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PETITIONER: NORTHERN INDIA CATERERS PRIVATE LTD., & ANR.

       Vs.

RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/04/1967

BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. BENCH: SHELAT, J.M. RAO, K. SUBBA (CJ) HIDAYATULLAH, M. BACHAWAT, R.S. VAIDYIALINGAM, C.A.

CITATION:  1967 AIR 1581            1967 SCR  (3) 399  CITATOR INFO :  RF         1972 SC2205  (6,11,12,24,28,29)  RF         1973 SC  66  (5)  RF         1973 SC1425  (14)  RF         1973 SC2246  (12)  O          1974 SC2009  (2,TO6,7,16,20,23,25,26,7,30,3  NF         1974 SC2044  (1,3)  O          1975 SC1187  (16,81)  RF         1977 SC 366  (15)  R          1979 SC1588  (12)  E          1980 SC 801  (3,6)  R          1980 SC1144  (3)  RF         1980 SC1438  (13)  RF         1981 SC 670  (8)  RF         1982 SC 781  (5)  RF         1983 SC 658  (13)  O          1985 SC 930  (1)  RF         1989 SC 406  (5)  R          1991 SC 855  (7)

ACT: Punjab Public Premises and Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act (31 of 1959), s. 5-Scope of -If Violates Art. 14 of  the Constitution.

HEADNOTE: The  respondent-State leased its premises to  the  appellant for  running a hotel and when the lease expired called  upon the  appellant  to  hand over  vacant  possession.   On  the appellant  failing to do so, the Collector issued  a  notice under s. 4 of the Punjab Public Premises and Land  (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, 1959 requiring the appellant to show cause why an order of eviction should not be passed under s. 5. The appellant thereupon filed a writ petition in the High Court  contending  that  the Act violated  Art.  14  of  the Constitution in two ways : (1) that it discriminated between the  occupants  of  public  premises  and  those  of   other premises;   and  (2)  that  it  discriminated  between   the occupants  of  public premises inter se as the  State  could arbitrarily proceed against an occupant either under the Act

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or  by way of suit.  The High Court dismissed  the  petition holding  that the proceeding under the Act is the  exclusive remedy  for  eviction of unauthorised  occupants  of  public premises, that there was a valid classification between  the occupiers   of   public  premises  and  those   of   private properties,  and that, as the Act was substitutive  and  not supplemental there wag no question of discrimination between the occupiers of public premises inter se. In appeal to this Court, HELD  :  (1) The High Court erred in holding  that  the  Act impliedly  took  away the right of suit by  the  Government. The Act was only intended to provide an additional remedy to the  Government which was speedier than the one by way of  a suit under the ordinary law of eviction. [404G; 41 1B] (Per  Subba Rao, C. J., Shelat and Vaidialingam, JJ.) :  The impugned Act is neither in negative terms nor in such  terms which result in negativing the right of the Government as  a landlord  to sue for eviction under. the ordinary law.   Nor is it possible to say that the co-existence of the two  sets of  provisions relating to eviction under the  ordinary  law and under the Act, leads to any inconvenience or  absurdity. The impugned Act deals with the Government’s right to  evict the occupants and tenants of public premises, but that fact, by  itself  would  not  lead  to  the  inference  that   the Legislature intended to take away the Government’s right  to file a suit for eviction.     [404C-E] (Per Hidayatullah  and  Bachawat, JJ.) : The  Act  does  not create a new right of    eviction. it creates an  additional remedy  for a right existing under the general law and  does not repeal the ordinary law giving the remedy of a suit  for                      eviction. [41 1C] (2)  By  Full Court : There is an  intelligible  differentia between  the two classes of occupiers, namely, occupiers  of public  property  and  premises and  other  occupiers.   The classification  has a -reasonable relation to the object  of the  Act  and does not offend Art. 14.  The two  classes  of occupiers are not similarly situated in that, in the case of public  properties and premises, the members of  the  public have a vital interest in seeing that such properties 400 and  premises are freed from encroachment  and  unauthorised occupation as speedily as possible; and the impugned Art has properly devised a special machinery for the speedy recovery of premises belonging to the Government. [406C-D; 412C-9] Babu  Rao  Shantaram More v. The Bombay  Housing  Board  and another, [1954] S.C.R. 572, followed. (3)  (Per  Subba  Rao,  C.  J.,  Shelat  and   Vaidialingam, JJ.)Sectioii 5 of the Act confers an additional remedy  over and above the remedy by way of ,suit.  The section  violates Art.  14  by  providing  two  alternative  remedies  to  the Government  and in leaving it to the unguided discretion  of the Collector to resort to one or the other and to pick  and choose some of those in occupation of public properties  and premises  for the application of the more drastic  procedure under s. 5. [409F-G] Discrimination  Would  result  if there  are  two  available procedures  one  more drastic or prejudicial  to  the  party concerned  than  the other and which can be applied  at  the arbitrary  will of the authority.  Assuming that persons  in occupation  of  government properties and  premises  form  a class  by  themselves as against tenants  and  occupiers  of private  owned  properties and that such  classification  is justified  on  the ground that they require  a  differential treatment  in  public  interest those who  fall  under  that classification   are  entitled  to  equal  treatment   among

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themselves. [409B-D] State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali, [1952] S.C.R. 284,  Suraj Mull Mohta v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri, [1955] 1 S C.R.  448, Shree  Meenakshi  Mills Ltd., Madurai v. A.  V.  Visvanathan Sastri,  [1955]  1  S.C.R.  787 and  Banarasi  Das  v.  Cane Commissioner,  U.P.  [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 760  A.I.R.  1963 S.C. 1417, followed. (Per  Hidayatullah  and  Bachawat,  JJ.  dissenting)  :  The impugned  Act  makes  no  unjust  discrimination  among  the occupants  of government properties inter se.   It  promotes public  welfare and is a beneficial measure of  legislation. [414D-E] The   impugned  Act  is  not  unfair  or  oppressive.    The unauthorised  occupant has full opportunity of  being  heard and  of producing his evidence before the Collector; he  may obtain a review of the Collector’s order by an appeal to the Commissioner  and  in appropriate cases ask for  a  writ  of certiorari  from  the High Court.  He is  not  denied  equal protection of the laws merely because the Government has the option of proceeding against him either by way of a suit  or under  the  Act.   An unauthorised  occupant  has  no  cons- itutional right to dictate that the Govrnment should have no choice  of proceedings.  The argument based upon the  option of  the  Government  to file a suit is  unreal,  because  in practice,  the Government is not likely to institute a  suit in a case when it can seek relief under the Act. [414B-D] Kanasari Haldar- & Another v. State of West Bengal, [1960] 2 S.C.R.  646; Shanti prasad v. The Director  of  Enforcement, [1963]  2  S.C.R. 297, 303-304.  Seth Banarsi Dass  v.  Cane Commissioner,  U.P.  [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 760  and  Arizona Copper  Co. v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400 63 L.Ed. 1058,  referred to. Suraj Mull Mohta & Co. v. A. V. Visvanatha Sastri [1955] 1 S C.R. 448, 466, explained.

JUDGMENT: CIVIL  APPELLATE  JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal  No.  1101  of 1965. Appeal from the judgment and order dated January 22, 1963 of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ No. 16 of 1960. 401 A. K. Sen and Ravinder Narain, for the appellants. Gopal Singh and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents. The  Judgment of SUBBA RAO, C.J., SHELAT  AND  VAIDIALINGAM, JJ.,  was delivered by SHELAT, J. The dissenting Opinion  of HIDAYATULLAH and BACHAWAT JJ., was delivered by BACHAWAT, J. Shelat, J. This appeal, by certificate, is directed  against the  judgment  and  order  of  the  High  Court  of   Punjab dismissing  the appellants’ writ petition  which  challenged the  validity  of  the  Punjab  Public  Premises  and   Land (Eviction and Rent Recovery) Act, XXXI of 1959. In or about September, 1953, the State of Punjab leased  the "Mount  View  Hotel" at Chandigarh to the appellants  for  a period of six years commencing from September 24, 1953 at an annual  rent  of Rs. 72,000/- subsequently  reduced  to  Rs. 50,0001-.  The deed of lease of the said Hotel, however, was drawn  up and executed on May 21, 1959.  On or about  August 27,  1959, the Government offered to sell the said Hotel  to the  appellants  at a price of Rs. 12,00,000/-.   Since  the appellants  did  not  accept the said  offer  the  same  was withdrawn  and as the said period of six years had  by  that time  expired, the Government called upon the appellants  to hand  over vacant possession on or before January  1,  1960.

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On  January  1,  1960, the  Estate  Officer  and  Collector, Capital  Project,  Chandigarh served the appellants  with  a notice alleging that their occupation of the said Hotel  had become  unauthorised  after December 31, 1959  and  required them  under  s.  4 of the Act to show  cause  on  or  before January  11, 1960 as to why an order of eviction should  not be  passed against them.  The appellants, in  the  meantime, filed  the writ petition in the High Court and  obtained  an interim stay against any order of eviction. The appellants contended in the High Court (1) that the  Act discriminated  between the occupants of public premises  and those of private property and also discriminated between the former  inter  se and, therefore, infringed their  right  of equality  before law and equal protection under Art.  14  of the Constitution, (2) that the Act infringed their tight  to property,  (3) that the procedure laid down in s. 5  of  the Act infringed rules of natural justice and (4) that the said notice  was  invalid as it did not give ten  clear  days  as required  by  s.  4(2)  (b) of  the  Act.   The  High  Court negatived  contentions  2,  3 and 4. As  regards  the  first contention, it held that as appearing from the preamble, the object  and the provisions of the Act, the  Act  substituted the remedy of the Government of eviction as a landlord under the  ordinary  law,  i,e. that by reason  of  the  Act,  the Government could only resort to the remedy under the Act and not by way of a suit for eviction and that the Act impliedly did away with the Government’s right to sue under the  Civil Procedure Code in respect of public pro- 402 perties and premises, that there was a valid  classification between  the  occupiers  of public  premises  and  those  of private  property and that as the Act was  substitutive  and not  supplemental  there was no question  of  discrimination also between the occupiers of public premises inter se.  The High  Court,  however, agreed that if the  Act  furnished  a ’supplemental’   and  not  a  ’substitutive’   remedy,   the contention  as to discrimination would be one of  substance. The reasons for holding that the Act impliedly repealed  the ordinary  law of eviction in respect of public property  and premises,  were  that the Act covered  the  entire  subject- matter of law relating to eviction, that the two laws  could not  have  been intended to exist simultaneously,  that  the preamble  and the provisions of the Act lent  themselves  to the deduction that it was intended to substitute the general law  of eviction as applicable to public premises, that  the object  of the Act was to discard the  cumbersome  procedure under  the  ordinary law involving delay and  to  provide  a special  and  speedier  remedy and lastly  that  though  the absence  of express words of repeal may raise a  presumption that the pre-existing law was not repealed that  presumption was  offset  by a comparison of the two  laws  which  demon- strated the legislative intent to supplant the ordinary law. Counsel  for the appellants contended that  the  conclusions reached by the High Court were erroneous. Before  we proceed to examine them it is necessary  to  read the relevant provisions of the Act.  The objects and reasons given  for the enactment of the Act (as quoted by  the  High Court) were that there was no provision in the Land  Revenue Act  or  in any other Act providing for summary  removal  of unauthorised  encroachments on or occupation  of  Government and  Nazul  properties  including  agricultural  lands   and residential  buildings and sites and for recovery  of  rent, that  the only procedure available to Government was to  sue the party concerned in a civil court which was a  cumbersome procedure  involving  delay and that therefore to  keep  all

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Government  owned lands whether put to agricultural or  non- agricultural  use  free  from  encroachments  and   unlawful possessions, it was necessary to provide a speedy machinery. The preamble of the Act declares that the Act was passed  to provide  for eviction of unauthorised occupants from  public premises  and for certain incidental matters.  Section 3  of the  Act  provides that a person shall be deemed  to  be  in unauthorised occupation of any public premises, where  being a  lessee,  he has, by reason of the  determination  of  his lease,  ceased  to be entitled to keep or hold  such  public premises.   Section 4 provides that if the Collector  is  of opinion  that  any person is in unauthorised  occupation  of public  premises  and that he should be  evicted,  be  shall issue  a notice in writing calling upon such person to  show cause  why an order of eviction should not be  passed.   The notice shall specify the grounds on which the 403 order  of eviction is proposed to be made and  require  such person to show cause on or before such date being a date not earlier  than  10  days  from the  date  of  issue  thereof. Section  5 provides that if after considering the cause  and the  evidence produced by such person and after  giving  him reasonable  opportunity  of being heard,  the  Collector  is satisfied  that  the  public premises  are  in  unauthorised occupation  he ’may make an order of eviction’.   Section  7 empowers the Collector to recover rent in arrears and assess and recover damages in respect of public premises as arrears of  land revenue.  Section 9 provides an appeal  against  an order  of  the  Collector  under s. 5 or  s.  7  before  the Commissioner.  Section 10 confers finality to the order made by  the Collector or the Commissioner and such order  cannot be called in question in any suit, application or  execution proceedings. We will first consider the High Court’s conclusion as to im- plied  repeal of the Government’s remedy of  eviction  under the ordinary law.  The rule of construction is that where  a statute  provides in express terms that its  enactment  will repeal  an earlier Act by reason of its  inconsistency  with such  earlier  Act, the latter may be treated  as  repealed. Even  where  the latter Act does not  contain  such  express words, if the co-existence of the two sets of provisions  is destructive  of  the object with which the  latter  Act  was passed,  the  Court  would treat the  earlier  provision  as impliedly repealed.  A latter Act which confers a new  right would repeal an earlier right if the fact of the two  rights co-existing together produces inconvenience, for, in such  a case it is legitimate to infer that the legislature did  not intend  such  a consequence.  If the two  Acts  are  general enactments and the latter of the two is couched in  negative terms,  the  inference  would be that the  earlier  one  was impliedly  repealed.   Even  if the  latter  statute  is  in affirmative  terms,  it  is  often  found  to  involve  that negative  which  makes it fatal to  the  earlier  enactment. Thus s. 40 of the Requirements of Fines and Recoveries  Act, 1833, which empowered a married woman to dispose of land  by deed  which  she held in fee, provided she did so  with  the concurrence  of  her husband and by deed  acknowledged,  was held to have been impliedly repealed by the Married  Women’s Property Act, 1882 which authorised her in general terms  to dispose of all real property as if she were a feme  sole(1). But  repeal  by  implication is not  generally  favoured  by courts.  Farwell, J. following such disinclination  observed in  Re. Chance ( 2 ) that "if it is possible, it is my  duty to  read the section as not to effect an implied  repeal  of the  earlier Act".  Maxwell on Interpretation  of  Statutes,

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11th Ed., p. 162 remarks : "A sufficient Act ought not to be held  to  be  repealed by implication  without  some  strong reason.  It is a reasonable presumption that the legislature did  not intend to keep really contradictory  enactments  on the (1) Re. Drummond [1891] 1 Ch. 524. L5 Sup C. I./67-13 (2) 1936 Ch. 266, 27 404 Statute Book, or, on the other hand, to effect so  important a  measure  as  the repeal of a law  without  expressing  an intention  to do so.  Such an interpretation, therefore,  is not  to  be adopted unless it be inevitable.   A  reasonable construction  which offers an escape from it is more  likely to  be  in consonance with the real  intention."  The  well- settled  rule  of  construction  is  that  when  the  latter enactment  is  worded  in  affirmative  terms  without   any negative  it  does  not impliedly repeal  the  earlier  law. "What words", observed Dr. Lushington, in The India, (1) (as quoted  in  Craies  on  Statute  Law,  6th  Ed.  371)  "will establish  a repeal by implication it is impossible  to  say from  authority  or  decided cases ....  The  prior  statute would, I conceive, be repealed by implication if its  provi- sions were wholly incompatible with a subsequent one; or  if the  two  statutes  together would  lead  to  wholly  absurd consequences;  or  if the entire subject-matter  were  taken away  by  the  subsequent statute".   The  impugned  Act  is neither in negative terms nor in such terms which result  in negativing the right of the Government as a landlord to  sue for eviction under the ordinary law.  Nor is it possible  to say  that  the co-existence of the two  sets  of  provisions relating  to  eviction lead to  inconvenience  or  absurdity which  the  legislature  would  be  presumed  not  to   have intended.   The  impugned  Act  no  doubt  deals  with   the Government’s  right  to evict the occupants and  tenants  of public premises.  In that sense it is an Act dealing with  a particular subject-matter, but that fact by itself would not lead to the inference that the legislature intended to  take away the Government’s right to file a suit for eviction.  As the reasons, and objects, relied on by the High Court,  show the legislature intended to provide an additional remedy  to the Government, a remedy which it thought was speedier  than the one by way of a suit under the ordinary law of eviction. In  our  view, there is nothing in the Act  to  warrant  the conclusion that it impliedly takes away the right of suit by Government  or that, therefore, it is substitutive  and  not supplemental.   Nor  is  it possible to  say  that  the  co- existence of the two remedies would cause such inconvenience or absurdity that the Court would be compelled to infer that the enactment of the Act resulted in an implied  deprivation of the Government’s right to sue in the ordinary courts.  In our  view,  the  High Court with respect  was  in  error  in holding  that there was an implied repeal only  because  the two  sets  of  provisions deal with  the  subject-matter  of eviction in respect of public premises. As aforesaid, the High Court was of the view that if the Act conferred  an  additional  remedy,  the  contention  as   to discrimination would have force.  The guarantee of  equality before  law  and equal protection under Art. 14  means  that there  should  be no discrimination between one  person  and another if as regards the 405 subject-matter  of  the legislation, their position  is  the same.  It is well-recognised, however, that the  legislature has  power  of  making special  laws  to  attain  particular

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objects  and for that purpose it has the power of  selection or classification of persons and things upon which such laws are  to  operate.  Such classification, however, has  to  be based on some real distinction bearing a just and reasonable relation.  The two tests laid down by this Court for a valid classification   are   that  it  must  be  founded   on   an intelligible  differentia which distinguishes those who  are grouped together from others and that differentia must  have a  rational  relation to the objects to be achieved  by  the Act.   When,  therefore, an enactment is challenged  on  the ground of discrimination, the Court must first ascertain the object  sought  to be achieved by the legislature  and  then apply  the  two  tests.  If the  tests  are  satisfied,  the classification cannot be held to be violative of Art. 14. In  Baburao Shantaram More v. The Bombay Housing  Board  and another(1),  section 4 of the Bombay Rents Act,  1947  which exempted certain public properties from the operation of the Act  was challenged on the ground that the exemption  caused discrimination between the tenants of the Housing Board  and the  rest of the tenants of private properties.  This  Court upheld  the  section  on  the  ground  that  there  was   an intelligible differentia which distinguished the tenants  of the  Board from the other tenants and that that  differentia had a rational nexus with the object of the Act.  The object of  the Act, it was observed, was to solve  the  residential accommodation to achieve which the Housing Board was set up. The  Board  was  not  actuated by  any  profit  motive  and, therefore,  there  was  no likelihood of  its  evicting  its tenants  for  the  purpose of unduly raising  the  rents  as private  landlords  were likely to do  taking  advantage  of dearth  of  accommodation.   This Court held  that  the  two classes  of tenants were not, therefore, similarly  situated and were not, by force of circumstances, placed on an  equal footing  and,  therefore, there was no  denial  of  equality before  law  or of .equal protection.  A modern State  in  a complex  and  growing society can no longer  content  itself with  performance  only of its traditional  activities.   To meet the manifold and variegated needs of society it has  to undertake   activities  of  considerable  diversity.    Such activities  now-a-days  range from supplying  the  elemental needs  of  its  citizens such as  housing,  importation  and distribution of food and clothes and other such  necessities to highly industralised and technocratic projects, which  it is said, the State alone can undertake.  In such  activities its citizens have a vital interest.  If a classification  is made  between  those who take advantage of  such  activities such  as accommodation and the rest it may be  difficult  to say  that there is not an intelligible  differentia  between the   two  or  that  there  is  no  relation  between   such differentia and the object (1)  [1954] S.C.R. 572. 406 of such legislation.  In such cases, if the law provides for differential treatment, it is possible to contend that it is justifiable  on  consideration  of  the  circumstances,  the object  and the policy of such legislation though  the  mere fact  that  it  is a Government-owned activity  may  not  by itself be sufficient. The objects and reasons of the impugned Act and its preamble indicate that the Act was passed to provide for eviction  of unauthorised occupants from public properties and  premises, and  to  keep  such properties free  from  encroachment  and unlawful possession and to provide a speedier machinery  for that  purpose as against the lengthy proceedings  under  the ordinary law of eviction involving delay.  The Act no  doubt

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differentiates  occupiers  of public property  and  premises from  other occupiers.  Nevertheless, it is possible to  say that  there is an intelligible differentia between  the  two classes  of occupiers, that they are not similarly  situated in  that in the case of public properties and  premises  the members  of  the  public  have  a  vital  interest  and  are interested  in seeing that such properties and premises  are freed  from  encroachment  and  unauthorised  occupation  as speedily  as possible.  It is also possible to contend  that such  classification  is  justified in that  it  is  in  the interest  of  the public that speedy recovery of  rents  and speedy  eviction of unauthorised occupiers is made  possible through the instrumentality of a speedier procedure  instead of  the  elaborate procedure by way of suit  involving  both expense  and  delay.   On these considerations,  it  may  be contended   that  the  segregation  of  tenants  of   public properties and premises from the tenants of private property is based on justifiable reason and that such segregation has a rational nexus with the object and policy of the Act. Assuming that such classification is valid, the complaint of the   appellants   is  that  s.  5  of  the  Act   makes   a discrimination   amongst  those  in  occupation  of   public properties   and   premises   inter   se   and   that   such discrimination  has no valid basis nor any reasonable  nexus with the object of the Act.  Under s. 4, if the Collector is of opinion that any person is in unauthorised occupation  of any public premises and that he should be evicted, he has to issue a notice calling upon such person to show cause why an order  of eviction should not be made.  Under s. 5,  if  the Collector  is  satisfied  that the public  premises  are  in unauthorised occupation he has the power to make an order of eviction  giving reasons therefore.  The contention is  that the  Government thus has two remedies open to it, one  under the   ordinary  law  and  the  other  a  drastic  and   more prejudicial  remedy under the present Act.  The  words  "the Collector  may make an order of eviction" in s. 5 show  that the section confers discretion to adopt the procedure  under ss. 4 and 5 or not.  Section 5 has left it to the discretion of  the Collector to make such an order in the case of  some of the tenants and not to make such an order against others. Section 5 thus enables the 407 Collector  to  discriminate against some by  exercising  his power  under  s.  5 and take proceedings by way  of  a  suit against  others,  both  the  remedies  being  simultaneously available to the Government.  There can be no doubt that  if the Collector were to proceed under ss. 4 and 5, the  remedy is  drastic  for a mere opinion by him that a person  is  in unauthorised occupation authorises him to issue a show cause notice and his satisfaction under s. 5 is sufficient for him to pass an order of eviction and then to recover under s.  7 rent  in arrears and damages which he may assess in  respect of such premises as arrears of land revenue.  Section 5 does not lay down any guiding principle or policy under which the Collector has to decide in which cases he should follow  one or  the  other  procedure  and,  therefore,  the  choice  is entirely left to his arbitrary will.  Consequently, s. 5  by conferring such unguided and absolute discretion  manifestly violates the right of equality guaranteed by Art. 14. It  is  well-settled  that  if a law  were  to  provide  for differential   treatment  for  amongst   persons   similarly situated,  it violates the equality clause of Art.  14.   In the  State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali,(1) s. 5 of the  W.B. Special  Courts Act, 1950 was challenged as infringing  Art. 14.  The majority judgment held that the procedure laid down

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for  trial by the Special Courts varied  substantially  from that laid down for the trial of offences generally under the Code of Criminal Procedure and that the Act did not classify or lay down any basis for classification of cases which  may be directed to be tried by the Special Courts but left it to the  uncontrolled  discretion  of the  State  Government  to direct  cases  which  it liked to be tried  by  the  Special Courts.   The  language  of s. 5(1) vested  the  State  with unrestricted discretion to direct any case or class of cases to be tried by the Special Courts, not a discretion to refer cases  where  it  is of opinion that  a  speedier  trial  is necessary.  The majority held that a rule of procedure  laid down  by law comes as much within the purview of Art. 14  as rules of substantive law and that it was necessary that  all litigants,  who  are similarly situated, are able  to  avail themselves of the same procedural rights for relief and  for defence with like protection and without discrimination.  If it  is  established  that the person  complaining  has  been discriminated against as a result of legislation and  denied equal privileges with others occupying the same position  it would be enough to make such a law violative of Art. 14.  In Suraj  Mall  Mohta v. A.  V. Visvanatha Sastri, (  2  )  the challenge  was  to  s.  5 (4) of  the  Taxation  and  Income (Investigation  Commission) Act, 1947.  The  contention  was that s. 5(4) gave arbitrary power to the Commission to  pick and  choose  the  evaders of income-tax  as  it  liked  and, therefore,  the  sub-section was  highly  discriminatory  in character.   This Court held that sub-s. (4) of s.  5  dealt with the same class of persons who fell within the ambit  of s. 34 of the Income-tax (1) [1952] S.C.R. 284. (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 448. 408 Act, 1922, that both s. 34 of the Income Tax Act and s. 5(4) of the Investigation Act dealt with persons who had  similar characteristics   and   similar   properties,   the   common characteristics  being  that they were persons who  had  not truly  disclosed  their  income and had  evaded  payment  of taxation  on  income, that the procedure prescribed  by  the Investigation  Act  was substantially more  prejudicial  and more  drastic to the assessee than the one under the  Income Tax  Act  and  that,  therefore, s. 5(4) in  so  far  as  it affected  persons proceeded against under  that  sub-section was a piece of discriminatory legislation and offended  Art. 14.  It appears that after that decision, Parliament amended s. 34 of the Income-tax Act providing for the cases of those very persons who originally fell within the ambit of s. 5(1) of the Investigation Act to be dealt with under the  amended s.  34 and under the procedure of the Income-tax Act.  As  a result  of the amendment both categories of  persons,  viz., those who came within the ambit of s. 5 (1) as well as those who came within the ambit of s. 34 of the Income-tax Act now formed  one class.  That being the effect of the  amendment, it was urged in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd., Madurai v. A. V. Visvanathasastri(1)  that  assuming  that  S.  5(1)  of  the Investigation  Act  was based on a  rational  classification that  classification had, because of the amendment of s.  34 become  void, as the classification which saved it from  the mischief of Art. 14 had become ineffective, its  distinctive characteristics  having  disappeared, and that  the  persons falling within the class defined in s. 5(1) now belonged  to the same class as was dealt with by s. 34 as amended.   This Court  accepted the contention and held that as a result  of the  said  amendment s. 34 as amended operated on  the  same field as s. 5(1) of the Investigation Act, assuming that the

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latter  was  based on a rational  classification,  and  that therefore   it  became  void  and  unenforceable  as   being discriminatory  in character.  Similarly, in Banarsi Das  v. Cane  Commissioner,  Uttar Pradesh(2), Rule 23 of  the  U.P. Sugar Factories Rules, 1938 was impeached on the ground that it  provided two different procedures either of which  could be  followed by the Cane Commissioner.  Raghubar  Dayal,  J. who gave a dissenting opinion was of the view that the  rule was discriminatory and should, therefore, be struck down  as contravening  Art. 14.  Hidayatullah, J. who spoke  for  the majority  agreed with him on principle that if "it could  be said  that the rule as framed, allows the Cane  Commissioner to discriminate between one party and another then the  rule must  offend Art. 14".  He, however, construed the  rule  to mean that the parties, instead of leaving the dispute to the decision  of the Commissioner, could go to arbitration  with his  permission.  On this construction, he held  that  where there  are two procedures, one for every one and the  other, if  the  disputants voluntarily agree to  follow  it,  there would be no (1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 787. (2) A.I.R. 1963 S.C.R. 1417. 409 discrimination  because discrimination can only be found  to exit  if the election is with someone else who can  exercise his  will  arbitrarily.  The principle  which  emerges  from these  decisions  is that’/ discrimination would  result  if there  are  two  available procedures one  more  drastic  or prejudicial to the party concerned than the other and  which can be applied at the arbitrary will of the authority. Assuming that persons in occupation of Government properties and  premises form a class by themselves as against  tenants and  occupiers  of private owned properties  and  that  such classification is justified on the around that they  require a differential treatment in public interest, those who  fall under  that classification are entitled to  equal  treatment among  themselves.  If the ordinary law of the land and  the special   law   provide  two   different   and   alternative procedures, one more prejudicial than the other, discrimina- tion must result if it is left to the will of the  authority to  exercise  the  more prejudicial  against  some  and  not against  the rest.  A person who is proceeded against  under the  more drastic procedure is bound to complain as  to  why the  drastic  procedure  is exercised against  him  and  not against  the others, even though those others are  similarly circumstanced.   The procedure under s. 5 is obviously  more drastic  and  prejudicial  than  the  one  under  the  Civil Procedure  Code where the litigant can get the benefit of  a trial by an ordinary court dealing with the ordinary law  of the  land  with  the right of  appeal,  revision,  etc.,  as against  the person who is proceeded against under s.  5  of the  Act  as his case would be disposed of by  an  executive officer of the Government, whose decision rests on his  mere satisfaction,  subject  no  doubt to an  appeal  but  before another  executive officer, viz., the  Commissioner.   There can be no doubt that s. 5 confers an additional remedy  over and  above the remedy by way of suit and that  by  providing two  alternative remedies to the ’Government and in  leaving it to the unguided discretion of the Collector to resort  to one  or  the other and to pick and choose some of  those  in occupation  of  public  properties  and  premises  for   the application  of the more drastic procedure under s. 5,  that section has lent itself open to the charge of discrimination and  as being violative of Art. 14.  In this view s. 5  must be declared to be void.

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In the result, the appeal is allowed.  The order of the High Court  is  set  aside and the writ  petition  filed  by  the appellants is made absolute with costs. Bachawat,  J.  An unauthorised occupant of  public  premises claims immunity from eviction under the summary procedure of the  Punjab  Public  Premises and Land  (Eviction  and  Rent Recovery)  Act,  1959 (Punjab Act No. 31 of  1959),  on  the ground  that  the Act offends art. 14 of  the  Constitution. The State of Punjab leased the premises known as Mount View, Chandigarh to the appellant 410 upto  December  31,  1959  after which  the  lease  was  not extended.   C  n  January 1, 1960, the  Collector  issued  a notice under s. 4 of the Act to the appellant to show  cause on or before January II, 1960, why an order of eviction from the  premises should not be made against it.  On January  7, 1960,  the appellant filed a writ petition  challenging  the vires  of the Act.  Since then it has,  successfully  defied the  law and continued to be in occupation of  the  premises under the shelter of stay orders and injunctions.  The  High Court  dismissed  the writ petition.  This appeal  has  been filed on a certificate granted by the High Court. The object of the impugned Act is to provide a summary  pro- cedure for the eviction of unauthorised occupants of  public premises. without recourse to the cumbersome procedure of  a title  suit.  Public premises means any  premises  belonging to, or taken on lease or requisitioned by, or on behalf  of, the  State  government, or requisitioned  by  the  competent authority under the Punjab Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable  Property  Act, 1953, and  includes  any  premises belonging  to  any  district  board,  municipal   committee, notified  area committee or panchayat [s. 2(d)].   A  person deemed  to be in unauthorised occupation of any public  pre- mises  includes  where  he, being  an  allottee,  lessee  or grantee, has, by reason of the determination or cancellation of  his  allotment, lease or grant in  accordance  with  the terms  in  that behalf therein  contained,  ceased,  whether before or after the commencement of this Act, to be entitled to  occupy or hold such public premises [s. 3(b)].   If  the Collector is of the opinion that any persons are in unautho- rized  occupation of any public premises situate within  his jurisdiction and that they should be evicted, he shall issue a  notice in writing calling upon all persons  concerned  to show  cause why an order of eviction should not be made  (s. 4).   If  after considering the objection, if  any,  of  the person concerned and giving him a reasonable opportunity  of being  heard,  the Collector is satisfied  that  the  public premises  are  in unauthorized occupation, he  may  make  an order of eviction for reasons to be recorded therein (S. 5). Section  6 provides for disposal of property left on  public premises  by  unauthorized occupants.  Section 7  gives  the Collector  the power ’to recover rent or damages in  respect of  public  premises as arrears of land  revenue.   For  the purpose of holding any inquiry under the Act, the  Collector has  the  power  of summoning witnesses  and  certain  other powers  vested in the civil court when trying a suit (S.  8. An appeal lies from every order of the Collector under ss. 5 and 7 to the Commissioner (. 9. Save as provided in the Act, every  order made by the Collector or Commissioner is  final and  cannot  be  called in question in  any  original  suit, application  or  execution proceeding (s. 10).   Section  11 protects action taken under the Act in good faith.   Section 12  gives power to make rules.  This in short is the  scheme of the Act.  Its provisions are similar to 411

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those  of  the  Public Premises  (Eviction  of  Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1958, save that an appeal under the  Central Act  from  an,  order  of the estate  officer  lies  to  the district judge. The  High Court found that the Act does not offend arts.  14 and  19(1)(f)  of the Constitution.  The appellant  has  now abandoned’  the  attack based on art.  19(1)(f).   Being  an unauthorized  occupant, it has no right of property  in  the premises.  The High Court repelled the attack based on  art. 14  on the ground that the proceeding under the Act  is  the exclusive remedy for the eviction of unauthorized  occupants of  public premises.  With this reasoning we  cannot  agree. The Act does not create a new right of eviction.  It creates an additional remedy for a right existing under the  general law.  It does not repeal the law giving the remedy of a suit or  bar the jurisdiction of civil courts to try a  suit  for eviction.   The government is at liberty to proceed  against the occupant either under the Act or by way of a suit. The argument for the appellant is that the Act violates art. 14  in  two  ways,  first,  that  it  discriminates  between unauthorized occupants of public premises and those of other premises  and the classification of public premises  has  no reasonable relation to the object of the Act.  Second,  that it discriminates between occupants of public premises  inter se as the State can arbitrarily proceed against the occupant either under the Act or by way of a suit at its sweet  will. The argument must be rejected. The constitutional guarantee of art. 14 requires that  there shall’ be no unjust discrimination and all persons shall  be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions.   The article  sustains  a  rich diversity  of  laws  and  permits reasonable  classification and differential treatment  based on substantial differences having reasonable relation to the object  of  the  legislation.  The protection  of’  art.  14 extends  to procedural laws, but the legislature  may  adopt one  or more types of procedure for one class of  litigation and   a   different  type  for  another  so  long   as   the classification  satisfies the test of reasonableness.   Thus without  violating  art.  14, the law  may  prohibit  cross- examination  of witnesses in proceedings for  externment  of undesirable persons, see Gurbachan Singh v. State of  Bombay and another(1). Article 14 permits differential treatment of the  government in  matters  of  both substantive law  and  procedure.   The legislature  may  reasonably  provide  a  longer  period  of limitation  for suits by the government, see  Nav  Rattanmal and others v. State of Rajasthan  (2) ,  give the government the  right  of  priority  in  payment  of  its  claims,  see Builders, Supply Corporation v. Union of India and (1) [1952] S.C.R. 737,743-44. (2) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 324.                             412 others(1) and deny the protection of the Rent Act to tenants of premises belonging to the government while extending  its protection to the government, see Baburao Shantaram More  v. The ,Bombay Housing Board and another(2). It  is  settled by our previous decisions that  the  Revenue Recovery Acts and other Acts creating special tribunals  and procedure for the expeditious recovery of revenue and  State dues are in the public interest and do not violate art.  14, see Shri Manna Lal and -another v. Collector of Jhalawar and others(3), Nav Rattanmal and others v. State of Rajasthan (4 )  ,  The Collector of Malabar v. Erimal  Ebrahim  Hajee(5), Purshottam  Govindji Halai v. Shree B. M. Desai,  Additional Collector of Bombay and others(6) and Lachhman Das v.  State

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of Punjab and others (7 ) . If quick recovery of revenue  is in  the  public  interest,  expeditious  recovery  of  State property from which revenue is derived is a fortiori in  the public  interest.  The impugned Act has properly  devised  a special  machinery  for  the  speedy  recovery  of  premises belonging to the ,government. The  class  of public premises to which the benefit  of  the impugned  Act  extends includes premises  belonging  to  the district   board,   .municipal  committee,   notified   area committee and panchayat.  The -classification has reasonable relation  to the object of the Act and does not offend  art. 14.   We have upheld similar classification for the  purpose of  other  Acts, see Baburao Shantaram More  v.  The  Bombay Housing Board and another(2). The  government has the option of proceeding against an  un- authorized occupant of public premises either under the  Act or by a civil suit.  On the question whether such an  option offends  art., 14, our decisions upholding the  validity  of the  Revenue  Recovery  Acts are  conclusive.   The  Revenue Recovery  Acts do not deny the equal protection of the  laws because the government has the free choice of recovering its revenue  either  by a suit or by a  proceeding  under  those Acts. We have struck down harsh, oppressive and unjust laws giving the  government  an arbitrary power of directing  a  summary trial  ,of offences by a special criminal court  instead  of trial  by the ordinary courts or of subjecting  assessee  to the  inquisitorial  procedure  of  the  Taxation  of  Income (Investigation  Commission) Act, 1947.  It is because  those laws  were  harsh, despotic and tyrannical  that  they  were struck down.  It is remarkable that in Suraj Mall Mohta  and Co.  v.  A. V. Visvanatha Sastri and another(8),  the  Court said that if there was a provision for reviewing the con-      (1) [1965] 2 S.C.R. 289. (2) [1954] S.C.R, 572.      (3) [1961] 2 S.C.R. 962. (4) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 324, 332.      (5) [1957] S.C.R. 970.   (6) [1955] 2 S.C.R. 887.      (7) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 353. (8)  [1955]  1 S.C.R.  448  at 466. 413 clusions of the investigation commission when acting both as investigators   and   judges,   the   Taxation   of   Income (Investigation   Commission)  Act  1947,  might  have   been sustained.   Even an Act giving the executive an  option  of sending a case for trial by a special criminal court is  not necessarily  violative of art. 14, see Kangsari  Haldar  and anr. v. The State of West Bengal(1).  We have upheld an  Act empowering  an administrative tribunal trying an offence  to send the case to a court for trial if the case deserves more severe punishment, see Shanti Prasad Jain v. The Director of Enforcement(2). Without  violating art. 14, the law may allow a  litigant  a free  choice of remedies, proceedings and tribunals for  the redress of his grievances.  The plaintiff may have a  choice of  claiming specific relief or damages.  As dominus  litis, he  has the option of suing in one of several courts  having concurrent  jurisdiction,  and the defendant  cannot  insist that  he  must  be  sued  at  a  place  where  he  can  more conveniently  carry  on the litigation.  The  plaintiff  may even  fix the original and appellate forums on the basis  of his  own ;arbitrary valuation.  For a suit on  a  negotiable instrument,   he  may  instead  of  choosing  the   ordinary procedure,  adopt the summary procedure of Order  XXXVII  of the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure and  shut  out  the  defence altogether  unless leave to defend is obtained. .A  landlord may  evict  a tenant by a suit or by  a  summary  proceeding

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under chapter VII of the Presidency Small Cause Courts  Act. An  aggrieved  party may be free to choose  one  of  several types of tribunals and modes of proceeding.  He may obtain a rectification  of  the  share register by a suit  or  by  an application  to  the  court taking  company  matters  or  by appealing to an administrative tribunal against the  refusal of the company to register the transfer of shares. Instead  of  filing  a  suit  or  a  proceeding  before   an administrative  tribunal, a party may at his  option  obtain quick  and  effective relief against the  government  by  an application  in the writ jurisdiction and by  adopting  this mode  of  proceeding  may  deprive  the  government  of  the procedural  safeguards  available to it in suits  and  other proceedings.   Likewise, the law may give the government  an option of recovering its revenue and properties by a suit or by a proceeding before an administrative tribunal. The  law  does  not violate art. 14  because  it  gives  an. aggrieved party the free choice of remedies and  proceedings for the redress of his grievances.  In Arizona Copper Co. v. Hammer,(3)  the U.S. Supreme Court held that employers  were not  denied  the  equal protection of the  laws  because  an employee injured in course of his employment had open to him three avenues of redress under three (1)  [1960] 2 S.C.R. 646.               (2) [1963] 2  S.C.R. 297, 303-4. (3) 250 US 400 :63 L.Ed. 1058. 414 different  laws,  each one of which he might pursue  at  his free  choice.  As Pitney J., said, "election of remedies  is an  option  very  frequently given by the law  to  a  person entitled  to an action-an option normally exercised  to  his own advantage as a matter of course." It  is not pretended that the proceeding under the  impugned Act is unfair or oppressive.  The unauthorised occupant  has full  opportunity  of  being  heard  and  of  producing  his evidence  before the Collector.  He may obtain a  review  of the order of the Collector by an appeal to the Commissioner. He  may  in appropriate cases ask for a writ  of  certiorari from the High Court.  He is not denied the equal  protection of  the  laws  because  the government  has  the  option  of proceeding  against him either by a suit or under  the  Act. An unauthorised occupant has no constitutional right to dic- tate   that  the  government  should  have  no   choice   of proceedings.   The  argument based upon the  option  of  the government to file a suit is unreal, because in practice the government is not likely to institute a suit in a case where it can seek relief under the Act. Article 14 does not require a fanatical approach to the pro- blem  of equality before the law.  It permits a free  choice of remedies for the redress of grievances.  The impugned Act makes no unjust discrimination.  It promotes public  welfare and  is a beneficient measure of legislation.  If we  strike down  the  Act,  we  shall  be  giving  a  free  charter  to unauthorized  occupants and to officers squatting on  public premises  after they have vacated their offices to  continue in occupation for an indefinite time until they are  evicted by  dilatory  procedure of a title suit.  The Act  does  not suffer from any blemish and we uphold it. In  Seth Banarsi Das v. Cane Commissioner(1), the Court  up- held a law prescribing two procedures one for every one  and the  other if the disputants agree to follow it.  The  Court did not say that a law cannot allow a choice of procedure to an aggrieved party. We would accordingly dismiss the      appeal with costs.                            ORDER

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In  accordance with the opinion of the majority, the  appeal is  allowed.  The order of the High Court is set  aside  and the  writ petition filed by the appellants is made  absolute with costs. V.P.S. (1) [1963] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 760.