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CASE NO.: Appeal (civil)  4699 of 2006

PETITIONER: Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd.

RESPONDENT: M/s Nippon Steel Corporation Ltd.

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/11/2006

BENCH: Dr. AR. Lakshmanan & Tarun Chatterjee

JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7294/2006)

Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J.

       Leave granted.

       Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. is the appellant.   Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 6th/8th December,  2005 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in  Appeal No. 321 of 1997 in Arbitration Petition No. 260 of 1996  in Award No. 98 of 1996, this appeal was preferred.   The question that falls for determination in this appeal is  whether the filing of the award dated 2.3.1996 by M/s Little &  Co., advocate for the Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (for  short "ONGC") in the Court on 23.3.1996 is the deemed notice  under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 and whether  the limitation for setting aside the said award at the instance  of ONGC shall commence from that date. The appellant is a Public Sector Oil Company  incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and engaged in  the business of exploration and exploitation of Hydrocarbons.   The appellant, ONGC and the respondent M/s Nippon Steel  Corporation Ltd.  entered into a contract for transportation  and installation of fabricated structures of South Basein  Platform Complex which was to be located at about 80Kms.  west of Bombay in the Arabian Sea.  Disputes and difference  arose between the parties which were subsequently arbitrated  and an award was passed on 2.3.1996 under the Indian  Arbitration Act, 1940 which confers statutory jurisdiction on  courts of law either to convert a legally valid award into a rule  of the Court or set aside/remit the same on the grounds  specifically provided for that purpose in the said Act.  There is  an express and well defined statutory scheme for the same in  the Act.  A provision of law \026 Section 14 of the Indian  Arbitration Act, 1940, which is relevant for this appeal, reads  as under: "14.  Award to be signed and filed \026

(1)     When the arbitrators or umpire have made their award,  they shall sign it and shall give notice in writing to the  parties of the making and signing thereof and of the  amount of fees and charges payable in respect of the  arbitration and award                                             (2)     The arbitrators or umpire shall, at the request of any  party to the arbitration agreement or any person

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claiming under such party or if so directed by the Court  and upon payment of the fees and charges due in  respect of the arbitration and award and of the costs  and charges of filing the award, cause the award or a  signed copy of it, together with any depositions and  documents which may have been taken and proved  before them, to be filed in Court, and the Court shall  thereupon give notice to the parties of the filing of the  award.

(3)     Where the arbitrators or umpire state a special case  under Clause (b) of Section 13, the Court, after giving  notice to the parties and hearing them, shall pronounce  its opinion thereon and such opinion shall be added to,  and shall form part of, the award."

The plain and simple language of the above provision  requires firstly that the arbitrators/umpire, as the case may  be, shall: (a)     sign the award they make (b)     give notice in writing to the parties of the making and  signing of the award

(c)     cause the award along with the records be filed in  Court Thereupon the Court shall:

(d)     give notice to the parties of the filing of the award (e)     if a special case is referred to court, shall pronounce  its opinion, after giving notice to the parties and  hearing them.

On 23.3.1996, M/s Little & Co., the advocates, as per the  request of the Arbitrator  filed an award in the Court on behalf  of the Arbitrator.  The Court, on 9.5.1996, issued a notice to  the parties about the filing of the award which was received by  the appellant on 14.6.1996.  The appellant, on the receipt of  the notice from the Court, moved an application for setting  aside the award on 12.7.1996.  The learned single Judge  rejected the petition of the appellant solely on the ground that  the same was time barred as the appellant had knowledge of  the filing of the award much prior to the date of notice to them  by the Court.   Aggrieved by the judgment and order as passed by the  learned single Judge, the appellant filed an appeal before the  Division Bench of the High Court which also dismissed the  appeal reaffirming the judgment of the learned single Judge  holding that the application of the appellant was barred by  limitation as the same was moved after a span of 30 days from  the knowledge of the filing of the award in Court.  The Division  Bench also directed the appellant to deposit with the office of  the Prothonotary & Senior Master, High Court, Bombay, a  sum of Rs.2,36,29,954/-.  The appellant deposited the above  said amount as per the said order.  Thereupon the respondent  moved a Notice of Motion No. 206 of 2006 in Appeal No. 321 of  1997 in Arbitration No. 260/96 in Award No. 98/96 praying  the Court to direct the office of the Prothonotary & Senior  Master, High Court, Bombay to pay and hand over the sum of  Rs.2,36,29,954/- with accrued interest due thereon to the  respondent.  The appellant filed an affidavit in reply to the  notice of motion.  The respondent again moved a Notice of  Motion No. 1082 of 2006 praying the Court to pass a judgment  and decree in terms of the Award dated 2.3.1996.  Hence the  present appeal by way of special leave petition has come up.

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We have heard Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned  Additional Solicitor General of India, appearing for the  appellant and Mr. Ashok H. Desai, learned senior counsel  appearing for the respondent. The learned ASG and the learned senior counsel  advanced elaborate submissions with reference to the  provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, Limitation  Act,1963 and also cited many decisions in support of their  respective contentions. Mr. Gopal Subramanium submitted as under: (a)     that the award was filed by the arbitrator and not by  the appellant and that the appellant has not  instructed their counsel to file the award and that the  award was filed by the counsel at the instance of the  arbitrator.  The arbitrators had addressed a letter to  the counsel along with their affidavits for filing the  award.  As the award was filed on behalf of the  arbitrator, the doctrine of constructive notice cannot  be stretched to the extent of imputing knowledge on  the appellant of filing of the award; (b)      that as per Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, the  arbitrator causes the award to be filed on request of  either of the party or on the express direction of the  Court.  In the instant case, the appellant has not filed  any application requesting the arbitrator to file the  award in Court. In the absence of such an application,  the award filed by the arbitrator, cannot be construed  as an award filed at the instance of the appellant and  hence doctrine of constructive notice cannot be  extended to the facts and circumstances of the case.   The High Court has overlooked the significance of the  expression "the Court shall thereupon give notice to  the parties of the filing of the award "  occurring in the  aforesaid section.  The use of the aforesaid expression  in the said section reflects the legislative intention that  the notice referred therein should always be given by  the Court. (c)     The High Court has failed to comprehend the true  spirit and intent of clause (b) of Article 119 of the  Limitation Act.  Mr. Gopal Subramanium submitted  that the words used in Article 119 makes it  abundantly clear that the said Article recognizes the  date of service of notice as the relevant date for  computation of the stipulated period of limitation.  The  Legislature, after exercising its wisdom, has  specifically used the expression "the date of service of  notice"  and not the date of knowledge of the filing of  the award, in Article 119 of the Limitation Act.   The  construction now adopted by the High Court tends to  obliterate the difference between the date of service of  notice and the date of knowledge of the award, and is  hence contrary to the legislative intent. (d)     that the appellant has not received any  communication or intimation about the filing of the  award except for the notice dated 9.5.1996.  The  expression "the Court shall thereupon give notice  to  the parties of the filing of the award" occurring in  Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act has to be conjointly  read with the expression "the date of notice" occurring  in Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act.  A conjoint  reading of the aforesaid section in the manner  indicated above leads to an irresistible conclusion that  the relevant date to be taken into account for  completion of the period of limitation as stipulated in  Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act,  is the date of

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service of notice by the Court. The notice dated  9.5.1996 is the first form of communication  received  by the appellant on 14.6.1996 as regards the filing of  the award.  Accordingly, the period of thirty days has  to be computed from 14.6.1996 i.e. the date of receipt  of the said notice.  In view of the expression "the date  of notice" used in Article 119 of the Limitation Act, the  period of limitation has to be computed from the date  of service of notice.  e)      The provisions of Order III Rule 5 of C.P.C. is  reproduced hereunder: "5.  Service of process on pleader \026 Any process served  on the pleader who has been duly appointed to act in  Court for any party or left at the office or ordinary  residence of such pleader, and whether the same is for  the personal appearance of the party or not, shall be  presumed to be duly communicated and made known  to the party whom the pleader represents, and, unless  the Court otherwise directs, shall be as effectual for all  purposes as if the same had been given to or served on  the party in person."

 It was argued that the High Court has erred in importing  the principle of Order III Rule 5 of the C.P.C. to the facts of the  present case.  The principle embodied in the said Rules is only  applicable in cases where the counsel acts on behalf of his  client and where the counsel in his representative capacity  represents his client.  In the present case, the counsel has not  acted in his representative capacity.  By filing the award at the  instance of the arbitrator, the counsel was acting as a  representative of the arbitrator and was not acting as a  representative of the appellant.  Since at the time of filing of  the award, the counsel was acting under the instruction of the  arbitrator, the principles of agency cannot be extended to the  aforesaid facts of the present case. Explaining further, the learned ASG submitted that it is  manifest from the aforesaid Rule that the presumption  inherent in the said Rule applies only in cases where the  pleader has been duly appointed to act for the party.  The  presumption under the Rule cannot be applied to situations  where the pleader is not acting for the party.  For application  of the aforesaid Rule, it is sine qua non that the pleader should  have been appointed by the party to act in Court.  It is  submitted that in the instant case, the counsel was not  appointed by the appellant to act in Court on its behalf.  The  counsel, at the time of filing of the award, was acting on behalf  of the arbitrator and was appointed by the arbitrator to file the  award on his behalf. (f)     that the High Court is not right in applying the  proposition laid down by this Court in F.C.I. vs. B.  Kuttappan, (1993) 3 SCC 445 and has failed to  appreciate the legal proposition laid down by this  Court in Deo Narain Choudhary vs. Shree Narain  Choudhary, (2000) 8 SCC 626.  The High Court  has committed an error in overlooking the  proposition laid down by this Court in Ch.  Ramalinga Reddy vs. Superintending Engineer,  (1999) 9 SCC 610. (g)     That the High Court has overlooked real bone of  contention between parties and have been swayed  away by the proposition that the notice  contemplated by Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act  can be in any form i.e., oral or written and the  aforesaid proposition only adumbrates the principle

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that the notice referred to in Section 14(2) need not  specifically be framed in a written format.   Thus Mr. Gopal Subramanium submitted that the  impugned judgment is contrary to well settled  proposition of law. Mr. Ashok H. Desai, learned senior counsel, appearing  for the respondent submitted as follows: 1.      The instant case is squarely covered by the decision  of this Court in F.C.I. vs. B. Kuttappan (Supra).   2.      In regard to the argument of the learned ASG  appearing for the appellant, that M/s Little &  Co.,advocate was acting as a representative of the  arbitrator and it was not acting as a representative  of the appellant and that they were not appointed  by the appellant to act in Court on their behalf, Mr.  Ashok Desai submitted that the above submission  is falsified by Annexures P-3 and P-4 filed by the  appellant itself.  Annexure P-3 is the letter dated  23.3.1996 addressed to the Prothonotary & Senior  Master, High Court, Mumbai by which M/s Little &  Co., advocates, in their capacity as an advocate for  the appellant herein, requested that the award  therein be taken on file.       Annexure P-4 is the letter dated 26.4.1996       addressed to the Prothonotary & Senior Master,  High Court, Mumbai by which M/s Little  & Co.,  advocates, again in their capacity as the advocate  for the appellant herein, gave the addresses of the  parties as well as their advocates.           According to Mr. Ashok Desai, both these  letters confirm that the award was filed by M/s  Little & Co., advocates as the counsel for the  appellant and that they had, by their own showing,  been appointed by the appellant to act on its behalf  in Court.  The learned single Judge also held that  there is not a word to say that M/s Little & Co. had  filed the award in Court for and on behalf of the  Arbitrator nor despite the specific contention of the  bar of limitation, had any affidavit been filed either  by the arbitrators or any one from the office of M/s  Little & Co. to say that the Arbitrator had engaged  or required M/s Little & Co. to file the award. (3)     It is settled law that intimation, communication or  notice to pleader is notice to the party in view of  Order III Rule 5 of C.P.C. and that such intimation,  communication or notice to pleader would be  sufficient compliance with Section 14(2) of the  Arbitration Act, 1940.  Therefore, Mr. Ashok Desai  submitted that the appellant is estopped from  claiming that it did not have the corresponding  knowledge of the filing of the award by M/s Little &  Co.  The moment the award was filed by the  appellant’s counsel in Court and was taken on  record by the Court, the notice by the Court is  deemed to the appellant.  In other words, even in  the absence of formal notice, some other act of the  Court is enough to foist awareness of the filing of  the award in Court, wherefrom the period of  limitation is to commence.   (4)     Inviting our attention to Rule 786 of the Bombay  High Court (Original Side) Rules, Mr. Ashok Desai  submitted that the award has been filed in Court,  the Prothonotary and Senior Master shall forthwith  issue notice of such filing to the parties interested  in the award.  In the instant case, the learned single

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Judge has recorded that the Prothonotary & Senior  Master of the Court had on around 24.4.1996  directed the counsel for the appellant M/s Little &  Co., to furnish detailed addresses of the parties and  that the appellant’s counsel had on 26.4.1996  furnished those addresses.   The learned single  Judge found that this communication from the  Court received by the appellant’s counsel on or  before 26.4.1996 could itself be treated to be a  notice by the Court to counsel for the appellant,  about the filing of the award in Court.  Thus it was  submitted even if the period of 30 days as  contemplated under Article 119 of the Limitation  Act is computed from 26.4.1996, the petition to set  aside the award filed on 12.7.1996 would be time  barred. He denied that the High Court has failed to follow the dictum  laid down by this Court in the case of Deo Narain Choudhary  vs. Shree Narain Choudhary,(supra) and in Ch. Ramalinga  Reddy vs. superintending Engineer  (supra).          In the above cases, this Court held that limitation does  not begin to run merely on filing of a caveat in Court by the  objecting party as the notice regarding filing of the award must  be act of Court, even though it need not be in writing.  The  instant case is not one where deemed or constructive notice is  imputed to the appellant because its own counsel expressly  acting as its counsel, filed the award in Court and hence the  appellant is estopped from claiming lack of knowledge about  the filing of the award on that date.  It does not lie in the  mouth of the appellant whose counsel had filed the award in  Court to contend that it did not have the knowledge of the  filing of the award.  Likewise, in the case of Ch. Ramalinga  Reddy vs. superintending Engineer (supra), this Court held  that mere intimation from one party to the other party as to  the filing of the award, without direction by the Court, is not  notice in terms of Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940.   The instant case is again not one where constructive or  deemed notice is imputed to the appellant because of any  intimation sent by the respondent to the appellant.         Concluding his arguments, Mr. Ashok Desai submitted  that the instant case is fully covered by the decision of this  Court in F.C.I. vs. B. Kuttappan, (supra) as aforesaid.  In the  said case, this Court has been pleased to impute constructive  notice to the party for the act of its counsel on similar facts.   Mr. Ashok Desai submitted that when the party or its pleader  already has knowledge of the filing of the award in Court in  terms of Section 14 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, a subsequent  notice by the Court to the parties in this regard is of no legal  consequence and cannot in law prejudice the rights of the  parties.  He further submitted that it is factually incorrect that  in the instant case, M/s Little & Co. did not act in its  "representative capacity" on behalf of the appellant and  reiterated that in the instant case M/s Little & Co. filed the  award expressly acting in Court as the counsel for the  appellant and that M/s Little & Co. was appointed by the  appellant to act in Court on its behalf which is evident from  Annexures P- 3 and P-4 to the appeal.         Arguing further, Mr. Ashok Desai submitted that the  question in the instant matter is not whether the appellant  had expressly instructed its counsel to file the award in Court  but whether the very act of the appellant’s counsel acting as  counsel of the appellant in filing the award in Court imputes  deemed and constructive knowledge of the filing of the award  on the appellant.         It was also submitted by Mr. Ashok Desai that the

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decisions of this Court in Deo Natain Choudhary vs. Shree  Narain Choudhury (supra) and Ch. Ramalinga Reddy vs.  Superintending Engineer (supra), are not applicable to the  facts of the instant case and are even otherwise consistent  with the decision of this Court in F.C.I. vs. B. Kuttappan,  (supra).  Mr. Ashok Desai further submitted that the appeal  filed by the ONGC has no merits and therefore, is liable to be  dismissed with heavy costs.

Questions of law:-         In the above background, the following substantial  questions of law arise for consideration by this Court: 1.      Whether the High Court was justified in extending the  principle of constructive notice to the facts of the present  case ignoring the express stipulations of Section 14(2) of  the Arbitration Act, 1940?

2.      Whether the High Court was justified in ignoring the  fundamental difference between the two expressions i.e.  date of service of notice and date of knowledge of award?

3.      Whether the High Court was justified in overlooking the  legislative intent in framing Article 119(b) of the  Limitation Act by incorporating the expression "the date  of service of notice"?

4.      Whether in view of the exhaustive nature of Article  119(b) of the Limitation Act, the High Court was justified  in importing the principle embodied in Order III Rule 5 of  the Code of Civil Procedure?

5.      Whether the High Court has failed to appreciate the  significance of the expression "the Court shall thereupon  give notice to the parties of filing of the award" occurring  in Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940?

6.      Whether the High Court was justified in overlooking that  the presumption of constructive notice can be drawn  only against the party whom the counsel is representing  at the time of performing the said act?

We have given our careful consideration to the entire material  placed before us, the arguments advanced by both sides with  reference to the pleadings, annexures, documents, provisions  of law in the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 and of the Limitation  Act, 1963 and the rulings cited by both the counsel.         In the instant case, the award was filed at the instance of  the arbitrator by M/s Little & Co. on 23.3.1996 as is clear  from Annexure P-4.  The relevant part of annexure P-4 reads  as under: "We, therefore, now give below the address of the parties  as well as their advocates for the purpose of serving  notice in respect of the above award.

       The address of the claimant is as under:

Xxxxxxxxxxx

The address of the respondents and their advocates are  as under:   

Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (E & C Division) Bombay Regional Business Centre 16-E Maker Towers,

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Cuffe Parade  Bombay-400 005

M/s Little  Co. Central Bank Building, 3rd Floor, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Fort, Bombay-400 023."

The description of M/s Little & Co. as the lawyer of the  respondent in the Arbitration, is not of any consequence and  not binding on the appellant so long as no vakalat is given to  them at the relevant time of filing of the award before the  Court to act as their lawyer in the proceedings initiated under  Sections 33 & 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 before the High  Court.  The fact that Annexure P-4 is filed after filing of the  award and that the counsel has furnished the address of the  appellant for service of notice reflects that M/s Little & Co.  was not representing the appellant at the time of filing of the  award.  These letters, in our view, clearly establish that M/s  Little & Co.  at the time of filing of the award was acting at the  instance of the Arbitrator. The fact that M/s Little & Co. on the panel of the  advocates of the appellant does not determine its  representative capacity at the time of filing of the award.   Panel lawyers are not standing counsel for the ONGC in the  High Court.  Panel lawyers’ services are availed of, on a case to  case basis.  M/s Little & Co. filed the award acting as the  agent of the arbitrator and while doing this ministerial act of  filing of the award on behalf of the Arbitrator they were not  acting in their capacity as the counsel of the appellant.   The respondent has misconstrued the pleadings of the  appellant.  The appellant is not denying the fact that M/s  Little & Co. was the counsel for the appellant in the arbitration  proceedings.  The appellant is, in fact, only contending that at  the time of filing of the award, the counsel was not acting on  behalf of the appellant but was acting as a representative of  the arbitrator.  The law requires the arbitrator to file the award  before the competent Court.  The Arbitrator can discharge this  legal duty by himself or through an agent who happened to be  an appellant’s counsel in the Arbitration.  The fact that the  counsel had filed the award at the express request of the  arbitrator reflects that the counsel was acting as a  representative of the Arbitrator at the time of filing of the  award and was discharging any professional service as a  lawyer to the appellant.  In fact, as contended by the learned  ASG appearing for the appellant, that the appellant had  occasioned to appoint M/s Little & Co. to act as its lawyer  before the High Court even before the award was filed.  Since  the appellant had no intention to get the award filed in Court,  there was no question of appointing M/s Little & Co. to  coordinate with arbitrator to obtain the award and file the  same before the court.  Therefore, in our view, the knowledge  of the said lawyer about the filing of the award is not a notice,  either actual or constructive to the appellant. Order III Rule 5 CPC:- We shall now consider the arguments advanced on Order  III Rule 5 C.P.C.  In our view, the principles enshrined in  Order III Rule 5 C.P.C. is not applicable to the facts of the  instant case.  The principles embodied in the said Rule is only  applicable in cases where the counsel acts on behalf of his  client and where the counsel in its representative capacity  represents its client.  In the instant case, by filing the award at  the instance of the arbitrator, the counsel is acting as a  representative of the arbitrator and was not acting as a

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representative of the appellant and, therefore, the presumption  envisaged by the said Rule cannot be stretched to situations  where the pleader is not acting on behalf of the party. Arguments on Article 119 of the Limitation Act, 1963:-         Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned Additional Solicitor  General, submitted that Article 119 recognizes the date of  service of notice as the relevant date for computation of the  period of limitation.  This Article unlike other Articles does not  refer to the date of knowledge of filing of the award and hence  the period of limitation cannot be computed from the date of  knowledge of filing of the award as contemplated by Article  119 of the Limitation Act.  In view of the specific expression  used in Article 119, limitation cannot be computed from the  date of knowledge of the award.  Further, at the time of filing  of the award, the appellant did not have knowledge of the filing  of the award as the award was filed by M/s Little & Co. at the  instance of the Arbitrator.         Our attention was drawn to paragraph 5 of the counter  affidavit filed by the respondent in this appeal.  We have  perused the same.  It is seen from the averments that the  respondent has admitted in paragraph 5 of the counter  affidavit that an act of the Court is necessary to foist  awareness of filing of the award.  The averments made in the  said paragraph itself indicates that by the letter dated  24.4.1996, the Prothonotary and Senior Master directed M/s  Little & Co. to furnish detailed address of the parties for the  purpose of serving them the notice of filing the award.  The  fact that M/s Little & Co. was directed to furnish address of  the parties for service of notice indicates that the Court itself  did not consider the act of filing of the award by M/s Little &  Co. as notice or even constructive notice.  The letter dated  24.4.1996 is a letter directing the counsel for the appellant to  furnish address for service of notice on the parties.  Therefore,  the said letter cannot be treated as an act of Court sufficient  to foist knowledge of filing of award.  On the other hand, the  said letter induces and triggers the belief that the Court shall,  notwithstanding the filing of the award, serve notice on the  parties including the appellants of filing of the award.  Vide  the communication dated 26.4.1996 M/s Little & Co. only  complied with the aforesaid direction and accordingly  furnished the address for service of notice on the parties.  By  furnishing the addresses, even M/s Little & Co. though the  knowledge they have about the filing the award is not notice to  ONGC and the Court ought to service notice separately.   Therefore, it was submitted that the period of limitation  cannot be computed w.e.f. 26.4.1996.  We see merit and  substance in the above submission.         Likewise, in paragraph 6 of the counter affidavit, the  respondent has admitted that the arbitrator had caused the  award to be filed through the appellant’s counsel in the  arbitration proceedings.  Thus at the relevant time M/s Little  & Co. was acting as an agent of the arbitrator and was not  acting as counsel for the appellant.           The doctrine of constructive notice cannot be extended to  acts that are performed at the instance of a third party.  As  already stated and noticed, that at the time of filing of the  award M/s Little & Co. was acting at the instance of the  arbitrator i.e. a third party.  This sine qua non for application  of the principle of constructive notice is that the counsel  should have acted as a representative of the party.  Since the  award was filed at the instance of the arbitrator and on his  express request, the counsel was acting as a representative of  the arbitrator and not as a representative of the appellant.          We shall now consider the decisions cited by learned ASG  in support of his contention.

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1.  Kumbha Mawji vs. Union of India, [1953] SCR 878          In this case, this Court was considering the authority of  the umpire to file the award on behalf of the appellant into  court in terms of Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act.  This  Court held that Section 14(2) clearly implies that where the  award or a signed copy thereof is in fact filed into court by a  party he should have the authority of the umpire for doing so.   This Court further held as under: "The mere filing of award in Court by a party to it  without the authority of the arbitrator or umpire is not a  sufficient compliance with the terms of s.14 of the  Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, nor can it be inferred from  the mere handing over of the original award by the  umpire to both the parties that he authorized them to  file the same in Court on his behalf; that authority has  to be specifically alleged and proved."   

2.      Nilkantha Shidramappa Ningashetti vs. Kashinath  Somanna Ningashetti and Others, [1962] 2 SCR 551          In this case, in a partition suit the Arbitrator filed his  award in the court and the judge adjourned the case for "the  parties’ say to the arbitrator’s report."   No notice in writing  was given to the parties by the court of the filing of the award.   Objection to the award was filed by the appellant beyond the  period of limitation.  The court ordered the award to be filed  and decree to be drawn up in terms of the award as the  objection filed was beyond the period limitation.          The appellant’s case was that the period of limitation as  under Art. 158 of the Limitation Act, for an application to set  aside the award, would run against him only from the date of  service of the notice in writing was issued by the Court to the  appellant the time never began to run against him.  The  appellant also contended that as the court had refused to set  aside the award the appeal was maintainable under s.39(1)(VI)  of the Arbitration Act.  This Court held as under: "that the communication by the court to the parties or  their counsel of the information that an award had been  filed was sufficient compliance with the requirements of  sub-s.(2) of s.14 of the Arbitration Act, with respect to  the giving of the notice to the parties concerned, about  the filing of the award.  Notice does not necessarily  mean "communication in writing".  The expression "give  notice" in sub-s.(2) of s.14 of the Arbitration Act simply  means giving intimation of the filing of the Award.  Such  intimation need not be given in writing and could be  communicated orally.  That would amount to service of  notice when no particular mode of service was  prescribed.         Held, further that where there was no objection  before the court praying for setting aside the award, no  question of refusing to set it aside could arise, and no  appeal therefore was maintainable under s.39(1)(VI) of  the Arbitration Act."     3.      Parasramka Commercial Company vs. Union of  India, 1969 (2) SCC 694         In this case, the appellant entered into a contract with  the Union of India and the matter was referred to arbitration.   The award was made and signed on April 26, 1950.  The  arbitrator did not send a notice of the making and signing of  the award but sent a copy of the award signed by him to the  company which acknowledged the receipt of the copy by letters  dated May 5 and May 16, 1950.  The Appellant filed an  application under Section 14(1) of the Arbitration Act in the  Trial Court on March 30, 1951, for making the award rule of  the Court.  The respondent took an objection before the Trial

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Court that the application was beyond time as it was not filed  within 90 days of the receipt of notice that the award had been  made and signed.  The Trial Court upheld the objection and  dismissed the application and the High Court, in revision,  confirmed it.  The Company appealed to this Court with  special leave.  It was contended that the notice under Section  14(1) had to be something besides the award of which a copy  had been sent.  This Court held as under: "that reading the word ’notice’ it denotes merely an  intimation to the party concerned of a particular fact.   Notice may take several forms.  It must be sufficient in  writing and must intimate quite clearly that the award  has been made and signed.  In the present case, a copy  of the award signed by the arbitrator was sent to the  company.  The company had sufficient notice that the  award has been made and signed.  In fact the two  letters of May 5 and May 16 quite clearly show that the  Company knew full well that the arbitrator had given  the award, made it and signed it.  In these  circumstances to insist upon a letter which perhaps was  also sent it is to refine the law beyond the legitimate  requirements.  The only omission was that there was no  notice of the amount of the fees and charges payable in  respect of arbitration and award.  But that was not an  essential part of the notice for the purpose of limitation.   A written notice clearly intimating the parties concerned  that the award has been made and signed certainly  starts limitation.  The decision of the learned Single  Judge who has endorsed the opinion of the Subordinate  Judge that limitation began to run from the receipt of  the copy of the award which was signed by the  arbitrator  and which gave due notice to the party  concerned that the award had been made and signed is  upheld.  That is how the party itself understood when it  acknowledged the copy sent to it.  Therefore, the  application must be treated as being out of time."   4.      Indian Rayon Corporation Ltd. vs. Raunaq and   Company Pvt. Ltd., (1988) 4 SCC 31         This Court in the above matter held: "In order to be effective both for the purpose of  obtaining the judgment in terms of the award and for  setting aside the award, there must be (a) filing of the  award in the proper count; (b) service of the notice by  the court or its office to the parties concerned; and (c)  such notice need not necessarily be in writing.  It is  upon the date of service of such notice that the period of  limitation begins and at present under clause (b) of  Article 119 of the Limitation Act, the limitation expires  on the expiry of the 30 days of the service of that notice  for an application for setting aside of the award.  It is  the service of the notice and not the mode or method of  the service that is important or relevant.  Beyond this  there is no statutory requirement of any technical  nature under Section 14(2) of the Act.  The expression  ’give notice’ in Section 14(2) simply means giving  intimation of the filing of the award.  Such intimation  need not be given in writing and could be  communicated orally or otherwise."

5.       Food Corporation of India and Others vs. E.  Kuttappan, (1993) 3 SCC 445.  In this case, this Court held  as under: "When the arbitrator had sent the award and other  papers to the respondent through his counsel, unless

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he had authorized the respondent or his counsel on his  behalf to the filing of it in court, it cannot be assumed  that when the respondent or his counsel filed the award  and other connected papers in court it was not done for  and on behalf of the arbitrator.  Instantly it was the  respondent who by his letter had requested the  arbitrator to send to his lawyer the award for filing it  into court and to whom the arbitrator obliged on such  request.  When the arbitrator chose to accede to the  request of the respondent in specific terms, he by  necessary implication authorized the respondent’s  counsel to file the award and the connected papers in  court on his behalf.  The law enjoined on the arbitrator  to file the award in court for which purpose he could  even be directed by the court.  The obligation of filing  the award in court is a legal imperative on the  arbitrator.  The agency of the party or its lawyer  employed by the arbitrator for the purpose normally  need be specific but can otherwise be deduced, inferred  or implied from the facts and circumstances of a given  case.  It needs, however, shedding the impression that  when a lawyer files the award in court when given to  him by the arbitrator his implied authority to do so,  shall not be presumed to exist.  In the instant case, no  one raised the plea that the filing of the award in court  by the respondent’s lawyer was without the authority of  the arbitrator and the courts below were not engaged on  that question.  The matter was agitated on the basis of  knowledge of award from that fact.

6.      Patel Motibhai Naranbhai and Another vs. Dinubhai  Motibhai Patel and Others, (1996) 2 SCC 585                In the above case, this Court held thus: "9. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 14, a duty is cast  upon the arbitrator to file the award or cause the award  to be filed in the court at the request of the party to the  arbitration agreement or if so directed by the court.  There is no provision which requires the arbitrator to  apply to the court for filing of the award and pass a  decree in terms of the award. An application for filing  the award in court has to be made within thirty days  from the date of service of the notice of making of the  award under Article 119 of the Limitation Act. Even if it  is held that Article 119 will apply only to an application  made by a party and not by the arbitrator, Article 137  will come in the way of the arbitrator’s making any  application beyond the period of three years from the  date of making of the award. 10. Faced with the situation that an application for  filing the Award in Court Under Section 14(2) of the  Arbitration Act has become barred by limitation,  Jayantikumar Ishwarbhai Patil induced the Arbitrator  to make an application for filing of the Award and also  for making the Award the rule of the Court. In other  words. Jayantikumar Ishwarbhai Patel, a party to the  dispute with the help of the Arbitrator, did indirectly  what he could not have done directly. We are of the view  that law cannot be allowed to be circumvented in this  fashion. The Court should have declined to entertain  the application moved by the Arbitrator nearly six years  after making of the Award. Without the application of  the Arbitrator, the application made by Jayantikumar  Ishwarbhai Patel Under Section 14(2) could not survive.  The court should not come to the aid of a party where  there has been unwarrantable delay in seeking the

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statutory remedy. Any remedy must be sought with  reasonable promptitude having regard to the  circumstances."

7.      Secretary to Govt. of Karnataka and Another vs. V.  Harishbabu, (1996) 5 SCC 400         In the above case, this Court held thus: "We also do not find any merit in the submission of the  learned Counsel for the respondent that the  endorsement made by the government pleader on  24.6.1993 on the award which was then filed by the  arbitrator in court would amount to a notice under  Section 14(2) of the Act. The endorsement made by the  additional government pleader on 24.6.1993 can at best  be construed as a notice issued by the arbitrator under  Section 14(1) of the Act and such a notice, as we have  already observed, is not a substitute for a notice which  is mandatorily required to be issued by the Court and  served upon the parties regarding the filing of the award  under Section 14(2) of the Act. The trial court, therefore,  fell in error in opining that "admittedly he has not filed  any objections within 30 days from the date of the filing  of award by the respondent No. 3 before this Court and  there are no other impediments as such to deny the  relief sought for by the petitioner." The period of  limitation, for filing objections to the award as we have  already noticed, does not commence from the date of  filing of the award by the arbitrator in the court and  that period would only commence from the date of  service of the notice issued by the court under Section  14(2) of the Act. The High Court also fell in error in  observing that the appellant could not be heard to say  that he had no knowledge of the filing of the award in  the Court prior to 13.7.1993 on the ground that "the  additional government pleader representing respondents  1 and 2 before the court below had taken notice of the  filing of the award by the arbitrator on 24.6.1993."  There is nothing on the record to show that any such  notice was issued by the Court regarding the filing of  the award. The endorsement made by the additional  government pleader on the award which was later on  filed by the arbitrator in the court, did not relieve the  court of its mandatory obligation to issue the notice,  orally or in writing, to the appellant or its counsel to file  the objections, if any, to the award. The endorsement  made by the additional government pleader is of no  consequence in so far as the issuance of notice by the  Court under Section 14(2) is concerned. Computing the  period of 30 days with effect from 13.7.93 no award  could be made a rule of the Court before the expiry of  the period of 30 days from that date. Not filing of any  objections to the memo by 31.7.93, could not take away  the statutory right of the appellants to file objections to  the award within a period of 30 days commencing from  13.7.1993. Under these circumstances, the order of the  trial court as well as the impugned order dated  12.7.1995 of the learned Single Judge of the High court  cannot be sustained and the same are hereby set aside.  This appeal consequently succeeds and is allowed."

8.      Ch. Ramalinga Reddy vs. Superintending Engineer  and Another, (1999) 9 SCC 610 (3 Judges)                 In this case, this Court held thus: "3.The award was made on 29-7-1985.  It was sent by  the arbitrator to the Court on 31-7-1985 and was

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received by the Court at 12 noon on 5-8-1985.  It is the  case of the appellant that his advocate informed the  Additional Government Pleader in writing of the receipt  of the award on 5-8-1985.  On 7-8-1985, the Court  issued notice of the award and it was received by the  respondents on 10-8-1985.  The petition to challenge  the award was filed by the respondents on 6-9-1985.  

6. Section 14(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, requires  arbitrators or umpires to give notice in writing to the  parties of the making and signing of the award.  Section  14(2) requires the court, after the filing of the award, to  give notice to the parties of the filing of the award.  The  difference in the provisions of the two sub-sections with  respect to the giving of notice is significant and  indicates clearly that the notice which the court is to  give to the parties of the filing of the award need not be  a notice in writing.  The notice can be given orally. (See  Nilkantha Sidramappa Ningashetti v. Kashinath  Somanna Ningashetti.)  In Indian Rayon Corpn. Ltd. v.  Raunaw and Co. (P) Ltd. it was held that the fact that  parties have notice of the filing of the award is not  enough.  The notice must be served by the court.  There  must be (a) filing of the award in the proper court; (b)  service of the notice by the court or its office to the  parties concerned; and (c) such notice need not  necessarily be in writing.  It is upon the date of service  of such notice that the period of limitation begins for an  application for setting aside the award.  

9. It will be noted that it was held that it did not lie in  the mouth of the party who had filed the award in court  through his advocate to contend that he did not have  knowledge of the filing of the award and he could not  contend that it was only the subsequent date upon  which the Court issued notice that was the starting  point of limitation.  This judgment, as the passage  quoted indicates, does not in any way dilute what was  laid down in the cases of Nilkantha Sidramappa  Ningashetti and Indian Rayon Corpn. Ltd., indeed, it  could not, for those were decisions of a larger and a  coordinate Bench, respectively.  The judgment holds  only that a party who has filed the award in court  through his advocate is estopped from contending that,  so far as he is concerned also, the period of limitation to  challenge the award begins only when the court issues  notice in respect of its filing.  The ratio of the judgment  has, therefore, no application to the facts of the case  before us."     

9.      Deo Narain Choudhary vs. Shree Narain Choudhary,  (2000) 8 SCC 626.         In the above judgment, this Court held that notice  regarding filing of the award must be some act of court even  though it need not be in writing but intimation by the  arbitrator is not sufficient for the purpose of Section 14(2).   Dismissing the appeal, this Court held that the period of  limitation under Article 119 of the Limitation Act, 1963 will  start running from the date the notice has been given by the  court under Section 14(2) of the Act. This Court in para 16  held thus: "16. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law  that the notice need not be in writing and can be oral.  However all the authorities clearly lay down that the  notice must be some act of the Court. The proposition

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that a notice must be by the Court is also confirmed by  an authority of this Court in the case of Ch. Ramalinga  Reddy v. Superintending Engineer reported in (1999) 9  S.C.C. 610. In this case "it has been held that mere  intimation by an Arbitrator is not sufficient and it is the  Court which has to given notice." 10.     East India Hotels Ltd. vs. Agra Development  Authority, (2001) 4 SCC 175         In this case, this Court held thus: "10. From a perusal of the above provision, shorn of  unnecessary details, it is clear that notice under sub- section (2) of Section 14 of the Act need not be in writing  and that it can also be oral. What is essential is that  there must be service of notice or intimation or  communication of the filing of the award to the parties,  mode of service of such a notice being immaterial. But  such information, communication and knowledge must  be by or pursuant to order of the court. However, after  filing of an award by the arbitrator or the Umpire in the  court, if it merely records the presence of the parties or  their counsel but does not indicate that notice of filing  of the award be given to the parties, no service of notice  can be attributed from that fact, as notice must be  referable to an act of the court."

11.    Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. vs. L.K. Ahuja, (2004) 5 SCC  109         In this case, this Court held thus:      "If there is no material to show that a notice of filing of  the award has ever been given to the parties, any period  of limitation as prescribed in Article 119(b) loses its  significance.  The law is clearly to the effect that mere  knowledge of passing of an award is not enough.  The  period of limitation will commence as provided in Article  119(b) of the Limitation Act only upon notice as to filing  of the award in the court being given to the parties  concerned.  

       In the present case the situation has arisen with  very special features.  The Supreme Court made an  order appointing a new arbitrator who was directed to  file an award in the Court and he submitted the award  in court after publishing the same to the parties.   Though on 18-02-2002 the Registry notified the  submission of the award in court by way of an office  report, but the same cannot be treated to be in the  nature of a notice.  The noting made by the Registry in  the office report merely brought to the notice of the  Court as to what had transpired and as the matter was  being listed before the Court, a copy was served upon  the parties concerned.  It is only thereafter it can be  said that the Court directed issue of notice to the  parties regarding filing of the award which has been  sent by the Registry.  The Registry on its own could not  have issued a notice without a direction from the Court  in this regard.  Therefore there was no notice of filing of  the award in the Court to the parties as contemplated in  Article 119(b) of the Limitation Act.  Further, on 11-3- 2002 when the matter was listed before the Court, the  parties concerned took notice of the same and  thereafter, objections have been filed by the parties on  11-4-2002.  The plea based on limitation is therefore  liable to be rejected."                   In the instant case, the impugned judgment has been

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passed without appreciating the factual difference in the  present case and the set of facts leading to the dictum laid  down in F.C.I. vs. E. Kuttappan (supra).  The dictum laid  down therein is not applicable to the facts and circumstances  of the case on hand.  The factual difference in F.C.I. vs. B.  Kuttappan (supra) and the present case are explained as  under:-

Facts of Food Corporation of  India vs. B. Kuttappan  Facts of the present case

The respondent therein moved  an application before the  Arbitrator requesting him to  forward the award to his  advocate for filing the same in  Court.  

No application is made by the  Petitioner requesting the  Arbitrator to file the award.   The Arbitrators themselves  forwarded the letter along with  the affidavit requesting the  Counsel to file the Award.

Filing of the Award was done  at the instance of the  Respondent herein and on its  express request.  

The Filing of the award is  done at the instance of the  Arbitrator and not at the  instance of the Petitioner.   M/s Little & Co. was acting as  the agent of the Arbitrator.   When it did the ministerial act  of filing the award in the  Court as requested by the  Arbitrator.  

 In view of the aforesaid difference in the facts and  circumstances, the dictum laid down in F.C.I. vs. B. Kuttappan  (supra) cannot be applied to the present case.  

       In our view, the High Court has failed to follow the  dictum laid down by this Court in Deo Narain Choudhary vs.  Shree Narain Choudhary (supra) and Ch. Ramalinga  Reddy vs. superintending Engineer (supra).

       This Court has expressly laid down that notice regarding  filing of Award must be given to the Court by some act of  court.  The letter of Prothonotary and Senior Master cannot be  regarded as an act of court.  This Court also conclusively laid  down in the aforesaid case that mere intimation from one  party to the other of the filing of the Award cannot be  construed as notice in terms of Section 14(2) of the Act.   Hence, in our view, the intimation from the Prothonotary  seeking address of the parties for the purpose of issuance of  notice cannot be characterized as notice in terms of Section  14(2).

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       We have already said that the dictum laid down in  Kuttappan’s case (supra) was not applicable to the facts of the  present case.  At the time of filing of the Award M/s Little &  Co. was not acting as representative of the appellant as  admitted by the respondent in para 5 of the counter affidavit.   The Arbitrator had caused the Award to be filed through M/s  Little & Co.  The aforesaid categorical admission cannot,  therefore, be ignored or brushed aside.  

       For the foregoing reasons, we hold that objections to the  Award filed by the appellant on 12.06.1996 was not barred by  time.  We, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order  passed by the High Court in Appeal No. 321 of 1997 affirming  the judgment passed by the learned single Judge dismissing  the arbitration petition under Sections 30 and 33 of the Act,  1940 on the ground of limitation under Article 119 of the  Limitation Act.   

       During the pendency of the special leave petition in this  court on 05.05.2006, this Court directed the Prothonotary and  Senior Master, High Court, Bombay to invest the sum of       Rs. 2,36,29,954/- in fixed deposit in a Nationalized Bank.  The  Prothonotary and Senior Master is directed to keep the said  fixed deposit in force till the disposal of the arbitration petition  No. 260 of 1996 in Award No. 98 of 1996 by the High Court.   The appellant is at liberty to file his objections to the award  passed by the arbitrator and the High Court.  The High Court  is requested to dispose off the arbitration petition which was  filed in the year 1996 within 3 months from today.  No costs.