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PETITIONER: OM PRAKASH GUPTA

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: RATTAN SINGH AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17/12/1962

BENCH:

ACT: Rent  Control-Penant availing benefit-Denying  relationship- Jurisdiction of Rent Controller-Delhi Rent Control Act  (Act LIX of 1958), s. 15.

HEADNOTE: The  appellant was sought to be evicted by the  landlord  on the  ground that he had habitually defaulted in the  payment of rent as well as on the ground of the bonafide requirement of  the land-lord for his own occupation.  He  resisted  the suit inter alia on the ground that the premises had been let to the 260 All  India Postal R. M. S. Union for  office-cum-residential purposes  and  that the tenancy of the Union  had  not  been terminated and that the rent had not been demanded from  the Union.  The appellant was directed to deposit the arrears of rent up-to-date as also to go on depositing the future  rent accruing  due month by month.  The respondent applied  under s.  15(7)  of the Act for striking out the  defence  of  the appellant  on the ground that he had failed to  comply  with the orders directing him to deposit the rent.  Rejecting the explanation of the appellant the Additional Rent  Controller ordered  the  defence of the appellant to be struck  out  on July 26, 1961, and proceeded to pass an ex-parte decree  for eviction.  The  appellant went in appeal against  the  order striking  out  the defence which was dismissed by  the  Rent Control  Tribunal both on the ground that it was  barred  by time as also on merits on March 6, 1961.  The appellant  did not  take  the matter in further appeal to the  High  Court. Against  the decree for eviction the appellant went  to  the Rent  Control  Tribunal  which dismissed  the  appeal.   The appellant  went  in further appeal to the High  Court  which also  dismissed the appeal summarily.  On special leave,  it was contended that the appellant having denied the existence of  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant,  the  Rent Controller had no jurisdiction in the matter. Held, that under the Rent Control Law, the special  tribunal has to proceed on the basis of the relationship of  landlord and tenant existing between the parties but a mere denial by the  tenant  of the tenancy would not suffice  to  oust  the jurisdiction  of the special tribunal.  It is only when  the tribunal  comes to the conclusion that such  a  relationship did not exist that it will have no jurisdiction. Held,  further, that the provisions of s. 15 read  with  the definition  of  "landlord"  enable the  Rent  Controller  to determine  the question of the relationship of landlord  and tenant  for the benefit of the tenant and when a  party  has invited the Rent Controller to apply the provisions of s. 15

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for  his  benefit  and the Rent Controller does  so,  he  is deemed  to  have  decided such a person is  a  tenant.   The proper course for a person pleading that he was not a tenant would  be to raise the plea and walk out of the  proceedings and not to submit to  jurisdiction. Held,  further,  that  the appellant not  having  taken  the matter of striking out his defence under s. 15 (7) in appeal to  the  High Court the question of his being  a  tenant  or otherwise had become final and could not be reagitated.  261

JUDGMENT: CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 541 of 1962. Appeal  by special leave from the judgment and  order  dated May  31, 1962, of the Punjab High Court (Circuit  Bench)  at Delhi in S. A. O. No. 86-D of 1962. A.S. B. Chari, M. K. Ramamurthi, D. P. Singh and B. K. Garg, for the appellant. G. S. Pathak, F. C. Bedi and D. D. Sharma, for respondents. 1962.  December 17.  The judgment of the Court was delivered by SINHA,  C.   J.-This  appeal by special  leave  is  directed against the judgment and order of a learned single judge  of the Punjab High Court summarily dismissing the appeal  filed by the appellant, by his order dated May 31, 1962, from  the order of the Rent Control Tribunal dated March 7, 1962, con- firming that of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi, dated July  27, 1961, whereby he had directed the appellant to  be evicted from the premises in question. It appears that the respondents are admittedly the landlords of  the  premises, No. 24, Ansari Road, Darya  Ganj,  Delhi. The  appellant  claims  to have been in  occupation  of  the premises since prior to 1950, at a monthly rent of Rs. 50/-. In  1955,  the  respondent had instituted  a  suit  for  the eviction  of  the All India Postal & R.M.S. Union,  and  the appellant  was also impleaded as a party to the  suit.   The respondents,  in 1958, made an application for amendment  of the plaint on the ground that they had come to know that the last owner, the father of the first respondent, had let  the building  to the appellant for his residential purposes  and that the case should proceed againt him only.  But the 262 Subordinate judge, before whom the suit was pending, did not permit the amendment of the plaint but granted permission to withdraw from the suit with liberty to bring a fresh one, by his  order dated May 8, 1959.  Thereafter, on  February  25, 1960,  the respondents made an application before  the  Rent Controller, Delhi, for the eviction of the appellant  alone, without impleading the Union aforesaid as a party:     The contention  of the appellant was that the premises had  been let  out by the father of the first plaintiff-respondent  to the  All  India  Postal  &  R.M.S.  Union  for   office-cum- residential purposes and the tenancy of the Union had  never been terminated.  The appellant also alleged that he was not a  tenant and, therefore, the application for  his  eviction was not maintainable.  The petition for eviction was founded on  the  allegation that the appellant as  tenant  had  made persistent  default  in the payment of rent  and,  secondly, that the premises were bonafide required by the  respondents for  their own residence, as the first respondent was  about to  leave  the employment of a certain  hospital  which  had provided  him  with residential accommodation.  That  is  to say,the petition for eviction was brought under s.14(1)(a) &

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(e)  of the Delhi Rent Control Act (LIX of 1958)which  will be  referred  to in the course of the judgment as  the  Act. The appellant besides denying his tenancy and asserting  the tenancy  of the Union aforesaid stated that the  respondents had  already  got  suitable  accommodation  and  that  their requirement  of the premises in question was  not  bonafide; the  notice  of  demand for payment of rent  served  on  the appellant was neither valid nor proper in law inasmuch as he was not the tenant in respect of the premises, and that  the notice of demand should have been served on the Union.   The appellant asserted that he was only a licensee of the Union, and  that there was no relationship of landlord  and  tenant between  him  and the respondents.  On April  2,  1960,  the Additional Rent Controller passed an order  263 directing the appellant to deposit the arrears of rent  from August  1,1958,  up-to-date,  at the rate of  Rs.  50/-  per month, and future monthly rent, month by month, by the  15th of   every  following  month.   The  respondents   made   an application  on May 16, 1961, under s. 15(7) of the Act  for striking out his defence against eviction on the ground that the  tenant  had failed to make the payment or  deposit,  as directed  by the order dated April 2, 1960, aforesaid.   The appellant denied that he had made any default in the regular payment  of  rent, but also asserted that if there  was  any such default it was not intentional and was the result of  a miscalculation.   By  his  order dated July  26,  1961,  the Additional  Rent  Controller  ordered  the  defence  of  the appellant  to  be struck out.  An appeal against  the  order striking  out  his  defence was made  to  the  Rent  Control Tribunal  on September 15, 1961, which was late by one  day. The learned Tribunal dismissed the appeal as time-barred, as also  on merits, by its order dated March 6, 1962.   By  his order  dated July 17 , 1961, the Additional Rent  Controller passed an ex-parte order of,ejectment against the  appellant holding  that prima facie the relationship of  landlord  and tenant  had been established, on the basis of  certain  rent receipts  granted by the respondents to the  appellant.   He also  held that the respondents’ personal bonafide need  for accommodation  had  been established.  Appeal  against  that order  was dismissed on March 7, 1962, by the  Rent  Control Tribunal.   On  May 28, 1962, the appellant filed  a  second appeal  in  the High Court of Punjab at  Delhi  against  the order  dated March .7, 1962, of the Rent  Control  Tribunal, dismissing  his  appeal against the order of  eviction.   No second appeal was taken to the High Court in respect of  the dismissal of the appeal relating to the order dated March 6, 1962, of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing his appeal  in respect  of  the  order of the  Additional  Rent  Controller striking  out  his defence.The second appeal  was  dismissed summarily by a 264 Single  judge  on May 31, 1962.  The  appellant  moved  this Court  during the long vacation and obtained an  order  from the learned Vacation judge granting special leave to appeal, on June 5, 1962. A preliminary objection was taken on behalf of the landlord- respondent  that no second appeal having been filed  againts the order aforesaid of the Rent Control Tribunal, dismissing his  appeal in respect of the order of the  Additional  Rent Controller  striking out his defence, that order had  become final  between the parties, and, therefore, this appeal  was incompetent.   As  will presently appear, this  question  is bound up with merits of the appeal and has, therefore, to be determined not as a preliminary objection but as one of  the

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contentions between the parties, on the merits of the appeal itself. It   was  argued  on  behalf  of  the  appellant  that   the authorities  under the Act had no jurisdiction to  entertain the  proceedings, inasmuch as it was denied that  there  was any relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Consequently, it was further contended, the provisions of s. 15 (7) of the Act could not be applied against the appellant in  the  absence  of a finding that he  was  the  tenant  in respect of the premises in question.  It was also  contended that  the delay of one day made in preferring the appeal  to the Rent Control Tribunal should have been condoned, and the order   refusing  condonation  was  vitiated   by   applying erroneous considerations.  Other contentions raised  related to  concurrent findings of fact of the Rent  Controller  and the  Rent Control Tribunal and we need not, therefore,  take notice of these arguments.  The most important question that arises for determination in this case is whether or not  the Rent Control authorities had jurisdiction in the matter  in- controversy  in this case.  Ordinarily it is for  the  Civil Courts   to  determine  whether  and,  if  so,  what   jural relationship exists between the litigating  265 parties.   But the Act has been enacted to provide  for  the control  of  rents and evictions of  tenants,  avowedly  for their  benefit  and  protection.   The  Act  postulates  the relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant  which  must  be   a preexisting  relationship.  The Act is directed  to  control some  of  the  terms and  incidents  of  that  relationship. Hence,  there is no express provision in the Act  empowering the controller, or the Tribunal, to determine whether or not there  is  a relationship of landlord  and  tenant.   Inmost cases  such a question would not arise for determination  by the authorities under the Act.  A landlord must be very ill- advised  to start proceedings under the Act, if there is  no such  relationship of landlord and tenant.  If a  person  in possession of the premises is not a tenant, the owner of the premises would be entitled to institute a suit for ejectment in  the Civil Courts, untrammelled by the provisions of  the Act.   It  is  only  when he happens to  be  the  tenant  of premises in an urban area that the provisions of the Act,are attracted.  If a person moves a Controller for eviction of a person  on  the ground that he is a tenant who had,  by  his acts or omissions, made himself liable to be evicted on  any one  of the grounds for eviction, and if the  tenant  denies that  the plaintiff is the landlord, the Controller  has  to decide  the  question whether there was  a  relationship  of landlord  and tenant.  If the Controller decides that  there is no-such relationship the proceeding has to be terminated, without  deciding the main question in  controversy,  namely the  question  of  eviction.   If on  the  other  hand,  the Controller  comes to the opposite conclusion and holds  that the person seeking eviction was the landlord and the  person in possession was the tenant the proceedings have to go  on. Under s. 15 (4) of the Act, the Controller is authorised  to decide the question whether the claimant was entitled to  an order  for payment of rent, and if there is a dispute as  to the  person or persons to whom the rent is payable,  he  may direct the tenant to deposit with him the 266 amount payable until the decision of the question as to  who is  entitled to that payment.  "Landlord" has  been  defined under the Act as a person who is receiver or is entitled  to receive  the  rent of the premises (omitting the  words  not necessary  for  our present purposes).   If  the  Controller

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comes  to  the  conclusion that any dispute  raised  by  the tenant  as  to  who was entitled to receive  rent  had  been raised by the tenant for false or frivolous reasons, he  may order  the            defence against eviction to be  struck out  (s.  15  (5)).  Similarly, if a tenant  fails  to  make payment or deposit as required by s. 15 (2), the  Controller may order the defence against eviction to be struck out  and proceed with the hearing of the application for eviction (s. 15 (7)).  Such an order was, as already indicated, passed by the Rent Controller in this case.  Now, proceedings under s. 15  are primarily meant for the benefit of the  tenant,  and the  section  authorises  the Controller  after  giving  the parties  an  opportunity of being heard, to  make  an  order directing the tenant to pay the amount found on  calculation to  be  due  to  the landlord or  to  deposit  it  with  the Controller, within one month of the date of the order.  Such an order can be passed by the Controller for the benefit  of the  tenant, only if the Controller decides that the  person against whom the proceedings for eviction had been initiated was in the position of a tenant.  Thus, any order passed  by the Controller, either under s. 15 or other sections of  the Act,  assumes  that the Controller has the  jurisdiction  to make  the order, i. e., to determine the issue of  relation- ship.  In this case, when the Controller made the order  for deposit of the arrears of rent due, under s. 15 (1), and  on default  of that made the order under sub-s. (7) of  s.  15, striking  out the defence, the Controller must be deemed  to have  decided  that  the appellant was  a  tenant.   Such  a decision may not be res judicata in a regular suit in  which a similar issue may directly arise for decision.  Hence,  267 any orders made by a Controller under the Act proceed on the assumption  that he has the necessary power to do  so  under the  provisions of the Act, which apply and which are  meant to  Control rents and evictions of tenants.  An order  under s. 15 (1) is meant primarily for the protection and  benefit of  the  tenant.  If the appellant took his stand  upon  the plea  that he was not a tenant he should have simply  denied the relationship and walked out of the proceedings.  Instead of that, he took active steps to get the protection  against eviction  afforded by Act, by having an order passed by  the Controller,  giving  him a locus  poenitentiae  by  allowing further time to make the deposit of rent outstanding against him.   The  Controller,  therefore, must be  taken  to  have decided that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between  the  parties,  and secondly, that  the  tenant  was entitled  to the protection under the Act.  It is true  that the  Act does not in terms authorise the  authorities  under the   Act   to  determine  finally  the  question   of   the relationship  of landlord and tenant.  The Act  proceeds  on the  assumption that there is such a relationship.   If  the relationship  is denied, the authorities under the Act  have to determine that question also, because a simple denial  of the  relationship  cannot  oust  the  jurisdiction  of   the tribunals  under the Act.  True, they are tribunals  of  the limited jurisdiction, the scope of their power and authority being  limited  by  the provisions of the  Statute.   But  a simple  denial  of the relationship either  by  the  alleged landlord or by the alleged tenant would not have the  effect of  ousting  the jurisdiction of the authorities  under  the Act,  because the simplest thing in the world would  be  for the party interested to block the proceedings under the  Act to  deny  the  relationship of  landlord  and  tenant.   The tribunals under the Act being creatures of the Statute  have limited  jurisdiction and have to function within the  four-

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corners  of  the  Statute creating  them.   But  within  the provisions 268 of the Act, they are tribunals of exclusive jurisdiction and their  orders are final and not liable to be  questioned  in collateral  proceedings like a separate suit or  application in execution proceedings.  In our opinion, therefore,  there is  no  substance  in the contention that  as  soon  as  the appellant  denied the relationship of landlord  and  tenant; the  jurisdiction  of  the authorities  under  the  Act  was completely  ousted.   Nor is there any jurisdiction  in  the contention that the provisions of sub-s. (7) of s. 15 of the Act  had  been erroneously applied to  the  appellant.   The orders  under those provisions were for his benefit  and  he must be deemed to have invited the Controller to pass  those orders in his favour.  Otherwise, he should have walked  out of  the proceedings after intimating to the Controller  that he was not interested to contest the proceedings in as  much as  he  was  not a tenant, and that a third  party  was  the tenant.  This order, of course, will bind only the appellant and  no one else, and as he failed to take advantage of  the order passed in his favour under s. 15 (7), he cannot make a grievance  of it.  Whether or not a delay of one day  should have  been  condoned  was a matter of  discretion  with  the appellate  authority,  and it is not for this Court  to  say that  this discretion should have been exercised in one  way and not in another.  The crucial question is not whether the delay  is of one day or more, but whether or not  there  was any  justification for the delay.  It is for  the  appellate authority  to  determine whether or not  the  appellant  had satisfied  it  as  to  the sufficiency  of  the  ground  for condoning the delay.  This question of condonation of  delay is  more  or  less of academic interest  only,  because  the Tribunal not only considered the question of delay but  also the appeal on its merits, and on merits also it came to  the conclusion  that there was no ground for  interference  with the  orders  passed  by the  Rent  Controller.   Hence,  the question of condonation of delay is of no importance in this case.  What is of greater importance is the  269 merit  of the decision awarding possession to the  landlord. In  this  connection, it may be added that it was  a  little inconsistent on the part of the appellant to have taken  all the advantages the Act affords to a tenant and then to  turn round  and  to  assert  that  the  Rent  Controller  had  no jurisdiction in the matter, because he was not. the  tenant. The  Rent  Controller had to determine  the  controversy  as between  the  parties for the purposes of disposing  of  the case  under the Act.  If the appellant really was a  tenant, he  has  had  the  benefit of  the  provision  of  the  Act, including the six months’ time as a period of grace after an order of the Rent Controller granting the landlord’s  prayer for  eviction.  If he was not the tenant, he has nothing  to lose by the order of the Rent Controller.  These proceedings cannot affect the interest of one who is not a party to  the present  case.   Furthermore, a second appeal lay  from  the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal dismissing  the appellant’s  appeal  against  the  order  striking  out  his defence.  No such second appeal was taken to the High Court, though  as  already  stated a second  appeal  was  preferred against  the order of the Rent Control  Tribunal  dismissing his  appeal against the order of eviction.  The position  is that the appellate order of the Rent Control Tribunal, dated March  6,  1962,  dismissing the appeal  against  the  order striking  out his defence became final between  the  parties

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and is no more open to challenge.  Hence, it is no more open to  the  appellant  to challenge  the  jurisdiction  of  the authorities under the Act. In our opinion, therefore, there is no merit in his  appeal. It is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. 270