispute  had  been  decided  during  the  pendency  of   the application.   The  respondent urged the revocation  of  the special  leave  as  he had not  appealed  against  the  High Court’s order made in the writ petition.

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HELD  :  No case was made out to revoke  the  special  leave granted.   The  High  Court  summarily  dismissed  the  writ petition.  The order dismissing the writ petition was not  a speaking order.  Hence no question of res judicata arose The respondent’s  contention is not correct, that the  order  of the  High  Court not having been appealed  against,  it  has become final and if the present appeal is allowed there will be  two  conflicting final orders.  The scope of  an  appeal under Art. 136 is much wider than a petition under Art. 226. In  an  appeal  under  Art; 136,  this  Court  can  go  into questions on facts as well as law whereas the High Court  in the writ petition could have only considered questions which would  have been strictly relevant in an application  for  a writ of certiorari. [93 G--94 B] Daryao and others v. State of U.P. and Ors. [1962] 1  S.C.R. 574, Management of Hindustan Commercial Bank Ltd.  Kanpur v. Bhagwan Pas, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1142 and Chandi Prasad Chokhni v. State of Bihar, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 276, referred to. 92 The   Labour  Court  was  right  in  holding  that  it   was incompetent to deal with an application under s. 33(3) after the industrial dispute was decided. An  application  under  s. 33(3)  for  prior  permission  is different from an application for approval under s. 33(2)(b) in  respect of matters not connected with the dispute.   The latter  is an independent proceeding and the order  for  the approval of which the application has been made would remain incohate until the competent authority accords its approval. The  sole  reason for an application under s. 33(3)  is  the pendency  of the industrial dispute and once the dispute  is decided  the  ban  placed on the common  law,  statutory  or contractual, rights of the employer stands removed and it is free to exercise those rights. [100 D-E; 101 B] Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak, [1965] 3 S.C.R. 411, held inapplicable. Strawboard  Manufacturing  Co.  v. Gobind,  [1962]  Supp.  3 S.C.R. 618 referred to.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION  : Civil Appeal  No.  785  of 1966. Appeal  by  special leave from the order dated  February  10 1965  of the Labour Court, Lucknow (Central) in Misc.   Case No. 22 of 1963. A. K. Sen and Anand Prakash, for the appellant. Niren  De,  Solicitor-General, S. V. Gupte,  and  K.  Baldev Mehta, for the respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde, J. In the aforementioned appeal by special leave, the point for consideration is whether the Labour Court, Lucknow was  right  in its conclusion that it was not  competent  to deal with Misc.  Case No. 22/63 on its file, an  application under s. 33(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In  1961, the appellant was a clerk working in the  Dehradun branch  of the State Bank of India, the  respondent  herein. In connection with certain alleged misconduct the respondent held  a  departmental  enquiry  against  him;  came  to  the conclusion that he was guilty of the charge levelled against him and for the said offence it proposed to dismiss him from its  service.   But as at that time  an  industrial  dispute between  the respondent and its workmen was  pending  before the  National  Industrial Tribunal in Ref.  No.  1  of  1960 (which  will  hereinafter be referred to as  the  industrial

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dispute), and the appellant being one of the office  bearers of  a recognized trade union connected with  the  respondent and consequently a ’protected workman’, it applied on  April 27,  1962  under  s. 3 3 (3 )  to  the  National  Industrial Tribunal  for permission to discharge him from service.   On the authority of an order made by the Central Government  on 23rd December, 1960 under sub-s. 2 of s. 33 B, the  National Industrial Tribunal, Bombay transferred 93 the  said  application  to the  Labour  Court,  Delhi.   The National  Industrial Tribunal Bombay, made its award in  the aforementioned  Reference  on June 7, 1962.   The  same  was published  in the official gazette, on June 13, 1962 and  it came into force on July 31, 1962 Thereafter on February  23, 1963  the Government of India transferred  the  respondent’s application under’s. 33(3) pending ’before the Labour Court, Delhi, to the Labour Court, Lucknow.  That court dropped the said proceedings as per its order dated 10th February,  1965 holding  that  in  view of the award  in  the  Reference  in question it had no competence to deal with that application. This  order  of  the  Labour Court  was  challenged  by  the appellant  in Civil Misc.  Writ Petition No. 619 of 1965  on the  fire  of the Allahabad High Court.  That  petition  was summarily  dismissed.  Thereafter he applied to  that  court for  a certificate under Articles 132(1 ) and 13’(1) (C)  of the Constitution.  During the pendency of that  application, he moved this Court on July 17, 1965 for special leave under Art. 136 of the Constitution to appeal against the order  of the  Tribunal.  Special leave was granted by this  Court  on September  8, 1965.  The application for  certificate  made- before  the Allahabad High Court was rejected by that  court by  its order dated September 13, 1965.  No application  for special leave under Art. 136 was filed against that order. When this appeal came up for hearing on a previous occasion, learned  counsel for the respondent urged that  the  special leave  granted  should be revoked as the appellant  had  not appealed against the order made by the Allahabad High  Court in his writ petition.  Thereafter, the appellant moved  this Court  for special leave against the order of the  Allahabad High Court rejecting hi,-, writ petition.  He, also filed an application for condonation of the, delay in submitting that special leave application. We  are  not  satisfied  that there  is  any  force  in  the preliminary objection taken by the learned Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent.  This case does not fall within the  rule, laid down by this Court in Daryao and  others  v. State  of  U.P. and Others(1).  As seen  earlier,  the  High Court  summarily  dismissed the writ petition filed  by  the appellant.  The order dismissing the writ petition was not a Speaking  order.  Hence no question of res judicata  arises. The learned Solicitor General did not try to bring the  pre- sent  case  within the rule laid down in  Daryao’s  case(1). His  contention  was that the order of the  High  Court  not having been appealed against the same, has become final  and therefore it would be inappropriate for this Court to  grant the relief prayed for by the appellant. According to him, if the present appeal is allowed there will be two  conflicting final  orders.  We are unable to accept this  contention  as correct.  The scope of an appeal under Art. 136 is (1) [1962] 1 S.C.R. 574. 94 much  wider  than a petition under Art. 226.  In  an  appeal under Art. 136, this Court can go into questions of facts as well  as  law whereas the High Court in  the  writ  petition could  have only considered questions which would have  been

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strictly   relevant  in  an  application  for  a   writ   of certiorari.   From  the order of the High Court  it  is  not possible to find out the reason or reasons that persuaded it to  reject the, appellant’s petition.  An appeal under  Art. 136 against an order can succeed even if no case is made out to issue a writ of certiorari. The, decision of this Court in Management of Hindustan  Com- mercial  Bank  Ltd.,  Kanpur v.  Bhagwan  Dass(1)  to  which reference was made by the learned Solicitor General does not bear  on  the  question  under  consideration.   There   the appellant  had applied to the High Court for the issue of  a certificate  under  Art. 132 against its order  but  without pursuing  that application he applied for and obtained  from this  Court  special leave to appeal against the  very  same order  and that without obtaining exemption from  compliance with, r. 2 of 0.13 of the rules of this Court.  It was under those  circumstances  this  Court held  that  special  leave granted should be revoked. The learned Solicitor General in support of his  preliminary objection placed a great deal of reliance on the decision of this  Court in Chandi Prasad Chakhani v. State of  Bihar  (2 )  .  That was a case under the, Bihar Sales Tax  Act.   The appellant’s claim of certain deductions had been  disallowed by  the department.  He went up in revision to the Board  of Revenue.   The  Board  of  Revenue  dismissed  his  revision petition.  There after under s.25(1) of the Bihar Sales  Tax Act,  he applied to the Board of Revenue by means  of  three different applications to state a case to the High Court  of Patna  in each of those petitions on questions of  law  for- mulated by him in his applications.  But those  applications were  rejected.  The appellant then moved the High Court  to call  upon  the Board to submit to it for its  opinions  the questions  of law set out by him in his  applications.   The High  Court  dismissed his applications in  respect  of  the first  two  periods  of assessment but by  its  order  dated November  17, 1954 it directed the Board to state a case  in regard  to the third period on one of the questions  of  law mentioned  in the petition which alone in its opinion  arose for  consideration.  By its judgment dated January 21,  1957 the High Court answered that question against the appellant. On  February  17, 1955, the appellant made  applications  to this Court for special leave to appeal against the order  Of the Board of Revenue referred to earlier.  The leave  prayed for  was  granted.  When the appeals came  up  for  hearing, objection  was  raised as to  their  maintainability.   This Court held that though the words of Art. 136 are (1) A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1142. (2) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 276. 95 wide  this  Court has uniformly held as a rule  of  practice that there must be exceptional and special circumstances  to justify  the exercise of the discretion under that  article. In the circumstances of that case the Court opined that  the appellant  was not entitled to obtain special leave  against the  orders  of  the Board of Revenue and  thus  bypass  the orders  of  the High Court.  In the course of  the  judgment this Court observed               "The question before us is not whether we have               the power; undoubtedly, we have the power, but               the  question is whether in the  circumstances               under  present consideration, it is  a  proper               exercise of discretion to allow the  appellant               to  have  resort to the power  of  this  Court               under Art. 136.  That question must be decided               on  the facts of each case, having  regard  to

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             the,   practice   of  this   Court   and   the               limitations  which this Court itself has  laid               down  with  regard  to  the  exercise  of  its                             discretion under Art. 136." The reasons that persuaded this Court to revoke the  special leave  granted  in those appeals are not available  in  this case. This takes up to the question whether a case is made out  to revoke  the special leave granted.  We shall  presently  see that  an  important question of law arises for  decision  in this   case.    The  High  Court  summarily   rejected   the appellant’s  application  under Art. 226.  At the  time  the appellant  approached  this  Court for  special  leave,  his application under Articles 132 and 133(1)(C) was pending  in the High Court.  Though in his special leave application the appellant mentioned the fact that his application under Art. 226  had  been  dismissed by the High Court,  he  failed  to mention  the  fact that his application  for  a  certificate under  Articles  132  and 133 was pending  before  the  High Court.  We were assured by Mr. A. K. Sen learned counsel for the  appellant  that this omission was due to  an  erroneous impression of the law on the part of the Advocate on, record and there was no intention to keep back that fact from  this Court.   As  seen  earlier the  fact  that  the  appellant’s application under Art. 226 had been dismissed was  mentioned in  the  special leave application.  Hence the  omission  in question cannot be considered as a deliberate suppression of a  fact’ Under these circumstances, we do not think  that  a case is made out to revoke the special leave granted. We  now come to the merits of the appeal.  As  seen  earlier the  tribunal  had concluded that it had  no  competence  to ’Pass  orders  on the application made,  by  the  respondent under s. 33 (3) as the industrial dispute had come to an end because  of  the  award  made  by  the  National   Tribunal. According  to,  Mr. Sen the tribunal erred  in  taking  that view.  He urged that once an application 96 under  S. 33 (3) is validly made, the tribunal  must  decide whether  the  permission  sought for should  be  granted  or refused even though the industrial dispute had been  decided during the pendency of that application.  His contention was that  if An application under sub-ss. 1, 2 or 3 of s. 33  is made  during  the  pendency of an  industrial  dispute,  the tribunal  which  considers that application has to  make  an order  one way or the other.  In support of this  contention he  placed strong reliance on the decision of this Court  in Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. S. N. Modak(1).  That was  a case arising under s. 3 3 (2) (b).  The question that  arose for  decision  therein  was  whether  a  proceeding  validly commenced  under that provision would automatically come  to an  end  merely because the industrial dispute  had  in  the meanwhile  been finally determined.  This Court  upheld  the view  taken by the tribunal that such an  application  would not automatically come to an end.  It was held therein  that an  application  under  s.  33 (2)  (b)  is  an  independent proceeding  and  not an interlocutory proceeding;  it  is  a proceeding  between an employer and his employee who was  no doubt  concerned with the industrial dispute along with  the other  employees;  but  it  is  nevertheless  a   proceeding ’between  two parties in respect of a matter not covered  by that  dispute.   It was further laid down therein  that  the order  for  the approval of which the application  had  been made  would remain inchoate until the tribunal  accords  its approval;  the said order cannot effectively terminate  ’the relationship  of  the  employer and the  employee  until  an

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approval  for that order is obtained from the tribunal.   If the approval is not accorded, the employer would be bound to treat the workman as his employee and pay him full wages for the period even though the employer may subsequently proceed to  terminate  the employee’s service.  In  that  case  this Court  confined its attention to the scope of  s.  33(2)(b). It  did not address itself to s. 33(3).  Hence, Mr. Sen  is, not right in his contention that the rule laid down in  that decision governs the controversy before us. Alternatively,  Mr.  Sen contended that the  ratio  of  that decision at any rate would support his contention.  To  find out  whether the ratio of that decision has any  bearing  on the  question that is before us, we have to examine  sub-ss. (2) and (3) of s. 33.  They read               "(2)   During   the  pendency  of   any   such               proceeding   in  respect  of   an   industrial               dispute, the employer may, in accordance  with               the  standing orders applicable to  a  workman               concerned in such dispute, or, where there are               no  such standing orders, in  accordance  with               the terms of the contract, whether express  or               implied,  between  him  and  the   workman-(a)               alter, in regard to any (1) [1965] 3 S.C.R. 411. 97 matter  not  connected with the dispute, the  conditions  of service  applicable to that. workman immediately before  the commencement  of such proceeding; or (b) for any  misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman; Provided  that  no  such  workman  shall  be  discharged  or dismissed,  unless he has been paid wages for one month  and an  application  has  been made ’by  the  employer  to,  the authority  before  which  the  proceeding  is  pending   for approval of the action taken by the employer. (3)  Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section  (2), no   employer  shall,  during  the  pendency  of  any   such proceeding  in  respect of an industrial dispute,  take  any action  against  any  protected workman  concerned  in  such dispute-(a)  by altering to the prejudice of such  protected workman,  the  conditions  of  service  applicable  to   him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings;  or (b)  by  discharging or punishing, whether by  dismissal  or otherwise, such protected workman, save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending. Explanation.-For  the  purposes  of  this  sub-section,   a‘ protected workman’ in relation to an establishment, means  a workman  who, being an officer of a registered  trade  union connected  with the establishment is recognised as  such  in accordance with rules made in this behalf." One common condition precedent for an application to be made under both those provisions is the pendency of any concilla- tion proceedings before a conciliation officer or a board or any  proceeding before an arbitrator or a labour court or  a tribunal  or National Tribunal in respect of  an  industrial dispute.  That apart the two provisions deal with  different situations.  Sub-s. 2 of s. 33 concerns itself with  actions that  may be taken by an employer against his  employees  in respect  of  matters  not  connected  with  the   industrial dispute.  In those cases though the employer can take any of the  actions mentioned in that provision in accordance  with the  standing  orders or where there are  no  such  standing orders,  in  accordance  with the  terms  of  the  contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workmen,  on

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his  own authority, he must, in the case of  discharging  or punishing whether by dismissal or otherwise, a workman  ’pay him wages for one month and must also make an application to the authority before which the industrial dispute is pending for approval of the action taken by him., 98 Sub-s.  3  of  s. 33 deals with  ’protected  workman’  which express’ ’on in relation to an establishment means a workman who  being an officer of a registered trade union  connected with the establishment, is recognized as such in  accordance with the ;-ales made in that behalf.  If the, employer wants to  take  any  action prejudicial  to  a  protected  workman concerned in an industrial dispute pending before one of the authorities  mentioned  earlier he can do so only  with  the "express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending".  On a comparison of sub-ss.  (2) &  (3)  of s. 33 it will be seen that the scope of  the  two provisions  are  wholly  different.  Taking the  case  of  a worker’s discharge or punishment by dismissal or  otherwise. In  the  former  the previous permission  of  the  authority before which the industrial dispute is Pending is  necessary but  under  the  latter only a subsequent  approval  from  a competent authority is needed.  Though the application under that provision should be made to the authority before  which the  industrial  dispute  is  pending  the  approval  to  be obtained need not be from that authority.  Once approval  is given  it  goes  back  to the date on  which  the  order  in question  was  made.   If  the approval  asked  for  is  not accorded  then the action taken by the employer  becomes  ab initio  void and the employee will continue in  service  and his  conditions  of service will also continue  without  any break as if the order in question had not been made at  all. Hence we are unable to accept the contention of Mr. Sen that the decision of this Court in Tata Iron and Steel  Company’s case  (1)has any bearing on the, question to be  decided  in this case. The purpose of those two sub-sections are wholly  different. This will be further clear if we refer to the history of  s. 33.   That  section, since its incorporation in the  Act  in 1947,  has  undergone several legislative  changes.   As  it stood originally it read               "No employer shall during the pendency of  any               conciliation proceeding or proceedings  before               a  tribunal  in  respect  of  any   industrial                             dispute, alter to the prejudice ,of th e workmen               concerned  in such dispute the  conditions  of               service-applicable to them immediately  before               the ,commencement of such proceeding, nor save               with the express permission in writing of  the               conciliation  officer, board or  tribunal,  as               the  case may be shall he during the  pendency               of  such proceedings, discharge,  dismiss,  or               otherwise punish any such workmen, except  for               misconduct not connected with the dispute." The  section  was amended by Act 48 of  1950.   The  amended section read :               "During  the  pendency  of  any   conciliation               proceedings  or proceedings before a  tribunal               in respect of any (1)  [1965] 3 S.C.R. 411. 99               industrial  dispute,  no  employer  shall  (a)               alter   to  the  prejudice  of   the   workmen               concerned  in such dispute, the conditions  of

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             service applicable to them immediately  before               the commencement of such proceedings; (b) dis-               charge  or  punish, whether  by  dismissal  or               otherwise,  any  workmen  concerned  in   such               dispute;               save with the express permission in writing of               the  conciliation officer, board or  tribunal,               as the case may be." The amended section dropped the exception made in respect of misconduct not connected with the, dispute.  This change  in the   law  prevented  the  employers  from  discharging   or punishing  their employees even in respect of  a  misconduct not  connected  with  the industrial dispute.   That  was  a serious  inroad  into the disciplinary jurisdiction  of  the employer.   It is possibly with a view to avoid  unnecessary interference  with the rights of the employers  the  section was amended by Act 36 of 1956. In  Strawboard  Manufacturing Co. v.  Govind(1)  this  Court observed :               "The  plain  object  of  the  section  was  to               maintain  the  status quo as far  as  possible               during the pendency of any industrial  dispute               before a tribunal.  But it seems to have  been               felt that S. 33, as it stood before the amend-               ment  of  1956,  was  too  stringent  for   it               completely took away the right of the employer               to  make any alteration in the  conditions  of               service  or to make any order of discharge  or               dismissal without making any distinction as to               whether  such alteration or such an  order  of               discharge  or  dismissal  was  in  any  manner               connected  with the dispute pending before  an               industrial  authority.  It seems to have  been               felt  therefore  that the  stringency  of  the                             provision  should be softened and the  employer               should   be  permitted  to  make  changes   in               conditions  of  service etc.  which  were  not               connected  with the dispute pending before  an               industrial  tribunal.  For the same reason  it               was felt that the authority of the employer to               dismiss  or discharge a workman should not  be               completely  taken away where the dismissal  or               discharge   was  dependent  on   the   matters               unconnected  with the dispute  pending  before               any  tribunal.  At the same time it  seems  to               have been felt that some safeguards should  be               provided  for a workman who may be  discharged               or dismissed during the pendency of a  dispute               on account of some matter unconnected with the               dispute.  Consequently S. 33 was re-drafted in               1956 and considerably expanded." (1)  [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 618, 623. 100 By enacting s. 33 the Parliament wanted to ensure a fair and satisfactory enquiry of an industrial dispute undisturbed by any  action on the part of the employer which  could  create fresh  cause for disharmony between him and  his  employees. The  object  of  s. 33 is that during  the  pendency  of  an industrial  dispute status quo should be maintained  and  no further  element of discord should be introduced.  But  then distinction  was  made between matters  connected  with  the industrial dispute and those unconnected with it. While  construing the scope of sub-s. 3 of s. 33 we have  to bear in mind the fact that under the common law the employer

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has   a  right  to  punish  his  employee  for   misconduct. Therefore  all that we have to see is, to what  extent  that right is taken away by sub-s. 3 of S. 33.  There is no doubt that  at the time the application in question was  made,  an industrial  dispute was pending between the  respondent  and its  employees.   It  is admitted that the  appellant  is  a ’protected workman’.  He had not been discharged or punished before  the industrial dispute was decided, though no  doubt the respondent had proposed to dismiss him after  obtaining- the necessary permission from the tribunal.  The application for  permission to dismiss him was made during the  pendency of  the  principal dispute.  No such permission  would  have been   necessary  if  no  industrial  dispute  between   the respondent  and its employees was pending.  Hence, the  sole reason  for  that  application  was  the  pendency  of   the industrial   dispute.   Once  the  industrial  dispute   was decided,  the  ban placed on the common  law,  statutory  or contractual  rights of the respondent stood removed  and  it was free to exercise those rights.  Thereafter there was  no need  to take anybody’s permission to exercise  its  rights. In  other words, the limitation placed on  the  respondent’s rights  by  sub-s.  3 of S. 33 disappeared  the  moment  the industrial  dispute was decided.  We are in  agreement  with the  tribunal  that  it had no competence  to  consider  the application  made  by the respondent  after  the  industrial dispute was decided. The   learned  Solicitor  General  tried  to   support   the conclusion  of  the  tribunal on yet  another  ground.   His contention  was  that the permission sought for  could  have been  granted  only  by  the  authority  before  which   the industrial  dispute was pending.  In the instant  case  that dispute was pending before the National Tribunal at  Bombay. Therefore  according to him, the permission asked for  could not  have been given either by the Labour Court at Delhi  or by the Labour Court at Lucknow.  The language of sub-s. 3 of s. 33 prima facie lends support to this contention.  But  in resisting  that  contention Mr. Sen relied on s.  33B  which confers power on the government and under certain conditions on  the Tribunal or National Tribunal as the case may be  to transfer any 101 proceeding  pending  before  them to a  Labour  Court.   The language  of this provision is not in harmony with  that  in sub-ss. (1) and (3) of s. 33.  The learned Solicitor General urged that to harmoniously construe these provisions we must confine the operation of s. 33B only to cases falling  under sub-s.  2  of  s. 33.  It is not necessary  to  decide  this controversy in this case in view of our conclusion that  the Labour Court at Lucknow was right in its conclusion that  it had no competence to grant the permission prayed for as  the industrial dispute had come to an end. For the reasons mentioned above, the appeal is dismissed but there  will  be  no order as to costs.   The  special  leave application as well as the civil miscellaneous petition have now  become  superfluous.  They  are  accordingly  dismissed without costs.. Y. P.                          Appeal dismissed. 102