REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1415 OF 2010

[Arising out of S.L.P.(C)No.9389 of 2005] Om Parkash  ....Appellant   

Versus

Union of India & Ors. ....Respondents

W I T H C.A.No.1515 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.9498 of 2005]; C.A.No.1516 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.10871 of 2005]; C.A.No.1517 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.18087 of 2005]; C.A.No.1518 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.23338 of 2005]; C.A.No.1519 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22867 of 2005]; C.A.No.1520 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22953 of 2005]; C.A.No.1521 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.23339 of 2005]; C.A.No.1522 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22971 of 2005]; C.A.No.1523 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.23083 of 2005]; C.A.No.1524 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.23390 of 2005]; C.A.No.1525 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.24910 of 2005]; C.A.No.1526 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.24934 of 2005]; C.A.No.1527 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25786 of 2005]; C.A.No.1528 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25789 of 2005]; C.A.No.1529 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25790 of 2005]; C.A.No.1530 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25792 of 2005]; C.A.No.1531 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25794 of 2005]; C.A.No.1532 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25795 of 2005]; C.A.No.1533 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25895 of 2005]; C.A.No.1534 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25168 of 2005]; C.A.No.1535 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1621 of 2006]; C.A.Nos.1536-38 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) Nos.1608-1610 of  2006]; C.A.No.1539 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25836 of 2005]; C.A.No.1540 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1611 of 2006]; C.A.No.1541 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1612 of 2006]; C.A.No.1542 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1613 of 2006]; C.A.No.1543 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1614 of 2006]; C.A.No.1544 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1616 of 2006];

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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C.A.No.1545 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1617 of 2006]; C.A.No.1546 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26418 of 2005]; C.A.No.1547 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26431 of 2005]; C.A.No.1548 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26738 of 2005]; C.A.No.1549 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1618 of 2006]; C.A.No.1550 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26537 of 2005]; C.A.No.1551 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26881 of 2005]; C.A.No.1552 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.26900 of 2005]; C.A.No.1553 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1619 of 2006]; C.A.No.1554 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4552 of 2010]   (CC No.  553); C.A.No.1555 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4553 of 2010] (CC No.  757); C.A.No.1556 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.1874 of 2006]; C.A.No.1557 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4554 of 2010] (CC NO.  993); C.A.No.1558 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4075 of 2006]; C.A.No.1559 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4164 of 2006]; C.A.No.1560 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4642 of 2006]; C.A.No.1561 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6077 of 2006]; C.A.No.1562 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6078 of 2006]; C.A.No.1563 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6016 of 2006]; C.A.No.1564 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6089 of 2006]; C.A.No.1565 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6069 of 2006]; C.A.No.1566 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.7483 of 2006]; C.A.No.1567 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.8261 of 2006]; C.A.No.1568 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.11240 of 2006]; C.A.No.1569 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6138 of 2006]; C.A.No.1570 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6140 of 2006]; C.A.No.1571 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.13138 of 2006]; C.A.No.1572 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.15800 of 2006]; C.A.No.1573 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.15804 of 2006]; C.A.No.1574 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.258 of 2007]; C.A.No.1575 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.12932 of 2007]; C.A.No.1576 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4558 of 2010] (CC  No.1003); C.A.No.1577 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4559 of 2010] (CC  No.1931); C.A.No.1578 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.18566 of 2007]; C.A.No.1579 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.7102 of 2008]; C.A.No.1580 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.20180 of 2007]; C.A.No.1581 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4419 of 2007]; C.A.No.1582 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.20591 of 2006]; C.A.No.1583 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4420 of 2007]; C.A.No.1584 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4421 of 2007]; C.A.No.1585 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) NO.4422 of 2007];

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 3 -  C.A.No.1586 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4423 of 2007]; C.A.No.1587 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.137 of 2007]; C.A.No.1588 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.167 of 2007]; C.A.No.1589 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.11290 of 2007]; C.A.No.1590 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.18822 of 2007]; C.A.Nos.1591-92 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) Nos.4565-66 of 2010]  (CC Nos.10441-10442); C.A.No.1593 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6912 of 2006]; C.A.No.1594 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.6913 of 2006]; C.A.No.1595 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.7690 of 2007]; C.A.No.1596 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.9394 of 2007]; C.A.No.1597 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25103 of 2005]; C.A.No.1598 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25119 of 2005]; C.A.No.1599 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25141 of 2005]; C.A.No.1600 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25417 of 2005]; C.A.No.1601 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25436 of 2005]; C.A.No.1602 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25440 of 2005]; C.A.No.1603 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.21662 of 2005]; C.A.No.1604 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22607 of 2005]; C.A.No.1605 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.22722 of 2005]; C.A.No.1606 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4573 of 2010](CC No.  711); C.A.No.1607 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4575 of 2010] (CC No.  779); C.A.No.1608 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4579 of 2010] (CC No.  803); C.A.No.1609 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4580 of 2010] (CC No.  850); C.A.No.1610 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4581 of 2010] (CC NO.  906); C.A.No.1611 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4583 of 2010] (CC NO.  928); C.A.No.1612 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4584 of 2010] (CC No.  963); C.A.No.1613-1614 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.15791-15792 of  2009]; C.A.No.1615 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.27029 of 2008]; C.A.No.1616 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.9504 of 2009]; C.A.No.1617 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.538  of 2007]; C.A.No.1618 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4586 of 2010] (CC  No.10061); C.A.No.1619 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.25787 of 2005];  C.A.No.1620 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4588 of 2010] [CC  13301]; and C.A.No.1621 of 2010 [arising out of SLP(C) No.4589 of 2010] [CC  13568].

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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J U D G M E N T Deepak Verma, J. 1. Permission to file Special Leave Petitions is granted. 2. Delay condoned.  Substitution allowed. 3. Leave granted. 4. For  planned  development  of  Delhi,  Lt.  Governor  issued  notifications under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,  1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') on 05.11.1980 and  25.11.1980 to acquire more than 50,000 bighas of land situated  in 13 different villages falling within Delhi. 5. The land owners, feeling aggrieved by the issuance of the  said notifications under Section 4 of the Act, filed writ  petitions in the High Court of Delhi challenging the same on  variety of grounds. The said judgment rendered on 15.11.1983  in the case of  Munni Lal & Ors. v.  Lt. Governor of Delhi &  Ors. is reported in ILR (1984) I Delhi 469. After considering  the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners  – Munni Lal & Ors., the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court  came to the conclusion that the writ petitions challenging the  validity of the notifications dated 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980  issued under Section 4 of the Act, deserve to be dismissed and  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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accordingly were dismissed.  We have been given to understand  that against this judgment and order, no appeal was filed and  this judgment thus attained finality. 6. These appeals arise out of Judgment and Order passed by  Delhi High Court in Writ Petitions preferred by appellant and  other similarly situated appellants under Article 226 of the  Constitution of  India, wherein  challenge was  primarily and  basically  to  the  declaration/notifications  issued  by  Delhi  Administration under Section 6 of the Act. 7. The  said  petitions  having  been  dismissed  by  different  Orders passed by Division Benches of Delhi High Court, these  appellants are before us challenging the same on variety of  grounds. 8. The cases have a long and chequered history. For the sake  of convenience, we are taking the facts of the civil appeal  arising out of SLP (C) No. 9389 of 2005, Om Prakash Vs. Union  of  India  and  Others  as  issue  involved  in  these  cases  is  almost identical and common. 9. Shorn of unnecessary details, the brief facts of the case  are mentioned hereinbelow. 10. Notifications under Section 4 of the Act were issued on  two different dates, viz., 5.11.1980 and  25.11.1980.  11. Pursuant thereto, further  declarations/notifications  as  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 6 - contemplated  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  were  issued  on  20.5.1985, 6.6.1985, 7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986. 12. Admittedly, appellant and several such other appellants  are  in  possession  as  owners  of  different  parcels  of  land  situated in 13 villages, within Delhi. 13. Notifications  issued  under  Section  4  for  planned  development of Delhi had a caveat that three types of land  were  exempted  from  the  purview  of  these  notifications  i.e  government land, land already notified under Section 4 or 6 of  the Act or land in respect of which lay-out plans/building  plans were sanctioned by Municipal Corporation of Delhi before  05.11.1980. 14. It is not in dispute that initially appellants had not  challenged the notifications issued under Section 4 of the  Act, by filing writ petitions or resorting to any other remedy  in accordance with law.   15. Obviously, there could not have been any order of stay  passed by any court in their favour. In other words, there was  no  order  of  restraint  from  issuance  of  declaration  under  Section 6 of the Act.   16. According to the appellants, the Act provides that the  said declaration should have been issued within a period of  three  years from  the date of issuance of notifications under  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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Section 4 of the Act, that is to say, positively on or before  24.11.1983. But no such declaration having been issued on or  before 24.11.1983, i.e., within the statutory period of three  years, it is contended that acquisition is illegal and void  qua appellants’  lands.  In  the  aforesaid  appeal,  last  declaration under Section 6 of the Act was finally issued on  07.06.1985,  which  according  to  the  appellant,  was  clearly  beyond  statutory  period  of  three  years.  Thus,  whole  proceedings of acquisition should be rendered illegal and void  ab initio.  However, the last declaration was still issued on  26.2.1986. 17. It has also been appellants’ case that the stay order  granted in favour of the other land-owners, who had challenged  either the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act or  the  declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act,  would  not  be  applicable or operative to the appellants' land as obviously  it would be confined only to those who had approached the  Court and were granted stay. 18. Like appellant, there were many such land-owners who had  challenged  the  said  declaration/notification  issued  under  Section 6 of the Act before the High Court of Delhi and their  petitions having been allowed on 14.8.1988, appellant claimed  parity on  the ground that due to some bona-fide mistake, the  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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appellant's petition which was filed in the year 1987 could  not  be  listed  along  with  batch  matters  but  subsequently,  appellant’s  petition  came  to  be  dismissed.  Thus,  for  this  reason he should not be put to an irreparable loss of losing  his land. 19. Appellant's petition came up for hearing before Division  Bench of High Court of Delhi on 25.11.2004  and on the said  date following order of dismissal came to be passed:

“We  find  that  the  issue  raised  in  the  petition  with  regard  to  validity  of  the  Declaration issued under Section 6 of the said  Act, stands concluded against the petitioner  by the decision of the Apex Court in Abhey Ram  and Ors. Vs.  Union of India & Ors. (1997) 5  SCC  421  (which  approved  the  full  Bench  decision of this court in B.R. Gupta's case.  AIR  1987  Delhi  239  on  the  issue  that  the  declaration  under  Section  6  was  not  beyond  time)  and  Delhi  Administration  Vs. Gurdip  Singh Uban and Ors. (1990) 7 SCC 44, wherein  their Lordships were pleased to observe that  those  who  had  not  filed  objections  under  Section  5(A)  of  the  said  Act  could  not  be  allowed  to  contend  either  that  Section  5  enquiry was bad, or that Section 6 Declaration  must be struck down and that the Section 4  notification would lapse.  Admittedly, in the  present case, no objections have been filed by  the petitioner under Section 5 (A) of the Act.   Consequently,  the  writ  petition  and  application for interim relief are dismissed  and  interim  order  dated  9.2.1987  stands  vacated.”

Sd/-  Sd/-

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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20. Perusal of the aforesaid order would make it abundantly  clear that while considering the appellant's petition, High  Court was of the opinion that in the light of the opinion  expressed by Full Bench in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India  reported in AIR 1987 Delhi 239 (refered to as B.R.Gupta-I),  affirmed by this Court in  Abhey Ram (Dead by LRs) and Ors.  Vs.  Union  of  India  &  Ors. (1997)  5  SCC  421  decided  on  22.04.1997,  holding  therein  that  declaration  issued  under  Section 6 was not beyond time. 21.  Impugned order further shows that it placed reliance on  another judgment of this Court reported in (1990) 7 SCC 44,  Delhi   Administration   Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. wherein  it  has  been  held  that  all  those  land-owners  who  had  not  preferred objections under Section 5A of the Act, could not  be allowed to contend that either enquiry under Section 5A of  the Act was bad or the declaration issued under Section 6  must  be  struck  down  on  the  ground  of  limitation  or  consequently, notification issued under Section 4 of the Act  would stand lapsed.  Thus, the appellant's petition was not  entertained and ultimately came to be dismissed. 22. It has neither been disputed here nor before the High  Court that some of the appellants herein  and many similarly  situated  land-owners  had  not  preferred  objections  under  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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Section 5A of the Act.  There are other appeals, in which  objections were preferred but have been decided against them  or  even  though  objections  were  preferred  but  were  not  pressed,  on  account  of  subsequent  developments  that  have  taken place.  We would deal with those type of matters little  later.  23. Mr.  P.P.  Rao,  learned  senior  counsel  for  appellant  contended  that  in  this  batch  of  appeals,  broadly  three  categories can be formulated :   Category No. 1 - where land-owners  had admittedly not  filed  objections  under  Section  5A  of  the  Act,  but  essentially,  the  challenge  was  only  to  declaration  issued  under Section 6 of the Act, being time-barred.    Category No. 2 – even though land-owners had preferred  objections under Section 5A of the Act, wherein an enquiry  was held, but the same were rejected.   Category No. 3 – during the pendency of the objections  under Section 5A of the Act, some of the land-owners had sold  their lands.  Pursuant to the execution of said sale-deeds  in favour of the vendees, they continued to press objections  preferred by their vendors but the same were also rejected.   24. It has been fairly conceded by learned senior counsel  for appellant that he had neither challenged the notification

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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issued  under  Section  4  of  the  Act  nor  had  preferred  any  objection under Section 5A of the Act independently. Thus,  obviously there could not have been any stay order granted in  his favour by any court.  Therefore, ordinarily, the period  of limitation would be three years as contemplated  under  Section 6 of the Act (first proviso read with Explanation 1  appended thereto). 25. To appreciate the aforesaid arguments, it is necessary  to understand the true and correct import of Section 6 of the  Act, reproduced hereinbelow :

“6.  Declaration that land is required for a  public purpose.-(1) Subject to the provisions  of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate  Government is satisfied, after considering the  report, if any, made under Section 5A, sub- section  (2),  that  any  particular  land  is  needed for public purpose or for a Company, a  declaration shall be made to that effect under  the  signature  of  a  Secretary  to  such  Government or of some officer duly authorised  to  certify  its  orders  and  different  declarations may be made from time to time in  respect  of  different  parcels  of  any  land  covered by the same notification under section  4,  sub-section (1),  irrespective of  whether  one report or different reports has or have  been  made (wherever  required) under  Section  5A, sub-section (2):   Provided that no declaration in respect of any  particular  land  covered  by  a  notification  under section 4, sub-section (1),-

(i) published after the commencement of the  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 12 - Land  Acquisition  (Amendment  and  Validation)  Ordinance, 1967 but before the commencement  of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984  shall be made after the expiry of three years  from  the  date  of  the  publication  of  the  notification; or (ii) published after the commencement of the  Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall  be made after the expiry of one year from the  date of the publication of the notification:

Provided  further  that  no  such  declaration  shall be made unless the compensation to be  awarded for such property is to be paid by a  company, or wholly or partly out of public  revenues or some fund controlled or managed by  a local authority.

[Explanation 1. -  In computing any  of  the  periods  referred  to  in  the  first  proviso, the period during which any action  or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the  notification  issued  under  Section  4,  sub- section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court  shall be excluded.

[Explanation  2.  -  Where  the  compensation to be awarded for such property  is  to  be  paid  out  of  the  funds  of  a  corporation owned or controlled by the State,  such  compensation  shall  be  deemed  to  be  compensation paid out of public revenues.] (2) Every declaration shall be published in  the  Official  Gazette,  [and  in  two  daily  newspapers  circulating  in  the  locality  in  which the land is situated of which at least  one shall be in the regional language, and the  Collector  shall  cause  public  notice  of  the  substance of such declaration to be given at  convenient places in the said locality (the  last of the dates of such publication and the  giving  of  such  public,  notice  being

hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  date  of  publication of the declaration), and such  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 13 - declaration shall state] the district or other  territorial  division  in  which  the  land  is  situate, the purpose  for which it is needed,  its approximate area, and, where a plan shall  have been made of the land, the place where  such plan may be inspected. (3) The said declaration shall be conclusive  evidence that the land is needed for a public  purpose or for a company, as the case may be;  and,  after  making  such  declaration  the  appropriate Government may acquire the land in  manner hereinafter appearing.”

26.  It has strenuously been contended by learned senior  counsel  Shri  P.P.  Rao  that  even  if  appellant  had  not  preferred  any  objection  under  Section  5A  of  the  Act,  his  right to challenge issuance of declaration under Section 6 of  the Act after the stipulated period of limitation, cannot be  taken  away,  especially  in  the  light  of  the  provisions  contained in Article 300A of the Constitution of India.  It  was also submitted by him that both rights are independent  and accordingly can be invoked separately.  He also submitted  that language of Articles 21 and 300A of the Constitution is  almost identical, thus, no person should be deprived of his  property save by authority of law.   27. We  were  also  taken  through  Article  17  of  Universal  Declaration of Human Rights, which safeguards the interest of

persons  in properties.  He, therefore, submitted that if the  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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property of the appellant is sought to be acquired in this  fashion then it would tantamount to violation of human rights  as guaranteed under Article 17 of the Universal Declaration.  28. A  further  point  has  also  been  tried  to  be  hammered  before us that Land Acquisition Act being expropriatory in  nature, its provisions deserve to be construed strictly and  each and every step required to be taken by the respondents  must be strictly adhered to.   29. Lastly,  it  was  submitted  by  him  that  in  any  case,  Government is not likely to suffer any loss, much less an  irreparable  loss,  even  if  the  land  owned,  possessed  and  occupied  by  the  appellant  is  exempted  from  acquisition  whereas the appellant would suffer a greater loss and injury  as with long passage of time he has constructed his house, is  residing therein for long number of years and acquisition  thereof  would  lead  to  serious  consequences  and  would  be  disastrous to him and other similarly situated land owners.  In other words, it has been contended that equitable justice  is required to be meted out to the appellant and this Court  shall ensure that no injustice is rendered to this appellant  and other such hundreds of appellants. 30. In  the  light  of  the  aforesaid  contentions,  learned

senior  counsel  for  the  appellant submitted that following  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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questions  of  law  would  arise  in  this  and  the  connected  appeals:

(i)  Whether  proposition  of  law  propounded  in  Delhi  Administration Vs. Gurdip Singh Uban and Ors. (Supra),  (referred to as No.1) has correctly been understood by  the Division Bench in the impugned order? (ii) Whether the judgment in the case of Abhey Ram and  Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. (Supra) which approved  the Full Bench opinion of Delhi High Court in  B.R.  Gupta-I, (Supra) has indirectly been over-ruled in the  case of Oxford English School  Vs. Government of Tamil  Nadu and Others (1995) 5 SCC 206? (iii) If, that being the legal position, even though  Abhey  Ram's  case  (supra)  rendered  by  three  learned  Judges  of  this  Court,  can  still  be  interpreted  to  grant  benefit  to  the  appellant  as  otherwise  great  injustice would be caused to appellant.

31. Shri  P.N.  Lekhi,  learned  senior  counsel  appearing  for  some of the appellants has taken us through the history of the  Act and the various amendments which have been incorporated  from time to time.  He has also advanced the same arguments as  have been put forth by Mr. P.P. Rao, that the effect of stay

order  granted  in  other  matter  should not be logically and  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 16 -

legally made applicable to those who had not even approached  the Court, as it would always be an order of stay in personam  and not an order in rem. 32. It is brought to our notice that he appears for all those  appellants, who are subsequent purchasers, after issuance of  declaration under Section 6 of the Act.  Sale Deeds in favour  of these appellants have been executed between the period from  18.11.1988 to 22.4.1997, i.e., the period between the date of  judgment of the Full Bench of the High Court in the case of  B.R. Gupta-I and the date of judgment of this Court in the  case of  Abhey Ram (supra).  According to him, this was the  eclipse period as in some of the matters, notifications under  Section  4  were  quashed  on  account  of  failure  of  Delhi  Administration  to issue further declarations under Section 6  of the Act, within a period of three years from the date of  issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the Act. Since  even thereafter, no steps were taken by Delhi Administration  to issue a fresh notification under Section 4 of the Act, the  subsequent purchasers were fully justified in purchasing the  lands  from  previous  owners.  Thus,  all  purchases  by  them  between the aforesaid period would be said to have been made  during the eclipse period and therefore, they should be called

owners rather than subsequent purchasers. C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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33. He has also put forth an argument that prior to coming  into force of Amendment Act of 1984, there was no exclusion  clause appended to Section 6, by way of an explanation and  therefore,  exactly  three  years'  period  has  to  be  computed  between the date of publication of notification under Section  4 of the Act and further declaration under Section 6 of the  Act for determining as to whether the same had been issued  within the aforesaid period or not. In other words, he has  contended that irrespective of the fact that there was any  stay or there was no stay, in either case, the period of three  years should be calculated from the actual date of publication  of notification issued under Section 4 of the Act till the  date of publication of notification under Section 6 of the  Act. 34. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior counsel appearing in  some  appeals  contended  that  primarily  petitions  of  these  appellants have been dismissed on the ground of laches. He has  contended that in Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India & Others  reported in 37 (1989) DLT 150 [hereinafter referred to as  'B.R. Gupta-II'], notification with regard to acquisition of  lands situated in 11 villages was quashed and in subsequent  judgment, notification with regard to two more villages was

quashed.  Therefore,  there  was  no  occasion  on the part of  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 18 -

these  appellants  to  have  continued  to  prosecute  their  objections preferred under Section 5A of the Act. 35. According to him, from the year 1989 to 1997, there was  an absolute silence with regard to the acquisition, which had  initially commenced in the year 1980.  Therefore, no prudent  man would have taken legal action during the aforesaid period.  He, therefore, contended that appellants were justified in not  taking any action during the aforesaid period. Only when fresh  proceedings commenced with regard to acquisition, appellants  were prompt enough to file writ petitions either in the year  2000 or 2002. Thus, delay having been explained properly, the  Division Bench has grossly erred in dismissing the same on the  ground of laches. 36. Our attention has been drawn to the letter of Mrs. Gita  Sagar, Joint Secretary, (L & B) dated 31.3.1989 mentioning  therein that in the light of the Division Bench Judgment of  Delhi High Court in  B.R. Gupta-II quashing the notifications  issued under Section 4 of the Act, nothing more was required  to  be  done  and  acquisition  proceedings  be  dropped.  This  further  stood  fortified  vide  subsequent  circular  issued  by  Delhi Administration on 07.12.1999.  According to him, thus  the  appellants  were  entirely  justified  in  not  taking  any

action. In other words,  he  contended that from the year 1990  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 19 -

to 1997, the judgment in the case of Delhi Administration Vs  Gurdip Singh Uban reported in (1999) 7 SCC 44 held the field  whereby notification issued under Section 4 of the Act was  quashed  and  no  further  action  was  taken  by  Delhi  Administration.   37. Thus, any prudent man would be given to understand that  nothing more was required to be done and therefore they sat  quiet  over  the  matters.   He,  therefore,  contended  that  dismissal  of  appellants'  writ  petitions  on  the  ground  of  laches was wholly unjustified and uncalled for, more so, when  the reasons for the delay were fully assigned satisfactorily. 38.  Arguments  were  advanced  by  him  on  the  Doctrine  of  'Legitimate Expectation'. He also contended that the right to  hold  property  as  envisaged  under  the  Constitution  being  constitutional right conferred under Article 300A, cannot be  permitted to be taken away without authority of law. Even  though,  it  is  not  a  Fundamental  Right  nevertheless,  it  continues to be a constitutional right, and such right was  never taken away from Article 14 of the Constitution. 39. It is further submitted by him that Sections 5A and 6 of  the  Act  cannot  be  separated  as  the  right  envisaged  under  Section 5A is a collective right and cannot be equated with

Section 6.  It has also been argued on the “Doctrine of Public  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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Law” to contend that there was no case for dismissal of the  petitions  of  these  appellants  on  the  ground  of  laches.  According to him, it would amount to discrimination to these  appellants  vis-a-vis  the  other  land-owners  who  have  been  extended the benefit of quashment of notifications, thereby  exempting their lands from being acquired, therefore, the same  cannot be allowed to stand. 40. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for  some other appellants contended that he is appearing  for  those  land-owners,  who  had  actually  filed  their  objections  under Section 5A of the Act and belong to village  Shayoorpur.  The said petitions were filed in the year 1985.   41. However,  unfortunately,  when  the  said  petitions  were  heard  on  3.3.2005,  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants  was  absent  as  a  result  whereof,  the  petitions  came  to  be  dismissed.   Thus,  they  were  constrained  to  file  review  petitions but same also came to be dismissed on 27.4.2006. 42. It  has  further  been  contended  that  on  account  of  difference of opinion between Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter  Kumar (as he then was) and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur  on the question of import and interpretation of Section 5A of  the Act, the matter was referred to Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S.

Thakur (as he then was). Hon’ble Mr.Justice Thakur agreed with  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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the views expressed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur.  While concurring, he held that hearing as contemplated under  Section 5A of the Act would mean an effective hearing and it  is not an empty formality and the provision thereof has to be  strictly adhered to and principles of natural justice have to  be followed. The said judgment titled Chatro Devi Vs Union of  India & Ors. is reported in 137 (2007) DLT 14. 43. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, strenuously contended before us that  in  B.R. Gupta-II, it was specifically held with regard to  land-owners  of  Shayoorpur  that  the  enquiry  was  bad  and  invalid. The report as sent by Collector to the Lt. Governor  and  his  satisfaction  thereon  was  also  bad.   If  this  was  already held so by Division Bench of the said Court then in  subsequent orders passed by Division Bench, it could not have  been  over-ruled  by  the  said  Bench,  it  being  a  coordinate  Bench. It was also contended by learned counsel that certain  observations made in B.R.Gupta (supra) and  Abhey Ram (supra)  would not constitute ratio decidendi as they could, at best,  be treated as obiter which is not binding on this Court. 44. It  was  reiterated  by  learned  Senior  Counsel  that  the  declaration under Section 6 of the Act, having not been issued  within a period of three years from the date of issuance of

notification under Section 4 of the Act, the whole process has  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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been rendered redundant and has become non est. 45. Shri P.S. Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel appearing for  some other appellants submitted that he represents those land- owners, whose lands are situated in village Chhatarpur but  their petitions have been dismissed solely on the ground of  laches.  According  to  him,  they  purchased  the  lands  from  original owners some time in the month of April, 1985 but had  filed the petitions in the High Court in the year 2004. 46. It has also been submitted by him that original owners,  that is the vendors of these appellants had already filed  their objections under Section 5A of the Act but the present  appellants  did  not  prosecute  the  same  any  further.  Thus,  obviously, they came to be dismissed. He further informed that  appellants still continue to be in possession of the lands,  and have already constructed houses over the same, without any  permission  or  sanction,  since  at  that  time  no  permission/sanction was required to be obtained either from  Panchayat or Municipal Corporation. 47. As regards laches, it has been tried to be explained by  contending that First Master Plan was published on 1.9.1962  but it lapsed in 1981.  The second Master Plan was in force  upto 2001. On account of serious confusion due to variety of

reasons, the  land-owners  were  in  a  lurch as to what legal  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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steps are required to be taken due to the fact that Delhi  Administration  itself  had  dropped  further  acquisition  proceedings. He, therefore, contended that when there was such  a massive confusion, not only amongst the litigating public  but also amongst the advocates representing them, thus, they  were fully justified in not taking up the issue earlier and  their petitions could not have been dismissed solely on the  ground of delay or laches when the same were sufficiently  explained to the Bench.   48. Mr. T.R. Andhyarujina, learned senior counsel appeared  for  Springdales  Educational  Society,  whose  land  is  also  situated in village Chhatarpur.  According to him, appellant  is the original owner of the land having purchased it in the  year  1966-1967.  On  coming  to  know  about  the  acquisition  proceedings, appellant had filed objections under Section 5A  of  the  Act  within  30  days  and  had  specifically  sought  an  opportunity of hearing to it, which was not granted.   49. He contended that appellant is imparting rural education  to  the  residents  of  that  area  and  the  purpose  for  which  appellant's  society  has  been  set  up  is  public  charitable  purpose.   Thus,  when  specific  opportunity  of  hearing  to  support objections filed by it under Section 5A of the Act was

sought, further  declaration under Section 6 of the Act should  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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not have been issued till the objections were finally decided.  He, therefore, submitted that since notifications have been  quashed in respect of many villages, it is a fit case where  notification as far as this appellant is concerned, should  also be quashed.  He has also pressed into service the legal  maxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit,” meaning thereby that an  act of the court shall prejudice none.  He also reiterated  that  there  was  total  confusion  with  regard  to  the  action  required to be taken by the land-owners.  Thus, the petitions  could not have been dismissed on the ground of laches, more  so, where equitable principles are invoked, laches would not  come into play and  especially in such type of cases, where  there was no occasion for the respondents to file counter  affidavit. 50. Almost  identical  arguments  have  been  advanced  by  Mr.  Vikas, Mr. Y.P. Mahajan, Mr. R.N. Keshwani, Mr. Bhargava V.  Desai, Mr. Ravinder Singh, Mr. Amarjit Singh Bedi, Mr. Vikas  Mehta, Mr. M.R. Shamshed, Mr. N.S. Vasisth, appearing for the  other Appellants. 51. In addition, they have also raised the ground that all  the subsequent purchasers have purchased the lands after fully  complying with the provisions contained in Section 5 of Delhi

Land (Restrictions on Transfer)  Act, 1972, which mandate upon  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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the land-owners of Delhi to seek permission from the competent  authority  that  the  said  land  is  not  under  orders  of  acquisition.  They  also  contended  that  since  permission  was  granted by the competent authority for sale and transfer of  their land, it would automatically mean that the land was free  from clutches of acquisition, otherwise no permission in this  regard would have been granted to them. 52. Learned   counsel  appearing  for  respondents  Shri  Hiren  Rawal, ASG, Ms.Indira Jaising, ASG, Mr. D.N. Goburdhan and Ms.  Gita Luthra opposed the prayer of the appellants and contended  that matters have now been settled by long catena  of cases  either  by  High  Court  or  by  this  Court,  ever  since  the  notifications were issued in the year 1980. Thus, it is too  late in the day for the appellants to challenge the same on  any other grounds. 53. Learned ASG for respondent No.1, Union of India, Mr. H.S.  Rawal has taken us through the aims and objects of Amending  Act No. 13 of 1967 and Amending Act No. 68 of 1984, primarily  to bring to our notice the purpose and reasons for bringing  various amendments in the original Land Acquisition Act 1894.  He submitted that vide Amending Act No. 13 of 1967, amending  provisions  thereof  came  into  operation  with  effect  from

12.4.1967.  C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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54. It has been submitted that the challenge by land owners  to the issuance of notifications under Section 4 of the Act  stood concluded in favour of the respondents by a Division  Bench Judgment in the matter of  Munni Lal (supra). Argument  was, therefore, advanced that the said judgment has already  attained finality as the aggrieved party had not challenged  the same by filing any further appeal in the Supreme Court.  Thus, it should be deemed that the notifications issued under  Section 4 of the Act by respondents were legal, valid and  beyond the pale of judicial review as the lands are acquired  for public purpose. 55. It  has  been  contended  by  him  that  generally  the  objections preferred under Section 5A of the Act were on a  cyclostat format raising the same grounds against acquisition,  still, full and complete hearing on the said objections was  afforded to them by Land Acquisition Collector as contemplated  under the Act. 56. He has brought to our notice that in Munni Lal (supra),  the Division Bench of Delhi High Court had passed an interim  order of stay on 18.3.1981, reproduced herein below:-

“Case  for  27.4.1981  in  the  meanwhile,  respondent Nos. 1 and 2 are restrained from  issuing any declaration under Section 6 of

the Act.”

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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57. In the light of the aforesaid interim blanket order of  stay  passed  by  Delhi  High  Court,  learned  counsel  for  respondents contended that the hands of the respondents were  tied  by  the  said  order  and  they  could  not  have  proceeded  further to issue any declaration under Section 6 of the Act.  The words used in the interim order were “any declaration”  which completely restrained them from proceeding further in  this direction. It was also contended that the aforesaid order  came  to  be  confirmed  on  4.5.1981.  Similar  interim  orders  thereafter came to be passed in various other writ petitions  preferred by land-owners.  In the light of the various interim  orders  passed  by  Delhi  High  Court  from  time  to  time,  the  respondents could not have issued further declaration under  Section  6  of  the  Act,  otherwise  they  would  have  exposed  themselves for committing contempt of the Court. 58. It was then contended that all objections preferred by  land-owners  under  Section  5A  of  the  Act  were  considered  between the period from 8.5.1985 to 13.6.1985.  After hearing  arguments on the objections, along with the report of the Land  Acquisition Collector, the same were forwarded to Lt. Governor  of Delhi between the period from 13.5.1985 to 22.6.1985. Lt.

Governor then examined the objections together with reports  enclosed therewith  prepared by Land Acquisition Collector and  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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gave his approval for acquisition of the land. In other words,  it has been contended that the provisions of the Act have  fully been complied with and there has not been any violation  thereof.   59. He has further brought to our notice that W.P.(C)No.2850  of 1985 was filed in the High Court of Delhi challenging the  same  issue  with  regard  to  period  of  limitation  prescribed  between issuance of notification under Section 4 and further  declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act,  which  came  to  be  dismissed by Division Bench on 25.11.1985. Pursuant to the  said order, respondents had taken possession of part of the  land sought to be acquired vide order dated 14.7.1987. 60. It has not been disputed before us that Mrs. Gita Sagar  had written a letter on 31.3.1989 mentioning therein that on  account of several developments and judgment of the High Court  of Delhi in B.R.Gupta-II the acquisition proceedings are being  dropped.  It  was  followed  by  another  circular  issued  by  respondent on 07.12.1999 but it has been contended before us  that they were not addressed to any of the appellants or land  owners  whose  lands  were  sought  to  be  acquired  and  by  no  stretch  of  imagination  it  could  be  said  that  all  further

proceedings of acquisition of land were dropped.  However, in  our opinion,  critical  reading  thereof  makes  it abundantly  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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clear the proceedings were dropped pursuant to the judgment in  the case of the  B.R. Gupta-II. Consequently, the benefit of  the said communication can be extended qua the petitioners who  had  approached  the  High  Court  and  not  to  all  other  land  owners. 61. Coming to the question of delay and laches in filing the  petitions by various petitioners in the  High Court, it has  been contended that as a matter of fact, cause of action for  filing the petitions had accrued to them in the year 1985,  when on four different dates, declaration under Section 6 of  the Act was issued. Therefore, it was necessary on the part of  the appellants to have explained the delay from 1985 onwards.  He thus, contended that it is to be explained in three stages  viz:  

(i) from 1985 till B.R. Gupta-II came to be decided on  18.11.1988;  

(ii) from the period from 18.11.1988 to 22.4.1997 when  Abhey Ram (supra) came to be decided and finally,  

(iii) post  Abhey Ram's case,  till the filing of the  petitions.  

62. It has been contended that unless the appellants are able

to successfully  overcome the first hurdle from the year 1985  till 1988, the  question of  their explaining delay and laches  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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for the second or third stage would not arise. 63. Apart  from  the  above,  it  has  also  been  strenuously  contended before us that perusal of each and every petition  filed by the appellants would show that there has been no  concrete  foundation  in  the  pleadings  explaining  delay  and  laches. According to respondents, it was incumbent on the part  of the appellants to have specifically pleaded as to why they  could not approach the Court earlier and to have explained the  laches.  Since this onus, which lay heavily on the appellants  was not discharged and their petitions having been dismissed  on  this  ground,  the  question  of  meeting  the  same  by  the  respondents by way of their counter did not arise. 64. It  was  thereafter  contended  that  in  all  the  matters,  awards have been passed between the period from 19.5.1987 to  17.6.1987 pertaining to all the 13 villages and money had also  been deposited.  Once awards have been passed, in the light of  various judgments of this Court, it was neither justified nor  legally  competent  on  the  part  of  the  appellants  to  have  challenged the declaration issued under the Act on the ground  of limitation or on any other ground. To buttress this ground,  learned counsel for respondents have placed reliance on the

following judgments :

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 31 -   1)  Vishwas  Nagar  Evacuees  Plot  Purchasers  

Association Vs.  Under  Secretary,  Delhi  Administration reported in (1990) 2 SCC 268;

2) Star Wire (India) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana  (1996) 11 SCC 698; and   3)  Swaika  Properties  (P)  Ltd. Vs.  State  of  Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC 695.

65. It was then submitted that as regards grant of permission  was concerned, the same has not been issued by the competent  authority as prescribed under the Delhi Land (Restrictions on  Transfer) Act, 1972.  Therefore, advantage thereof cannot be  taken by the appellants.  To put forth further arguments in  this regard, reliance has been placed on a recent judgment of  this Court reported in (2008) 9 SCC 177 Meera Sahni Vs.   Lt.  Governor of Delhi. It has been brought to our notice that NOCs  produced before this Court for perusal, would show that the  same  have  been  issued  under  the  seal  and  signature  of  Tehsildar and not by the competent authority as defined under  Delhi Land (Restrictions on Transfer) Act, 1972.  Therefore,  no advantage thereof could be claimed by the appellants, who  are subsequent purchasers from original owners.

66. To contend further in this regard, we have been taken  through  the affidavit  of Shri  U.P. Singh, OSD (Litigation),  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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Building Department of Government of NCT, Delhi, in which it  has categorically been mentioned with regard to the alleged  NOC that the same is of no consequence as it has not been  issued by the competent authority as contemplated under the  said Act. It has been contended that the said NOC cannot be  construed as a valid permission to the subsequent purchasers  in the light of provisions of the Delhi Land (Restrictions on  Transfer) Act, 1972.  67. Additionally, it has been argued that in any case, the  said NOC issued by Tehsildar is of no consequence because  Tehsildar  was  not  the  competent  authority  at  the  relevant  point of time. In the wake of this categorical denial of valid  NOC possessed by subsequent purchasers, it has been contended  that even grant of alleged NOC would not carry the appellants'  case further to their advantage. 68. It is emphasised by him that in the light of judgment of  this Court in Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors.  (2000) 7 SCC 296 known as Gurdip Singh Uban-II, all points  having already been considered, no fresh look is required by  this  Court.  More  so,  when  each  and  every  point  argued,  hammered  and  contended  by  the  appellants  has  already  been

decided against them. It was also submitted by him that in the  name of unfair treatment, matters which stood closed either by  

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several judgments of this Court or of Delhi High Court and  also keeping in mind that land acquisition proceedings were  initiated in the year 1980, nothing more is required to be  done and the appeals deserve to be dismissed. 69. Learned  ASG,  Ms.  Indira  Jaising,  appearing  for  Delhi  Development Authority argued on the similar lines, which have  already been advanced by Mr. H.S Rawal. In addition, she has  contended that once notification under Section 4 of the Act is  issued, the same never dies or becomes ineffective unless it  is  specifically  revoked  as  required  under  the  Act  in  accordance with law. To substantiate this contention, learned  Counsel  has  placed  reliance  on  Section  21  of  the  General  Clauses Act. She has also placed reliance on two judgments of  House of Lords titled  Smith Vs.  East Elloe Rural District  Council and Others reported in 1956 AC 376 and F. Hoffmann- LA  Roche and Co. A.G. and Others Vs. Secretary of State for Trade  and Industry reported in 1975 AC 295, in this regard. 70. She has further submitted that in view of three earlier  judgments of this Court, it has been held that Explanation 1  appended to first proviso to Section 6 would apply squarely to  the  facts  of  the  case  therefore,  it  is  neither  legally

permissible nor warranted to take a different view.

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71. Coming to the question of legitimate expectation, it was  contended that no advantage of noting on the files or inter  se  circulars  issued  by  Departments  can  be  taken  by  the  parties. It was also submitted that the letter of    Mrs.  Gita Sagar as also the Circular issued thereafter would show  that none was addressed to any of the appellants and the same  had died their own natural death, on which appellants cannot  build  up  their  cases  invoking  the  doctrine  of  'Legitimate  Expectation'. She has also submitted that as the cause of  action had actually accrued to the appellants in the year  1985 unless they are able to successfully show to this Court  and reasonably explain the delay caused in filing the writ  petitions  in  the  High  Court,  the  High  Court  was  fully  justified in dismissing the same on the ground of delay and  laches.   72. In  the  light  of  the  aforesaid  contentions,  several  authorities have been cited by her but in nutshell they are  the same which have already been cited by the learned counsel  for other side.  Nevertheless, we would deal with the same in  the latter part of the judgment 73. Ms. Gita Luthra and Mr. D.N.Goburdhan, learned Counsel

appearing  for  Govt.  of  NCT  of  Delhi  reiterated  the  same  grounds  which  have  already been argued and advanced by Mr.  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

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Rawal and Ms. Indira Jaising.  Additionally,  it has been  contended  that  in  some  of  the  matters,  objections  under  Section 5A of the Act were not filed,  yet they got the  benefit,  when 73 petitions came to be disposed of,  in batch  matters by Delhi High Court.  It has also been brought to our  notice that  at a  much later  stage, appellants  had sought  permission to amend their petitions by raising a ground under  Section 5A of the Act but the Court was constrained to reject  the  same.  Mr.  D.N.  Goburdhan  contended  that  delay  in  approaching the Court in filing  a petition under Articles  226-227  cannot be condoned unless the same is reasonably and  satisfactorily explained and that the Court must be fully  satisfied with regard to the plausible explanation of not  being able to reach the Court earlier. 74. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the judgment  of this Court wherein it has been held that even delay of 17  months  could  not  be  condoned  and  was  not  found  to  be  reasonable by this Court.  With all these arguments having  been  advanced  by  learned  Counsel  for  respondents,  their  contentions have come to an end. 75. In the light of the aforesaid rival contentions advanced

by the parties, we proceed to decide the matter as  

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- 36 - under. 76. Explanation 1 appended to first proviso of Section 6 of  the Act, as reproduced hereinabove, makes it crystal clear  that where any order of stay has been granted in favour of  land  owner,  while  computing  the  period  of  limitation  of  three  years  for  issuance  of  Section  6  notification,  the  actual  period  covered  by  such  order  of  stay  should  be  excluded.  In other words, the period of three years would  automatically get extended by that much of period during  which stay was in operation. The question which, therefore,  arises for our consideration is whether even in those cases  where there has been no stay order granted or passed in  favour of the land owners, the period of limitation would be  three years from the date of issuance of notification under  Section 4 of the Act or it would be more on account of stay  order granted in other matter in which such appellants were  not parties. 77. On account of difference of opinion between two Benches  of High Court of Delhi, matter was referred to a Full Bench,  referred to as B.R. Gupta-I, the only question posed before  it for opinion was with regard to effect of grant of stay,  where  challenge  is  to  the  issuance  of  notification  under

Section 4 of the Act vis-a-vis other land owners who had not  challenged it. After considering the ambit, scope and nature  

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of stay granted especially in land acquisition matters, Full  Bench  has  expressed  its  opinion  in  paragraphs  26  to  31,  reproduced hereinbelow :

 “26. Learned counsel for the petitioners is  to some extent right in his contention that  broad as the above observations are, these  cases are slightly different in that they all  dealt with the effect of the operation of  stay order only vis-a-vis one of the parties  to the litigation in which the stay order is  passed.  But we are of opinion that these  decisions are of guidance as to the proper  approach to such a question.  In the first  place, they show that a stay of execution of  a  decree  can  be  pleaded  as  a  ground  for  conclusion of the period of stay even by a  judgment-debtor who did not seek the stay.  To  that  extent,  the  insistence  by  the  petitioners  that  the  exclusion  can  operate  only against the party who obtained the stay  order would not be correct.  Secondly, these  decisions show that the prohibition on action  need not be the direct effect of a stay order  of a court.  Thus, in the present cases, even  if in terms the court be held not to have  stayed a declaration in other cases, such was  the  indirect  effect  of  the  stay  order  in  these cases.  Thirdly, they lay down that we  should not interpret a provision of this type  rigidly but should give it an interpretation  that  gives  effect  to  the  object  of  the  legislature.   27.   We,  therefore,  think  that,  in  proceeding  to  interpret  the  scope  of  the  explanation,  we  should  keep  in  mind  the  nature of the  proceedings under the Land

Acquisition  Act  and  the  nature  of  the  proceedings  in  which  stay  orders  are  obtained.   So  far  as  the  first  of  these  aspects is concerned, while it is possible  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 38 - for  the  Government  to  issue  notifications  under S. 4 in respect of each plot of land  sought  to be acquired, it is not feasible  or practicable   to  do so, particularly in  the context of the purpose of many of the  acquisitions  at  the  present  day.  It  is  common knowledge that in Delhi, as well as  many other capital cities, vast extents are  being acquired for 'planned development' or  public  projects.   The  acquisition  is  generally  part  of  an  integrated  scheme  or  plan  and,  though,  technically  speaking,  there  can  be  no  objection  to  individual  plots being processed under Ss. 5A, 6, 9,  12, etc., particularly after the amendment  of 1967, the purpose of acquisition demands  that  at  least  substantial  blocks  of  land  should be dealt with together at least upto  the stage of the declaration under S.6.  To  give an example, if a large extent of land  is to be acquired for the excavation of a  canal, the scheme itself cannot be put into  operation  unless  the  whole  land  can  be  eventually made available.  If even one of  the  land  owners  anywhere  along  the  line  applies  to  court  and  gets  a  stay  of  the  operation of the notification under S. 4, in  practical  terms,  the  whole  scheme  of  acquisition will fall through.  It is of no  consolation to say that there was no stay  regarding other lands covered by the scheme.  To compel the Government to proceed against  the other lands (by refusing the benefit of  the explanation in such a case on the ground  that  there  is  no  stay  order  in  respect  thereof)  would  only  result  in  waste  of  public  expenditure  and  energy.  If,  ultimately,  the  single   owner  succeeds  in  establishing a vitiating element in the S.4  notification  and  in  getting  it  quashed  by  the Supreme Court, the whole proceeding of  acquisition  will  fail  and  the  government

will have to retrace the steps they may have  taken  in  respect  of  other  lands.  (See:  Shenoy Vs.  Commercial Tax Officer, AIR 1985  SC 621 and Gauraya  Vs.  Thakur, AIR 1986 SC  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 39 - 1440). Assuming that where such final order  is by a High Court the position is not free  from difficulty, the debate as to whether,  in  law,  the  quashing  of  the  order  enures  only to the benefit of the party who filed  the writ petition and obtained the order is  futile, for the moment the Government seeks  to  enforce  the  acquisition  against  the  others,  they  would  come  up  with  similar  petitions which cannot but be allowed.  In  other  words,  in  many  of  the  present  day  notifications, the acquisition scheme is an  integral one and the stay or quashing of any  part thereof is a stay or quashing of the  whole.  This aspect should not be lost sight  of. 28.   It is true that the object of having  contiguity of all plots sought to be acquired  may fail for various reasons.  For instance,  there may be items of properties exempt from  acquisition in between.  Again, it may happen  that a particular person may have been able  to stave off acquisition of his land for one  reason or other, particularly since dates of  declarations under S.6, awards and taking of  possession  may  vary  from  plot  to  plot.  Moreover, it is not in all cases that the  object  of  acquisition  needs  a  number  of  contiguous  plots  and  may  be  workable  even  without  some  of  the  intervening  lands.  However,  in  considering  a  question  of  interpretation, one should not go only by one  particular  situation  but  must  consider  all  eventualities to the extent possible. It is  only on a broad perspective of the scheme of  present  day  acquisitions  in  large  measure  that we say that any hurdle in regard to any  one  plot  of  land  can  hold  up  an  entire  acquisition, all promptness and expedition on  the part of the Government notwithstanding.

29. It  was  sought  to  be  urged  that  the  interpretation  sought  to  be  placed  by  the  respondent  would  result  in  equating  an  interim  order  with a final judgment and the  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 40 - final judgment in a land acquisition case to  a  judgment  in  rem  and  in  this  context  reference was made to S.41, Evidence Act, and  to a passage in Woodroffe on Evidence (14th  Edition,  Vol.2)  at  page  1225.   We  do  not  think this analogy is correct.  If the final  order can operate to the benefit of all the  parties, there is no reason why the interim  order cannot also affect them.  Moreover, we  are considering the nature and effect of an  injunction passed by the court  against one  of the parties thereto who has to act in the  same capacity not only in the acquisition of  the  plot  of  land  the  owner  of  which  has  obtained a stay order but in all proceedings  consequent on or in pursuance of the same  notification  that  is  challenged  in  that  petition. 30. Secondly, the nature of proceedings in  which stay orders are obtained are also very  different  from  the  old  pattern  of  suits  confined  to  parties  in  their  scope  and  effect.  Section  4  notifications  are  challenged in writ petitions and it is now  settled  law that in this type of proceeding,  the  principle  of  locus  standi  stands  considerably  diluted.   Any  public  spirited  person  can  challenge  the  validity  of  proceedings   of  acquisition  on  general  grounds and when he does this the litigation  is not inter parties simpliciter: it is a  public  interest  litigation  which  affects  wider interests.  The grounds of challenge to  the notification may be nothing personal to  the particular landholder but are, more often  than  not,  grounds  common  to  all  or  substantial blocks of the land owners.  In  fact, this group  of petitions now listed  before  us  raise  practically  the  same  contentions  just  as  the  previous  batch  of  writ petitions challenging the notifications

under S. 4 raised certain common contentions.  To accept the contention that the challenges  and interim orders in such petitions should  be confined to the particular petitioners and  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 41 - their lands would virtually provide persons  with common interests with a second innings.  If the initial  challenge succeeds, all of  them benefit; and if for some reason that  fails and the second challenge succeeds on a  ground  like  the  one  presently  raised,  the  first  batch  of  petitioners   also  get  indirectly  benefited  because  of  the  impossibility of partial implementation  of  the  scheme  for  which  the  acquisition  is  intended. 31. We have, therefore, to give full effect  to the language of the section and the stay  orders in question, in the above context and  background.  The use of the word ”any” in  the  explanation  considerably  amplifies  its  scope and shows clearly that the explanation  can be invoked in any case if some action or  proceeding is stayed.  It may be complete  stay  of  the  operation  of  the  entire  notification or may even be a partial stay –  partial in degree or in regard to persons or  lands in respect of whom it will operate.  The words used in the explanation are of the  widest  amplitude   and  there  is  no  justification whatever to confine its terms  and operation only to the cases in which the  stay order is actually obtained.”

78.  In  the  light  of  the  aforesaid  opinion  having  been  expressed by Full Bench, the original Writ Petition of the  Petitioner-Balak Ram was placed before a Division Bench for  its disposal in accordance with law. 79. Division  Bench  of  the  High  Court  on  14.8.1988,  pronounced only the operative part of the judgment, to the

effect that further acquisition proceedings in all the said  writ petitions stood quashed, reasons were to follow. The  

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reasons in respect of the aforesaid operative part of the  order were supplied in a judgment referred to as B.R. Gupta- II. 80. The Division Bench while allowing the petitions recorded  the concession made by the Senior Advocate Mr. R.K. Anand, to  the effect that he was unable to support the declaration in  view of the lack of opportunity  of hearing granted by Land  Acquisition Collector under Section 5A of the Act to the land  owners.  The concession so given is recorded in para 7 of the  judgment. The Court also examined the matter independent of  the concession and quashed the entire notification on many  grounds.   Thus,  all  the  73  Writ  Petitions  filed  by  land  owners  came  to  be  allowed  and  the  acquisition  proceedings  were dropped. 81. Against the order passed in writ petitions by Delhi High  Court in B.R. Gupta-II, the matter travelled to this Court in  Abhey Ram (supra). 82. This Court after considering previous judgments on the  controversy involved in the matter held as under in paras 10,  11 and 12 reproduced herein below :  

“10. The question then arises is whether the

quashing of the declaration by the Division  Bench in respect of the other matters would  enure  the  benefit  to  the  appellants  also.  Though,  prima  facie, the  argument  of  the  

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 43 - learned  counsel  is  attractive,  on  deeper  consideration,  it  is  difficult  to  give  acceptance, to the contention of Mr. Sachar.  When the Division Bench expressly limited the  controversy  to  the  quashing  of  the  declaration qua the writ petitioners before  the  Bench,  necessary  consequences  would  be  that the declaration published under Section  6 should stand upheld. 11. It  is  seen  that  before  the  Division  Bench judgment was rendered, the petition of  the  appellants  stood  dismissed  and  the  appellants  had  filed  the  special  leave  petition in this court.  If it were a case  entirely relating to section 6 declaration as  has  been  quashed  by  the  High  court,  necessarily that would enure the benefit  to  others  also,  though  they  did  not  file  any  petition, except to those whose  lands were  taken possession of and were vested in the  State under Sections 16 and 17 (2) of the Act  free from all encumbrances.  But it is seen  that  the  Division  Bench  confined  the  controversy  to  the  quashing  of  the  declaration under Section 6 in respect of the  persons qua the writ petitioners before the  Division Bench. Therefore, the benefit of the  quashing of the declaration under Section 6  by the division Bench does not ensure  to the  appellants. 12. It is true that a Bench of this Court  has considered the effect of such a quashing  in  Delhi  Development   Authority v.  Sudan  Singh (1997) 5 SCC 430.  But, unfortunately,  in  that  case  the  operative  part  of  the  judgment  referred  to  earlier  has  not  been  brought  to  the  notice  of  this  Court.  Therefore,  the  ratio  therein  has  no  application to the facts  in this case.  It  is  also  true  that  in Yusufbhai  Noormohmed

Nendoliya Vs.  State of Gujarat (1991) 4 SCC  531,this  Court  had  also  observed  that  it  would  ensure  the  benefit  to  those  petitioners.   

C.As @ SLP(C)No.9389/05 etc. (contd.)

- 44 -  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  notification  under  Section  4  (1)  is  a  composite  one  and  equally  the  declaration  under  Section  6  is  also  a  composite  one,  unless  the  declaration  under  Section  6  is  quashed in toto, it does not operate as if  the  entire  declaration  requires  to  be  quashed.  It is seen  that the appellants had  not filed any objections to the notice issued  under Section 5A.”

83. In fact, after the pronouncement of the judgment in Abhey  Ram (supra) rendered by  three learned Judges of this Court,  nothing survives in these Appeals, but looking to the vehement  arguments advanced by learned senior counsel Mr. P.P. Rao, we  have once again examined the whole controversy in the light of  his arguments. 84. Even  though  judicial  propriety  and  discipline  create  legal  hurdles  and  impediments,  in  coming  to  a  different  conclusion than what has already been arrived at by three  learned Judges of this Court in Abhey Ram (supra), but looking  to the arguments advanced, we proceed to decide it. 85. It has been submitted before us by Mr. P.P. Rao that  admittedly, appellants represented by him, had not preferred  any objections under Section 5A of the Act, thus, in any case,  they  could  not  have  been  precluded  from  challenging  the  declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act being barred by

limitation.  According  to  him,  two  issues  being  entirely  different  and  separate  they  could  not  have  been clubbed  

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together so as to non-suit the appellants. 86. Even though the arguments advanced by learned counsel for  the  appellants  appear  to  be  attractive,  but,  on  deeper  scanning of the same we are of the opinion that on account of  omission of the appellants, they cannot be granted dividend  for their own defaults.  The appellants should have been more  careful, cautious and vigilant to get the matters listed along  with those 73 petitions, which were ultimately allowed by the  High Court. Not having done so, the appellants have obviously  to suffer the consequence of issuance of notifications under  Section 4 and further declaration under Section 6 of the Act. 87. Perusal  of the  opinion of  Full Bench  in  B.R.  Gupta-I  would clearly indicate with regard to interpretation of the  word 'any' in Explanation 1 to the first proviso to Section 6  of the Act which expands the scope of stay order granted in  one case of land owners to be automatically extended to all  those  land  owners,  whose  lands  are  covered  under  the  notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act, irrespective  of the fact whether there was any separate order of stay or  not as regards their lands.  The logic assigned by Full Bench,  the  relevant  portions  whereof  have  been  reproduced

hereinabove, appear to be reasonable, apt, legal and proper.

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88. It  is  also  worth  mentioning  that  each  of  the  notifications issued under Section 4 of the Act was composite  in nature. The interim order of stay granted in one of the  matters, i.e.,  Munni Lal (supra) and confirmed subsequently  have been reproduced hereinabove.  We have also been given to  understand that similar orders of stay were passed in many  other petitions.  Thus, in the teeth of such interim orders of  stay, as reproduced hereinabove, we are of the opinion that  during the period of stay respondents could not have proceeded  further to issue declaration/notification under Section 6 of  the Act. As soon as the interim stay came to be vacated by  virtue  of  the  main  order  having  been  passed  in  the  writ  petition, respondents, taking advantage of the period of stay  during which they were restrained from issuance of declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act,  proceeded  further  and  issued  notification under Section 6 of the Act. 89. Thus, in other words, the interim order of stay granted  in one of the matters of the land owners would put complete  restraint  on  the  respondents  to  have  proceeded  further  to  issue  notification  under  Section  6  of  the  Act.   Had  they  issued the said notification during the period when the stay

was operative, then obviously they may have been hauled up for  committing  contempt  of  court.  The language employed in the  

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interim orders of stay is also such that it had completely  restrained  the  respondents  from  proceeding  further  in  the  matter by issuing declaration/notification under Section 6 of  the Act. 90. No doubt, it is true that language of Section 6 of the  Act implies that declarations can be issued piecemeal and it  is not necessary to issue one single declaration for whole of  the  area  which  is  covered  under  notification  issued  under  Section 4 of the Act.  Parliament was aware of such type of  situation and that is why such a right has been carved out in  favour of respondent-State.  In many cases, urgency clause may  be invoked, therefore, the right of filing objections under  Section 5A of the Act would not arise.  In some cases, even  though objections might be preferred under Section 5A of the  Act,  but,  may  not  be  pressed  in  spite  of  knowledge  of  acquisition of land.  Some of the land owners may not prefer  to file any objections at all.  In order to meet such type of  exigencies as may arise in the case, power has been given by  the  Parliament  to  the  Executive  to  issue  declarations  in  piecemeal  under  Section  6  of  the  Act,  wherever  it  may  be  feasible to implement the scheme.  

91. The facts of the aforesaid cases would show that in the  case in hand  as many as  four declarations under Section 6 of  

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the  Act  were  issued  from  time  to  time.  Finally  when  declaration is quashed by any Court, it would only enure to  the benefit of those who had approached the Court.  It would  certainly  not  extend  the  benefit  to  those  who  had  not  approached the Court or who might have gone into slumber.  92. To us, this appears to be the scheme of the Act and that  was the intention of the Parliament. That being so, scheme of  the Act as has been legislated, has to be given full effect  to.   93. We find no ground to grant the same reliefs to those  appellants  to  whom  on  earlier  occasions,  same  relief  was  granted. At this long distance of time, it would neither be  proper nor legally justified to grant that benefit to the  appellants.   If  it  is  granted  to  even  those  who  had  not  approached the court, then it would frustrate the very purpose  and scope of the Act.  In the light of the aforesaid, we are  of  the  considered  opinion  that  final  quashment  of  the  declaration under Section 6 of the Act by any Court, in some  other matter, cannot be extended to the benefit of the present  appellants.  In any case, there is no ground for us, to rise  to the occasion to do so, much less to the benefits of the

appellants. In our considered opinion, it is not a fit case  where  situation or  circumstances call upon us to rise to the  

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occasion  and  to  grant  such  inequitable  reliefs  to  the  appellants, after such a long delay. 94. Obviously, the appellants cannot be rewarded on account  of their own lapse as they should have been vigilant enough to  get their matters also listed along with those in whose favour  ultimately judgment was pronounced. 95. Looking to the scheme of the Act, it is obvious that the  appellants  would  certainly  suffer  the  consequence  of  the  interim order passed in some other matters preferred by other  land owners challenging the notifications but finally benefit  thereof cannot be accrued to the appellants as the same would  obviously  be  confined  to  those  petitioners  only  in  whose  favour orders were passed. 96. The arguments advanced by Mr. P.N. Lekhi appear to be  attractive at the first instance, but, after going through  closer and deeper scrutiny of the first proviso appended to  Section 6 of the Act, we are of the considered opinion that  certain  period  has  been  saved.   First  proviso  clearly  indicates that all actions which have taken place between the  period, after commencement of Land Acquisition (Amendment &  Validation) Ordinance 1967 but before the commencement of Land

Acquisition (Amendment) Act 1984, would be saved.  There is no  dispute in these matters that notifications under Section 4 of  

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the Act were issued on 05.11.1980 and 25.11.1980, the period  which is covered by the first proviso to Section 6 of the Act.  Thus, this ground sought to be advanced by Mr. Lekhi as well  as  Mr.  Mukul  Rohtagi,  cannot  be  accepted  and  is  decided  against them. 97. In fact, this aspect of the matter has been dealt with  elaborately in the opinion expressed by Full Bench in the case  of  B.R.  Gupta-I.   The  proviso,  according  to  Full  Bench  opinion, is very elaborate and made Explanation 1 applicable  to the computation of any of the periods referred to in first  proviso.  In  the  said  judgment,  four  situations  have  been  carved out. Situation No.(ii) would cover the present case  which deals with notification issued under Section 4 after  28.1.1967 but before 25.9.1981.  Relevant portion of paragraph  11 thereof is reproduced hereunder :

“If the object of the legislature had been  to  confer  the  benefit  of  the  explanation  only to situations (iii) and (iv), it could  have  enacted  the  proviso  as  indicated  earlier  and  added  an  explanation  that,  in  computing the period of limitation, periods  covered  by  stay  orders  would  be  excluded.  The  legislature  need  not  have  at  all  referred to situation (ii) above.  But the  Legislature  also  wanted  to  make  it  clear  that the explanation would apply in respect

of notifications under S.4 issued prior to  25-9-1981  as  well.   In  doing  so,  the  provision could well have taken into account  even S.4 notifications issued prior to 29-1-

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- 51 - 1967  for  it  was  quite  conceivable  that,  though  the  two  year  period  for  following  these  up  with  declaration  under  S.6  had  elapsed by 28-1-1969, the failure to make a  S.6  declaration  may  have  been  the  consequence of a stay order from a court.  But the Legislature decided to exclude this  category from the provision for extension in  the  explanation,  and  decided  to  confine  itself to all notifications under S.4 made  after 29-1-1967.  This is very important and  the manner in which cl.(a) of the proviso is  worded  so  as  to  cover  all  notifications  after  29-1-1967  and  before  24-9-1984  precludes the contention urged on behalf of  the  petitioners  seeking  to  limit  the  operation  of  the  explanation.   This  contention  is  that  the  amendments  of  1984  can at best only affect cases in which the  three year period prescribed in 1967 had not  expired by 24-9-1984.  In other words, the  argument  is  that  only  cases  covered  by  notifications under S.4 issued after 25-9- 1981 can be affected by the amendments and  have  the  benefit  of  the  extended  period  contemplated  in  the  explanation.   This  contention is clearly unacceptable.  It runs  counter to the entire scheme of the proviso  (which specifically takes in all the period  after 29-1-1967) and the explanation (which  is specifically made applicable to both the  clauses of the proviso).  We are, therefore,  of opinion that the language and intendment  of the provision are clear and unambiguous  and that the period of exclusion mentioned  in  the  explanation  should  be  taken  into  account  in  the  cases  of  all  notifications  issued  after  29-1-1967  whether  or  not  the  period otherwise limited under the proviso  for  a  follow-up  declaration  under  S.6  in  respect  thereof  had  expired  or  not.   We,  therefore,  reject  the  contention  urged  on

behalf of the petitioners.”

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98. Thus, considering the matter in the light of the opinion  expressed by Full Bench as also with the plain reading of the  first proviso and explanation (i) the following opinion can  be  safely  deduced  and  the  aforesaid  conclusion  would  be  inescapable  that  the  exclusion  envisaged  is  available  in  respect of notifications issued between the period commencing  from 29.1.1967 and 24.9.1984. 99. As  mentioned  hereinabove,  in  Chatro  Devi-I both  the  learned Judges dismissed the writ petition in respect of the  cases where Land Acquisition Collector was the same who had  heard  the  arguments  then  prepared  the  report  and  also  in  respect of those who had not preferred any objections under  Section 5A of the Act. The decision of Division Bench of  Delhi High Court in  B.R. Gupta-II (supra) was held to be  incorrect and acquisition proceedings were upheld in respect  of  aforesaid  cases.  However,  difference  of  opinion  was  confined only with regard to import and interpretation of  Section 5A of the Act as to what would constitute 'hearing'. 100. Primarily, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Swatanter Kumar (as he  then was) was of the opinion that even if matters have been

heard  by  'A'  and  decided  by  'B',  it  would  amount  to  sufficient compliance of Section 5A of the Act but Hon'ble  Mr. Justice Madan B. Lokur was  of  the view that if a matter  

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is heard by 'A' obviously it has to be decided by him only  and if it has been decided by 'B' then the same would amount  to  miscarriage  of  justice  and  obviously  would  lead  to  violation of principles of natural justice. 101. Only  to  this  limited  extent,  with  regard  to  interpretation of Section 5A of the Act, matter was referred  to third learned Judge Hon'ble Mr. Justice T.S. Thakur, (as  he then was). In his separate judgment, Hon'ble Mr.Justice  Thakur  concurred  with  the  view  expressed  by  Hon'ble  Mr.  Justice Madan B. Lokur titled Chatro Devi Vs. Union of India  & Ors. reported in 137 (2007) DLT 14 known as Chatro Devi-II. 102. We have been given to understand that, feeling aggrieved  by the majority  opinion as expressed by two learned Judges in  the matter of Chatro Devi II, the Union of India had filed 39  Special Leave Petitions in this Court wherein leave has been  granted and appeals are now pending disposal in accordance  with law. 103. At  the  first  instance,  we  thought  of  getting  those  matters also listed before us for hearing so that once for  all, the dispute pertaining to the notifications issued in the

year 1980 would come to an end, but  we have been informed  that many of the respondents have not yet been served and some  matters cannot be listed on account of technical defaults.  We  

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also  requested  learned  counsel  appearing  for  appellants  to  appear for those respondents but they showed their inability  in doing so as the respondents of those appeals  are not the  same, who are appellants before us. 104. Thus, in this judgment, we are not considering the ambit,  scope and interpretation of Section 5A of the Act and have  specifically  left  it  open,  to  be  decided  in  the  said  39  appeals. 105. It has not been disputed before us that after the opinion  was expressed by Full Bench in B.R. Gupta-I all the connected  73 writ petitions came to be heard by Division Bench in B.R.  Gupta-II.  All the said petitions were allowed and the reliefs  as claimed by them were granted vide order dated 18.11.1988.  The question whether stay granted to some of the land owners  prohibiting the authorities from publication of declaration  under Section 6 of the Act would be applicable to others also,  who had not obtained stay in that behalf came to be considered  by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Abhey Ram  (supra). In paragraph (9) thereof it has been held as under:-

“9. ..... The words 'stay of the action or

proceeding' have been widely interpreted by  this  Court and  mean that  any type  of the  orders  passed  by  this  Court  would  be  an  inhibitive  action  on  the  part  of  the  authorities  to  proceed  further.   When  the  action  of  conducting   an   enquiry  under  

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- 55 - Section  5A  was  put  in  issue  and  the  declaration under Section 6 was questioned,  necessarily  unless  the  Court  holds  that  enquiry  under  Section  5A  was  properly  conducted  and  the  declaration  published  under Section 6 was valid, it would not be  open to the officers to proceed further into  the  matter.   As  a  consequence,  the  stay  granted  in  respect  of  some  would  be  applicable  to  others  also  who  had  not  obtained stay in that behalf.  We are not  concerned  with  the  correctness  of  the  earlier direction with regard to Section 5A  enquiry and consideration of objections as  it  was  not  challenged  by  the  respondent  Union. ....”

Further in the same judgment, in paragraph 12 it has been held  as under :

“12. ... ... ... In view of the fact that the  notification  under  Section  4(1)  is  a  composite  one  and  equally  the  declaration  under  Section  6  is  also  a  composite  one,  unless  the  declaration  under  Section  6  is  quashed in toto, it does not operate as if  the  entire  declaration  requires  to  be  quashed.  It is seen that the appellants had  not filed any objections to the notice issued  under Section 5A.”

106. To  satisfy  ourselves  with  regard  to  the  aforesaid  arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellants, we  have gone through the record and find that Land Acquisition  Collector  had  heard  the  objections  and  thereafter  had

forwarded the same to Lt. Governor for his opinion. The dates  from which the objections were heard have already been given  hereinabove.  Similarly, the  manner  in  which the same were  

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dealt with by Lt. Governor has also been scrutinized.  We do  not find any infirmity or illegality in the procedure adopted  in the same. We are of the considered opinion that there has  been full, complete and strict compliance of the provisions  contained in the Act by the respondents. 107. In  the  light  of  the  aforesaid  discussion,  it  is  not  necessary for us to consider the judgment of this Court in  the  case  of  Oxford  English  School (supra).   This  was  a  judgment  by  two  learned  Judges  of  this  Court  whereas  the  judgment in the case of Abhey Ram (supra) is by three learned  Judges of this Court.  Secondly, the question as to whether  an order of stay passed in one case would be applicable to  other similarly situated persons who had not been granted  stay was not directly in issue in Oxford School Case (supra)  decided by this Court. The  question  in  the  said  case  was  primarily with regard to the period of limitation of three  years within which a declaration under Section 6 is required  to be made.   108. In  the  light  of  the  foregoing  discussion,  more  so,  keeping  in  mind  the  ratio  of  which  stood  concluded  by  a

judgment of Bench of three learned Judges of this Court in  the case of Abhey Ram (supra), we are of the opinion that it  is not a fit case where  we  are  called  upon  to come to  a  

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different conclusion that subsequent declaration issued under  Section  6  was  beyond  the  period  of  limitation.   Fact  situation does not warrant us to do so. 109. Impugned orders passed by High Court from time to time  would reveal that some have been dismissed primarily on the  ground of delay and laches. We have gone through the said  orders critically and find that if the appellants were under  some bonafide mistake and had not challenged the issuance of  notifications  or  declaration  under  Section  6  of  the  Act  within a reasonable time then on the ground that there was an  eclipse period during which they were not supposed to take  any legal action, would be of no help to them. For that they  have to thank their own stars. Some of the petitions have  been filed either in the year 2000 or subsequent thereto.  Thus, the High Court was justified in not entertaining such  petitions on the ground of delay and laches. Even though,  they have tried to attempt to explain the delay but such a  long delay cannot be condoned more so, when proceeding of  acquisition was initiated in the year 1980.   110. It may be recalled that notifications were issued in the

year 1980.  Almost 30 years have already passed by, but, no  steps could be taken to formally complete the scheme so far.  Thus, after such  a  long  lapse of time, it will not only be  

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harsh but inequitable also to quash the notifications so as  to  grant  liberty  to  the  appellants  to  challenge  same  in  accordance with law. 111.  The contention that in the cases of Abhey Ram and Gurdip  Singh  Uban,  admittedly,  no  objections  were  preferred  under  Section 5A of the Act, therefore, the appellants' cases stood  on a higher pedestal than those which were considered in the  aforesaid two cases also has no merits. It was also submitted  that  the  so  called  satisfaction  of  Lt.  Governor  was  not  legally tenable as admittedly no records were sent to him by  the Land Acquisition Collector after deciding the objections  filed by the appellants along with his report. We have already  mentioned above that there has been application of mind by the  Lt. Governor to the facts of the case. 112.  As has been mentioned above and held by this Court in  Abhey Ram (supra) that notification under Section 4(1) of the  Act being composite one it would not be proper and legally  justifiable  to  quash  the  same  more  so  when  most  of  the  appellants had not filed any objections under Section 5A of  the Act. Thus, the declarations issued under Section 6 of the

Act cannot be quashed. 113. The clear ratio of the aforesaid passage of this Court is  that unless  the  declarations issued  by  respondents  on  as  

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many as four dates, as mentioned hereinabove, in the year  1985, are quashed in toto, it cannot be said that respondents  could not have proceeded further with regard to acquisition  of  those  lands  for  which  the  same  has  not  been  quashed  earlier.  114. In other words, it has been held that for all remaining  lands for which neither the notifications under Section 4 nor  declarations under Section 6 have been quashed, acquisition  proceedings,  notification/declaration  issued  for  remaining  lands would continue to hold good and respondents can proceed  further. 115. In  the  light  of  foregoing  discussion,  we  are  of  the  opinion that appeals have no merit and substance. The same  are hereby dismissed with costs. Counsel’s fees Rs. 10,000/-  in each case.

.......................J. [V.S. SIRPURKAR]

.......................J.

[DEEPAK VERMA] February 08, 2010.