http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 5  

PETITIONER: NRISINGHA MURARI CHAKRABORTY & ORS

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF WEST BENGAL

DATE OF JUDGMENT12/04/1977

BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. BENCH: SHINGAL, P.N. CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. GOSWAMI, P.K.

CITATION:  1977 AIR 1174            1977 SCR  (3) 521  1977 SCC  (3)   7

ACT:         Indian Penal Code 1860--Sec. 415-420--whether Passport is  a         Property-Meaning of property.

HEADNOTE:             The appellants were charged under section 420 read  with         section  120B  of the Indian Penal Code on the  ground  that         there  was  a conspiracy between them as a result  of  which         hundreds  of applications were filed for the issue of  pass-         ports.   The applications were made by suppressing the  real         facts about the .nationality and addresses of the applicants         and  by  making false representations in several  other  re-         spects.  The prosecution alleged that hundreds of  passports         were  issued and delivered to persons who were not  entitled         to  have  them  under the law.  Special  Leave  was  granted         limited to the question whether the passports were  property         within the meaning of section 420 of the  Indian Penal code.         Dismissing the appeal,             HELD:  1. A passport is a document which by  its  nature         and  purpose is a political document for the benefit Of  its         holder.   It  recognises  him as a citizen  of  the  country         granting  it and is in the nature of a request to the  other         country for his free passage there.  [522-C]            Satwant  Singh Sawhney v.D. Ramarathnam (1967) 3 SCR  525         refered to;             Ahayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar (1962) 2 SCR  241         followed;             Queen Empress v.  Appasami (1889) I.L.R. 12 Mad. 151 and         Queen  Empress  v. Sashi Bhushan (1893) I.L.R. 15  All.  210         approved;          Ishwarlal  Girdharilal Parekh v. State of  Maharashtra  and         Other (1969) 1 SCR 13 followed.             In  re  Packianathan A.I.R. 1920 Mad. 131(1)  and  Local         Government v. Ganga Ram A.I.R. 1922 Nagpur 229 approved.         2. The word ’property’ is defined as the right to the use or         enjoyment  or the beneficial right of disposal  of  anything         that can be the subject of ownership, specially ownership of         tangible things.  Passport is a tangible thing and is  capa-         ble  of ownership.  It is the property of the State so  long         as  it  is with the passport issuing authority and  has  not         been  issued  to the person concerned, and  after  issue  it

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 2 of 5  

       becomes  the  property  of the person to whom  it  has  been         granted. Passport can be the subject of ownership or  exclu-         sive possession and is therefore property within the meaning         of sections 415 and 420 I.P.C.  [523 A-C, 524 G]

JUDGMENT:             CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 277         of 1971.             Appeal  by  Special Leave from the  Judgment  and  Order         dated the 23rd June, 1971 of the Calcutta High Court in Crl.         A. No. 45 of 1964.              P.K. Chatterjee and Rathin Das for the Appellants.             D.N. Mukherjee and G.S. Chatterjee for Respondents.            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by            SHINGHAL,  J.--This appeal by special leave  is  directed         against  the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated  June         23,  1971,  upholding the conviction of the  appellants  for         offences  under sections 420 and 420/120B of the Penal  Code         but reducing their sentences.  The charge related to  cheat-         ing the passport issuing authority of the Hooghly         522         district  by dishonestly inducing him to issue passports  on         the basis of false representations.  This Court has  limited         the special leave to the question whether the passports were         "property"  within the meaning of section 420 of  the  Penal         Code ?             Speaking broadly, the allegation against the  appellants         was  that there was a conspiracy between them as a result of         which  1480 applications were filed for the issue  of  pass-         ports from July, 1956 to April, 1957, by Muslims and Chinese         nationals.   These applications  were alleged to  have  been         made  by suppressing the real facts  about  the  nationality         and addresses of the applicants, and by making false  repre-         sentations  in  several  other  respects.   The  prosecution         alleged  that  hundreds of passports were  thus  issued  and         delivered to persons who were not entitled to them under the         law.    Some of the appellants were alleged to  be  directly         concerned  with  those  applications, and   it  was  further         alleged  that  the  orders of the  Passport  Authority  were         obtained by dishonest inducement and false representation.             A  passport is a document which, by its nature and  pur-         pose, is a political document for the benefit of its holder.         It  recognises  him as a citizen of the country granting  it         and  is in the nature of a request to the other country  for         his free passage there.  Its importance was examined by this         Court  in Satwant Singh Sawhney v.  D.  Ramarathnam(1)  with         reference  to the provisions of the Indian  Passport  (Entry         Into India) Act, 1920, (hereinafter referred to as the  Act)         and  the  Rules made thereunder which were in force  at  the         time when  the offences were said to have been committed  in         this case.  After referring to sections  3 and 4 of the Act,         and  rules  4  and 5 of the Rules, this  Court  observed  as         follows,--                             "    ......   possession  of   passport,                       whatever  may be its meaning or legal  effect,                       is  a necessary requisite for   leaving  India                       for travelling abroad.  The argument that  the                       Act .does not impose the taking of a  passport                       as  a condition of exit from India,  therefore                       it  does not interfere with the  right  of   a                       person  to leave India, if we may say  so,  is                       rather  hypertechnical and ignores the  reali-                       ties  of the situation.  Apart from  the  fact

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 3 of 5  

                     that  possession  of passport is  a  necessary                       condition  of  travel  in  the   international                       community,   the  prohibition  against   entry                       indirectly  prevents the person from   leaving                       India. The State in fact tells a person living                       in India ’you can leave India at your pleasure                       without  a  passport,  but you  would  not  be                       allowed  by  foreign countries to  enter  them                       without  it and you cannot also come  back  to                       India  without  it.’ No person  in  India  can                       possibly  travel on those conditions.   Indeed                       it  is  impossible  for him to  do  so.   That                       apart,  even that theoretical  possibility  of                       exit  is  expressly  restricted  by  executive                       instructions  and  by refusal  of  foreign-ex-                       change."’         There can therefore be no doubt that a passport is a   docu-         ment  of importance for travel abroad and is of considerable         value to its holder.         (1) [1967] 3 S.C.R. 525.         523             The  word  "property" has been defined in  the  Century,         Dictionary,  which  is  an  encyclopedic   lexicon   of  the         English language,  as follows,--                             "the  right to the use or  enjoyment  or                       the  beneficial fight of disposal of  anything                       that  can be the subject of ownership;  owner-                       ship; estate; especially, ownership of  tangi-                       ble  things       .....: anything that may  be                       exclusively  possessed  and  enjoyed;    .....                       possessions."          As  has been stated, a passport provides the several  bene-         fits mentioned above.  It is a tangible thing and is capable         of   ownership.  There can therefore be no doubt that it  is         "property".   It is property of the State so long as  it  is         with the passport issuing authority and has  not been issued         to  the  person concerned and, after issue, it  becomes  the         property of the person to whom it has.been granted.             Our attention has not been invited to any case where the         question now before us arose for consideration on an earlier         occasion.  But a somewhat similar question was considered by         this  Court in Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar  (1).         The  appellant  there applied to the  Patna  University  for         permission  to appear at .the M.A. examination as a  private         candidate,  representing that he was a graduate  having  ob-         tained  the B.A. degree in 1951 and had been teaching  in  a         school. On that basis, an admission card was despatched  for         him  to the Headmaster of the school.  It was however  found         that he was neither a graduate nor a teacher.  He was prose-         cuted for the  offence ’under section 420 read with  section         511 of the Penal Code.  He contended that his conviction was         unsustainable  because the admission card had  no  pecuniary         value and was not property.  This Court repelled the conten-         tion  and held that although the admission card as such  had         no  pecuniary value, it had immense value to  the  candidate         appearing in the examination for he could not have  appeared         at  the  examination without it, and that it  was  therefore         property  within  the meaning of section 415  of  the  Penal         Code.  While reaching that conclusion,  this Court relied on         Queen  Empress  v. Appasami (2) and Queen Empress  v.  Sashi         Bhushan.(3) In Appasami’s case it was held that the   ticket         entitling  the  accused to enter the  examination  room  was         "property",  and  in Sashi Bhushan’s case it was  held  that         the  term  "property" included a written certificate to  the         effect  that the accused had attended a course  of  lectures

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 4 of 5  

       and had paid up his fees.  On a parity of reasoning, we have         no doubt that looking to the importance and  characteristics         of  a  passport,  the High Court rightly held  that  it  was         property  within the meaning of sections 415 and 420 of  the         Penal Code.             We  may make a reference to Ishwarlal Girdharlal  Parekh         v.  State  of Maharashtra and others (4) also.    There  the         question  for consideration was whether an order of  assess-         ment was "property"  within  the         (1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 241.     (2) [1889] I.L.R. 12 Mad.  151.         (3) [1893] I.L.R. 15 All. 210.  (4) [1969] 1 S.C.R. 193.         524            meaning  of section 420 I.P.C.  The charge in  that  case         was that the    appellant dishonestly or fradulently induced         the income-tax authorities  and obtainer an assessment order         for less income-tax than due.  It  was held that .the  order         of  assessment  received by an   assessee   was  "property",         since  it was of great importance to the assessee,  as  con-         taining a computation, of his total assessable income   and,         as   containtion   or  his  tax   liability.    This   Court         also  expressed  the view that the word  "property"  did not         necessarily   expressed that the  thing, of  which  delivery         was  dishonestly desired by the  person  who  cheats,  "must         have  a  money value or a market value, in the hand  of  the         person cheated".  It was held that "even if the thing has no         money value, in the hand of the person cheated, but  becomes         a   thing  of value, in the hand of the person, who may  get         possession  of it as a  result of the cheating practised  by         him,  it would still fall within  the   connotation  of  the         term  ’property’ in section 420 I.P.C." This decision   also         lends  support  to the view we have taken for, as  has  been         stated, a passport is a valuable document.           Our  attention  has also been invited to In  re  Packiana-         than(1)  and  Local Government v. Gangaram.(2)  The  accused         in  Packianathan’s case was prosecuted for an offence  under         section 419 read with section 511 of the Penal Code.  He was         going to Ceylon, and he used  the permit which stood in  the         name of one Kumarswami, while his  own name was J. Packiana-         than.   On seeing the permit the  Health  Officer  issued  a         health certificate.  It was held that the health certificate         was  "property"  within the meaning of section  415  of  the         Penal Code and that if a person dishonestly and fraudulently         induced  the    Health Officer to deliver it to him, he  was         guilty of an offence under  section 419 I.P.C. Local Govern-         ment  v. Gangaram was a case where  the accused  obtained  a         certificate  from  the   Deputy  Inspector   of  Schools  by         stating untruly that he had passed the examination.  It  was         held that the certificate was ’property’ within the  meaning         of  sections 415 and 420 I.P.C.  and that the   accused  was         guilty   of an offence  punishable under section 420  I.P.C.         In  taking that view the Nagpur High Court relied  on  Queen         Empress  v.  Appasami (supra) and Queen  Empress  v.   Sashi         Bhushan (supra) on which reliance was placed by  this  Court         in   Abhayanand  Mishra  v.  The State  of  Bihar    (Supra)         referred to above.              So  as  passport  was  a  tangible  thing,  and  was  a         useful.document,  and could be the subject of  ownership  or         exclusive  possession, it was "property" within the  meaning         of  sections 415 and 420 I.P.C. There is  therefore  nothing         wrong  with the view which has been taken by the High  Court         and the appeal is hereby dismissed.  The appellants who  are         on bail shall surrender to serve out the remaining sentence.         P.H.P.                                   Appeal dismissed.         (1) A.I.R. 3920 Mad. 131 (1)         (2) A.I.R. 1922 Nagpur 229.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 5 of 5  

       525