NORTH DELHI POWER LTD. Vs GOVT. OF N.C.T. .
Case number: C.A. No.-004269-004269 / 2006
Diary number: 15003 / 2006
Advocates: ABHAY KUMAR Vs
RANI CHHABRA
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“REPORTABLE”
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL No. 4269 OF 2006
North Delhi Power Limited …. Appellant
Versus
Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi & Ors. …. Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL No. 4270 OF 2006
BSES Rajdhani Power Limited & Anr. …. Appellants
Versus
Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi & Ors. …. Respondents
J U D G M E N T
V.S. SIRPURKAR, J
1. This judgment shall dispose of the two appeals being CA No. 4269
of 2006 and CA No. 4270 of 2006. Civil Appeal No.4269/2006 has been
filed on behalf of North Delhi Power Limited and Civil Appeal No.4270 of
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2006 has been filed by BSES Rajdhani Limited. Since a common question
falls for consideration in both the appeals, the same are disposed of by this
common judgment. The question can be framed as under:
“Whether the appellants are responsible for meeting the liabilities relating to employees who ceased to be the employees of erstwhile Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking (Predecessor of Delhi Vidhyut Board – DVB) prior to 1.7.2002 on account of their retirement, removal, dismissal or compulsory retirement in accordance with the provisions of Delhi Electric Reforms Act, 2000?”
By the impugned judgment dated 30.3.2006 passed by the Delhi
High Court, the High Court has held that the appellants alone would be
responsible to meet such liabilities.
2. In order to understand the nature of controversy and the
ramifications thereof, some facts common to both these appeals would be
necessary.
Common Facts:
3. The Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi
passed the Act on 23.11.2000 being Delhi Electric Reforms Act, 2000
(hereinafter called the “Act, 2000”). This Act came into force on 8.3.2001.
The Preamble of this Act reads as under:
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“An Act to provide for the constitution of an Electricity Commission, restructuring of the electricity industry (rationalization of generation, transmission, distribution and supply of electricity), increasing avenues for participation of private sector in the electricity industry and generally for taking measures conducive to the development and management of the electricity industry in an efficient, commercial, economic and competitive manner in the National Capital Territory of Delhi and for matter connected therewith or incidental thereto.
BE it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi in the Fifty-first year of the Republic of India as follows:”
Section 2 pertains to definitions of relevant terms used in the Act
and sub-section (1) contains the definitions clauses. Sub-sections (2) and
(3) of Section 2 run as under:
“(2) Words and expressions used but not defined in this Act and defined in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Central Act 54 of 1948) have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act.
(3) Words and expressions used but not defined either in this Act or in the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Central Act 54 of 1948) and defined in the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (Central Act 9 of 1910) have the meanings respectively assigned to them in that Act.”
Thus the definitions of relevant terms under Electricity (Supply) Act,
1948 and Electricity Act, 1910 were incorporated in the Act, 2000. Section
3 of the Act, 2000 provides for establishment of Delhi Electricity Regulatory
Commission. The functions of this Commission are provided in Section
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11. Some of the functions, amongst others, as provided in Section 11 (1)
are as under:
“(c) to regulate power, purchase and procurement process of the licensees and transmission utilities including the price at which the power shall be procured from the generating companies, generating stations or from other sources for transmission, sale, distribution and supply in the National Capital Territory of Delhi;
(d) to promote competition, efficiency and economy in the activities of the electricity industry to achieve the objects and purposes of this Act;
(e) to aid and advise the government in matters concerning electricity generation, transmission, distribution and supply in the National Capital Territory of Delhi;
(h) to promote competitiveness and make avenues for participation of private sector in the electricity industry in the National Capital Territory of Delhi and also to ensure a fair deal to the customers;
(k) to regulate the assets, properties and interest in properties concerned or related to the electricity industry in the National Capital Territory of Delhi including the conditions governing entry into, and exit from the electricity industry in such manner as to safeguard the public interest;
(l) to issue licences for transmission, bulk supply, distribution or supply of electricity and determine the conditions to be included in the licences;”
4. Under Section 14 of the Act, 2000, the subject of incorporation of
companies for the purposes of generation, transmission or distribution of
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electricity was dealt with. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (6) of Section 14,
which are relevant for our purposes provide as under:
“14(1)The government may, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, cause one or more companies to be incorporated and set up under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 (Central Act 1 of 1956) for the purpose of generation, transmission or distribution of electricity, including companies engaged in more than one of the said activities in the National Capital Territory of Delhi and may transfer the existing generating stations or the transmission system or distribution system, or any part of the transmission system or distribution system, to such company or companies.
14(2) The government may designate any company set up under sub-section (1) to be the principal company to undertake all planning and coordination in regard to generation or transmission or both; and such company shall undertake works connected with generation or transmission and determine the requirements of the territory in consultation with the other companies engaged in generation or transmission for the National Capital Territory of Delhi, the Commission, the Regional Electricity Board and the Central Electricity Authority and any other authority under any law in force for the time being, or any other government concerned.
14(6) The government may convert the companies set up under this Act to joint venture companies through a process of disinvestment, in accordance with the transfer scheme prepared under the provisions of this Act.”
Section 15 of the Act, 2000 provides for Reorganisation of Delhi
Vidyut Board and transfer of properties, functions and duties thereof. Sub-
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sections (3), (6), (7) and (9) of Section 15, which are relevant for purposes
provide:
“15(3)Such of the rights and powers to be exercised by the Board under the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 (Central Act 54 of 1948), as the government may, by notification in the official gazette, specify, shall be exercisable by a company or companies established as the case may be, under Section 14, for the purpose of discharge of the functions and duties with which it is entrusted.
15(6) A transfer scheme may –
(a) provide for the formation of subsidiaries, joint venture, companies or other schemes of divisions, amalgamation, merger, reconstruction or arrangements;
(b) define the property, interest in property, rights and liabilities to be allocated –
(i) by specifying or describing the property, rights and liabilities in question,
(ii) by referring to all the property, interest in property, rights and liabilities comprised in a specified part of the transferor’s undertaking, or
(iii) partly in one way and partly in the other:
Provided that the property, interest in property, rights and liabilities shall be subject to such further transfer as the government may specify;
(c) provide that any rights, or liabilities specified or described in the scheme shall be enforceable by or against the transferor or the transferee;
(d) impose on any licensee an obligation to enter into such written agreements with, or execute such other instruments in favour of any other
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subsequent licensee as may be specified in the scheme;
(e) make such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions as the transferor licensee considers appropriate including provision specifying the order in which any transfer or transaction is to be regarded as taking effect;
(f) provide that the transfer shall be provisional subject to the provisions of Section 18.
15(7) All debts and obligations incurred, all contracts entered into and all matters and things done by, with or for the Board, or a company or companies established as the case may be, under Section 14 or generating company or distribution company or companies before a transfer scheme becomes effective shall, to the extent specified in the relevant transfer scheme, be deemed to have been incurred, entered into or done by, with or for the government or the transferee and all suits or other legal proceedings instituted by or against the Board or transferor, as the case may be, may be continued or instituted by or against the government or concerned transferee, as the case may be.
15(9) The Board shall cease to exist with the transfer of functions and duties specified and with the transfer of assets as on the effective date.”
Section 16 is extremely important which deals with the subject of
Personnel. It provides:
“(1) The government may by a transfer scheme provide for the transfer of the personnel from the Board to a company or companies established as the case may be, under Section 14 and distribution companies (hereinafter referred to as “transferee company or
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companies”) on the vesting of properties, rights and liabilities in a company or companies established, as the case may be, under Section 14 or the distribution companies.
(2) Upon such transfers the personnel shall hold office in the transferee company on terms and conditions that may be specified in the transfer scheme subject, however, to the following, namely:
(a) that the terms and conditions of the service applicable to them in the transferee company shall not in any way, be less favourable than or inferior to those applicable to them immediately before the transfer;
(b) that the personnel shall have continuity of service in all respects; and
(c) that the benefits of service accrued before the transfer shall be fully recognized and taken in account for all purposes including the payment of any and all terminal benefits.”
Section 57 of the Act, 2000 which deals with the Power to remove
difficulties reads as under:
“(1) If any difficulty arises in giving effect to the provisions of this Act or rules, regulations, schemes or orders made thereunder, the government may, by order published in the Official Gazette, make such provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act as may appear to it to be necessary or expedient for removing the difficulty:
Provided that no order shall be made under this section after the expiry of two years from the date of the commencement of this Act.
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(2) Every order made under this section shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made before the Legislative Assembly of the National Capital Territory of Delhi.”
5. In accordance with the above provisions a Transfer Scheme called
“Delhi Electricity Reforms (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001” (hereinafter
referred to as “the Scheme, 2001”) came into existence. Rule 2 of the
Scheme, 2001 deals with the definitions of various terms. Relevant
Clauses (b), (c), (h) and (k) of Rule 2 read as under:
“(b) “assets” includes all rights, interests and claims of whatever nature as well as block or blocks of assets of the Delhi Vidyut Board;
(c) “Board” means the Delhi Vidyut Board constituted under Section 5 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1958 (54 of 1948);
(h) “DISCOMS” means and includes DISCOM 1, DISCOM 2 and DISCOM 3 collectively.
(k) “liabilities” include all liabilities, debts, duties, obligations and other outgoings including contingent liabilities, statutory liabilities and government levies of whatever nature, which may arise in regard to dealings before the date of the transfer in respect of the specified undertakings;”
Rule 3 of the Scheme, 2000 provides for transfer of assets, etc., of
the Board to the Government as defined in Rule 2(c) above. It provides
that all the assets, liabilities and proceedings of the Board shall stand
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transferred to and vest in the government absolutely. Sub-Rule (2) of Rule
3 is significant and provides as under:
“3(2) Nothing in Sub-rule (1) shall apply to rights, responsibilities and obligations in respect of the personnel and personnel related mattes, which have been dealt in the manner provided under Rule 6.”
Rule 4 is connected only to Rule 3(1) and has nothing to do with
Rule 3(2) which deals with the personnel which subject is exclusively dealt
with in Rule 6. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 6 is very significant and runs as under:
“6(8) Subject to sub-rule (9) below, in respect of all statutory and other schemes and employment related matters, including the provident fund, gratuity fund, pension and any superannuation fund or special fund created or existing for the benefit of the personnel and the existing pensioners, the relevant transferee shall stand substituted for the Board for all purposes and all the rights, powers and obligations of the Board in relation to any and all such matters shall become those of such transferee and the services of the personnel shall be treated as having been continuous for the purpose of the application of this sub-rule.”
Sub-rule (9) of Rule 6 provides:
“6(9) The government shall make appropriate arrangements as provided in the tripartite agreements in regard to the funding of the terminal benefits to the extent it is unfunded on the date of the transfer from the Board. Till such arrangements are made, the payment falling due to the existing pensioners shall be made by the TRANSCO, subject to appropriate adjustments with other transferees.
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For the purpose of this sub-rule, the term –
(a) “existing pensioners” mean all the persons eligible for the pension as on the date of the transfer from the Board and shall include family members of the personnel as per the applicable scheme; and
(b) “terminal benefits” mean the gratuity, pension, dearness and other terminal benefits to the personnel and existing pensioners.”
6. It is an admitted case that while the government was contemplating
unbundling of Delhi Vidyut Board (hereinafter referred to as “DVB”) for
handing over the distribution of electricity to private companies as also for
restructuring the electricity industry and rationalization of generation,
transmission and supply of electricity by increasing the avenues for
participation of private sector in the electricity industry in the National
Capital Territory of Delhi, the erstwhile employees of the DVB displayed
their apprehension and reservations to the effect that on emergence of the
private companies their services may not be protected. Therefore, these
employees were taken into confidence by assuring them that their services
will be protected by entering into Tripartite Agreements which were
executed on 28.10.2000 and 9.11.2000 between Government of National
Capital Territory of Delhi (“GNCTD”), DVB and Delhi Vidyut Board Joint
Action Committee. The said committee consisted of various Unions as
well as Junior Engineer Officer Association. Under these Tripartite
Agreements, the existing pensioners as well as the employees were
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protected. All the existing welfare schemes and benefits to the retired
employees were allowed to continue.
7. After the Act and the scheme came on the anvil, as a first step of
privatization, the Request for Qualification (RFQ) Documents for
privatization of electricity distribution in Delhi was floated on 15.2.2001
giving in detail the status of the DVB, the manner of the privatization where
it was specifically provided that DVB is being offered to private companies
as a going concern on business valuation method, transferring all the past,
present and future liabilities including that of existing employees as well as
the retirees. The details of the employees as on 1.1.2000 were also
provided. Para 11.6 of the RFQ Document mentions about the fact that
apart from existing employees which were 24,634 in number as on
1.1.2000, there were about 9200 retired employees. The aforementioned
transfer scheme was notified on 21.11.2001. Under the scheme the
distribution companies, generation, transmission and holding companies
were identified. At the time when the bids were put in by the companies
who were in consideration and the negotiations were on, the DISCOMS
put in revised bids. The present appellants which were South-West Delhi
Electricity Distribution Company Ltd. (now known as BSES Rajdhani
Power Ltd.), as also North-West Delhi Distribution Company Ltd. (now
known as NDPL) were amongst those who submitted the revised bids
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documents. Their demand was that the contingent liability arising out of
any event including any legal proceedings prior to the transfer should be
limited to Rs.1 crore per annum considered individually or collectively
during the first five years. Based on that sub-rule (3) in Rule 8 came to be
added in the Scheme, 2001 on 26.6.2002 which is as under:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in these Rules including the schedules, the liabilities arising out of litigation, suits, claims, etc., pending on the date of the transfer and/or arising due to events prior to the date of the transfer shall be borne by the relevant distribution company, viz., DISCOM 1, DISCOM 2 and DISCOM 3 respectively, subject to a maximum of Rs.1 crore per annum. Any amount above this shall be to the account of the holding company in the event for any reason the Commission does not allow the amount to be included in the revenue requirement of the DISCOM.”
Resultantly from 1.7.2002, the DVB unbundled into six companies,
they being DISCOM 1 (BSES Yamuna Power Ltd.), DISCOM 2 (BSES
Rajdhani Power Ltd.)-appellant and DISCOM 3 (North Delhi Power Ltd.)-
appellant, Delhi Power Supply Company Ltd. (TRANSCO) and generation
company (GENCO). Another company called “DPCL” (holding company)
was also constituted with aims and objects to hold shares in the
aforementioned DISCOM companies. The said DPCL holds 49% shares
in DISCOM 1, 2 and 3 and holds 100% shares in GENCO and TRANSCO.
For all practical purposes DVB ceased to exist from 1.7.2002.
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8. There are various schedules attached to the Scheme, 2001. The
distribution undertaking its assets, liabilities and proceedings concerning
the distribution areas are specified in Part III of Schedule H. Relevant
Schedules are Part I for DISCOM 1, BSES and Part III for DISCOM 3,
NDPL.
9. Rule 12 of the Scheme, 2001 provides that the decision of the
Government shall be final and sub-Rule (1) stipulates that if any doubt,
dispute, difference or issue shall arise in regard to the transfers under
these Rules, subject to the provisions of the Act, the decision of the
government thereon, shall be final and binding on all parties.
10. On the backdrop of these legal provisions it will now be proper to
see the individual facts in the two appeals.
11. The Letters Patent Appeal filed by the appellant before the High
Court was dismissed. It so happened, that respondent No.3 herein
Shri K. R. Jain, who was an erstwhile employee of the Delhi Electric
Supply Undertaking (DESU), superannuated from service on 31.07.1996.
Eventually, Delhi Vidyut Board (DVB) became successor of Delhi
Electricity Supply Undertaking (DESU). NDPL was incorporated on
04.07.2001 and inherited the distribution undertaking on 01.07.2002 along
with the assets, liabilities, personnel and proceedings in pursuance of
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statutory transfer scheme notified by the Government pursuant to Sections
14-16 and 60 of the Delhi Electricity Reforms Act, 2000. It was much
before that, that respondent No. 3 was superannuated. His pension was
paid from the Terminal Benefit Fund, 2002 of DVB. The DVB had floated
Time Bound Terminal Scale Scheme by its Office Order dated 23.07.1997
and Resolution No. 216 dated 16.07.1997. Claiming that though he had
superannuated on 31.07.96, still he was covered by the scheme,
respondent No.3 filed a Writ Petition No. 2337 of 2004 seeking appropriate
direction against Delhi Government, Delhi Power Co. Ltd. and Delhi Power
Supply Company and claimed benefits arising out of the Scheme.
Significantly enough, NDPL was not made a party nor was there any claim
against it. This Writ Petition was allowed by the Learned Single Judge,
holding that respondent No.3 was entitled to avail the benefits under Time
Bound Promotional Scale Scheme (TBPS) and that DVB had unjustly
denied him his dues. Holding the present appellant as a successor,
Mandamus was issued against the appellant who was not a party and was
not given an opportunity of hearing. This was based on the statement of
an advocate appearing for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 herein to the effect
that it was the appellant-petitioner who was the successor and was as
such responsible to implement the judgment dated 23.03.2004.
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12. On 23.11.2004 an application was filed for recall/modification of the
judgment before the Learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court. This
application was, however, allowed holding that:
(a) respondent No.3 had retired from DVB on 31.07.96 from Ashok Vihar
(b) All liabilities of DVB, other than those specifically transferred in terms of Schedules ‘B’ to ‘F’ of the Transfer Scheme shall be the liability of the holding company.
(c) In terms of the Rule 6 (2) and (8) of the transfer scheme, only such proceedings were transferred to successor companies as were pending on 01.07.2002. Since no proceedings were pending qua the entitlements of respondent No.3, hence it was the holding company and not the present appellant who would be liable to pay the arrears and other entitlements of respondent No. 3 under the TBPS Scheme.
13. Respondent No.1 and 2 filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the
modified order of the Learned Single Judge dated 23.11.2004 vide LPA
No. 98/2005. This appeal came to be allowed by the Division Bench of the
High Court. The High Court held that the appellant-petitioner alone was
responsible for the payments claimed by respondent No.3.
14. The second matter has emanated out of the judgment and order
dated 25.05.2006 wherein the Learned Single Judge of the High Court has
dismissed the Writ Petition filed by the appellant-petitioner being Writ
Petition No. 5110 of 2005 [BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Govt. of NCT of
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Delhi & Another]. By that Writ Petition, validity and legality of the letter
dated 21.01.2004 issued by the Government of NCT of Delhi was
challenged. By this letter, a clarification was issued by the Government to
the effect that vigilance/ disciplinary/ Court cases in respect of employees
of erstwhile DVB, who could not become part of any of the companies on
the date of restructuring due to retirement/dismissal/removal/compulsory
retirement shall be processed and decided by the successor company like
the appellant-petitioner who would have been the controlling authority of
the employees but for their retirement/removal/dismissal/compulsory
retirement as per the Schedule in the Transfer Scheme. In pursuance of
this letter, all the cases were forwarded with records involving employees
who, due to their retirement/suspension/ termination or death were
allegedly not transferred to DISCOMS on 01.07.2002. This was resisted
by DISCOMS including the appellant herein on the ground that such
employees who were not transferred to them were in fact liability of the
holding company. Representations were sent against this clarificatory
letter dated 21.01.2004. Such representations were sent even by NDPL.
However, in K.R. Jain’s case, the Division Bench deciding the LPA, took
the view that such employees were the liability of the transferee DISCOMS
like NDPL or, as the case may be, the BSES. Relying on that judgment,
the Writ Petition of the petitioner was dismissed by judgment dated
25.05.2006 by the Learned Single Judge of the High Court. Since it would
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have been futile for the appellant to go to the Division Bench, it has
straightaway moved this Court by way of the present appeal.
15. In the impugned judgment, the whole history of the legislation was
traced by the Division Bench and after noting Rules 2 (k), (n) and (l), and
Rule 3 along with Rule 12, it was observed that the assets and liabilities as
given in Schedule A to G to different companies did not relate to the
liabilities regarding the personnel vide Rule 3 (2). Rule 6 was noted to be
dealing with the responsibilities of the personnel and a categorical finding
was recorded that the Schedules under Rule 4 were not helpful to
determine the liabilities in respect of the personnel, even if they were
retired personnel and pensioners. Noting Section 16 of the DERA, 2000
and Rule 6 of the DERR, 2001 and, more particularly, noting Rule 6 (8),
the High Court chose not to agree with the contentions raised before it that
the responsibility of the NDPL was only with respect to those personnel
who had been transferred to the NDPL as per the list mentioned in
Appendix E. It located the following categories of the personnel required
to be dealt with:
“16. There would be the following categories of personnel required to be dealt with:
(a) existing employees of DVB on the date of transfer scheme who were on roll and working;
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(b) employees under suspension and facing disciplinary/ departmental proceedings at the time of the transfer scheme.
(c) employees terminated, dismissed as a consequence of departmental proceedings and who had initiated litigation/cases, proceedings against DVB and such proceeding/ litigation was pending at the time of disbanding of DVB.
(d) retired employees who after retirement filed cases in courts claiming some benefits or dues, and such cases were pending at the time of the transfer scheme.
(e) retired/dismissed employees of DVB who filed court cases after the transfer scheme and such case got decided in their favour.”
There is no dispute in respect of personnel at (a). However, Mr. Raj
Birbal, learned Senior Counsel for NDPL contends that the responsibility of
NDPL is only in respect of those personnel who have been transferred to
NDPL as per the list mentioned in appendix E. We do not agree with this
contention.
16. The High Court also noted that except for Rule 6 (8), (9) and (11),
other provisions dealt with existing working personnel of DVB at the time of
transfer and that Rule 6 (11) took care of the categories (b) and (c) shown
earlier. It also noted Rule 8 regarding the pending suits and proceedings
and refuted the contention raised on behalf of NDPL that Rule 8 covers
litigations only in respect of cases between DVB and consumers,
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contractors and third parties and not those cases which were between
DVB and its retired employees. For that purpose, the High Court noted
the phraseology “all proceedings” appearing in Rule 8 (1). It also refuted
the argument that if the liability created in Rule 8 (3) had been of the
employees, it would not have limited the liability only to DISCOMS to
rupees one crore and it would have mentioned TRANSCO and GENCO
also, and held that the limit of rupees one crore in that provision was fixed
at the representation of DISCOMS like the NDPL, only in their respect.
The High Court then noted Rule 5(2), clothing the transferee with the
responsibility of all contracts, rights, deeds, schemes, bonds, agreements
and other instruments of whatever nature relating to respective
undertaking and assets and liabilities transferred to it, to which Board was
a party, subsisting or having effect on the date of transfer, in the same
manner as the Board was liable immediately before the date of transfer
and the same shall be in force and effect against or in favour of respective
transferee and may be enforced effectively as if the respective transferee
had been a party thereto instead of the Board. Interpreting it in the light of
various judgments of this Court, the High Court concluded that not only the
assets and liabilities were transferred to the transferee company but the
entire past and future litigation were also transferred to the transferee
company and such litigation could have been in respect of the employees,
consumers and other parties. It reiterated that the scheme of the Rules
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provided that all corresponding employees were transferred by way of
forming list in respect to employees who were working in the respective
area while all employees who were under suspension or termination and in
respect of whom any kind of proceedings defined in section 2 (n) were
pending at that stage, were also specifically made the responsibility of the
transferee company under Rule 6 (11). The High Court again referred to
Rule 5(2) to note the responsibility of the transferee company and also
made reference to Section 15 of the Act.
17. Lastly, the High Court has relied on the letter dated 21-22.01.2004
which was issued by the Government for removal of doubt, dispute and
difference under its power under Rule 12 (1) which clearly fixed the
responsibility on the DISCOMS. In that letter, on a reference having been
made by the Delhi TRANSCO seeking clarification from the Government
with respect to the competent authority to deal with vigilance, disciplinary
and Court cases in relation to the employees of the erstwhile DVB who
could not become part of any of the companies on 01.07.2002 in terms of
the transfer scheme due to retirement/dismissal/removal/compulsory
retirement by the then DVB, the Government clarified that such cases
would be processed and decided by such company who would have been
the controlling authority of the employee but for their retirement/removal/
dismissal/compulsory retirement etc. as per Schedule ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’ and
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‘F”, thereby clearly fixing the responsibility on the DISCOMS like the
present appellant herein.
18. This judgment was severely criticized by the learned Senior Counsel
Shri P.P. Rao as well as Shri P.S. Patwalia. They firstly attacked the
procedural aspect of the matter. They pointed out that in the initial Writ
Petition i.e. WP (C) 2331/2004 by Shri K.R. Jain, the present appellant was
not a party and as such it had no opportunity to put its say. They pointed
out that in his judgment dated 23.03.2004, the Learned Single Judge, even
in the absence of the appellant, came to the erroneous finding that the
appellant was the successor-in-interest of the DVB. They then referred to
the two applications made on behalf of the appellant i.e. one for
impleadment and the second for recalling the order dated 23.03.2004 and
pointed out that by its order dated 23.03.2004 the Learned Judge was
pleased to recall his earlier order and held that the order dated 23.03.2004
would stand issued against the Delhi Power Company Ltd. i.e. the holding
company and the appellant would stand relieved of the Mandamus issued.
They referred to the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the Government of NCT
and the Delhi Power Company Ltd. (DPCL) which was entertained by the
High Court. It is obvious that in this LPA the appellant was impleaded as a
party. The contention raised is that instead of deciding the whole
controversy itself, the Division Bench should have remanded back the
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matter to the Single Judge giving the opportunity to the present appellant
to raise all the questions, and in proceeding straightaway to decide the
controversy involved, the Division Bench has caused injustice to the
appellant. The Learned senior counsel pointed out that this was done in
the absence of the pleadings inasmuch as, in the first instance, no written
statement was filed by the three impleaded respondents while there was
no question of filing the written submission on behalf of the present
appellant who was not a party to the said Writ Petition. Again, it is pointed
out that in the recall application, the respondents, namely, the Government
of NCT of Delhi and the DPCL had not filed any reply whatsoever so also
in LPA no opportunity was given to any of the parties to file pleadings with
respect to the claims made against the appellant herein.
19. The Learned Counsel also relied on Rules I and I-A of the Delhi High
Court rules for issue of various writs which require every application for the
issue of a direction to set forth all facts on which the relief is sought and to
file an affidavit in support thereof. Our attention was also invited to Rule 6
which requires filing of an answer to rule nisi and Rule 7 which provides for
ordering the rule nisi to be served on any party to be affected by any order
which the Court may make in the matter. It was pointed out that no such
applications were filed by the Government of NCT and DPCL claiming
relief against the appellant and the Division Bench had no jurisdiction to
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entertain the claim of both for the first time in their Letters Patent Appeal
No.98/2005. They, therefore, demanded remand on that basis.
20. There can be no dispute that the procedure in this case was slightly
unusual. There was no justification in the order of the Learned Single
Judge accepting a statement to the effect that the appellant herein was the
successor-in-interest of the DVB and then to fix the liability on the same
without even hearing the appellant. That was certainly incorrect in law as
well as in practice. However, once the recall application was made before
the learned Single Judge, the Learned Single Judge recalled its order and
proceeded to hold the DPCL responsible in place of the appellant, thereby
exonerating the present appellant completely. Once a Letters Patent
Appeal was filed against the order of the Learned Single Judge to that
effect, it would have been in the fitness of things for the Division Bench to
remand the matter back, perhaps issuing the direction that a de novo
hearing should be done after impleading the NDPL in their initial pleadings.
But that was not done. In stead, the Division Bench gave an opportunity to
the appellant herein to file their written submissions. We find these written
submissions on record. Very significantly, however, in the written
submissions, the appellant herein has not insisted on remand on the
technical issue of the absence of pleadings and the loss of opportunity to
it. In stead, detailed submissions were filed predominantly raising the
25
question that the appellant-NDPL was not in any way liable to pay for the
past liability of the retired employees who were not the employees on the
date of transfer. In the said written submission, the appellant has taken a
complete survey of the relevant provisions of DERA and the Transfer
Scheme Rules, 2001 and every effort was made to show from the said
proceedings that the NDPL could not be made liable for the dues, if any, of
the retired employee who was not on the rolls on the date of transfer.
21. We have seen these submissions very carefully only to find that this
question was not raised. The order of the Division Bench is also silent
about any such procedural question having been raised by the appellant.
Perhaps, had such question been raised, the Division Bench would have
been justified in remanding the matter to the Learned Single Judge for
deciding all the issues afresh after joining the NDPL as a party to the
original petition. The question not having been raised before the High
Court, cannot be considered at this stage of litigation when much water
has flown under the bridge. Considering the submissions before the
Division Bench which are in extenso, it is difficult to accept the contention
that any prejudice was caused to the appellant. On the other hand, the
question of liability seems to have been thrashed very minutely in the light
of the provisions of the DERA, the Transfer Scheme, Rules, Tripartite
Agreements and the other agreements including the bid documents. If all
26
this is insufficient, we do not find this question to have been raised in the
present appeal also. The contention raised is, therefore, rejected.
22. Shri Rao and Shri Patwalia then urged that the whole scheme of
disinvestment brought in by the DERA, 2000 was based on the consent of
the interested private parties. The Act had postulated joint venture
companies with private investment and participation to take over the task
of entire distribution of electricity. For that purpose, bids were invited and
the terms of the transfer were settled by mutual consent taking note of the
Tripartite Agreements and the bid agreement and it was then that the
scheme was notified in the shape of Rules under the Act. Under such
circumstances, there can be no further amendment to the scheme
involving additional liability which has to be essentially only with the
consent of the partners of the joint venture.
23. We have absolutely no quarrel with this proposition. However, this
could be true if there was no “additional liability” brought in. For the
reasons which follow, we do not think that in clothing the NDPL with a
liability regarding the personnel who were retired, compulsorily retired or
otherwise dead, dismissed etc. could be termed as “additional lilability.” In
fact the reading of the Rules and, more particularly, Rule 6(8) would
indicate that liability was innate and accepted by the DISCOMS.
27
24. Reliance was made on Sections 15 (1) and, more particularly, sub-
Section (6) and (7) by Shri Rao. That Section deals with the subject of
reorganisation of DVB and transfer of properties, functions and duties.
Sub-rule (6) refers to the transfer scheme while sub-section (7) specifically
provides that the obligations incurred by the Board or companies
established under Section 14 or generating company or distribution
company before a transfer scheme becomes effective shall, to the extent
specified in the relevant transfer scheme, be deemed to have been
incurred, entered into or done by, with or for the government or the
transferee. Section 16 deals with the provisions relating to the transfer of
personnel. Shri Rao tried to contend that, therefore, for resolution of the
controversy, transfer scheme alone would have to be considered in the
light of the provisions of the Act. He is, no doubt, correct. However, in
order to show that the transfer scheme does not contemplate such
liabilities as are in question, Shri Rao relied on Rule 3(1). In our opinion,
Rule 3(1) has got nothing to do with such liabilities. That Rule is
independent of Rule 3(2) which reads as under:
“Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to rights, responsibilities and obligations in respect of the personnel and personnel related matters, which have been dealt in the manner provided under Rule 6.”
28
25. By necessary reference, therefore, Rule 4 would also be pushed to
the background as that Rule specifically relates to the assets and liabilities
and proceedings transferred to the Government under sub-Rule (1) of Rule
3. Therefore, Rule 4 (a) to (g) would have no application whatsoever when
it comes to consideration of the liability in question of personnel and
personnel related matters. For that matter, even Rule 5 would be of no
consequence for such matters as it specifically provides that all the rights,
responsibilities and obligations in respect of personnel and personnel
related to matters have been dealt with in Rule 6 alone. The reliance of
the learned counsel on Rules 4 and 5 is, therefore, uncalled for. The only
relevant Rule which would have to be considered for this purpose is Rule 6
which is a complete code by itself in relation to personnel and personnel
related matters. The words used in Rule 3(2), namely, personnel related
matters are sufficiently broad to take into their sweep the matters regarding
the retired, dismissed or dead personnel also. Rule 6(8) which we have
already quoted but would repeat again for the ready reference is as under:
“(8) Subject to sub-rule (9) below, in respect of all statutory and other schemes and employment related matters, including the provident fund, gratuity fund, pension and any superannuation fund or special fund created or existing for the benefit of the personnel and the existing pensioners, the relevant transferee shall stand substituted for the Board for all purposes and all the rights, powers and obligations of the board in
29
relation to any and all such matters shall become those of such transferee and the services of the personnel shall be treated as having been continuous for the purpose of the application of this sub-rule.”
26. The language is extremely clear. It not only specifies the
employment related matters but also clarifies what those matters would be
which include pension and any superannuation fund or special fund
created or existing for the benefit of the personnel and the existing
pensioners. The words ‘existing pensioners’ are extremely important. A
plain reading of this Rule would leave no manner of doubt in respect of the
liability having been transferred to transferee company and the NDPL is
certainly the one. The language is broad enough to include all dismissed,
dead, retired and compulsorily retired employees. As if that was not
sufficient, sub-Rule (9) requires the Government to make appropriate
arrangements in terms of the Tripartite Agreements in regard to the fund of
terminal benefits to the extent it is unfunded on the date of transfer from
the Board. Rule 9(a) and (b) are also very significant and are as under:
“9. The Government shall make appropriate arrangements as provided in the tri-partite agreements in regard to the funding of the terminal benefits to the extent it is unfunded on the date of transfer from the Board. Till such arrangements are made, the payment falling due to the existing pensioners shall be made by the
30
TRANSCO, subject to appropriate adjustments with other transferees.
“For the purpose of this sub-rule, the term-
(a) “existing pensioners” mean all the persons eligible for the pension as on the date of the transfer from the Board and shall include family members of the personnel as per the applicable scheme; and
(b) “terminal benefits” mean the gratuity, pension, dearness and other terminal benefits to the personnel and existing pensioners.”
27. A glance at these sub-rules is sufficient to come to the conclusion
that the liabilities have undoubtedly been transferred to the DISCOMS
which include both NDPL as well as the BSES. A feeble argument was
raised that sub-rule (8) does not contemplate pension or any liability on
account of the revised pay-scale or interpretation of respective scheme of
promotion so far as existing pensioners or the erstwhile DVB are
concerned to the DISCOMS. Considering the broad language of the Rule,
we do not think that such contention is possible.
28. Again relying on Rule 2 (r) it was feebly tried to be suggested that
the DISCOMS were not the only transferees but it was also the holding
company, namely, the Delhi Power Company Ltd (DPCL). The argument
is obviously incorrect as no employees were ever transferred to the DPCL.
All transferees came only to the DISCOMS like the NDPL under the
31
transfer scheme. The High Court has correctly interpreted these Rules
and has correctly come to the conclusions that the liabilities would rest with
the DISCOMS including NDPL and BSES.
29. The learned counsel next contended that the High Court had erred
in interpretation of Rule 8(3) of the transfer scheme. It was urged that if
the Rule is construed widely, it will be arbitrary and affect the foundation of
the privatisation which is mutual agreement. We do not think so. On the
other hand, the purpose of sub-Rule (3) is to cap any liability arising out of
litigation, suits, claims etc. either pending on the date of transfer and/ or
arising due to events prior to the date of transfer to be borne by the
relevant DISCOM 1, DISCOM 2 or DISCOM 3, respectively. However, it
will be subject to a maximum of rupees one crore per annum and any
amount above this shall be to the account of the holding company and,
even for any reason the Commission does not allow the amount to be
included in the revenue requirements of the DISCOMS. The language is
extremely clear. All that it obtains is capping of the liability. However, the
nature of the liability and its being imposed on the DISCOMS alone is as
clear as sunshine. To that extent, there can be no doubt that it includes all
the liabilities including the liabilities on account of the personnel. Unlike
Rule 3, Rule 8 (3) does not make any difference between the liabilities
32
arising out of the transfer under Rule 4 or the liabilities contemplated in
Rule 6. The contention is clearly incorrect.
30. It was suggested that the non obstante clause in Rule 8(3) if widely
construed, would render the clause unconstitutional. We do not think that
the clause can be rendered unconstitutional in any manner. The language
is clear, unambiguous and must be given its natural meaning. If such a
meaning is given, we do not think that any other interpretation is possible
except the one rendered by the High Court. Shri Rao and Shir Patwalia
relied on paragraphs 28 and 29 of the reported judgment in M.
Rathinaswami & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. [2009 (5) SCC
625]. In the said paragraphs, it is reiterated that in order to save a statutory
provision from the vice of unconstitutionality sometimes a restricted or
extended interpretation of the statute has to be given. Since we don’t
agree that the clause can be rendered unconstitutional in any manner, in
our opinion, the judgment is not apposite.
31. Similarly reliance was made by Shri Rao on ICICI Bank Ltd. v.
SIDCO Leathers Ltd. & Others [2006 (10) SCC 452], Ramdev Food
Products (P) Ltd.v. Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel [2006 (8) SCC 726],
Madan Mohan Pathak & Anr. v. Union Of India & Ors.[1978 (2) SCC
50], Venture Global Engineering v. Satyam Computer Services Ltd. &
Anr. [2008 (4) SCC 190] and Shin-EtsuChemical Co. Ltd. v. Aksh
33
Optifibre Ltd. & Anr. [2005 (7) SCC 234]. We have absolutely no quarrel
with the principles in all these reported decisions. However, since the
constitutionality of Rule 8(3) cannot be doubted under any circumstances,
all these decisions do not apply to the present controversy. We must,
however, point out that the capping of the liability of one crore of rupees
was at the instance of the DISCOMS only. They were more aware of the
language brought in. They were also aware of the liabilities which arose,
particularly, in view of Rule 6 (8) and they had open eyedly accepted Rule
8(3). They cannot now find fault with the constitutionality of the provisions.
32. It was tried to be suggested by Shri Rao, learned Senior Counsel
that under Section 15(1) of the Act, any property, interest in property, rights
and liabilities which immediately before the effective date belonged to the
Board, stood vested in the Government with effect from the date on which
the Transfer Scheme came into existence by way of its publication. It was
also suggested that under sub-Section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, it was
for the Government to transfer such property and interest in the property,
rights and liabilities to any company established under Section 14 of the
Act. It was then tried to be urged that such transfer of undertaking has
been taken care of in Rule 5 of the Transfer Scheme Rules, 2001. It was
then pointed out that as per the Schedules, the transfer was effected and
in case of the present appellant, the transfer was effected as per Schedule
34
‘F’. The learned Senior Counsel very earnestly suggested that this was all
that was transferred and, therefore, a liability which was not covered under
Schedule ‘F’ could not be said to have been transferred to the appellant. It
was then pointed out by reference to Rule 2(t) that ‘undertaking’ includes
“wherever the context so admits the personnel”. It was, therefore, urged
that the personnel transferred to the appellant company were only the
ones who were included in the lists. It was also suggested that under Rule
2(r), the ‘transferee’ includes not only DISCOMS, like the present
appellant, but also the Holding company like Delhi Power Company
Limited. It was, therefore, urged that considering the provisions of Rule 5
read with Rule 2(r), 2(t), Schedules ‘F’ and ‘G’, was be all and end all of
the matter. It was urged that in the absence of any liability allocated to
DISCOM 3 in Schedule ‘F’ and in terms of para 2 of Schedule ‘G’,
allocating of residuary liabilities to the Holding company, the liability in
respect of existing pensioners would devolve on the Holding company, i.e.
DPCL and not on the present appellant. The argument is clearly incorrect.
We have already pointed out that Schedule ‘F’ cannot be read as the
exhaustive list of transfers as regards the assets and liabilities. This is
because of the peculiar language of Rule 3(1) and Rule 3(2). Rule 3(2)
very specifically provides that in the matter of personnel and personnel
related matters, Rule 3(1) would be of no consequence. What is provided
in Rule 4, on which the heavy reliance was being placed, is relatable to
35
Rule 3(1) alone. Same logic applies to Rule 5, which provides for transfer
of undertaking. It flows only from Rule 4. A reading of Rule 5 and, more
particularly, Clauses (a) to (g) of Rule 5(1) correspond to Clauses (a) to (g)
in Rule 4(1). Rule 4(1) is again specific and takes into sweep only sub
Rule (1) of Rule 3. It is very clear that Rule 3(2) makes all the difference
and in the clearest possible language, Rules 4 and 5 relate to the assets,
liabilities and proceedings covered only under Rule 3(1). Rule 5 also has
to be read in that context.
33. The transfer of personnel and all the principles, therefore, are
governed by Rule 6 alone. As provided in Rule 6(2), there are lists
wherein the personnel have been classified into five groups based on the
principle of “as is where is”, where a specific reference is to be found to
GENCO, TRANSCO and three DISCOMS. Very significantly, there is no
reference to DPCL. Thus, no employee was transferred to DPCL. This is
in case of the existing employees. Sub Rule (8), however, takes into
sweep not only the existing employees, who find the reference in the lists
prepared under Rule 6(2), but also makes a reference to the employment
related matters including provident fund, gratuity fund, pension and any
superannuation fund or special fund created or existing for the benefit of
personnel and the existing pensioners. There was no question of existing
pensioners being covered under the lists prepared under Rule 6(2). By
36
using the words “existing pensioners” and by providing that the relevant
transferee would stand substituted for the Board for all purposes and all
the rights, powers and obligations of the Board in relation to any and all
such matters, the legislative intention is very clearly displayed to the effect
that the existing pensioners on the day of transfer were also covered and
stood transferred to the DISCOMS and not to DPCL and it is only the
transferee DISCOM, who would substitute for the Board. Once these
Rules are read in proper perspective, there is hardly any doubt about the
liability of DISCOMS in respect of existing pensioners on the day of
transfer. There can be no dispute that those who retired and those who
were serving with the Board would stand transferred in respect of their
liabilities etc. to the successor company, i.e. DISCOM-3. The High Court
has correctly appreciated this position.
34. This takes us to the next contention of Shri Rao and Shri Patwalia
that the decision given by the Government on such liability was without any
authority or non est in the light of the provisions of the Act and the Rules.
In that behalf, Shri Rao, Learned Senior Counsel invited our attention to
Rule 12(1), whereunder a finality is given to the decision of the
Government in respect of any doubt, dispute, difference or issue as
regards the transfers under these Rules. The Rule provides that under
any such eventuality, the decision of the Government shall be final subject
37
to the provisions of the Act. Sub Rule (2) of Rule 12 provides that the
Government may, by order, publish in the Official Gazette, make such
provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, which provisions
may appear to be necessary for removing the difficulties arising in
implementing the transfers under these Rules. Section 57 of the Act is
also clear and provides power to the Government to remove any
difficulties. However, there is a rider to the effect that no such order to
remove difficulties could be made by the Government after expiry of two
years from the date of commencement of the Act. It is also provided by
sub-Section (2) of Section 57 that every such order after it is made shall be
laid before the Legislative Assembly. Heavily relying on Section 57, Shri
Rao and Shri Patwalia, learned Senior Counsel contended that the
Government’s power to make any such order had already come to an end
with the expiry of two years after the date of notification. This argument
and the reliance of the Learned Senior Counsel on Section 57 can be
understood, as in this matter, the Government has issued the letter dated
21.01.2004 i.e. after more than two years of the relevant date. This letter
is authored by one Shri Y.V.V.J. Rajashekhar, Deputy Secretary (Power)
and is addressed to Delhi TRANSCO Ltd. which is a 100 per cent
Government company. The subject thereof is removal of doubts, disputes
and differences under the provisions of Delhi Electricity Reforms (Transfer
Scheme) Rules, 2001 and issue of clarificatory order of the Government
38
under Rule 12. It is an answer to the letter received from Delhi TRANSCO
Ltd. seeking clarifications from the Government with respect to the
competent authority/new entity to deal with vigilance/ disciplinary/court
cases in relation to the employees of erstwhile DVB who could not become
part of any of the companies on 01.07.2002 in terms of the Delhi Electricity
Reforms (Transfer Scheme) Rules, 2001. In that, a reference was made in
the second paragraph to Section 6 of the Act read with Section 15 and 16
of the DERA read with Rule 12 of the Delhi Electricity Reforms (Transfer
Scheme) Rules, 2001. It was then conveyed that being empowered by the
directions issued vide No.11 (94)/2003/Power/103 dated 09.01.2004, it is
clarified that the vigilance, disciplinary and Court cases in respect of the
employees of the then DVB who could not become part of any of the
companies, namely, DPCL, Delhi TRANSCO, Indraprastha Power
Generation Co. Ltd., BSES Yamuna Power Ltd., BSES Rajdhani Power
Ltd. and NDPL on 01.07.2002 i.e. on the date of restructuring due to
retirement/dismissal/ removal/compulsory retirement shall be processed
and decided by such company which would have been the controlling
authority of the employee but for their
retirement/dismissal/removal/compulsory retirement etc. as per Schedule
‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’ and ‘F’ of the Delhi Electricity Reforms (Transfer Scheme)
Rules, 2001. It is absolutely clear that by this letter the whole liability was
put on the head of the DISCOMS. The appellant is only one of the
39
DISCOMS who would have been the controlling authority of the employees
had those employees continued.
35. This position was, however, opposed by the Learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants pointing out the two earlier letters i.e. a letter
dated 17.09.2002 authored by one Shri Jagdish Sagar, Principal Secretary
(Power) to DISCOM 1 and DISCOM 2 as also the subsequent Office Order
dated 30.09.2002 issued by one G. Srinivas, Administrative Officer (G) of
Delhi Power Supply Ltd. In the aforementioned letter dated 17.09.2002,
Shri Jagdish Sagar, Principal Secretary (Power) had informed one Shri
Chalasani, Chief Executive Officer, BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. that a copy
of the advice of the Law Department of the Delhi Government which had
been accepted by the Government was enclosed with that letter. Amongst
the other liabilities, Part II of this Government decision concerns the
liabilities relating to distribution, business for the tasks undertaken in the
period immediately before the date of transfer but payment against which
would have been made after the date of transfer.
36. A question has been posed in the following form:
“Whether the DISCOMS are under obligation to discharge liabilities in respect of any works completed or liabilities incurred in respect of staff pertaining to the period before 30.06.2002 on the basis that such payments are normally made in the month of July?”
40
Answer to this question is to be found to have been given in the
negative. Learned Senior Counsel insists that the words in the question
regarding the liabilities incurred in respect of staff pertaining to the period
before 30.06.2002 would clearly show that the Government had taken a
decision that such liabilities could not be put on the head of the DISCOMS
and, therefore, it was clearly the liability of the holding company in terms of
the answer given to this question. Learned counsel further pointed out that
in pursuance of that, a further Office Order came to be issued under the
signatures of one Shri G. Srinivas, Administrative Officer on 30.09.2002 in
the following manner:
“Consequent upon unbundling of DVB, a doubt has been raised by Finance Department regarding payment of arrears of pay and allowance to retired employees to which company has to pay the same.
It is now clarified that all such liabilities of erstwhile DVB have been transferred to the Holding Company as per Transfer Scheme Rule. Therefore, such payment of arrears pay and allowances to the retirees on account of revision of pay/court orders, etc. for the period up to 30.06.2002 i.e. prior to unbundling of DVB will be borne and paid by the Holding Company.
All such claims will be prepared by APO(B) concerned and after duly auditing the same, will be forwarded to Holding Company for effecting the payment.”
37. Now relying on this office order very heavily, Learned Senior
Counsel pointed out that the liabilities would be only that of the holding
41
company and not of the DISCOMS, like the appellant herein. In our
opinion, the argument is clearly incorrect. Firstly, a query made and
answered in the letter dated 17.09.2002 does not, in our opinion, pertain to
the liability which is in question. The query is simple and it raises a
question, whether, if any, work is completed or liabilities are incurred in
respect of the staff pertaining to period before 30.06.2002, in which case
the payments have to be made in the month of July, would the DISCOMS
be under obligation to discharge such liability. The liability covered under
second query, does not, in our opinion, take into its sweep the liabilities
like the present liability. The answer which was provided when construed
closely would bring about the following:
“This interpretation is further supported by the provision in Schedule ‘G’ by which all the receivables from sale of power to the consumer of the erstwhile Board other than to the extent specifically included in schedules D, E and F shall be to the account of the Holding Company. The Schedule ‘G’ further goes on to say that the DISCOMS will be authorized to release the receivable of the holding company and it is apparently for that reason they retain its 20 % share in such receivables as are collected, which are over and above the amounts included in Schedule D, E and F in respect of which no such share in the nature of collection charges is payable. It would not be reasonable to interpret the rules as assigning the liabilities for any period to the company which was not also entitled to the receivables pertaining to the same period, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary. Therefore, my answer to the first question is in the negative.”
42
In our opinion, therefore, the reliance on this would be uncalled for.
38. The office order dated 30.09.2002 is undoubtedly clear in support of
the appellants. However, this office order does not show on what basis
this was issued and under what authority. This seems to have been
issued by an Administrative Officer of the DPCL. However, the last letter
dated 21.01.2004 which has been issued by the Deputy Secretary (Power)
very clearly spells out the liability and the said decision has the authority of
Section 60 read with Section 15 and 16 read with Rule 12 of the Transfer
Scheme Rules. It has superseded the earlier direction dated 09.01.2004.
However, it has not been made available to us. Be that as it may, the
clarification is more than clear which puts the responsibilities of the
erstwhile staff on the DISCOMS.
39. It was tried to be argued that under Section 57 of the Act such
decision could not be taken after two years of the transfer. This argument
is clearly incorrect. Section 57 operates in entirely different sphere. It
speaks about the power of the Government to remove doubts. It is the
power to make provisions for the smooth operation of the Act and the
Rules which have to be brought into effect by passing orders which are
required to be published in the Official Gazette and such orders would then
be given effect by making provisions which are not inconsistent with the
Act. It is for such kind of orders that the Rules apply. What is referred to
43
in the aforementioned decision is in pursuance of the power of the
Government to make rules under Section 60 pertaining to Section 15 and
16 of the Act. It was tried to be argued that even if Section 60 was referred
to in the aforementioned order, such rules had to be notified.
40. It is then argued that Section 60 does not empower rule making by a
letter. It was also suggested that the letter dated 21.01.2004, the purpose
of which was mentioned as ‘removal of doubts’ which could not only be
done by Section 15 of the Act and, therefore, that was not question of the
letter being effective, particularly, because it has been passed after two
years of the relevant date and would clearly be hit by provision of Section
57 which does not empower any rules to be made after two years of the
date of transfer. Learned Senior Counsel, therefore, very heavily relied on
this Section, which argument, in our opinion is incorrect. There is a clear
reference made to Rule 12 which runs as under:
12. Decision of Government-Final:
(1) If any doubt, dispute, difference or issue shall arise in regard to the transfers under these rules, subject to the provisions of the Act, the decision of the government thereon, shall be final and binding on all parties.
(2) The government may by order published in the Official Gazette, make such provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, as may appear to be necessary for removing the difficulties arising in
44
implementing the transfers under these rules.”
41. It must be said that the powers under sub-Rule (1) and (2) are of
different kinds. The finality of the Government decision is writ large from
the provisions of sub-Rule (1) of Rule 12, while under the provisions of
sub-Rule (2), the Government has the power to make provisions by order
published in the Official Gazette. Therefore, in our opinion, the position
taken by the Government in the letter dated 21.01.2004 is clear and
doubtless.
42. One feeble argument was made that the Government had already
exhausted its power under Rule 12 (1) while taking the decision dated
17.09.2002 and, hence, it had lost the power to pass any fresh orders.
The argument is clearly incorrect. There can be no finality in the matter of
removal doubts or the removal difficulties and also taking the decisions
under Rule 12(1). The argument that once the Government has exercised
the powers under Rule 12(1), the power gets exhausted and the decision
becomes final and binding on all the parties, including the Government, is
clearly incorrect. The argument that there is no further power under Rule
in the Government to issue any letter dated 21.01.2004, is also an
incorrect argument. In our opinion, nothing stopped the Government from
taking any decision and it has taken a clearest possible decision by letter
45
dated 21.01.2004 which is binding on all the parties. This is apart from the
fact that the Government has not dealt with the subject in its earlier
decision dated 17.09.2002 as regards the controversy which has fallen for
consideration in this matter. It was in respect of other liabilities which were
covered by Schedules ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’ and ‘G’. We have already clarified that
those liabilities were different from the liabilities which arose on account of
the employees who could not become the employees of the DISCOMS on
the date of transfer due to their retirement, dismissal, death etc. In our
opinion, therefore, the view taken by the Delhi High Court is the correct
view. We have already clarified about the so-called Office Order dated
30.09.2002 which is overridden by the final decision taken by the
Government in its letter dated 21.01.2004.
43. On the overall consideration, we are of the clear opinion, that these
appeals do not have any merits and must be dismissed. There shall be no
order as to costs.
………………………………… …….J.
(V.S. SIRPURKAR)
………………………………………J. (SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)
New Delhi; May 3, 2010
46