REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 325 OF 2007

NISHAN SINGH …Appellant

  Versus

STATE OF PUNJAB        …Respondent

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 326 OF 2007

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 467 OF 2007

J U D G M E N T

S.B. SINHA,  J :

1. These Appeals arising out of a common judgment.

2. We would, at the outset, place on record that three trials were held

one after the other and the judgments therein were delivered also one after

the other in relation to an incident which took place one after the other but

wherefor only one First Information Report had been lodged.   

3. On or about 30th June, 1999 at 2.30 p.m.,  Rachhpal Singh along with

Sawinder  Singh  and  Hardev  Singh  had  an  altercation  with  one  Resham

Singh S/o Subeg Singh.  Rachhpal Singh inflicted a knife injury on the right

wrist and chest of Resham Singh.  He picked up the knife from which was

with  Pargat  Singh  II  S/o  Shangara  Singh  who  was  accompanying  him.

Resham   Singh  fell  down.    Hardev  Singh  and  Sawinder  Singh  also

allegedly inflicted ‘dang’ blows on Resham Singh.  An alarm  was raised by

Resham Singh’s  father Subeg Singh.  Resham Singh died on the spot.

The said incident is the subject matter of Criminal Appeal No. 326 of

2007.   

4. As   an off shoot to the murder of the said Resham Singh  for which

the  said  Rachhpal  Singh  was  tried  and  convicted,  another  incident  took

place on the same day.  Hardev Singh, Dilbagh Singh and Baljit Singh were

in their house when Savinder Singh came there armed with a gandasi and

started  hurling  abuses  on  them.   It  was  objected  to  by  Dilbagh  Singh.

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Sawinder Singh inflicted a gandasi blow on the head of Dilbagh Singh, who

purportedly in exercise of his right of private defence inflicted a blow on

Sawinder  Singh.   Pargat  Singh  –II  s/o  of  Shangara  Singh   who  was  a

witness  to  the  murder  of  Resham  Singh  arrived  there  with  his  brother

Mehal Singh.  Whereas   Pargat Singh –II  was armed with  a rifle,  Mehal

Singh came empty handed.  Baljit Singh allegedly climbed on the roof of a

nearby Gurudwara and started hurling brickbats.  A exhortation was given

by  Mehal     Singh     asking   Pargat   Singh-II  to  shoot  Baljit  Singh

whereupon a shot was fired by him hitting  the left shoulder of Baljit Singh.

He was brought to his house  in an injured condition.  Mehal Singh and

Pargat Singh-II are said to have run away from the said place of occurrence.

6. The third incident took place when brother of Baljit Singh, Hardev

Singh  and  Dilbagh Singh  (PW 4)  after  arranging  a  tractor  trolley were

proceeding  with  the  injured  persons  to  Amritsar.   The tractor  was being

driven  by Hardev  Singh.   When  they  were  passing  through  Jasraur  and

reached near the house of one Karaj Singh,  Pargat Singh-I s/o of Subeg

Singh, the appellant  in Criminal Appeal No. 467 of 2007, and    Nishan

Singh, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 325 of 2007, arrived.  They

were  accompanied  by Major  Singh.   Nishan Singh  is  said  to  have  been

armed with a .12 bore gun.  

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Pargat  Singh-I  exhorted  that  as  Hardev  Singh  had  murdered   his

brother  Resham   Singh,  he should not  be allowed to go alive.   Nishan

Singh fired a shot from his gun which hit Hardev Singh on  his left ear as a

result whereof the tractor went out of control and dashed against the  house

of  Jagtar Singh.    Hardev Singh died on the spot.   More shots were fired as

a result whereof Sudagar Singh, Chowkidar, and another person of Sheikh

Bhatti were injured.    Baljit Singh, Dilbagh Singh and the chowkidar  were

taken by Swaran Singh to  Guru Nanak Dev Hospital in a mini Bus.  A First

Information Report was recorded by the sub inspector Ajit Singh PW 11.   

8. Nishan  Singh   was  charged  for  commission  of  an  offence  under

Section 302 and 307 of IPC;  whereas  Pargat  Singh-I  was charged under

Section 307 and 302/34 IPC.  Major Singh was charged for commission of

alleged offence  under section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal

Code.   

9. Whereas  Nishan Singh was acquitted  of  the charges under Section

307 IPC, he was convicted for commission of the offence under Section 302

of the Indian Penal Code.  Pargat Singh-II was convicted for commission of

the offence under Section 302/34 and acquitted for commission of offence

under Section 307 IPC.  Major Singh was acquitted of the charges framed

against him.

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10. Originally,  however,  no  charge  sheet  was  filed  as  against  Pargat

Singh-I  PW1,  Swaran  Singh  was  examined  before  the  learned  Sessions

Judge in the Sessions Case on 12.9.2000.  On the basis of the statements

made  by  him,  an  application  was  filed  on  25th September,  2000  for

summoning   Nishan Singh on which was allowed.  

11. Upon appearance of Nishan Singh, fresh charges were framed against

all the three accused persons.   

12. Statement of PW 1 was recorded again and he was cross examined as

PW3.   Although  three  eye-witnesses  were  examined  on   behalf  of  the

prosecution,  the  learned  Additional  Sessions  Judge  did  not  place  any

reliance on the evidence of PW 5 constable Inder Singh.  Reliance has been

placed both by the Sessions Judge as also High Court on the testimonies of

PW3, Swaran Singh and PW4, Dilbagh Singh.   

13. Three appeals have been filed, two in relation to the 3rd incident and

one preferred by Rachhpal Singh in relation to first incident.

14. Mr.  Uma  Datta,  learned  counsel   appearing  on  behalf  of  the

appellants in Criminal Appeal No. 325 of 2007 and 467 of 2007, would,

inter alia, submit :   

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1) As after summoning Nishan Singh in terms of Section  319 of the

Code  of  Criminal  Procedure,  Swaran  Singh  was  not  examined-in-

chief  afresh  by  the  prosecution  and  was   only  tendered  for  cross

examination, the entire trial as against him became vitiated in law as

the provision contained in sub-section  4 of Section 319 of Code of

Criminal  Procedure was not  complied with,  which is  mandatory in

nature.  

2. The learned courts below committed a serious error in regard to the

identity of the appellants, namely, Pargat Singh who had nothing to

do with the first incident.   

3. The learned courts below failed to take into consideration the effect

of the deposition of  Sudagar Singh, chowkidar, who admittedly was

one of the persons injured in the incident as he categorically stated

that  neither  of  the  appellants  was  present   when  the  incident  took

place.

4. Although Nishan Singh was named in  the examination in chief  by

PW1, as in his cross examination he has attributed the overt act of

firing the shot to Pargat Singh-I, no case can be said  to have been

made out as against the appellant in Criminal Appeal No.325 of 2007.

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5. Reliance  placed  on  the  evidence  of  Dilbagh  Singh  by the  learned

courts below is wholly misplaced inasmuch as keeping in view the

nature of injuries suffered by him as was described by  D.W.2 Dr.

Gurmanjit  Rai,  evidently  he  was  not  in  a  position  to  witness  the

occurrence.   

6. The prosecution case being commission of overt acts of Pargat Singh-

I to extortion, the evidence of the prosecution that Nishan Singh had

fired a shot cannot be accepted.   

15. Mrs. Manjeet Chawla, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of  Rachhpal

Singh, the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 326 of 2007, submitted :

1) Having  regard  to the fact that the appellant was not armed with any

weapon and as he is  said to have snatched the knife from Pargat Singh –

II, he cannot be said to have any intention to cause the murder of Resham

Singh and, thus,  his conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal

Code is not sustainable.    

2) The statement of the witnesses having been recorded by the investigating

officer six hours after the incident, no reliance could have been placed

thereupon thereupon by the courts below.   

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3) All the prosecution witnesses examined in  the matter  being interested

witnesses, the Courts below misdirected themselves by placing explicit

reliance on them.   

4) The effect of acquittal of Sawinder Singh having not been considered by

the Courts below while appreciating the evidence brought on record by

the prosecution, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside.

16. Mr. Kuldip Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State,

on the other hand, submitted  

1. The judgment of acquittal in favour of Sawinder Singh was passed by

the learned sessions judge as no evidence could be brought on record

against him and inasmuch as the prosecution had established that it

was  appellant  Rachhpal  Singh  who  caused  all  the  injuries  upon

Resham Singh, there is no infirmity in the impugned judgments.  

2. It is incorrect to contend that Sawarn Singh was not examined again

after summoning of Nishan Singh.  As charges were framed on 30th

November 2001 and he was examined afresh on 5.9.2003 as PW3; the

requirements  of  sub-section  4  of  Section  319  were  fully  complied

with.   

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3. In any event, keeping in view the provisions contained in Section 465

of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the judgment of conviction should

not  be  reversed,  unless  a  real  prejudice  is  shown  to  have  been

suffered by the accused.    

4. Nishan Singh and Pargat Singh having been charged for commission

of an offence under Section 302/34 IPC and the same having been

established, it was not necessary to prove any specific overt act on the

part of each of them.  

5. There is nothing to show as to why the evidence of Dilbagh Singh

shall not be accepted inasmuch as he suffered a brain injury and was

examined by DW2 after three years of the incident.

17. Indisputably,  Nishan  Singh  and  Pargat  Singh-I  were  named in  the

F.I.R.  The first  informant   attributed overt  acts to them.  They had the

motive to commit the offence.  Offences were committed one after the other

with a view to take revenge.   

18. Nishan  Singh  however  was  not  charge  sheeted  for  reasons  best

known  to  the  investigating  officer.   PW -1  Sawinder  Singh’s   evidence

categorically attributed the role played by him in respect  of  the death of

Hardev Singh and causing injuries to Dilbagh Singh PW 4.   

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19. Deposition of PW 1 was recorded on 12.9.2000.  After summoning

Nishan Singh in terms of Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

charges were framed   afresh on 30th November, 2001.  He was examined in

chief again on 5.9.2003 as PW3.  It is, therefore, not correct to say   that he

was  not  examined  in  chief  afresh.   Requirements  of  sub-section  (4)  of

section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, therefore, have been complied

with in this case.   

Strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Datta on a decision of this

Court in  Shashikant Singh v.  Tarkeshwar Singh and Ors. [(2002) 3 SCR

400].  It was held therein :

“The intention of the provision here is that where in  the course of  any enquiry into,  or  trial  of,  an offence, it appears to the court from the evidence that  any  person  not  being  the  accused  has committed  any  offence,  the  court  may  proceed against  him for  the  offence which he appears  to have  committed.  At  the  stage,  the  court  would consider that such a person could be tried together with the accused who is already before the Court facing the trial. The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the proceedings right from the beginning have mandatory to  be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-heard. In short, there has  to  be  a  de  novo  trial  against  him.  The provision of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of a person so brought before the Court. It would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses  for  the  cross-examination  of  such  a person.  They have  to  be  examined  afresh.  Fresh examination  in  chief  and  not  only  their

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presentation  for  the  purpose  of  the  cross- examination  on  the  newly  added  accused  is  the mandate  of Section  319(4).  The words  'could be tried together with the accused' in Section 319(1), appear  to  be  only  directory.  'Could  be'  cannot under these circumstances be held to be 'must be'. The provision cannot be interpreted to mean that since  the  trial  in  respect  of  a  person  who  was before the Court has concluded with the result that the newly added person cannot  be tried together with the accused who was before the Court when order under Section  319(1) was passed, the order would  become  ineffective  and  inoperative, nullifying the opinion earlier formed by the Court on the basis of evidence before it  that the newly added  person  appears  to  have  committed  the offence resulting in an order for his being brought before the Court.”

20. In  that  case,  two  separate  trials  were  held  in  the  sense  that  the

examination in chief and the cross examination of the prosecution witnesses

were over, when the trial restarted.  It was in that factual matrix, this court

laid down the afore-mentioned proposition of law.  

Sub-section 4 of Section 319 Cr.P.C., however, must be read with the

residuary  provision  contained  in  of  Section  375  thereof.   Complaint  in

regard  to  non  compliance  of  statutory  provisions  must  be  made  at  the

earliest opportunity.  When a judgment is pronounced; a case must be made

out  that  by  reason  of  a  procedural  irregularity,  failure  of  justice  has

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occurred. Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeks to achieve a

salutary principle.   

21. What would constitute ‘failure to justice’ came up for consideration

before this Court in  State of Madhya Pradesh v.  Bhooraji & Ors. [(2001) 7

SCC 679], wherein, inter alia, it was held that   :

“We conclude that  the trial  held by the Sessions Court reaching the judgment impugned before the High Court in appeal was conducted by a court of competent  jurisdiction  and  the  same  cannot  be erased  merely on account  of  a  procedural  lapse, particularly  when  the  same  happened  at  a  time when the law which held the field in the State of Madhya Pradesh was governed by the decision of the  Full  Bench  of  the  Madhya  Pradesh  High Court.”

In  Dr. M.C. Sulkunte v.  State of Mysore [AIR 1971 SC 508], this

Court held :

“It has been emphasized in a number of decisions of this Court that to set aside a conviction it must be shown that there has been miscarriage of justice as a result of an irregular investigation.”

22. In Central Bureau of Investigation v.  V.K. Sehgal & Anr. [(1999) 8

SCC 501], it was held :

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“10. A court of appeal or revision is debarred from reversing a finding (or even an order of conviction and  sentence)  on  account  of  any  error  or irregularity  in  the  sanction  for  the  prosecution, unless  failure  of  justice  had been occasioned on account  of  such  error  or  irregularity.  For determining whether want of valid sanction had in fact occasioned failure of justice the aforesaid sub- section (2) enjoins on the court a duty to consider whether the accused had raised any objection on that score at the trial stage. Even if he had raised any such objection at the early stage it  is hardly sufficient  to  conclude  that  there  was  failure  of justice. It has to be determined on the facts of each case.  But an accused who did not  raise  it  at  the trial  stage  cannot  possibly  sustain  such  a  plea made for the first time in the appellate court.”

 It was observed :

“11. In a case where the accused failed to raise the question of valid sanction the trial would normally proceed  to  its  logical  end  by  making  a  judicial scrutiny of the entire materials. If that case ends in conviction there is no question of failure of justice on  the  mere  premise  that  no  valid  sanction  was accorded  for  prosecuting  the  public  servant because  the  very  purpose  of  providing  such  a filtering check is to safeguard public servants from frivolous or mala fide or vindictive prosecution on the allegation that they have committed offence in the discharge of their official duties. But once the judicial filtering process is over on completion of the  trial  the  purpose  of  providing  for  the  initial sanction  would  bog  down  to  a  surplusage.  This could be the reason for providing a bridle upon the appellate  and  revisional  forums  as  envisaged  in Section 465 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.”

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It does not appear that even any contention was raised in that behalf.  

{See also State of Haryana v. Ram Singh [2002 (1) SCR 208]}.   

However,  in  view of  the  factual  matrix  obtaining  herein,  it  is  not

necessary to delve deep into the said question as in this case the statutory

requirements have been complied with.   

23. The  Courts  below have  clearly  noticed  the  supportive  role  Pargat

Singh-I and Pargat Singh-II.  They have proceeded on that basis.  Whereas

Pargat  Singh-II  was  connected  with  the  first  occurrence,    the  appellant

Pargat Singh-I was connected with the third occurrence with which we are

concerned  herein.   The  courts  below  had  not  committed  any  mistake

whatsoever in that behalf.  

34. The fact that the injured persons were being removed to a hospital in

a tractor trolley is not in dispute.  It is also not in dispute that as a result of

being hit by a shot fired by Nishan Singh, the tractor dashed into the wall of

Jagtar  Singh’s  house  and  the  got  damaged.   Sudagar  Singh  who  was  a

Chowkidar was also injured in the incident.

25. Both the appellants herein had been named in the FIR.  They were

tried together.  Evidently, they came at the spot with a common intention.

Both  of them  had weapon in their hands.   The prosecution witnesses had

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to take the injured Dilbagh Singh to the hospital by arranging a mini bus.

Whereas Baljit Singh died in the hospital, PW 4 Dilbagh Singh survived.   

26. The  First  Information  Report  was  lodged  at  8.30  p.m.  by  Subeg

Singh.  One First Information Report was lodged in respect of all the three

incidents.  Three murders, as noticed hereinbefore, took place one of after

the other.  Some other persons also received injuries.  When three instances

occurred one after the other, keeping in view the fact that each had a link

with the other, it  is  difficult  for us to know that the appellants would be

falsely implicated by Subeg Singh whose son was one of the deceaseds.    

27. It  has not  been denied  or  disputed  that  Pargat  Singh-I  and Nishan

Singh had a motive to commit the offence.   

It is true that Sudagar Singh had stated that he could not identify the

assailants, but no reliance can be placed on the said statement that the death

of Hardev Singh was caused by a gunshot injury is not denied by Sudagar

Singh.  He was a prosecution witness.  He was given up by the prosecution

presumably on the basis that he had been won over.  

Strangely, the Public Prosecutor did not confront him with his earlier

statements.   It  demonstrates  how  poorly  the  prosecution  case  was

conducted.

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28. Dilbagh  Singh  is  an  injured  witness.   He  has  given  a  complete

account of the entire occurrence.  We do not see any   reason to disbelieve

his testimony.  He had been put to stringent cross examination.  Even no

suggestion was made to him that he could not have witnessed the incidence.

If it was within the knowledge of the defence that Dilbagh Singh was not in

a  position  to  speak about  the  occurrence,  he  should  have  been accosted

therewith.    He could have given an explanation.  If his being  carried  to

the hospital in an injured condition is accepted and if furthermore it stands

established that all injured persons were brought to the hospital  together, it

is  difficult  to  accept  the  contention  of  the  learned  counsel  that  PW  4

Dilbagh Singh could not be present at the time when the occurrence took

place.  In his cross examination, Dilbagh Singh categorically stated that he

was fully conscious at the time of the death of Baljit Singh.   

29. DW  2,  Dr.   Gurmanjit  Rai  who  was  examined  on  behalf  of  the

defence in his deposition stated that he had examined Dilbagh Singh at 5.30

p.m on 2.7.1999 and to the said extent, he corroborated the statements PW1,

Rishi Ram and PW2 Dr. Ashok Chanana.   

30. Furthermore,  according  to  DW2,  he  examined  Dilbagh  Singh  on

2.7.1999.  How he could depose in regard to the condition of the patient as

on 13th June, 1999 is not known.  He declared the injury as grievous only

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after he received the report of the radiologist and that of the surgeon.  His

right upper  limb function was found to have been impaired.  

31. Reliance has been placed on Prem Sagar v. Dharambir & Ors. [(2004)

1 SCC 113] by Mr. Datta to contend that Section 34 of the Indian Penal

Code  is  not  attracted.   We are  not  in  a  position  to  agree  with  the  said

submission.  Both Pargat Singh-I and  Nishan Singh came together; at least

one of them armed with  a fire arm. One of them exhorted  and another

fired.   It is accepted by the defence  that at least one person was killed and

two other were injured in the said firing.  Evidently, more than one shot was

fired.   

32. The  question  is  as  to  whether  common  intention  was  formed  for

commission of an offence or not and it depends upon the fact of each case.   

It  was  in  the  factual  scenario  obtained  therein,  this  court  in  Prem

Sagar (Supra) opined that the accused was not proved to be linked in the

manner so as to bring the applicability of Section 34 of the Indian Penal

Code.  The common intention of the accused persons was not found to be

present therein, when the incident took place, in the backdrop of the facts of

the said case.  It was submitted that the court should be slow to interfere

with a judgment of acquittal.  {See Suresh & Anr. v. State of U.P. [(2001) 3

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SCC 673]  followed  in  Rotash v.  State  of  Rajasthan [2006  (13)  SCALE

186]}.

Reliance  has  also  been  placed  on  State  of  Haryana v.  Ram Singh

[(2002) 1 SCR 208]  wherein this Court held :

“While  it  is  true  that  the  law  is  well  settled  in regard  to  the  issue  that  in  an  appeal  against conviction  for  the  offence  of  murder  Supreme Court  would  be  rather  slow  to  intervene  in  the event  of there being a concurrent  finding of fact but  it  is  equally  settled  that  in  the  event  the finding, which suffers from the vice of perversity of  any  fundamental  rules  or  even  a  definite procedural  injustice  going  to  the  root  of  the prosecution case question of the Apex Court being slow in intervention would not arise.”

We  have  herein  proceeded  on  applying  the  principles  laid  down

therein.

34. So far as the case of Rachhpal Singh is concerned, it may be true that

no independent witness was examined.  But that by itself is not sufficient to

disregard the statements of the prosecution witnesses totally.   

PW3 Swaran Singh and PW 4 Dilbagh Singh were the eye-witnesses.

Both the Ld. Trial Judge as also the High Court considered their depositions

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in great details.  No contention has been raised that the said findings are in

any way perverse or not in conformity with the evidences or record.   

35. One of the accused may be acquitted as the prosecution witness might

not have attributed any overt act to him.  But it is well settled that acquittal

of  one  accused  itself  would  not  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  entire

prosecution case was false.

In Sukhdev Yadav & Ors. v.  State of Bihar [(2001) 8 SCC 86], this

Court held :

“It is now well-settled that the Court can sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses.  The evidence is to be considered  from  the  point  of  view  of trustworthiness and once the same stands satisfied, it  ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the Court to accept the stated evidence.”

It was further held by this Court while relying upon appabhai & Anr.

v. State of Gujarat [1988 Supp.1 SCC 241], that discrepancies which do not

shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded.

36. The deceased Resham Singh suffered as many as four injuries.  The

folllwing injuries have been shown in the autopsy report :  

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1) “An oblique  incised  wound  4  x  1.2 cm  with clotted blood was present on the front and right  side of chest, 7.00 cm below and  medical to right nipple at 4 O’ clock position.

2) An oblique incised wound 4.3 x 1.00 cm with clotted blood was present on the left infra scapular region.

3) An oblique incised wound 3 x 1.2 cm with clotted blood was present on the back and left  side of the chest,  7.00 cm below and medical to injury no.2.

4) A slashed incised wound 3.5 x 2.8 cm with clotted blood was present on the posterior lateral aspect of right wrist.”

37. The injuries were inflicted on the vital parts of the body and some of

them were sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death or likely to cause

death,   Part II of Section  304 of the Indian Penal Code shall have, thus, no

application in this case.  Rachhpal Singh might have been  unarmed,  but

with a view to inflict injury on the deceased,  he snatched the knife which

was  being  carried  by  Pargat  Singh-II.   Dilbagh  Singh  saw  the  entire

occurrence.  He examined himself as PW 4.  If a person snatches a weapon

carried by someone else and brutally kills another, it cannot be said that he

did not have any intention to cause death.  Whether the accused had any

intention to kill the deceased must be judged upon taking into consideration

the fact situation obtaining in each case.  {See Harendra Nath Mishra & Ors.

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v.  State  of  Bihar [JT  2002  (10)  SC  157]  relying  upon  Suresh (supra);

Ramashish Yadav v.  State of Bihar [(1999) 8 SCC 555];  Gajjan Singh v.

State of Punjab and Pandurang [(1976) 3 SCC 391];  Tukia and Bhillia v.

The State of Hyderabad [(1955) 1 SCR 1083]}.  [See also Rotash (Supra)]

The matter has been considered in some details by Vivian Bose J, in

Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1958 SC 465] wherein it was opined :

“In considering whether the intention was to inflict the injury found to have been inflicted, the enquiry necessarily  proceeds  on  broad  lines  as,  for example, whether there was an intention to strike at a vital  or a dangerous spot,  and whether with sufficient force to cause the kind of injury found to have been inflicted. It is, of course, not necessary to  enquire  into  every last  detail  as,  for  instance, whether the prisoner intended to have the bowels fall  out,  or  whether  he intended to  penetrate  the liver or the kidneys or the heart. Otherwise, a man who has no knowledge of anatomy could never be convict,  for,  if  he  does  not  know that  there  is  a heart or a kidney or bowels, he cannot be said to have intended to injure them. Of course, that is not the kind of enquiry. It is broad-based and simple and based on commonsense;  the kind of enquiry that  'twelve  good  men  and  true'  could  readily appreciate and understand.”

{See also Hari Yadav v. State of Bihar [2007 (14) SCALE 656]}

38. For the reasons above mentioned, there is no merit in these appeals,

which are hereby dismissed.  

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……………………..…J. [S.B. Sinha]

……………………..…J. [Harjit Singh Bedi]

New Delhi. March 7, 2008.

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